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
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Volume 1
Number 2
January
1964

SPEAKER and GAVEL

Official publication of Delta Sigma Rho–Tau Kappa Alpha
National Honorary Forensic Society

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The names of new members, those elected between September of one year and September of the following year, appear in the November issue of *SPEAKER* and *GAVEL*. According to present regulations of the society, new members receive *SPEAKER* and *GAVEL* for two years following their initiation if they return the record form supplied them at the time their application is approved by the Executive Secretary and certified to the sponsor. Following this time all members who wish to receive *SPEAKER* and *GAVEL* may subscribe at the following rates: \$1.50 per year for the standard subscription; \$5.00 per year for those who wish to sustain the work of *SPEAKER* and *GAVEL*; and \$25.00 for a lifetime subscription.

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Speaker and Gavel

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ANNOUNCEMENT

DISTINGUISHED ALUMNI AWARDS 1964

The program of recognizing distinguished alumni for their contributions to and through effective and responsible public address is being continued by DSR–TKA. A limited number of individuals will be selected annually and appropriately honored. Each chapter is invited to nominate individuals for consideration. These should be alumni either of the former organizations or of the present society. Chapters may nominate alumni from other institutions.

This first announcement calls attention to the existence of the award and should stimulate preliminary thought and evaluation. Additional information concerning criteria and procedure will be released in the near future. The anticipated deadline for nominations will be the latter part of February or early March. Extensive supporting material should accompany each nomination. Correspondence may be addressed to any committee member:

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THORREL B. FEST
Chairman

"IS DEBATE MERELY A GAME FOR CONSERVATIVE PLAYERS?"

PATRICK O. MARSH

Assistant Professor of Speech, University of Wyoming

Kruger's recent article, "The Meaning of Inherency," has caused me to reexamine the obligation of the affirmative in demonstrating a proposition of policy.¹ This examination has led me to believe that there are several weaknesses which "inhere in" the prevailing practice of requiring affirmative debaters to demonstrate an inherent weakness in the *status quo*. The overall weakness, common to each of the more specific ones I shall expose, is that this burden constitutes an unnecessarily restrictive set of "game rules" for the competitive debater to follow. They are arbitrary and not logically essential. The result is that they prejudice judges against other legitimate methods of affirmative case construction and delude our students into thinking that this is "the only way to debate."

Normally the "inherency argument" is based upon four assumptions: (1) that a presumption favors the *status quo*, (2) that "evils" in the *status quo* must be demonstrated, (3) that these evils must be shown to be "casually related" to the *status quo*, and (4) that the removal of these evils must constitute a "major change" from the *status quo*. The adequacy of each of these assumptions will be examined.

Presumption Favoring the Status Quo

Elemental to a proposition of policy is the concept of "should." Even though this concept is often the focal point of novice debaters who hesitate to "come to grips" with the proposition, I believe that within this concept lies the key to a realistic interpretation of the "presumption" problem. Let us begin by examining Kruger's definition:²

Briefly, "should" means that the proposed policy is the best means to a certain desired end and is, therefore, logically desirable. [After giving an example of a misinterpretation of the term, he offers a further clarification.]

The only alternative is that "they should join" means that "they should want to join" "they will realize it is to their best interest to join"—and it thus becomes an affirmative obligation to demonstrate that joining is indeed in these countries' own best interest. *Admitted this interpretation assumes that people and nation-states are motivated chiefly by self-interest. But if debate did not take into account such realities, it would tend to be sterile.* [Italics mine.]

Kruger stresses the subjective basis of debate, according to the unique circumstances of those to be affected by its outcome, when he stresses the self-interest motivation. Must not an admission follow that different "people and nation-states" may have different self-interests? For example, those who are established "should" attempt to retain their established positions for their own best interests (a basically conservative position). But, by the same reasoning, should not those who are not established—who have nothing to lose—find it in their own best interest to accept anything as being better than what they now have; namely, nothing (a basically "liberal" position)?

¹ Arthur N. Kruger, "The Meaning of Inherency," *The Gavel*, 45:46 ff.

² Arthur N. Kruger, *Modern Debate: Its Logic and Strategy* (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, Inc., 1960), p. 27.

When one presumes that present conditions should be preserved, he is arguing from an established position that reflects his own subjective circumstances. To decide that all arguments must be based upon the same presumption is an arbitrary conclusion; our present tendency is to presume that the conservative position of "what is established ought to remain established" is best. But, with equal justification, one could argue from the nonestablished or "liberal" motivation and claim authorization for the opposite presumption that new policies with promising possibilities of success should be tried, else we will reduce our prospects for progress. The conservative viewpoint is that security is more valuable than progress; the liberal viewpoint is that progress is worth risking some degree of our security. Who can say which position is right? From time to time different societies have *assumed* they had reduced this universal issue to the truth. But, of course, such decisions are societal, subjective, and arbitrary. The point here is not whether the conservative or the liberal preference is correct. Good arguments can be mustered for either. But, the point is that "which one is better" remains debatable, and since neither has been conclusively demonstrated, we cannot arbitrarily presume either. To do so is to "beg the question," or in Kruger's words, "... to assume the truth of an implied premise which is not a self-evident truth."³

An examination of the origin of the presumption favoring the *status quo* may prove helpful in clarifying this position. The introduction of this concept into the current theory of argumentation is generally credited to Whately. Orville Pence states:⁴

According to Stanford and Parrish, Whately's discussion of the burden of proof and of presumption was the first in English rhetoric. . . .

Whately's examination of the burden of proof and presumption was extensive and most modern in tone. Those who argue for a change in the *status quo* bear the burden of proof. Those who oppose a change must not abandon the protection of the presumption in favor of the entrenched *status quo*. These are commonplace in a modern text of argument, but no evidence was uncovered in this study to modify Stanford's and Parrish's position that this perspicuous treatment of burden of proof was indeed the first in English rhetoric.

However much Whately may be revered for his contributions to argumentative theory, we must recognize that he made arbitrary decisions in establishing his presumptions, some of which are not so readily accepted in our own society and in our present debating practices. For example: he asserted that there is no presumption in favor of antiquity (although his presumption favoring the *status quo* is closely akin to the antiquity presumption). Further, he questioned the desirability of the presumption in favor of the learned (which somewhat weakens our practice of supporting arguments with statements from authorities), and he held reservations about establishing a presumption in favor of the collective wisdom of assemblies (contrary to the American presumption favoring majority rule). If we are to accept his presumption favoring the *status quo* on the basis of authority, we must accept his other presumptions also; but more realistically, we should not accept it on the basis of his authority, for Whately's attempts to settle such universal matters arbitrarily and finally were subject to what Bacon

³ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

⁴ Orville L. Pence, "The Concept and Function of Logical Proofs in the Rhetorical System of Richard Whately," *Speech Monographs*, 20:31-32.

called “idols of the theatre”—errors resulting from the distortions inherent in one’s preferred philosophy. What was Whately’s preferred philosophical grounding? He was an archbishop (an *established* position) in an *established* church which sought to remain *established*. It is not surprising that he would favor retaining the *status quo*, for the conservative position favored his self-interests.

Since presumptions are inferential rather than factual, since they are arbitrary rather than demonstrable, such conclusions should be debated and not merely assumed.

William O. Douglas suggests that granting a presumption favoring the *status quo* may in itself restrict the freedom of expression which debate coaches generally profess to protect.⁵ He says:

Every majority tends to acquire a vested interest in the *status quo*. The values represented by their economic, political, racial, or religious interests seem to them to be the expression of the ultimate. They cling tenaciously to them and look on the minority with antagonism and suspicion. In a state under the domination of the church, the teaching of evolution might be deemed subversive. In a state ruled by atheists, religion might be a dangerous subject. . . .

When sovereignty rests in a man or in a majority, suppression of a minority may be necessary to protect and safeguard the *status quo*. But when sovereignty is in the people, it is distributed equally and indivisibly among every member of the group. (With no presumption for any faction.) The conformists and the non-conformists alike can claim the privilege. So can the reactionaries and the revolutionaries, those who believe in *laissez faire* and those who believe in the dictatorship of the proletariat. That, at least, is the theory. And freedom of expression is as integral a part of the rights of sovereignty as running for office or voting.

I believe that freeing debaters from the concept of presumption will lend greater educational value to academic debate training. For if we regard debate as essentially a means of training our students in logical processes, we cannot justify the insistence that their reasoning process begin with an unsupported presumption that the conservative position is the correct position. By doing so we teach our students from the outset to beg the question. Or, if we regard debate as primarily a means of developing oral composition, the insistence upon a prescribed and restrictive composition formula, such as we find in the so-called “stock issues,” disregards the teaching that the form must be organic with the content. Further, if we regard debate primarily as a means of developing skill in persuasion (for influencing public audiences rather than developing detailed logical appeals for sophisticated critics), the insistence upon a conservative presumption will reduce the persuasive effectiveness of our students. Bitzer, after examining the enthymeme’s persuasive essence, concluded that rhetorical deduction gains its persuasive appeal by starting from a position that the audience is willing to grant.⁶ If the maxim, on which the debater’s persuasive appeal is based, must arbitrarily emanate from a conservative philosophy, what possible chance is there for persuasive effectiveness when the audience happens to be a liberally oriented one? Persuasion begins with audience analysis, but when tradition prevents audience adaptation, any change in audience attitude is more likely to result from factors other than the speaker’s arguments.

⁵ William O. Douglas, *The Rights of the People* (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1958), pp. 22–23.

⁶ Lloyd F. Bitzer, “Aristotle’s Enthymeme Revisited,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 45:399–408.

But, if college debate is regarded primarily as a healthy outlet for the students' competitive spirit rather than training in logic, composition, or persuasion, it becomes a game in the category with other competitive college games. Granted, game rules are arbitrary and, accordingly, the insistence upon conservative presumptions may be justified. At this point, however, the concern should no longer be with the justification of presumptions in debating, but rather with the justification of continuing debate programs under the guise of an educational activity.

Since the traditional presumptions are inferential, societal, and arbitrary, they remain debatable and should be incorporated into the debate—not merely assumed. Thus, the judge-critic may base his decision upon the relative strength of the opposing arguments rather than to allow the legitimate issues to be prejudged.

Indictment of the Status Quo

Having begun their thinking from the assumption that a presumption favors the *status quo* (a concept which I have tried to show is open to serious question *per se*), many formulators of stock issues then reason that it is necessary for an affirmative debater to indict the *status quo* before any change is warranted. This concept also is open to criticism.

In the first place a distinction appears to be in order between the terms *status quo* and "present policy," for it is sometimes mistakenly assumed that the *status quo* always has some policy which has "worked, however imperfectly, for some time." The needed distinction is this: the present policy is always a part of the *status quo*, but the *status quo* does not always have a present policy. Kruger says:⁷

In advocating a change or rejection of the *status quo*, the affirmative is asking us to abandon a program which is in existence and presumably has worked, however imperfectly, for some time. And this is to be discarded for a program whose workability can only be speculated about; that is, the affirmative in advocating the new policy can only argue what *will probably happen*, not what has happened, which is usually much more convincing.

Certainly, there must be instances where the *status quo* has not even anticipated the problem and has therefore not adopted any policy to meet it. To assume otherwise would be to assume the ability of man to anticipate all quickly developing, hitherto unmet problems. For example, we presently have no uniform policy regulating population expansion. There may be individual practices, but there is no policy. Yet, is not this an acceptable proposition of policy: "Resolved, That the federal government should adopt a uniform policy governing population growth." In advocating this proposition, one is certainly advocating a change from the *status quo*, but he is not indicting the present policy for there is no present policy. Another example where deliberative debate may proceed from a *status quo* with no present policy may be drawn from any newly formulated deliberative assembly. Its members deliberate (that is, they debate propositions of policy) over what items should be included in their constitutions. No previous constitution exists to be indicted, yet they are formulating policies. There are, therefore, some cases in which this presumably universal burden does not apply.

Another area of confusion in the near-sacred traditional "need issue" concept is that a *desire* is taken to be a *need*, thus it takes on more of a sense

⁷ Kruger, *The Gavel*, p. 46.

of urgency. But, as indicated in the definition of “should” cited earlier, a need reflects one’s own self-interest—a *desired* end. Now, when we come to make such decisions of desirability rather than of necessity, are we not dealing with propositions of value? The point is this: a proposition of policy is nothing more than a special case of a proposition of value in which an attempt is made to discover which of the available policies is *best* to meet our own desires. All that is logically essential in making such a decision is: (1) to establish criteria by which the various policies may be evaluated, and (2) measure each policy according to these criteria. One additional assumption is needed when we set up the minimum essential contentions for a proposition of policy *prima facie* case; that is the almost self-evident contention that we should adopt the best available policy. Even this assumption should be offered for judicial notice, however, rather than as a presumption, for it might conceivably be justifiably contested. All that can logically be demanded in demonstrating a proposition of policy, therefore, are the following contentions:

1. We should adopt the best available policy (judicial notice).
2. These are the proper criteria for determining which policy is best.
3. The affirmative policy best meets these criteria.

The debate may turn on any or all of these contentions; they are logically adequate; no mention need be made of the evils in the *status quo* (especially if the *status quo* offers no policy to be evaluated).

Inherent Weaknesses in the Status Quo

Kruger’s demand that the existence of weaknesses be demonstrated and that it be demonstrated that these weaknesses “inhere in” or are caused by the *status quo* appears to be nonessential in light of the previous discussion. However, some difficulties arise even when a debater elects to go beyond the minimum essential issues and to take on this additional burden.

The underlying reasoning which leads to the conclusion, that “inherent weaknesses” must be demonstrated, appears to be that if (and only if) the causes for the weaknesses be discovered, those causes may be eliminated by the proper policy, and thus the weaknesses (effects) will disappear. Granted, in many instances this procedure may be the most desirable, but it is not the only way a satisfactory solution may be achieved. I submit that there are instances in which the undesirable effects may be brought under control without ever having isolated the causes for them. For example, the miserable symptoms of hay fever may be brought under control by taking certain patented medicines, thus producing just as desirable an effect at much lower costs than if an expensive allergy diagnosis were undertaken to discover the causes for the hay fever and medicines prescribed accordingly.

Causal-reasoning sections in the popular argumentation textbooks probably show more confusion and more disagreement among authors than in any other area of argumentative theory. To demand that the debater show causal relationships in every affirmative debate, before he has been able to unravel the inconsistencies in the theory, cannot help but lead to superficial treatment of causality. This seems unwise especially since isolation of the cause is usually unnecessary. If a cause be defined as an event which either completes or breaks the chain of “necessary conditions” to bring about an effect (and this appears to me to be the most defensible definition), then it is unnecessary for the debater to isolate the one condition which completes or breaks the chain. His concern is to find a policy which meets *all* of the

"necessary conditions" to achieve a certain end. In "comparative advantages" debating the criteria set forth by the affirmative should include the necessary conditions for achieving the desired end. The available policies will either meet the conditions or they will not, and some will meet them more advantageously than others. If this is what Kruger means by showing causal relationships, then he can have no quarrel with the comparative advantages case, for it is so contained. But if he demands showing the reason for the absence of certain necessary conditions, then he is asking debaters to concern themselves with nonessentials which may easily lead to irrelevancies if not to absurdities.

Barzun and Graff, writing principally for historiographers, have made a distinction between concepts of causality which is as important to the debater as it is to the historical researcher.⁸ Their words require no interpretation in order to relate them to this problem of inherency:

In sum, every attempt in historical writing to formalize causal description or make a parade of exactitude by assigning one "paramount" cause and several "contributory" causes ends in self-stultification. Any such distinction implies a measurement that we cannot in fact make; it foolishly apes the chemical formula by which a compound requires several elements in stated proportions. For if, as Edward Lucas White once contended, it took malaria-bearing mosquitoes and the spread of Christianity to undo the Roman Empire, the mosquitoes were as necessary as the Christians and neither is paramount to the other.

The historical researcher is thus led to adopt a practical distinction about causality which has already commended itself to workers in physical science. They draw attention to the differences between causation that occurs in a chain of events of various kinds and causation within a closed system. An example of the first is: the forming of a cloud, the darkening of the sun to earth dwellers, the lowering of temperature, people putting on coats, a thunderstorm bursting, a person taking refuge under a tree, and being struck by lightning and killed. This chain of "causes" is miscellaneous and each event in it unpredictable, not because it is not determined, but because it occurs outside any controllable limits. As against this, in the physics laboratory, an elastic body of known stresses and strains goes through a series of evolving states; at any moment a single definite distribution of measured stresses and strains is the effect of the previous moment, which may therefore be regarded as its complete cause, *as the cause*.

Major Change in the Status Quo

The final concept in contemporary policy debating with which I should like to take issue is that a proposition of policy must advocate a major change from the *status quo*. In Kruger's word: "Propositions of policy must call for a major change from the present policy."⁹ Is it not more realistic to define a proposition of policy as one calling for any change in the *status quo*? It may be major or minor. To require a major change always raises the question of "when is a change a major one and when is it a minor one?" Such a question of degree can focus the debate on nonessential positions. Further, if we require major changes, how will minor improvements ever be accomplished? The one who advocates the change, major or minor, must argue the affirmative, for even when the negative offers a "repairs case" or a "counterplan" it is not actively advocating its acceptance; it is rather trying

⁸ Jacques Barzun and Henry F. Graff, *The Modern Researcher* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1962), pp. 151-152.

⁹ Kruger, *Modern Debate*, p. 18.

to refute the affirmative's contention that its plan is the most desirable one available. Under our present argumentative theory, we are forced into an uncomfortable and unfeasible dilemma: either we must make major changes (thus abandoning the *status quo* completely) or we may make no modifications at all, for the decision asked for in a debate is whether we should accept or reject the proposition which is always framed in affirmative terms. We are never asked whether we will accept the negative's repairs case or counterplan.

DELIBERATIVE VERSUS FORENSIC DEBATE

If the objections I have raised concerning the prevailing method of affirmative case construction possess validity, perhaps the next item of inquiry ought to be: "Where were we led astray?" It appears to me that the faulty premise upon which our otherwise logical formulations have derived is that academic debate should be patterned after legal debate. The temptation to adopt the methodical practices of the legal profession has at times been overpowering because of the keenness and precision with which legal decisions can be made. Yet the argument of the courtroom and the argument of deliberation differ so vastly in certain fundamental concepts that it is indeed unfortunate that college debate has borrowed so freely from forensic debate (even to the point of being called a "forensic" activity). How frequently are forensic propositions debated in colleges? By far, the greatest number of college propositions are deliberative, yet the most commonly accepted formula for deliberative debating is based upon the legal concept of indictment. I maintain that fruitful deliberation is unnecessarily hampered by such a restrictive presumption.

Consider how forensic and deliberative debate differ fundamentally. First, our courts operate from the constitutional presumption that one is "innocent until he is proven guilty." This presumption is based upon our goal of preserving human rights—that it is more desirable to allow some guilty persons to escape justice than to convict some innocent persons. This policy has some weaknesses, but we tolerate them in order to achieve a more highly regarded goal. But where is there a constitutional presumption favoring conservatism in the form of the *status quo*? Indeed, at the time of our constitution's composition, there was little admiration for or presumption favoring the *status quo*. The fundamental presumption upon which legal debate was founded concerns *human rights*, but policies are not human and do not share the same rights. To modify this basic legal presumption so that it becomes: "the present policy is innocent until it has been proven guilty" is to personify our policies. The analogous reasoning that follows is faulty because it is figurative rather than literal; it attempts to reason analogously about phenomena from different categories. Yet, deliberative debaters have attempted to do this.

The second principal difference between the two types of debate is to be found in purposes. Forensic debate is concerned with the *justice* or *injustice* of some *past* act; its issues are of fact, definition, quality, and competence. But, deliberative debate is concerned with the expediency of a proposed policy for *future* adoption; its issues are of goal, criteria, and compliance. Because of its reflective essence—dealing with past events—forensic debate may demand factual evidence, whereas deliberative debate, being essentially projective, must rely upon probabilities. And further, our entire system of law stems from a body of presumptions supplied by tradition and statute which provides the bases for argument on the issue of definition. Con-

sistency with the past is the basis for justice, but an overzealous consistency with the past is the enemy of progress, and it is, as Emerson has labeled it, "the hobgoblin of little minds."

The final critical difference between the two forms of debate is that juries are encouraged to think dichotomously—to judge "guilty" or "not guilty." But the fact that amendment procedures are practiced in deliberative assemblies and denied in our courts suggests that future policy is better determined by comparing the available alternatives than by categorical acceptance or rejection. Kruger, as well as many other debate text authors, considers one of academic debate's values to be that: "It (particularly the practice of debating both sides of the same question) develops tolerance for different points of view, and is thus a valuable means for seeking the truth."¹⁰ If truth seeking be a function of debate, we cannot arbitrarily designate the truth to dichotomous categories. Even under our dichotomous legal system, juries at times recommend leniency which in itself suggests that some kind of continuum is more desirable than a dichotomy. But since juries are asked to base their decision up the question: "What sayeth the law?" such dichotomies may be justified in court. Legislative assemblies, though, are asked to base their decisions on quite a different question, namely: "Is the proposed policy in our best interest?" The term "best" implies the superlative and requires that the available policies be evaluated according to some consistent set of standards. I can see no alternative to concluding that productive deliberation requires greater freedom than the courtroom judgments allow.

I have too much respect for debate's potential to sit idly by and not speak out against some practices which I believe ill-prepare our debaters who leave academic tournaments to take posts at international conferences. When they are met by opponents who are unwilling to grant that our society's presumptions are correct, our debaters are muted, for they have been inadequately trained to defend their basic premises. Thus, communication lines are broken. I have too much respect for debate's potential to allow it to become merely a *game* for *conservative* players.

¹⁰ Kruger, *Modern Debate*, p. 5.

ATTENTION:

Members
Faculty
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Articles of worth are always in demand, as well as letters, notes, and even complaints.

Send to
Prof. Charles Goetzinger, Editor—Speaker and Gavel
Department of Speech and Drama
University of Colorado
Boulder, Colorado



PAUL ALFRED CARMACK

1903–1963

Paul Alfred Carmack died in Columbus, Ohio on December 27, 1963. His distinguished career was brought to an untimely end by a heart attack.

He was one of the leaders in the movement to establish Delta Sigma Rho–Tau Kappa Alpha. The very first issue of the *Speaker and Gavel* provides a sampling of his contributions to the fraternity. On page three we are reminded that Dr. Carmack was a member of the Joint Coordinating Council which drafted our constitution. On page six we note that he served as National Secretary of Delta Sigma Rho from 1958 to 1963. On page twenty we see a picture of Dr. Carmack as he presented the official chapter list of Delta Sigma Rho to the Merger Meeting.

Born in Murdock, Illinois on March 16, 1903, Paul A. Carmack received his A.B. degree with High Distinction from DePauw University in 1929; the M.S. degree from Butler University in 1929 where, thirty-five years earlier, Tau Kappa Alpha was founded; the Ph.D. degree from Syracuse University in 1949. In 1962 he was awarded the honorary degree of LL.D. by Findlay College. He taught at Indiana State Teachers College and Syracuse University before joining the faculty of Ohio State University in 1946 where he served until his death.

Dr. Carmack was well known for his development of rhetorical

models of many important rhetoricians of all ages. At the time of his death, a book of rhetorical studies, of which he was the co-editor, was nearing completion. He had an extensive library of rare books of rhetoric and early public speaking texts which he generously made available to his students. His sound scholarship and stimulating teaching attracted many students to him; at the time of his death he was directing the studies of twenty-seven graduate students.

He made important and lasting contributions to speech in Ohio. For many years he served as chairman of the annual Ohio Conference for Speech Education and with his energy and ability won it national recognition. He was one of the founders of the *Ohio Speech Journal*. The first two volumes, published under his editorship, won wide professional acclaim.

On the national scene Dr. Carmack will long be remembered for his significant contributions to the American Forensic Association. He was one of the founders of the AFA and served with distinction as its third president. Under his able leadership the AFA continued to increase its membership and expand its services. Many of the programs and policies of his administration are carried forward to the present day.

His extensive record of professional and civic responsibilities reflect the esteem of all who knew him. Among the offices he held were: Member of the Board of Directors of the American Institute of Parliamentarians; Vice President of the Ohio Council of State Universities of the American Association of University Professors; President of the Ohio State University Chapter of the American Association of University Professors; Member of the Executive Committee of the Legislative Assembly of the Speech Association of America; Parliamentarian to the Speech Association of America, the Ohio Association of Real Estate Boards, the Ohio Education Association, and the Ohio State Nurses Association; President of the Perry Local Board of Education.

Paul Alfred Carmack was a man of great good *ethos*. His competence is amply attested by his able execution of the duties of the responsible offices for which his colleagues so often chose him. His integrity was unquestioned. All who were privileged to work with him felt the glow of goodwill he had for his colleagues and his students. His loss will be deeply mourned by all in Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha and by his wide circle of friends throughout the speech profession. We all join in extending most sincere sympathy to his wife, Florence, his daughter, Sabra, and his sons, Alfred and Douglas. Paul was, to paraphrase Quintilian, a true citizen, fit for public and private administration, a good man skilled in speech.

—AUSTIN J. FREELEY

John Carroll University

REFLECTIONS OF A SPEECH TEACHER

E. C. BUEHLER

Professor of Speech, University of Kansas

I

IN A PERSONAL SENSE

Teaching must have been my calling, for I found the abundant life in the classroom. I have been teaching speech for more than forty years, thirty-nine at K.U. I have also taught in various speech communication programs for more than two hundred groups in business and industry. I have coached or directed hundreds of college orators and debaters for competitive forensic events. I am sure, if there were such a thing as a speechometer, the totals would register more than 300,000 speeches heard.

I can hear some of my readers say, "Poor Professor, how dull and boring a life he must have had! I can't even stay awake in church listening to the preacher!" On the contrary, I have never known a dull or boring moment, never dreaded meeting my classes. It has all been immensely exciting, and even now I find it more enjoyable than ever. But there is really nothing mysterious about this exuberance, for I come in close touch with people and deal intimately and realistically with them.

There is something about the individual personality which is appealing to most of us. Woodrow Wilson once said, "The most exciting thing in all the world is the human personality." The point is that speech is a reflection and manifestation of the human personality in action. Many of us will stand for minutes on end, as if spellbound, before an iron cage in a zoo to watch monkeys go through their antics. I, too, am a monkey-watcher, but I wouldn't care for monkey-watching as a steady diet, day after day. For me, it is much more exciting and interesting to observe people, the masterpieces of the creative process—to observe the antics of the human mind as mirrored by the spoken word.

Moreover, it is especially rewarding and gratifying to observe the personalities of students flower and unfold before my very eyes, to see them experience a kind of self-renewal and self-discovery as they share their attitudes and ideas orally with their peers. Speech-making, in its essence, is a social experience; and most people, be they college freshmen or company executives, are driven by a deep sense of pride to show the better side of their nature when talking before a group. The ego becomes deeply involved, and this generates the great and common bugaboo of public speakers, stage fright. Speakers have to learn how to live with it, but they soon come to recognize it as something to control, not to get rid of. While a student is in mild shock, he isn't himself; frankly, he isn't all there. He must learn how to adjust himself, to gain the self-assurance and personal equilibrium which he must have for his best mental alertness and his most persuasive manner.

Once he gets this feeling of self-mastery when standing before a group, the student experiences a new sense of achievement which carries over into everything he does. An example or two will explain what I mean:

A senior girl dropped by my office only a few days ago to express her appreciation for what happened to her in a speech class three years ago when she was a timid freshman. She spoke of how this one class helped her through her entire college life; it made her studies in other courses easier and more enjoyable, helped her in conference with her teachers, helped her get along better with other students, but, most important of all, it helped her to live with herself.

* *Journal-World*, Lawrence, Kansas, Feb. 17, 1964

I received a Christmas card a year ago with a postmark from a South American country. The card read, in part, "Professor, you won't remember me but I was a student in your speech class in Green Hall in 1930. I want to wish you a Merry Christmas and tell you that you opened a window for me for which I have forever been grateful. Sincerely, C. A."

These are not isolated instances. They are typical of scores of similar responses, and I do not mention them in a boastful manner. I am embarrassingly pleased and humbled by such responses. They come from both college students and middle-aged men and women, who were in adult speech classes in business and industry. I have heard countless testimonies from the lips of high school teachers, especially debate coaches, about similar experiences among their students.

This all makes sense to me, for it strikes a responsive chord in my nature. This is exactly what happened to me in speech classes at Northwestern University as a graduate student when I was a grown man 27 years old. It was like being born again. This experience in self-renewal or self-discovery is the beginning of a new life with a new set of values, new capacities to appreciate the arts, new vision and insights for the pursuit of happiness. One's whole personality seems to have more room in which to move. Here lie some of the richest rewards of a teacher, not only the teacher of speech but of mathematics, of biology, of architecture, and so on.

The late U. G. Mitchell, onetime chairman of the Department of Mathematics at K.U., gave us a clue to the secret. When his colleagues begged him to tell them his secret for his outstanding success as a classroom teacher, his reply was: "Heaven's sake, we don't teach mathematics, no one can teach math; we just teach people." Ah, there you have it. We can't teach debate or oratory or public speaking; as we teach the man, the whole man with his many-sided personality, the skills in the oral communication process will find their natural orbit.

The strange thing is that there is nothing new about this. The ancient Greeks and Romans practiced this nearly three thousand years ago. The Greeks made much of the inscription on their temples, "Know thyself." This is part of it, yes, but the more important part of it is to make thyself worth knowing. In this age of sputniks and heavy emphasis upon science and materialism, we need more than ever to trap those sources that build humanity in man. Herein lie the real makings of a civilized world.

II

IN A PROFESSIONAL SENSE

Speech-teaching as a profession was born in America just fifty years ago. The National Association of Academic Teachers of Public Speaking, formed in 1914 with a membership of 165, has grown beyond the 25,000 mark, counting memberships in theater arts, speech and hearing, and radio broadcasters. When I became identified with the profession, scarcely a half-dozen universities offered a major in speech. Advanced degrees were almost unknown. In fact, I received the first M.A. degree in speech ever offered by Northwestern University, in 1923. Today more than 200 colleges offer the M.A., and 50 have programs for the Ph.D. More than a thousand departments of speech graduate 6,000 majors annually. A fundamental speech course, along with English composition, is commonly required among most colleges west of the Ohio Valley. At K.U. more than a thousand students are enrolled each semester in the beginning course, taught by a staff of 36 instructors. We have witnessed a far greater growth in speech education

during the past fifty years than we have seen in the preceding three thousand years.

This is decidedly an American phenomenon. There are numerous nations in our Western culture among whose universities one cannot find a single speech course in the curriculum. Emphasis upon speech as an academic discipline is a natural outgrowth of our culture. We are the children of the spirit of revolt, of revolt against tyranny. The words "Liberty or death" have been on the lips of every schoolboy since the Declaration of Independence. Free speech is the lifeblood of democracy. The Constitution gave freedom of speech the "go" sign. It made free speech the law of the land. A new nation, conceived in liberty, facing new frontiers, new opportunities, new private enterprises, new social and political issues, had much need for talk to shape its manifest destiny. And talk there was, in shops, churches, schools, townhalls, legislative chambers, Chautauqua tents, and open-air platforms. Probably no nation since the time of the ancient Greeks has enjoyed such a rich heritage in oral rhetoric as we.

It must seem paradoxical to the layman that in this country, where speech education flourishes, we should witness such a sharp decline in public oratory. The rhetoric of the platform seems to hit a new low year after year. But this does not distress me, for the method and styles of speech-making have changed drastically. There has been a revolution in methods and kinds of speech-making. The one great single underlying influence for this is embodied in the concept, *communication*. "Did he get the message?" is the phrase heard most often. "The occasions for Websterian oratory are few and the men capable of it still fewer," says Norman Thomas.

Speech-making has become everybody's business. It is no longer reserved for the lawyer, the preacher, the politician, and the college president; the merchant, the housewife, the farmer, all kinds of citizens must be articulate. On a per capita basis, there is ten times as much speech-making done now as in Webster's day. W. J. Bryan's oratory would probably be as much out of style today as high-buttoned shoes and celluloid collars. Speeches today are tailored to fit the clock. As an eighth-grader, I heard Senator Robert LaFollette speak at a Chautauqua meeting, and he spoke for three and one-half hours. This was about par for the course. Not only are speeches today much shorter and more to the point, but they are also more informal, more direct, more conversational, and much more communicative.

Revolutionary methods of teaching speech have swept into the college classroom. In some classrooms, "delivery" has almost become a dirty word. Personally, I feel the pendulum has swung too far towards efforts to downgrade the role of delivery. Too many speakers with worthwhile ideas fail to get their message across because of poor delivery. Of course, the overriding goal still is to develop more able speakers and listeners, but the mastery of speaking and listening skills *as such* is only one phase of the speech communication discipline. Sharing and energizing worthwhile ideas, knowledge and insight into speech theory, sound methods of research, and especially critical thinking in a responsible speech philosophy have become the warp and woof of the beginning speech course. A class that does not help the student toward more functional intelligence is a failure. Learning to speak means learning to think.

Research shows that students who take the beginning speech course as freshmen make better grades later in college than those who do not take the

(Continued on page 76)

REFLECTIVE THINKING AND THE PROBLEM OF EVALUATING THE PARTICIPANT IN COMPETITIVE GROUP DISCUSSION*

H. CHARLES PYRON
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One of the standard arguments used to justify the speech tournament as an educational technique has been the belief that it offers the opportunity for students to practice what they have learned in the classroom. Tournament, or "competitive," group discussion, however, has often been criticized because the element of competition tends to foster a distortion by the students of the discussion techniques they have learned in the classroom. The following research study was therefore designed to explore at least one phase of this important question.

Analysis of Problem and Statement of Hypotheses. An examination of eleven modern college discussion texts seemed to indicate that a great importance is put upon various adaptations of John Dewey's five steps of reflective thinking, especially in problem solving discussion. Some texts go as far as to define discussion as "the process of group reflective thinking;" and in all cases, there is a major emphasis placed upon the advantages of the members using a reflective thought pattern in the solution of the problem before the group. Therefore, we would appear to be on safe ground in concluding that reflective thinking certainly is being taught, to at least some extent, in most college discussion courses. Likewise, we should be able to assume that the adequately prepared college discussant would be thoroughly familiar with, and supposedly ready to use, the reflective thinking approach in the so-called discussion tournament. Thus we might hypothesize that the ability to think reflectively in a group problem solving discussion will play an important role in the "winning" of a discussion contest. Furthermore, if discussion teachers are used as judges, their evaluation of the contestants as discussants should reward the ability to do reflective thinking.

Previous research tends to support this hypothesis. In one research study using a total of 65 discussion groups (small groups of six to nine college students participating in two hour discussions) it was found that persons selected as contributing the most to the solution of the group's problem demonstrated a statistically significantly greater ability in reflective thinking¹ than those selected as contributing the least to the solution of the problem being discussed by the group.² In another study of 28 business and professional groups in actual problem solving conferences and group discussions, the same general results were obtained.³

A third study examined 27 problem solving discussion groups composed

* This research was completed on a Purdue Research Foundation Grant while the author was a graduate student at Purdue University.

¹ As measured by the test, *How Do You Think?*, used by permission of the author, Dr. Alma Johnson Sarett.

² H. Charles Pyron and Harry Sharp, Jr., "A Quantitative Study of Reflective Thinking and Performance in Problem Solving Discussion," *Journal of Communication*, XIII (1963), 46-48.

³ H. Charles Pyron, "An Experimental Study of the Role of Reflective Thinking in Business and Professional Conferences and Discussions," unpublished research report, Communication Research Center, Purdue University.

of 6-9 college students, previously matched on reflective thinking ability (Hi-Mid-Lo) according to scores on the Johnson test. Findings showed that the nine groups whose members possessed a "high" degree of reflective thinking ability produced "solutions" judged significantly "better" than the "solutions" of the nine groups composed of members having "lower" reflective thinking scores.⁴ (Judging of the solutions was done by graduate students and faculty in the subject matter area being discussed.)

Finally, it should be noted that previous research has shown that when speech instructors select the discussant whom they perceive as contributing the most, as well as the person contributing the least, to the solution of the problem being discussed by the group, there is a greater chance that there will be a significant difference between the reflective thinking ability of these two persons than when a non-instructor (a student observer, student discussant, or businessman) selects the person contributing most or least. This finding further supports our hypothesis, since it would be assumed that the same instructors who evaluated classroom discussants on the basis of their reflective thinking ability would use the same criterion when evaluating a discussant on his contribution in discussion contests.

Investigation: In December of each year, Purdue University hosts its annual High School Debaters Conference. During a two day period, 146 Indiana High School students, who had been randomly placed in a total of 18 discussion groups, discussed a problem in American education. These groups remained intact for a total of three, 1 hour, 45 minute sessions and the judges (members of the Purdue Speech Staff) rotated from group to group. Since most of these judges had been used in a previous classroom study where the hypothesis was confirmed, we decided to use the same methodology; i.e., select only the top and bottom 10% of the discussants, based on their total ratings during the three sessions, and then administer the Johnson Test of Reflective Thinking.

This procedure gave us a total sample of 29, the 15 highest rated and the 14 lowest rated discussants. Much to our surprise we found that the mean score on the Johnson test for the high rated discussant (46.4) was almost the same as for those rated low (42.2), which meant that the t test did not show a statistically significant difference, and the data did not confirm the hypothesis ($t_{\text{obs}} = 1.54$; $t_{.05}^{(27)} = 2.05$).

This rather surprising result stimulated a second examination. Traveling to the Delta Sigma Rho Forensic Tournament on March 9, 1962, I administered the Johnson Test to discussants who had just completed participating in three, 50 minute sessions of discussion. (All groups used the same topic, the 6 members remained together as a group for the entire three rounds, and discussion coaches serving as judges, rotating from session to session.) Surely, with this design, our hypothesis would be confirmed. However, again to our surprise, a Pearson Product Moment correlation between each contestant's total ratings for the three rounds and his score on the Johnson test yielded an r of .260 ($S_{ro} = .169$, $Z = 1.54$, $n = 36$) which is not significantly different from what could be expected by chance. Thus, in two tournament settings, the results were inconsistent with those found in the classroom and in the "real world" of business and professional problem solving discussion.

⁴ Harry Sharp, Jr. and J. E. Milliken, "A Study of the Relationship Between Individual Reflective Thinking Ability and Group Product," unpublished research report, Communication Research Center, Purdue University.

Going upon the assumption that I had somehow overlooked some crucial variable in the first two discussion contests, which had been accounted for in the previous research done in the classroom and business world, I traveled to the Tau Kappa Alpha National Convention for a third try. The discussion contest was very similar to the two previously tested: i.e., four to six members in each discussion group, who remained together for six, 90 minute sessions, and each group had the same topic for all six rounds. Coaches served as judges on a rotating basis. In addition to the regular testing procedure used at the first two tournaments, I asked each discussant to rank the members of his discussion group, excluding himself, according to who he thought contributed the most to the solution of the problem that the group had just discussed. No one was informed about the purpose of the research until after the completion of the last round of discussion.

Again, however, the results failed to support the hypothesis. A Pearson Product Moment correlation between total ratings and reflective thinking scores was only $r = .167$ - - which means practically no correlation between accumulated perceived discussion ability and reflective thinking ability.

In addition, reflective thinking scores of the 12 discussants in each group having the highest total ratings were compared with the scores of the 12 discussants having the lowest total ratings in each group. The mean score of the top twelve discussants (46.58) was, practically speaking, equal to the mean score of the bottom twelve discussants (46.42). Someone might argue that there wasn't any real difference between the discussants, however an analysis of the *ratings* for these same 12 top and 12 bottom rated individuals

yielded $t_{\text{obs}} = 6.839$ ($t_{.001}^{(11)} = 4.437$) which is extremely significant. This means that, although the judges perceived an extreme difference between "best" and "worst" discussants on whatever criteria they used, there was no difference between these discussants on a reflective thinking ability criterion.

Furthermore, an analysis was made of the relationship between reflective thinking ability and results in each of the 6 discussion groups, taken individually. To do this, of course, we had to turn to the discussants' rankings of each other, since the judges could make no ranking within each group because they rotated from group to group from one session to another. It should, however, be pointed out that ranking by discussants was the method used in the classroom and business studies mentioned earlier, and the results did support the hypothesis. However, for our six discussion groups the Spearman Rank Order Correlation (ρ s) were: $-.95$, $-.33$, $-.014$, $-.129$, $.10$, $.529$. It can easily be seen that the only one that even approaches significance is in the *wrong* direction. Obviously, not only do judges (coaches) not use reflective thinking as a criterion of judgment in a tournament situation, but neither do their students.

The final attempt to glean some relationship from the data was an analysis of the relationship between average rating, average reflective thinking ability score, and number of award winners in each group. This analysis was based on the suggestion that possibly all of the good reflective thinkers were in one group, or that possibly all of the award winners came from one group, etc. (Table 1 shows this and other within-group relationships.) It can be noted that the group with the highest average rating also has the highest average reflective thinking ability. The ρ for this relationship is $\rho = .657$, but this is not significant at even the .05 level and may be spurious due to the fact that the average ratings for groups 2-5 is practically equal. The ρ for the relationship between the number of awards (weighting: Sup. = 2, Ex. = 1)

TABLE 1

Group	Index of Agreement for Rankings by Discussants (Kendall W)	Rank Order Correlations Between Discussants Rankings and Reflective Thinking Score	Average Rating by Judges	Average Reflective Thinking Score	Number of Awards
I	.340*	-.014	111.8	52.2	1 Sup. 1 Ex.
II	.473**	-.129	105.7	48.3	1 Sup. 2 Ex.
III	.700***	-.950	105.2	45.8	2 Ex.
IV	.240	.100	104.8	41.7	No Awards
V	.750**	-.33	104.8	38.5	1 Sup.
VI	.713****	.529	100.2	47.8	1 Sup. 2 Ex.

* Sig. .05
 ** Sig. .02
 *** Sig. .01
 **** Sig. .001

and the average reflective thinking ability of the group was higher but not significant $\rho = .743$ (.829 necessary for Sig. at the .05 level).

One of the most interesting findings in this phase of the study was the fact that the group where perceived contribution had least to do with reflective thinking ($\rho = -.95$) and the group where it had the most ($\rho = .529$) were the groups where the index of agreement was the highest (see Table 1). This indicates that there was general agreement within each group about the criterion they were using to rank their fellow discussants on contribution, but each group was using a different criterion, and neither was reflective thinking, *per se*.

Finally, was there any difference between the mean reflective thinking score of the ten award winners and the mean reflective thinking score of all the discussants? The reflective thinking score of all the 32 contestants was 46.16, which is almost identical to the 48.5 for the ten award winners. (The t_{obs} being an insignificant .9512.)

Conclusions and Implications: In the three discussion contests studies, there failed to appear a single statistically significant indication that any relationship exists between a student's reflective thinking ability and his perceived ability as a contributor to the solution within his group's discussion. This result therefore leads to the rejection of our hypothesis, at least applied to the competitive group discussions studied in this experiment.

How then can we explain the divergence between the criterion of contribution used in classroom, business, and professional problem solving discussions and that being used by *both* students and their instructors (the judges) in a competitive setting? It may be that the categorized type of rating scale being used to evaluate discussants is not sensitive enough to reflect the contestants' reflective thinking ability. (If this be the case, then shouldn't we revise our measuring instrument so as to measure what we are supposedly teaching in the classroom?) But this explanation does not account for the lack of correlation found when using *only* the discussants' perceptions of who contributed the most to the discussion. In the TKA tournament results, even the discussants failed to use the same criterion that other college students had used in comparable classroom discussions.

One possible explanation is that students who participate in extracurricular discussion contests are "specialists," far above average in both I.Q. and reflective thinking ability; and thus, because they represent only one side of

the normal curve of the entire population, contribution will not be related to reflective thinking ability. This interpretation, however, appears weak in several points. First, the reflective thinking scores of the discussants at the TKA and DSR Tournaments were not too much higher than a random group of college freshman (\bar{x} [contest] = 45.98; \bar{x} [freshman] = 42.00). Furthermore, in connection with another study, a group of people in various professions were given the Johnson test, their average score was even higher than the contest discussants, and contribution *was* significantly related to reflective thinking ability in their discussions. Therefore, it appears that we must look elsewhere for an explanation of why reflective thinking was not related to contribution in the three discussion tournaments examined.

Finally, do these results suggest that the factor of competition tends to distort the normal discussion processes? Is "discussion to win" a form of "discussion to impress" rather than discussion designed to solve a problem? I believe that the question can valuably be argued whether reflective thinking should be taught as a basis for resolving problems within a group, and future research is needed to help argue this question; but the fact remains that in our discussion texts, and therefore presumably in our classes, we do stress the importance of reflective thinking in problem solving discussion. Why then is not this teaching reflected in the evaluation of competitive group discussions? The findings of this study should stimulate a bit of rethinking and reappraising of the purposes of competitive discussion. In at least the three discussion contests reported herein, reflective thinking skills were either not being used in the solution of the groups' problem, or else it was not being used as a basis for evaluating the individual discussant's contribution, in either case, a rather disturbing commentary on competitive group discussion.

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RULES OF THE FIRST NATIONAL DELTA SIGMA RHO— TAU KAPPA ALPHA CONGRESS

As Revised by the Committee on Rules and Procedures, R. Victor Harnack, Chairman.

Purposes

1. To provide broad, intensive, and realistic educational opportunities for college speakers.
2. To increase opportunities for intensive investigation of significant contemporary problems.
3. To promote the use of logical reasoning and the use of the best available evidence in dealing with these problems.
4. To stimulate the students to honest and original effort.
5. To provide specific opportunities in the arts of public speaking, persuasion, discussion, and debate.
6. To help young men and women become more effective citizens by promoting an understanding of the legislative procedures fundamental to the democratic way of life.
7. To use the competition inherent in a free society to motivate students to their best efforts in attaining these objectives.

I. Name

The name of this organization shall be THE FIRST NATIONAL STUDENT CONGRESS OF DELTA SIGMA RHO—TAU KAPPA ALPHA.

II. Dates of the Meetings

1. The business of this organization shall occupy three (3) consecutive days.
2. The dates for this meeting shall be March 30, 31, and 32, 1964.

III. Powers and Duties of Faculty Sponsors

1. This organization shall be sponsored by the National Society of Delta Sigma Rho—Tau Kappa Alpha.
2. At least twelve (12) months prior to each meeting of the Student Congress, the National President of Delta Sigma Rho shall appoint a committee of not less than four (4) faculty or alumni representatives. This committee shall be known as the Faculty Committee on Rules and Procedures.
3. The Faculty Committee on Rules and Procedures shall have the following powers and duties:
 - a. To revise these rules, if they deem such revision necessary and desirable.
 - b. To fix the exact dates for the Student Congress.
 - c. To determine the place at which the Student Congress shall meet.
 - d. To decide upon and phrase problem(s) of significant contemporary interest which shall be studied and acted upon by the delegates attending the Student Congress as herein-after provided; and to notify all colleges of these problems at least two (2) months prior to the start of the Congress.
 - e. To receive from all Faculty Sponsors, at least thirty (30) days before the opening of the Student Congress the names of Speaker of the Assembly, Clerk of the Assembly, Party Floor Leader, Party Whip, and the names of all students recommended for appointment as Chairmen Pro Tem of the Cau-

cuses, and Temporary Chairmen of the Main Committees. Candidates for these positions must be certified by their Faculty Sponsors as qualified to discharge the duties of office in a manner which will reflect credit both on their college and on Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha.

- f. To appoint one or more Faculty Sponsors to serve as Parliamentarian(s) during the Student Congress with advisory powers as hereinafter specified.
- g. To appoint such other subordinate officers and committees as hereinafter specified and such other subordinate officers and committees as they shall deem necessary or desirable to provide for the effective conduct of the Congress and to delegate to these officers and committees such powers and duties as they deem proper.
- h. To discharge all other duties hereinafter specified.

IV. General Structure

1. The Official business sessions of the Student Congress shall be known by the following names:
 - a. Caucuses
 - b. The Opening Legislative Assembly
 - c. Main Committee Meetings
 - d. Joint Conference Committee Meetings
 - e. Legislative Assemblies
2. In addition to the above sessions there shall be a Registration Period and various Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha Business Meetings.
3. The order and number of events, together with the exact times and places, shall be determined by the Faculty Committee on Rules and Procedures.

V. Registration

1. The Faculty Committee on Rules and Procedures shall call for advance registration, to be made not later than thirty (30) days before the opening of the Congress. The advance registration shall include the names of all student delegates, their party affiliation as provided in Article VI, Section 1; candidacy for Chairman Pro Tem of their Party Caucus as provided in Article VI, Section 3; or candidacy for Speaker of the Assembly or Clerk of the Assembly as provided in Article III, Section 3-e; and sub-topic preference for committee membership, as provided in Article VIII, Section 1.
2. The Faculty Committee on Rules and Procedures may require the use of such forms as it shall prepare for both Advance and Final Registration and shall publish and enforce closing dates and times for the filing of such forms.
3. At the Final Registration each delegation shall confirm its Advance Registration. Change in delegates shall be permitted only for serious cause. No additional nominations or applications for assignments to committee or officers may be made at this time. Only students whose registration is confirmed during the Final Registration may take part in any of the activities of the Congress except by special permission of the Congress Director.

VI. Caucuses

1. At the time of Advance Registration for the Congress, each delegate shall register as a member of the following parties:
 - a. Conservative
 - b. Liberal
2. At the time designated in the Calendar, each of the parties shall

- hold a Caucus for the purpose of selecting party candidates for Speaker and Clerk of Assembly, respectively, and for the purpose of electing a Party Floor Leader and a Party Whip.
3. Each Caucus shall be convened by a Chairman Pro Tem who shall preside over the Caucus until the candidate for Speaker of the Assembly has been selected. The roll call vote of the individual delegates shall be recorded by a Clerk Pro Tem. The Pro Tem officers shall be appointed by the Faculty Committee on Rules and Procedures.
 - a. Delegates wishing to be considered for Pro Tem offices shall so indicate at the time of Advance Registration as provided in Article III, Section 3-e, and shall also submit a statement of their qualifications.
 - b. The Chairman Pro Tem of each Caucus shall be selected from colleges not nominating candidates for the office of Speaker.
4. The Caucus shall proceed in accordance with the following rules:
 - a. No student may be nominated whose name has not been submitted in advance by the Faculty Sponsor of his college to the Faculty Committee on Rules and Procedures, as provided in Article III, Section 3-e, except that when the number of such properly certified candidates for an office is less than four, nominations for such office may be made from the floor, but in no case shall there be more than a total of four candidates for any one office. In all cases nominations shall be closed automatically after the nomination of a fourth candidate for any office.
 - b. Delegates placing names in nomination shall be allowed not more than five (5) minutes to describe the qualifications of their candidates.
 - c. Nominations may be seconded, but seconding speeches may not be given.
 - d. When all nominations for Speaker of the Assembly have been heard, each candidate shall be allotted five (5) minutes in which to state his views on the public problem(s) to be considered by the Congress.
 - e. When all candidates have spoken, the vote shall be taken by roll call of the individual delegations.
 - f. If no candidate receives a majority on the first vote, the two candidates receiving the greatest number of votes shall be voted upon again in a second roll call vote.
 - g. The Clerk Pro Tem shall act as timekeeper for the above speeches, and shall conduct the roll call vote(s).
5. When a candidate for Speaker has been elected, he shall immediately assume the chair as presiding officer of the Caucus. The same procedure shall be followed in the election of the candidate for Clerk, except that there shall be no campaign speeches by the nominees.
6. When a candidate for Clerk has been elected, he shall immediately assume the duties of Clerk of the Caucus. The same procedure as described in Article VI, Section 5, shall be followed in the election of a Party Floor Leader. It shall be the duty of the Party Floor Leader to seek to coordinate the efforts of the party in securing passage of bills endorsed by party members.

7. When a Party Floor Leader has been elected, the Caucus shall proceed to the election of a Party Whip. The same procedure as described in Article VI, Section 5, shall be followed in the election of a Party Whip. It shall be the duty of the Party Whip to assist the Party Floor Leader.

VII. Opening Assembly

1. The Opening Assembly shall be called to order by the Temporary Chairman, who shall be a faculty member appointed by the Faculty Committee on Rules and Procedures.
2. The Temporary Clerk, who shall be a faculty member appointed by the Faculty Committee on Rules and Procedures, shall call the roll.
3. The Temporary Chairman shall preside during the election of the Speaker of the Student Congress. The election shall proceed in accordance with the following rules:
 - a. Delegates nominating the candidates of the respective parties for Speaker of the Student Congress shall be allowed not more than three (3) minutes to describe the qualifications of their candidates.
 - b. Nominations may be made from the floor under the following conditions: First, a nominating petition signed by not less than twenty-five (25) properly registered delegates who have not signed nomination papers for more than one candidate must be filed with the Temporary Clerk. Second, the Temporary Clerk shall accept nominations papers only for candidates qualified as provided in Article III, Section 3-e. Third, if the Temporary Clerk determines that the nomination petition is in order the candidate may be placed in nomination as provided in Article VII, Sections a and c.
 - c. After the nominating speeches for Speaker of the Student Congress have been made, the candidates shall be allowed two (2) minutes each in which to state their views to the Opening Assembly on the public problem(s) to be considered by the Congress.
 - d. When the candidates have spoken, the vote shall be by roll call of colleges. Each delegate is free to vote as an individual, but for each college a delegation leader shall respond to the roll call and report his delegation's vote.
 - e. The candidate receiving the majority of votes shall be declared elected.
 - f. If no candidate receives a majority on the first vote, the two receiving the greatest number of votes shall be voted upon again in a second roll call.
 - g. The Temporary Clerk shall act as timekeeper for the above speeches and shall conduct the roll call vote(s) to determine the winning candidate.
4. The newly elected Speaker shall preside during the election of the Clerk of the Student Congress. The rules of this election shall be the same as those for election of the Speaker, except that nominating speeches shall be limited to two (2) minutes and that the candidates shall not speak.
5. A member of the Faculty Committee on Rules and Procedures shall announce the assignment of delegates to their proper committees as hereinafter provided in Articles VIII and XI.
6. The only other business which shall be in order at the Opening Assembly shall be the hearing of

messages, communications, and announcements, a list of which shall have been prepared by the Faculty Committee on Rules and Procedures.

VIII. Main Committee Meetings

1. At the time of Advance Registration for the Congress, the delegates may indicate preference on sub-topics for committee membership. Delegates without preference shall so indicate.
2. The Faculty Committee on Rules and Procedures shall divide the delegates into as many Main Committees as may seem appropriate to the number of delegates registered in the Congress.
 - a. In determining the number of Main Committees on each sub-topic, the Faculty Committee on Rules and Procedures shall give consideration to the number of expressed preferences and to the number and nature of Advanced Bills submitted.
 - b. Delegates shall be placed where needed to help equalize the size of committees.
 - c. In assigning delegates to the Main Committees, the Faculty Committee on Rules and Procedures will follow the principle of proportional distribution according to advance party registrations.
 - d. No more than one delegate from the same college will be assigned to the same committee.
 - e. In order to provide a workable distribution of membership on the several committees, the Faculty Committee on Rules and Procedures shall have full and final authority to select delegates by lot to be placed wherever necessary.
3. Each Committee shall be called

to order by a Temporary Chairman appointed by the Faculty Committee on Rules and Procedures. The Temporary Chairman of each Main Committee shall be responsible for securing from the Faculty Committee on Rules and Procedures copies of the Advance Bills assigned to his committee.

4. The Temporary Chairman shall preside during the election of the student chairman and student Secretary for the Committee. He shall assume the duties of Temporary Secretary during this time.
5. It shall be the essential purpose of each committee to discuss the problem to which the committee has been assigned and to develop a legislative solution to the problem stated in the form of a Bill which shall represent the consensus of the Committee.
6. As the construction of such a well conceived Bill is to be the basis of the work of the Committee, the order of business shall be:
 - a. The definition and delimitation of the problem to which the Committee has been assigned.
 - b. The analysis of the problem to which the Committee has been assigned. This shall include both a consideration of the causes of the problem and the establishment of criteria which the Committee shall use to evaluate proposed solutions.
 - c. The consideration of proposed solutions. The Secretary shall distribute copies of the Advance Bills to the members and shall read the titles of the Advanced Bills submitted to the Committee in the order numbered by the Faculty Committee on Rules and Procedures. The Committee shall determine whether one of the Advanced Bills shall be used

- as a basis for their deliberations, or whether the Committee shall construct a new Bill, using the Advance Bills merely as guides and suggestions.
- d. The construction of a Bill which, in the considered judgment of the Committee, shall represent the best possible legislative solution to the problem.
 - e. Action upon any Advance Bill, or portion thereof, or upon any motion which proposes a new Bill or portion thereof, shall consist of either the rejection of the item, or the acceptance of it with or without amendment.
8. As soon as the essential content of a Bill has been decided upon, which must not be later than thirty (30) minutes prior to the adjournment of the last meeting of the Committee, the Chairman shall conduct the election of three (3) members whose duty it shall be to give the Majority Bill its final form and phrasing, and to represent the Main Committee at the meeting of the Joint Conference Committee. At least one of the three so elected shall be other than a member of the majority party of the Assembly.
 9. While at all times it shall be the objective of delegates to adhere to the highest standards of Parliamentary debate, the size of the Committee admits of greater informality than is possible on the floor of the Assembly; members shall be permitted to speak as often as they wish subject to recognition by the Chairman, and to such limitations as may be decided upon by the Committee itself. The use of more formal Parliamentary procedures and voting should be as infrequent as possible in this informal situation.
 10. If for any reason a minority of the Committee shall find that it cannot support the Bill approved by the majority of the Committee, it may draft a Minority Bill and elect a representative whose duty it shall be to represent the Minority at meetings of the Joint Conference Committee.

IX. Joint Conference Committees

1. At the time designated in the Calendar, the Joint Conference Committee(s), shall convene. The number of such Joint Conference Committees shall be determined by the Faculty Committee on Rules and Procedures, taking into account, (a) the number and nature of the public problems considered by the Congress, and (b) the number of delegates working in Main Committees which the Faculty Committee on Rules and Procedures designates as constituting an appropriate unit. The election of members of the Joint Conference Committees shall be as provided in Article VIII, Sections 8 and 10.
2. Each Joint Conference Committee shall be called to order by a Temporary Chairman appointed by the Faculty Committee on Rules and Procedures.
3. The Temporary Chairman shall preside during the election of the student Chairman and student Secretary of the Committee. He shall also assume the duties of Temporary Secretary during this time.
4. The Secretary shall immediately read the Majority and Minority Bills submitted by delegates representing the Main Committees. After the Bills have been read, the Chairman shall preside over the deliberations to determine whether one of these bills shall be used as the basis for Com-

- mittee action or whether the Committee shall construct a new Bill using these Bills as a basis.
5. If in the deliberations it becomes apparent that there is a fundamental cleavage of opinion the minority may withdraw. In such cases the minority delegates shall meet separately in another room where they shall organize in accordance with Article IX, Sections 2 and 3, and they shall be known as the Joint Conference Committee of the Minority. The majority delegates shall be known as the Joint Conference Committee of the Majority.
 6. It shall be the duty of the Joint Conference Committee of the Majority to frame a Bill which shall express their views.
 7. It shall be the duty of the Joint Conference Committee of the Minority, if such a Committee be formed, to frame a Bill which shall express their views.
 8. Any delegate, whether or not he be a member of a Joint Conference Committee, who dissents from any portion of the Majority Bill and whose views are not satisfactorily expressed by a Minority Bill may draw an amendment to be proposed from the floor of the General Assembly.
3. Each committee shall report its bills and amendments in the following manner:
 - a. The Majority Bill shall be read by a member of the majority, who shall move its adoption, and who shall immediately give a copy of the bill to the Clerk, and distribute copies to the Assembly.
 - b. The Majority Leaders, or delegates appointed by him, shall be allowed a total of not more than ten (10) minutes in which to explain and defend the bill.
 - c. The Minority Bill, if there be one, shall be read by a member of the Minority, who shall move its substitution in place of the Majority Bill, and who shall immediately give a copy of the bill to the Clerk and distribute copies to the Assembly.
 - d. The Minority Leader, if there be a Minority Bill, or delegates appointed by him, shall be allowed a total of not more than ten (10) minutes in which to explain and defend the bill.
 - e. Any delegate desiring to amend either the Majority or the Minority Bill shall present a written copy of his amendment to the Clerk not later than at the close of the time allowed the Minority Leader. At the conclusion of the Minority Leader's time, the Speaker shall ask if there are any proposed amendments not on the Clerk's desk. After this time, no more amendments may be received.
 - f. Each Joint Conference Committee shall choose a representative to assist the Steering Committee in screening proposed amendments that have been properly submitted and shall impartially consolidate

X. General Assemblies

1. The Speaker shall call the meetings to order; the Clerk shall call the roll, read the Minutes of the preceding Assembly, and all communications or announcements submitted by the Steering Committee or the Faculty Committee on Rules and Procedures.
2. The Speaker shall announce the order in which the committees shall report; and shall make any further necessary announcements regarding the division of time for debate or clarification of rules.

- such amendments as may be considered identical.
- g. The Speaker shall announce the time fixed by the Steering Committee for debate on the motion to substitute the Minority Bill for the Majority Bill. He shall make this announcement before either bill has been presented to the Assembly. At the expiration of time for debate on the substitute motion the vote must be taken, and it shall be on the motion to substitute.
 - h. Having completed its work of screening the amendments, and taking into account the number to be considered by the Assembly, the Steering Committee shall determine, and the Speaker shall announce, the time to be allotted to each amendment, including amendments to that particular amendment. When the allotted time has expired, the vote must be taken.
 - i. Delegates who have submitted amendments to the Minority Bill may then be heard in the order in which they have submitted their amendments to the Clerk. If any amendments have been consolidated by the screening process, the Steering Committee shall determine the order in which such consolidated amendments shall be heard.
 - j. A maximum of three (3) minutes shall be allowed each proposer of an amendment in which to read, explain, and defend his proposed amendment.
 - k. Other delegates wishing to debate the amendment shall be allowed two (2) minutes each and the Speaker shall recognize favoring and opposing delegates in alteration insofar as possible.
 - l. Amendments to amendments may be presented from the floor with the necessity of early presentation in written form to the Clerk.
 - m. If the Minority Bill is not adopted as a substitute for the Majority Bill, amendments to the Majority Bill shall be heard and acted upon in the same manner as provided for debate on the Minority Bill.
 - n. Throughout the debate upon any given Bill and its amendments, the Speaker shall not recognize any delegate who has previously spoken unless no other delegate is requesting the floor.
 - o. The Speaker, or a delegate appointed by him, shall time the delegates during all debates. No delegate may exceed his time without consent of the Assembly by two-thirds vote.
 - p. The Speaker may ask the advice of the Parliamentarian, as provided for in Article III, Section 3-f, but the Parliamentarian shall act in an advisory capacity only.
 - q. If during the second session of the Legislative Assembly it seems to be desirable to refer a matter to committee the following motions shall be in order: a motion to refer to Committee. Motions to refer to a specified Joint Conference Committee or to a Special Committee may or may not include instructions to the committee. Unless a motion to refer to a Special Committee specifies the number of members, how the members are to be chosen, and who is to be chairman, these matters shall be determined by the Steering Committee and shall be announced by the Speaker. A motion to refer an amend-

ment to a committee shall take with it the motion to which the amendment applies.

- r. After all debate has been heard, or the time limits reached, or the previous question moved and passed, the Bill before the Assembly for adoption shall be voted upon by roll call as provided in Article XIV. It may be approved with or without amendment, or be rejected. If rejected, no new Bill on the same topic may be offered to the Assembly, but the Speaker may entertain a Resolution stating that the Assembly is unable to recommend action upon the problem at issue.

XI. Committee on the Evaluation of Legislative Procedure

1. There shall be a Committee on the Evaluation of Legislative Procedure composed of not more than ten (10) members.
2. The function of this Committee shall be to evaluate the procedure, work, and effectiveness of the Congress, and to evaluate the performance of the student delegates.

XII. Membership

1. Any college or university included on the current chapter roll of the National Society of Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha or any college or university specifically invited by the National President of Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha is entitled to send delegates to participate in the Student Congress.
2. Student delegates must be bona fide undergraduate students of the college they represent. They need not be members of Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha in order to participate in the Student

Congress meetings, but they must be members of Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha in order to participate in Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha Business Meetings.

3. Each participating college shall be entitled to a maximum of four (4) participating student delegates at any one time except as provided in Article XI, Section 7. Not more than two (2) student delegates shall be assigned to the same sub-topic of the public problem(s) under consideration.
4. Any college may send as many students as it wishes, to be designated as alternates or observers, but in that capacity they may not participate in any of the business of a Committee, Caucus, or General Assembly, except as defined in Article XII, Section 5.
5. The participating delegates representing a given college during the various committee meetings, need not be the same students for meetings of the Assembly. When a participating delegate and an alternate thus exchange status, it shall be at the discretion of the Faculty Sponsor of the college involved and written notification of this exchange must be submitted to the Faculty Committee on Rules and Procedures and to the Clerk of the Assembly.

XIII. Bills, Amendments, Resolutions

1. Advance Bills may be prepared by delegates before the Congress convenes to be submitted to the appropriate committees at the time they convene as tentative proposals for the committee to consider.
2. Delegates desiring to submit Advance Bills shall observe the following procedures:
 - a. Each college may submit one bill for referral to each of the Main Committees. (Thus for

- the 1964 Congress, each college may submit a total of four (4) Advance Bills.)
- b. Any delegate desiring to submit an Advance Bill shall submit ten (10) identical copies to the Chairman of the Faculty Committee on Rules and Procedures not less than twenty-one (21) days prior to the opening of the Congress. (Thus for the 1964 Congress, Advance Bills bearing a postmark later than midnight March 9, 1964, may be rejected.) All such bills must be drafted in accordance with the rules hereinafter specified.
 - c. Any delegate submitting an Advanced Bill may circulate copies of his bill to all chapters of Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha and to other invited participating colleges in advance of the Congress.
 - d. Each delegate submitting an Advance Bill must deposit one hundred (100) identical copies of the bill with the Faculty Committee on Rules and Procedures during the Final Registration period.
 - e. The Faculty Committee on Rules and Procedures shall sort the Advance Bills in terms of the Committee to which they are submitted and shall number them in order of their receipt as provided in Article XIII, Section 2-b.
3. All Advance Bills must be presented in the form hereinafter described:
 - a. They must be typewritten, duplicated, and double spaced upon a single sheet of white $8\frac{1}{2} \times 11$ inch paper.
 - b. The first line shall consist of these words: "Congress Bill Number _____."
 - c. The second line shall consist of these words: "Referred to the Committee on (herein state the name of the appropriate Committee)."
 - d. The third line shall give the name of the student introducing the bill together with the name of the college he represents.
 - e. Commencing with the fourth line, the title of the bill must be stated, beginning with the words, "An Act," and continuing with a statement of the purpose of the bill.
 - f. The text of the bill proper must begin with the words: "Be it enacted by the Student Congress of Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha." The material following must begin with the word, "That." Each line of the material which follows must be numbered on the left margin of the page, beginning with "1."
 - g. Every section shall be numbered commencing at one. No figures shall be used in the bill except for the numbers of sections and lines. No abbreviations shall be used.
 - h. The following form is an illustration of the prescribed form for drafting bills:

Congress Bill Number _____
 Referred to the Committee on
 The Providing of Teachers
 and Facilities.
 by John Doe of _____ Uni-
 versity
 AN ACT to provide for the
 increasing of teachers' sala-
 ries.
 BE IT ENACTED BY THE
 STUDENT CONGRESS
 OF DELTA SIGMA RHO-
 TAU KAPPA ALPHA

 1. Section 1. That the
 2. Section 2. That also
 4. Bills prepared by each Commit-

- tee for recommendation to the Joint Conference Committee shall follow the same form as prescribed for Advance Bills with the following exceptions:
 - a. They shall not be limited as to length.
 - b. The second line shall consist of these words: "Referred to the Joint Conference Committee on (herein state the name of the appropriate Committee)."
 - c. The third line shall consist of the words: "Majority (or Minority) Bill by" followed by the names and colleges of the delegates supporting the bill.
5. Bills prepared by each Joint Conference Committee for recommendation to the General Assembly shall follow the same form as prescribed for Advance Bills with the following exceptions:
 - a. They shall not be limited as to length.
 - b. They shall omit the second line as described in Article XIII, Section 3-c.
 - c. The next line shall consist of the words: "Majority (or Minority) Bill by" followed by Conference Committee on (herein state the name of the appropriate Committee)" followed by the names and colleges of the delegates supporting the bill.
6. The proper form for amendments shall be one of the following:
 - a. "I move to amend by striking out the words" or
 - b. "I move to amend by substituting the words" or
 - c. "I move to amend by adding the words" or
 - d. "I move to amend by inserting the words" or
 - e. "I move to amend by dividing the"
7. Bills passed by the General Assembly shall be signed by the Speaker and Clerk, and three (3) copies shall be delivered to the Chairman of the Faculty Committee on Rules and Procedures, who shall have copies sent out to the President of the United States, to the Chairman of appropriate Committees of the Congress of the United States, to the Presidents of the participating colleges and universities, and to such organizations and individuals as he shall deem appropriate.
8. In the event the Assembly fails to pass any bill properly brought before it, no bill may be offered to the Assembly. If the Assembly wishes to express itself with regard to matters other than those relating to the official Committee problems but within its proper range of action it may consider such motions as are approved by the Steering Committee in the form of Resolutions.

XIV. Voting

1. In the Assemblies, the Committees, and the Caucuses each individual delegate is entitled to one vote. He is free to vote as he chooses without regard to how any other delegate or delegates cast their ballots.
2. Roll call votes shall be used only in electing officers or in taking final action upon whole bills. In the Assemblies all roll calls will be by colleges, and one delegate from each college should respond and report the votes of his delegation.
3. In all meetings of the Congress no delegate shall be privileged to change his vote after the vote has been declared by the presiding officer. Any change of vote prior to that moment shall be reported from the floor by the delegation

making the changes. This should be made through the delegation representative.

4. In the event that official responsibilities require that a delegate be absent for a portion of a meeting he may vote by proxy by submitting his vote to the Clerk or Secretary in written form, but only in the case of specific motions pending at the time of the delegate's departure. Such proxies shall be void if the motion to which they apply shall be changed in any manner.
5. In the Assemblies, Committees, and Caucuses the participating delegates shall be seated together in an area from which all others are excluded. Guests and observers shall be seated in an area clearly separated from that of the participating delegates. This makes possible more efficient conduct of business and accurate determination of votes.

XV. Powers and Duties of Officers

1. The Speaker of the Assembly shall call the meeting to order; he shall preserve order and decorum; he shall name the one entitled to the floor; he shall decide all questions of order, subject to appeal to the Assembly; he shall not be required to vote in ordinary legislative proceedings except where his vote would be decisive; he shall put questions; he shall certify to all bills passed by the Assembly.
2. The Chairman of a Committee shall call the meetings to order; he shall preserve order and decorum; he shall name the one entitled to the floor; he shall decide all questions of order, subject to appeal to the Committee; he shall not be required to vote, except where his vote would be decisive; he shall put questions; and shall con-

duct the election of members to the Joint Committee.

3. The Clerk of the Assembly shall have the care and custody of all papers and records; he shall serve as Clerk of the Steering Committee; he has arranged in its proper order, as determined by the Steering Committee, from day to day all the business of the Assembly; he shall keep the journal of the Assembly; he shall conduct voting by roll call, and tabulate and announce the results; he shall receive and list in order of receipt, amendments to bills; he shall certify to all bills passed by the Assembly, and shall deliver three (3) copies of all such bills, together with copies of the minutes to the Faculty Committee on Rules and Procedures.
4. The Secretary of a Committee shall have the care and custody of all papers and records; he shall conduct all roll call votes, and tabulate and announce the results; he shall keep the minutes of the sessions of the Committee, and shall send a copy of those minutes to the Faculty Committee on Rules and Procedures within one week of the adjournment of the final session of the Congress.

XVI. Steering Committee

1. There shall be a Steering Committee composed of the Speaker of the Assembly, the Clerk of the Assembly, the Majority Party Floor Leader, the Minority Party Floor Leader, the Majority Leaders of the Joint Conference Committees, the Minority Leaders of the Joint Conference Committee on Rules and Procedures, and a faculty Parliamentarian who shall be chairman of the Committee. This Committee shall:
 - a. Determine the agenda for meetings of the General As-

- sembly. The Steering Committee shall have the power to limit the agenda, selecting from the bills reported from the Joint Conference Committees, so that thorough debate on the measure(s) may occur.
- b. Receive and approve for placement on the agenda any resolutions, memorials, communications, or similar matters which individual delegates or Congress Committees wish to bring before the Assembly.
 - c. Designate the order in which the Committees shall report to the Assembly.
 - d. Fix the total time allowed for debate on each Committee's bill and amendments, subject to appeal of the Assembly as provided in Article X, Section o.
 - e. Formulate and present to the Assembly any resolutions, memorials, or similar matters which it feels should properly come before that body.
 - f. Meet with the Editor of the *Speaker and Gavel* subsequent to the adjournment of the Congress for the purpose of editing and transmitting any bills and resolutions adopted by the Congress in accordance with Article XIII, Section 7 and 8, to the Chairman of the Faculty Committee on Rules and Procedures and through him to the President of the United States, the Chairman of the appropriate committee of the Congress of the United States, to the Presidents of the participating colleges and universities, to the Editor of the *Speaker and Gavel*, and to such other organizations and individuals as he shall deem appropriate, or as shall be specified by the Rules of the Congress or action of the Assembly.
 - g. Have primary responsibility for recommending any action which the Committee believes will expedite the work of the Assembly.
 - h. All decisions of the Steering Committee regarding the agenda and time limits on debate shall be published and distributed previous to the legislative session to which they apply.
2. All Committee action shall be subject to appeal to the Assembly.

XVII. Miscellaneous

1. In the Assembly, the unqualified motion to adjourn is a main motion because its effect would be to dissolve the Congress sine die.
2. In cases not covered by these Rules, the presiding officer shall follow H. M. Robert, *Rules of Order* (Rev.) Scott, Foresman and Company, New York, 1951.

REFLECTIONS OF A SPEECH TEACHER

(Continued from page 59)

course. The student's mind is activated to look for what makes sound sense in a speech; mental skills thus become more important than mere bodily and vocal expression. Listeners are taught to ask of the speaker: "What do you mean?" "Why is this so?" "Why do you care?" "Why should I believe what you say?" "Why should I care?" Since speech can be a dangerous, harmful weapon for social control (as well as a useful, beneficial one) we need more minds able to search for the truth and reveal it with integrity. For truth is ultimately the stuff from which wisdom must be fashioned.



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