New Wine in Old Wineskins

Questioning the Value of Research Questions in Rhetorical Criticism

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Recent years have seen a trend toward the inclusion and heightened valuing of research questions in competitive Rhetorical Criticism (Communication Analysis). The inclusion of this content element is quite a new phenomenon on the national-level competitive circuit. In fact, the absence of such research questions in competitive speeches was highlighted by Ott as recently as 1998. But by 2007-2008, the inclusion of a research question was established as essentially de rigueur for a vast number of judges. For example, consider the ballots received this past year by a competitively successful rhetorical criticism entry I coached. At one tournament, all five ballots written in response to this speech (2 in Prelims, 3 in Finals) wrote the research question at the very top of the ballot. For four of the five judges, their assessment of the handling of this question was clearly central to the scores they assigned. Three questioned the quality of the question: (1) “this is a big question to ask based on this one incident,” (2) “Islamaphobia: relevant, but a bit out of the public consciousness (for a while now),” and (3) “your research question needs clearer, specific focus – you could apply it to many artifacts. How can you focus the question on this specific artifact?” The fourth judge meanwhile focused on the adequacy of the question’s answer, stating that the response needed to be “extended.” Ballot comments about this speech’s research question continued throughout the year – requiring this aspect of the speech to be the single most frequently rewritten and rethought aspect of the speech across the length of the competitive season.

To borrow language from many Persuasive speakers, “this is not an isolated incident.” As both a coach and a frequent tab-room worker, I have read innumerable ballots written by critics judging this event. Research questions have clearly become a crucial component in many judging paradigms. Given the precipitous rise of this speech component, it is important that we assess the nature and worth of emphasizing research questions in competitive rhetorical criticism. In order to do so, we will: first, establish a philosophical perspective from which to answer the question (we will privilege the vision of forensics as an “educational liberal art”); second, speculate about the reasons why this element has so quickly gained favor among judges; third, assess the degree to which this element meshes with other required elements of competitive speeches in this category; and fourth and finally, propose a paradigm shift.

A Philosophical Grounding

The philosophy we accept dictates the forensics world we build. Ott (1998) stresses this fact, opening his article with a quotation from Faules (1968), which states: “At some time during a teacher’s career his [sic] will be asked to explain why he [sic] is asking students to perform in a certain way or to carry out a particular task. His answer will determine whether he is an educator or [simply] a trainer, whether he himself is educated, and whether he has considered the reason for his beliefs. The educator knows the ‘why’ of what he does, and to him theory and conceptual knowledge take precedence over conditioned responses...Pedagogy is generated by theory, and theory comes from a philosophy which is grounded in certain values (p. 1).”

Perhaps the most popular metaphor used over the years to frame the discussion of forensics-as-education has been McBath’s “educational laboratory” (1975). For example, Burnett, Brand, and Meister (2003) point to Ulrich (1984) and Whitney (1997) as examples of community members who have relied on this metaphor. But while the laboratory metaphor can be interpreted in quite positive ways (particularly if we envision the laboratory as a place where exploration and risks are dared within a safe environment), this metaphor becomes problematic if we envision the laboratory as a site where “one right answer” (a single Platonic “Truth”) is envisioned as the ultimate end sought. Thus, Aden’s definition of forensics as a “liberal art” (1991) may be a more satisfying way to conceptualize the field. In any case, a significant numbers of scholars have stressed the significance of educational goals in forensics. Others, however, question this vision. Instead, some believe it is better described as a competitive playing field – a world in which education is an appealing shibboleth but competition is a full-blooded reality. Thus, Burnett, Brand and Meister (2003) title their article “Winning is Everything: Education as Myth in Forensics.” Providing an explanation for this title, they write: “current practices in forensics focus on competition and not on an often-referenced education model...although forensics can be viewed as both an educational and a competitive activity, the practice of competition co-opts education. In Burke’s terms, through the focus on com-
petition, we have developed a ‘trained incapacity’ to focus on the merits of education....Our training at
best blinds, and at the least clouds, the mythic “edu-
cational” virtues of the forensics community (p. 12).”

In the face of these two visions of our activity, this
eSSay is committed to a value paradigm which
asserts the primacy of educational values over com-
petitive values. While the activity undeniably is high-
ly competitive in nature, my concern is with what I see as the “ultimate justification” for forensics. The
position staked out here asserts that the value of fo-
rensics is massively diminished if it is defined pri-
marily as an act of competition. This is not to deny
that competitive is a powerful and valuable teacher
of many valuable concrete skills and mental perspec-
tives. However, I believe that competitive goals are
too often privileged to the detriment of more import-
ant ethical, practical, emotional, spiritual, and life-
learning educational goals. Thus, as applied to the
question at hand, this paper seeks to determine
whether or not the inclusion of research questions in
academic inquiry accordingly:

Why Have Judge-Critics Embraced
the Use of Research Questions?

The answers suggested here in response to this
question are at best speculative. I have not yet at-
tempted to gather any empirical data on this subject,
and so I am relying on informal conversations, a
reading of the extant literature, a study of various
ballots written by judges, and my own instincts in
order to reach my conclusions. Tentatively, I believe
that the circuit’s turn toward research questions is
based in part upon: (1) a general desire for change in
the event/activity, (2) a desire to deepen the level of
thinking (cognitive complexity) demanded by the
event, (3) a desire to connect students more deeply
to the scholarly traditions of our discipline, and (4) a
desire to clarify the extant judging criteria (an urge
for additional standardization).

First, humans desire change. While we appre-
ciate continuity and tradition, we also want to try
new things and take new paths. We need to believe
that we have new insights to offer, new discoveries to
make, new vistas to look out over, new roads others
have not seen before that deserve to be traveled.
When it comes to academia, schools periodically
create new “Five Year Plans” that project goals and
objectives for the future that will take them beyond
where they stand at present. Academic departments
periodically review their curricula and major/minor
tracks with an eye toward updating and enhancing
them. Instructors regularly rethink the individual
courses they teach, looking for ways (both minor and
major) to improve them. This general urge certainly
applies to the educational laboratory of forensics at
large as well as to the written and unwritten “rules”
the community employs in relation to the individual
speaking events. We do not want to “do the same
thing forever.” Nor do we need to. Nor should we. In
fact, even the quickest glance at the field of rhetori-
cal criticism as an academic discipline demonstrates
the need to evolve our practices. As noted by Foss
(1989, p. 71), the modern-day pursuit of rhetorical
criticism can be (in a certain sense) dated to its birth
in 1925 with the publication by Herbert A. Wichelns
of his article “The Literary Criticism of Oratory.” For
the next forty years or so, Neo-Aristotelianism con-
stituted the virtually singular track critics trod in
their work. But this all changed in the mid-1960’s,
triggered by the work of Edwin Black. As a field, we
discovered that there were a lot more ways to look at
rhetoric, a lot more tools available to dissect it, a lot
more questions to ask about it, and a lot more in-
sights to be derived from it. Today, rhetorical critics
revel in and rely on the freedom to study a vast array
of rhetorical artifacts from a plethora of perspec-
tives. These perspectives are typically grounded in
the work or other critics, but each work of criticism
is a unique blend of past knowledge, a particular
rhetorical artifact, and the unique insights of the
particular critic. No critic is “locked in” to the bound-
daries established by another. To a very meaningful
degree, each writer is free to write and rewrite the
rules they individually play by. Thus, as it relates to
competitive forensics, it makes sense that our com-
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Inquiry involves processes of systematic, disciplined ordering of experience that lead to the development of understanding and knowledge….Inquiry is focused; it involves a planned means or method and it has an expected outcome. The investigator is never sure of the exact outcome of inquiry and can anticipate only the general form or nature of the results. These scholars also share a general approach to inquiry that involves three stages. The first and guiding stage of all inquiry is *asking questions*. Gerald Miller and Henry Nicholson [1976], in fact, believe that inquiry is ‘nothing more…than the process of asking interesting, significant questions…and providing disciplined, systematic answers to them.’…the second stage of inquiry is *observation*….The third stage of inquiry is *constructing answers*. Here, the scholar attempts to define, to describe and explain, to make judgments. This stage, which is the focus of this book, is usually referred to as *theory*. (p. 9)

This general process substantially reflects the standardized outline we expect students to employ when writing competitive rhetorical criticism speeches today: ask a question, observe the phenomenon (apply a rhetorical method to a rhetorical artifact as a lens through which to view its properties), and then answer the question (derive critical conclusions). Thus, many judges may well believe that they are enhancing the education of the students they critique by requiring them to present clear and pointed research questions. In this context, the use of research questions is perceived by judge-critics as a valuable addition to the educational laboratory.

Third, as rhetorical scholars ourselves, we seek to pass on the knowledge of our field to our students. We want to aid them as they begin the journey toward becoming rhetoricians. Ott (1998) reminds us that “[t]he academic discipline of speech communication and the activity of intercollegiate forensics are natural allies….Collectively, these two traditions represent a unique intersection of theory and practice (p. 53).” Accordingly, LaMaster (2005) observes that “Rhetorical Criticism is modeled after academic rhetorical criticism” (p. 32). At some level, we hope and intend that participating in this competitive event will better prepare our students for possible future study in the discipline. The value of working with this event for students who are considering going on to graduate school is often stressed — and indeed, a significant number of forensics competitors ultimately pursue careers in the area of rhetorical scholarship.

A fourth reason also can be suggested as to why judge-critics have embraced the inclusion of research questions in competitive speeches. As participants in forensics, we feel a constant pressure toward higher levels of standardization. We want to be able to evaluate students as fairly as possible. We feel pressure to offer “mainstream” comments that demonstrate our understanding of and adherence to “unwritten rules” that enhance the do-ability of coaching and the predictability of results. As a rising number of our colleagues talk about and vote on the basis of research questions, the likelihood that we also will adopt this practice increases. Thus, it becomes even more important that we evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of this trend now, before it becomes even more deeply entrenched in our collective judging paradigm.

### Evaluating the “Fit” of the Research Question in the Practice of Competitive Rhetorical Criticism

In order to conduct this evaluation, it is essential to begin with Littlejohn’s preceding description of the inquiry process. By analyzing the progression he describes, we can observe that two critical concepts are central to it: (1) a linear time progression, and (2) a step-to-step freedom to make choices at any given stage of the process depending on what has happened in the preceding stage. I will argue that both of these essential components of the inquiry process are impossible to achieve in a genuine way within the current standardized rhetorical criticism model.

First, the inquiry process mandates that the research question pre-date the selection not only of the general body of theory the researcher employs (Marxism, feminism, or whatever) but also — and much more importantly — precedes the selection of the particular rhetorical tenets (“methodological elements” we often call them in forensics) the critic employs in relation to the general body of theory. Thus, the research question points the way to a general critical perspective, but does not immediately mandate the selection of particular “methodological constructs” (those appear later in the process). An extended quotation from Ott (1998) helps to clarify the point here:

> Modern textbooks on rhetorical criticism survey several methods. These methods are unified, not by a set of narrow rhetorical tenets, but by a general outlook. In *Rhetoric and Popular culture*, for instance, Brummett identifies five key methods: marxist, feminist and psychoanalytic, dramatistic/narrative, media-centered, and culture-centered. Brock, Scott, and Chesebro’s *Methods of Rhetorical Criticism* is organized around the methods of fantasy-theme, neo-Aristotelianism, dramatistic, narrative, generic, feminist, and deconstructionist. Similarly, Poss’s *Rhetorical Criticism* covers cluster, neo-Aristotelianism, fantasy-theme, feminist, generic, ideological, narrative, and pentadic….All of these methods exist, not as a narrow set of con-
trolling terms, but as a general perspective on discourse. Genre criticism generally examines the shared expectations created by classes of texts...and so forth. This scholarly view of method has two important consequences. First, each method can produce an infinitude of distinct, yet valuable analyses. A feminist criticism of a text, for instance, might look at repressed desire, or phallic representations, or sexist language, for there is no single, prescribed way to do feminist criticism. Second, any number of methods could be brought to bear on a single text, each yielding its own valuable insights. (p. 62, emphasis added)

Only after the critic selects her or his general method (their broad critical outlook) does she or he start to dissect the artifact, studying it closely in order to then identify the particular critical constructs that will be useful in order to dissect this particular artifact from this particular general stance. This brings us to the second key issue at stake in our discussion: the concept of intellectual freedom. To reiterate Ott once more, “a feminist criticism of a text, for instance, might look at repressed desire, or phallic representations, or sexist language, for there is no single, prescribed way to do feminist criticism” (p. 62, emphasis again added). The writer-critic must be free, based on their analysis of the rhetorical text at hand, to make choices about which specific rhetorical constructs will and will not be essential in order to unlock certain aspects of the text (not all aspects) from this particular critical angle, with no presumption being made that this is the “only” viable angle, or even necessarily the “best” angle. In fact, the words “only” and “best” are invalid and intellectually stunting descriptors of the task being attempted.

Rhetorical criticism, as practiced in competitive speeches, robs the research process of both its temporal flow and its intellectual freedom. We require that students model their work after that of a more “established” scholar. Accordingly, we require that they select “a model” and use only the tenets (steps, concepts, components) directly employed by that earlier scholar when that scholar analyzed some other artifact. Ott (1998) again illuminates this process, noting that “what passes as method in forensics is simply one critic’s analysis of a particular instance of discourse. Although scholarly critics use methods, such as the ideological perspective, their analyses are themselves not methods (pp. 62-62).” In other words, “feminism” is a “method” – but the particular concepts used by author Jane Doe to study the feminist aspects of Artifact One do not in and of themselves constitute a “rhetorical method.” The pitfalls inherent in this tendency to misdefine the word “method” are also noted by Ott, when he explains that any given author “identifies certain principles at work in the examined discourse, but those principles are not a method. They are the scholar’s critical observations, and when a student uses those observations as a method, the student critic is, in effect, pirating someone else’s critical observations concerning a specific rhetorical artifact and forcing those observations to account for another instance of discourse” (p. 63, emphasis added). Thus, by defining the phrase “rhetorical method” in this manner, the following holes in the intellectual process inevitably arise.

First, students become hopelessly tangled in the intellectual time-progression they should be following. They are unavoidably locked into an infinitely regressive circle of action. They cannot choose a question then choose a (general) rhetorical method then choose relevant constructs, because once they get to stage three (choosing relevant constructs) they discover that those concepts have already been chosen for them. They can’t choose constructs that fit their research question, especially as that question applies to the artifact they want to study. Instead, they must follow the lead of the earlier author. And that earlier author was trying to answer a particular research question of their own in relation to a particular artifact of their own choosing. Logically, the only way the student can coherently enter this circuit is to use the same research question the original author pursued, and to apply it to a rhetorical artifact that is as similar as possible to the original rhetorical artifact. Doing this is difficult at best and impossible in toto. And when the student tries to do anything else, the process disintegrates completely. How can they possibly answer a different question about a different artifact using the same constructs? Again, Ott explains this well: Competitive RC is still caught in the 1960s model of methodological pluralism. Although student criticisms are characterized by a wide variety of theories, the overall approach to RC continues to entail a narrow and reductionistic conception of methods and to be animated by method. In forcing a narrow set of principles gleaned from a specific rhetorical analysis to account for the rhetoric they are analyzing, student critics tend to fall into one of two traps. On the one hand, many students mangle a critic’s controlling principles until they fit the discourse they are analyzing. Some students, on the other hand, disfigure a discourse until it fits the controlling principles found in a published rhetorical analysis. Hence, students shred their artifact by ignoring language that does do [sic] not fit the method and by quoting textual fragments out of context to create a perfect correspondence between text and method. Competitive rhetorical criticisms tend to lack any real explanatory power because they force the practice to fit the theory, or the theory to fit the practice. (p. 65)
Locked into the use of another author’s “method” (as the term is misdefined), student’s must resolve the time-progression problem by abandoning the ideal of freedom. They must march lock-step with the author whose work they emulate. Thus, grasping one horn of the dilemma, students who seek to answer their artificially-duplicated research questions can only replicate the same answer discovered by the original author. The student can only produce “unimaginative and unenlightening criticism” (Ott, 1998, p. 63). The only alternative is to grasp the other horn of the conundrum and distort the tool and/or the artifact in a way which produces a “new answer” generated by critical misrepresentation. Neither horn is educationally appealing.

It is important to note that Ott observed this problem arising prior to our contemporary addiction to the research question. For him, it is generated by our misdefinition of the term “method” alone. And I agree with him. But I take the position here that this problem is significantly exacerbated by the movement toward including research questions. At an earlier time in our field’s history, students and coaches at some level “understood” that competitive RCs were inevitably emulative acts of learning. They have always been similar to the ancient practice of “learning by imitation.” This style of teaching has a long and respectable history in our field. It dates back to the school of speech founded by Isocrates in 392 B.C.E., at which students relied heavily on imitating models in order to develop their own skills (Golden, Coleman, Berquist and Sproule, 2003, p. 83). In the same way, competitive rhetorical criticism has long encouraged students to copy others first (rely on the clusters of critical terms recognized scholars in the field have shaped), learn from that, then go on to do more “original” work. But our demand that students use research questions (as well as the relatively recent escalation in the time allotted to “critical conclusions”) produces a significant shift in our mental imaging of the game. Students are now being told that they must produce original questions and reach original answers – but that they can only do so by using absolutely unoriginal clusters of critical concepts (“methods”) developed by somebody else to take some other intellectual journey. We are asking students to do the ultimately un-doable.

Proposing a Paradigm Shift

At least as recently as the early 1980’s, the typical competitive rhetorical criticism speech employed a largely “imitative” approach to the study of rhetorical theory. It relied on requiring students to imitate/emulate the critical process followed by established scholars in the field in order to learn through modeling. But in recent years, as we have de-emphasized the importance of detailed “application steps” and escalated the prominence of “critical conclusions,” as we have shifted away from canonical “mainstream” or “previously discussed” rhetorical artifacts and toward the study of artifacts typified by “recency, shock value, and obscurity” (Ott, 1998, p. 55), we have moved further and further away from a primarily imitative approach to writing competitive rhetorical criticisms and evolved toward a writing model that edges closer to the academic inquiry process. This evolution is clearly apparent in our recent efforts to graft the research question (an element central to the academic inquiry process) onto the competitive prototype. Accordingly, we are currently attempting (consciously or unconsciously) to reap the benefits of two quite different types of teaching/learning approaches: the “old” imitation-based style and an emerging “academic inquiry” style. While either model in and of itself has value, the two simply do not blend very well – and students who attempt to travel down both paths at once are very likely to end up writing speeches which distort or misrepresent the learning process, the actual “process-as-experienced” chronology of their work, their understanding of theory, their operational definitions of critical constructs, their selection and interpretation of data from the artifact, and the conclusions they attempt to reach.

I believe that we must abandon the attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable and choose between these two models. Or rather, we should make room in this competitive event for students to choose (based on their personal and individual levels of expertise, based on their personal and individual learning needs) which of the two writing models to employ when constructing any given speech.

There is no reason why every single rhetorical criticism speech needs to cleave to exactly the same writing format. If the goal of forensics is in fact to educate students (we return to the philosophical roots established for this paper at this point), then we need to coach and judge all competitive events based on their ability to enable student learning. Ultimately, I believe that we’ve gotten our priorities turned around. Overall, forensics events have evolved to the point that a single ideal unwritten prototype tends to define our thinking relative to any given event. This prototype tells us in great detail exactly what the structure, content elements, delivery, research base, topic choice and so on of any given speech in any given competitive category “should be.” These standardized prototypes make it easier for us to coach any given event, easier for us to judge any given event, and easier for students to “learn the rules to win” in any given event. But since when is education supposed to be about making things “easy?” Granted, any student who follows the prototype will learn “something.” But there are so many things that the prototype cannot teach – and so many students who will learn the prototype, perfect it, and then ask (in the words of the old Peggy Lee song): “Is that all there is?” The answer, of
course, is that is not all there is. There is so much more to learn, if we’ll just give ourselves permission to teach it and our students permission to immerse themselves in it.

Which brings us to a proposal. Let us make room for at least two different prototypes in the event we call “Rhetorical Criticism” (“Communication Analysis”). Students who feel that they can learn more from the imitative approach at any given point in their career should be allowed (better yet, encouraged) to revert to the writing style of the early 1980’s, when comparatively more time and effort were invested in the “application” step of the speech, research questions were not expected, and critical conclusions (which play a minor role in published journal articles anyway) were minor or nonexistent. Students who employ this model could “learn from the masters” and dig deep into a set of critical constructs deemed coherent by an established scholar. They would be held accountable for demonstrating a clear, coherent, and detailed ability to understand and apply a limited set of critical constructs. Yet, even as we consider returning to this model, it is important that such a return should ideally attempt to address and resolve some of the problems noted by scholars at that time. For example, as noted by Givens (1994, p. 31), Murphy (1988) bemoaned the fact that, even twenty years ago, too much speech time was being devoted to the explanation and building of method and not enough to actual analysis and application. According to Murphy, as of 1988 “judges want[ed] an introduction to the method, an explanation of the method, an application of the method, and methodological conclusions (p. 4).” As a result, according to Givens (1994, p. 31), competitors made “the methodology, not the artifact, the focus of their speeches.” A return to a model which eliminates research questions and de-emphasizes critical conclusions (which play a minor role in published conclusions) would still face the challenge of optimally balancing the explanation vs. the application of theory.

On the other hand, students should also have a second choice. They should be able to write speeches which reflect a full and genuine use of the inquiry process if they so choose. These students would produce work highly similar to what we see published in our professional journals. They would start with a research question, select a “method” (defined as feminism, Marxism, genre criticism, or the like), then select a set of specific critical constructs which they personally are convinced will operationalize that method for the particular artifact they have chosen, then apply these constructs, then draw critical conclusions. In other words, the crucial difference between this second model and the style we currently employ on the circuit lies in where the precise list of sub-steps or critical constructs comes from. Under this model, I propose that we abandon the search for a particular article or book chapter written by somebody else which offers up a pre-digested set of “steps.” These “steps” are in any case a sort of Holy Grail which many authors don’t really offer, even though forensics conventions and terminology compel us to look for these “concrete lists.” These conventions pressure us to deduce or identify a “set of steps” which often aren’t there in the original article to begin with. If we simply abandon the search for the “perfect list” or the “ideal article” – if we rethink our definition of and expectations concerning what constitutes a “critical method” – then we can clear the way to genuine critical inquiry. Students can create their own “lists of steps,” select their own clusters of “critical constructs,” and thus be empowered to ask and answer research questions in a much more genuine way.

Ultimately, we are drawn back to the question of what philosophy we wish to be guided by. Are we really just “trainers” who can coach students to follow a set of rules in order to win awards? Or are we in fact educators, who are determined to offer each student who comes to us an optimal opportunity to learn as much as possible from as many different angles as possible in order to develop a cognitive groundwork which will serve them well as they move on toward the graduate schools (possibly) and careers (probably) and lives (definitely) which will follow the brief span of their undergraduate competitive careers? Consciously or unconsciously, willingly or unwillingly, every choice we make as coaches contributes to the answering of this question – for the circuit at large, and for the individual programs we are invested in. Whether or not we include research questions in Rhetorical Criticism is just one small piece of this puzzle. We are certainly not defined as teachers, or as a community, by the way we respond to this one “narrow” conundrum. But the way we approach the answering of this question, wherever we ultimately take our stand, forces us to confront basic issues we cannot ignore. How can we refine any given event to ensure that it makes logical and theoretical “sense”? How can we make sure that each event exists not in “competitive limbo” but rather in relation to our general field of study? How can we use each event to teach our students things they don’t already know and skills that will serve them well later? What responsibilities do we bear as educators?

References


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