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DONALD O. OLSON

SPEAKER



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Volume 1
Number 3
March
1964

Donald O. Olson

SPEAKER and GAVEL

Official publication of Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha
National Honorary Forensic Society

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THOMAS A. BYRNE 1902-1964

Thomas A. Byrne, a distinguished member of the Marquette University Chapter of Delta Sigma Rho, died February 6, 1964. Mr. Byrne had been city tax commissioner of Milwaukee, Wisconsin for 23 years. He received his bachelor of arts degree in 1924, graduating cum laude, and his law degree in 1927 from Marquette University.

As a student at Marquette in 1925,

he and his teammates on the debating squad defeated the Cambridge University of England team. One Cambridge debater was A. Michael Ramsay, who is now Archbishop of Canterbury.

Mr. Byrne was a member of numerous professional societies and served as an officer in many. In 1958 he was elected to the Executive Committee of the National Tax Association.

PRIMARY SOURCES AS DEBATE EVIDENCE

JAMES C. McCROSKEY AND DONALD W. KLOPF
Pennsylvania State University and University of Hawaii

Most of us have heard the story about the elders of the medieval church who became embroiled in a disputation over the number of teeth in a horse's mouth. Unable to find a copy of Aristotle's works, they turned to the classics for the answer. A noviceiate in their midst intimated that they could go to the stables, open a horse's mouth, and count the teeth for themselves. After a severe chastisement for suggesting such an indecent, unscholarly activity, they banished the unfortunate one from their membership and returned to their search in the classics for an answer they never found.

Today the "elders" of the debate coaching profession seem to be reacting like the medieval church elders on the issue of what constitutes worthwhile primary debate evidence. They, too, want to avoid looking in the horse's mouth.

Primary evidence, like interviews or letters, has won general acclaim among research and public speaking text writers as the best evidence for settling an issue. Auer states this position:

We commonly distinguish between primary and secondary source materials, and emphasize the desirability of uncovering the former.¹

Brigance adds his support:

Whenever possible, go and see for yourself or write and find out first-hand. . . . If you need specific information that others have first-hand, often you can get it by writing a letter.²

Crocker emphasizes the value of primary evidence:

The public speaker often denies himself a fund of useful information by not writing to agencies and authorities in the field. . . . One wants to know more about a particular phase of the problem and discovers that only by writing to the author of other articles can he find what he wants.³

McBurney and Wrage view the excellence of primary evidence in terms of probable audience reaction:

. . . if you can report from "the horse's mouth," the audience is likely to attach higher importance to your report than it would to second-hand statements.⁴

Debate coaches, however, would cast aside these suggestions, if the results of a study recently completed by the writers are truly representative.

Five hundred fifty-eight of the nation's college and high school debate coaches were surveyed regarding their attitudes toward the ethics of forty

¹ J. Jeffery Auer, *An Introduction to Research in Speech* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), p. 29.

² William Norwood Brigance, *Speech; Its Techniques and Disciplines in a Free Society* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1961), p. 199.

³ Lionel Crocker, *Public Speaking For College Students* (New York: American Book Co., 1956), p. 198.

⁴ James H. McBurney and Ernest J. Wrage, *The Art of Good Speech* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1953), p. 122.

⁵ For a complete report of this study see "Ethics in Debate," *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (January, 1964), pp. 13-16; "NFL Debate Directors' Attitudes toward Ethics in Debate," *The Rostrum*, Vol. 38, No. 5 (January, 1964), pp. 5-7.

practices which can occur in academic debate.⁵ The coaches were asked to decide whether each item was (1) ethical and good debate procedure, (2) ethical but bad procedure, (3) ethically questionable, or (4) unethical. One item included which concerns primary evidence was: "Using personal letters as evidence." We expected this item to be overwhelmingly supported by people trained in public address and debate. The reverse was the case. Eighty-six percent of the high school respondents and 72 percent of the college respondents considered this item unethical, questionable, or bad debate procedure. In short, a vast majority opposed the use of personal letters as debate evidence.

Most debate text authors appear to disagree. Huber, for one, endorses the use of correspondence to obtain support material and infers that it is acceptable to use it in debate. He says:

When particular information is needed and a personal interview is out of the question, one may gather information by writing either to authorities in the field or people working in the area with which your proposition is concerned . . . letters will be helpful in gathering materials for analysis, for understanding the audience, and for obtaining good support material.⁶

Freeley does not specifically recommend the use of personal letters as evidence, but his approval is implicit in his treatment of correspondence. He tells us that:

Correspondence is often a fruitful source of information . . . [most organizations] are willing to answer thoughtful letters asking intelligent questions in the area of their concern.⁷

Braden recommends writing authorities and asking their opinions.⁸ We assume that if the authorities reply, he would not oppose the use of that reply in debate.

The strongest and most direct statement in favor of this type of evidence is provided by Ehninger and Brockriede. They state:

Consultation with experts through correspondence or interviews, when properly planned and conducted, often proves unusually valuable. It is a source of information too little used by most beginning debaters.⁹

Perhaps two practical concerns cause the coaches to oppose the idealism of speech authors on the use of letters as primary evidence. The first is fear of fabrication. Certainly, personal letters can be forged. But secondary source materials also can be forged. In fact, fabricating evidence cards would seem to be easier than fabricating those personal letters which are written on letterhead stationery. A few years ago one of the writers urged a debater to use a personal letter written to him by a noted labor law authority, which exposed frequently distorted evidence from this authority's often-quoted book. Unfortunately, the first time the debater used the letter to point out how the authority's views were being distorted, the judge berated the debater for the usage of unethical evidence, even though the letter was available for examination.

⁶ Robert B. Huber, *Influencing Through Argument* (New York: David McKay Co., 1963), pp. 70-71.

⁷ Austin J. Freeley, *Argumentation and Debate* (San Francisco: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1961), p. 44.

⁸ Waldo W. Braden, *Argumentation and Debate*, James H. McBath, ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1963), p. 71.

⁹ Douglas Ehringer and Wayne Brockriede, *Decision By Debate* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1963), p. 38.

The second concern seems to be the belief that personal letters are not available to all debaters and, as a consequence, those who use them have an unfair advantage. Certainly this may be true. But nothing prevents all debaters from obtaining such primary evidence if they choose.

These concerns over the use of personal letters would be reduced or eliminated if this method suggested by Newman would be followed:

Personal letters are admissible as evidence, since their authenticity can be verified by the letterhead and their credibility attacked; but they must be submitted to participants requesting to see them.¹⁰

We believe the time has come for coaches to reevaluate their position on the use of this evidence. Securing this type of primary evidence, like opening the horse's mouth and actually counting his teeth, is sound research technique. The use of material gathered in this fashion should be encouraged in debate.

¹⁰ Robert P. Newman, "The Pittsburgh Code For Academic Debate" (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962), p. 10.

THE PROBLEM OF THE PRIMA FACIE CASE: A REPLY TO MR. MARKGRAF

ROBERT L. SCOTT*

In the November, 1963 number of the *Speaker and Gavel*, Professor Bruce Markgraf set before us a modest proposal, i.e., that the second negative speaker in a traditionally patterned debate might assert, "I submit that the affirmative has failed to prove a prima facie case." This challenge would be sustained or overruled by the judge. Mr. Markgraf claims two advantages for the proposal. First, the "convention," which he believes derivative from courtroom procedure, would "help make debate even more realistic and practical than it is presently." The second I find implied rather than directly asserted—it would shorten and enliven some dull, pointless debates in which negative teams are "forced to attack cases which by themselves do not logically stand" and judges are forced "to sit by idly."¹

I find myself in nearly complete disagreement with the case Professor Markgraf has made. But at least his proposal, if accepted, would throw into bold relief the question of what prima facie means, a question which I do not find simple and to which I once addressed an article.² Not all argumentation texts use the term and most of those that do, I have argued in the article mentioned, give definitions which are vague and probably circular. Most debaters I have heard use the term seem to mean roughly "good case." I would contend, then, that when a judge would hear such a challenge under the Markgraf proposal he would have at best a scant notion of what the debater meant. His sustaining or overruling the challenge, at any rate, would depend on *his own* meaning for the term.

Let me make clear an assumption about judging intercollegiate or inter-scholastic debates. The only question that the judge should ask in making a decision is, "Which team did the better job of debating?" An analogous question most emphatically is not the basic query for a judge or a jury to ask when directing a court case. I have often voted for an affirmative team which did not in my opinion make a prima facie case for the proposition. One is probably seldom happy in trying to decide which is the poorer debating—failing to make a prima facie case or failing to seize upon the peculiar weakness of such a case. But ordinarily there are also other questions the judge will ask himself about the general quality of the debating he has heard in rendering a decision. However, if one disagrees with this basic point of view toward debate judging, one might very well disagree with my attitude toward prima facie questions.

In making any analogy, one must consider dissimilarities. We have already pointed to one which applies to the comparison of academic debating and courtroom debating. In reference to prima facie questions, we should recognize that the courts have in the written law and in precedent a body of rather well-defined requirements which help decide whether or not a par-

*Mr. Scott (Ph.D., University of Illinois, 1955) is professor of speech and theatre arts and Director of Forensics at the University of Minnesota.

¹ Bruce Markgraf, "The Prima Facie Case: A Modest Proposal," *Speaker and Gavel*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (November, 1963), pp. 27-28.

² "On the Meaning of the Term *Prima-Facie* in Argumentation," *Central States Speech Journal*, Vol. XII, No. 1 (1960), pp. 33-37.

ticular set of arguments is acceptable on its face.³ College and high school debaters do not have this advantage except insofar as the stock-issue analysis serves the purpose in regard to propositions of policy.

"The affirmative has not argued that the supposed problems are inherent in the present system." This charge, which reflects stock-issue analysis, asserts in effect that the case is not *prima facie* complete even though the negative may not realize this implication. As a matter of fact, we often hear the negative make arguments which come down to "the affirmative has not presented a *prima facie* case." These instances demonstrate that attacks on cases which are not complete and/or consistent (a phrase which I contend can ordinarily be substituted for *prima facie*) may not be artificial or "forced." If under the present practices a judge is "forced to sit by idly" wondering why the negative doesn't say, "This case is not acceptable on its face," he might, if Mr. Markgraf's proposal were to become conventional, be moved to ask a negative who makes the challenge, "Just why do you believe that it is not a *prima facie* case?" That is, he might be so moved if he is interested in understanding what a particular negative speaker means and in evaluating his argument.

Although a case which is not *prima facie* does not require rebuttal in a close sense of the word, it does in ordinary debate require a reply. Presumably the affirmative is unaware that the case presented is not acceptable on its face. Should the negative debaters assume that *without further explanation* every listener (or at least the judge) will also see what the affirmative debaters have failed to see? A good debater should be able to point out the incompleteness and/or inconsistency of the affirmative's contentions and will probably wish to do so. (If non-*prima facie* becomes a conventional challenge, should a judge assume that the debater making it understands the force of the charge against a particular case or that he's just taking a I-have-little-to-lose-anyway risk?)

My own opinion is that every negative should form the habit of considering each case he hears as possibly failing to be acceptable on its face. The fact that he "cannot learn objectively what the judge is thinking" will not necessarily keep him from doing so. If he decides that the case is not *prima facie* acceptable, he should consider replying in this manner: "Let us assume that everything the affirmative said is true. Even so, it does not follow that we should accept the proposition because. . . ."

Prima facie questions are fundamentally logical questions, i.e., they refer us to the form of the argument. Accepting the premises, does the conclusion follow? For example, it seems to me that a majority of the affirmative cases which I have heard this year in support of the proposition Minnesota high schools are debating (Resolved: that social security benefits be extended to provide complete medical care) are not *prima facie*.

Most of these cases come down to the following sequence. The cost of medical care is high and going higher. Comparatively the income of persons over 65 years of age is low. Therefore, these persons are unable to provide

³ William T. Foster gives an interesting example of this fact. If a farmer should sue a railroad for damages resulting from a burned field, it would be enough for his lawyer to prove that a fire did occur and that it was kindled by the engine. He would not be required to prove that any member of the crew was negligent or that the engine or any equipment was defective. The elements of the *prima facie* case (the fire and its source) have been set by practice for this category of claims (see *Argumentation and Debating* [New York, 1945], pp. 247-249).

adequately for their own medical care. This is only the "need," to use the jargon of stock-issue analysis, but we need not go further since it is here that the problem lies. A possible negative response is, "Even if these two contentions are true, the conclusion does not necessarily follow." But a negative speaker will probably want to explain why he does not think that conclusion follows. As a judge, I would much prefer to hear his explanation than to sustain or overrule a conventional challenge as Mr. Markgraf modestly proposes be possible.

What I have tried to illustrate I call the "first level"⁴ of *prima facie* questioning, i.e., is the case considered as a whole acceptable on its face? Each contention in turn may be taken as a unit and considered from the viewpoint, *prima facie*? This *second* level of *prima facie* questioning makes possible the interesting prospect of the affirmative's turning the charge against the negative. For example, a negative may contend that since the income of persons over 65, when one takes into account the fact of tax advantages and lower family size, compares very favorably per capita with the average incomes of persons under 65, therefore, older persons certainly can provide readily for their own medical care. As a matter of fact, I heard a negative make this argument on the proposition referred to above. The affirmative could reply that this argument is not *prima facie*. It assumes that persons under 65 can provide readily for their medical needs, which has not been argued and need not be accepted. Further the argument assumes that the medical needs of both age groups are comparable, another assumption that need not be accepted.

This final illustration raises another point. Lawyers talk about *prima facie* evidence. A third level of *prima facie* questioning asks, "What sort of data are sufficient to establish an alleged fact as a fact?" Again legal usage has some well-established conventions which ordinary argument does not have. An attack which asserts that "the data are not sufficient to establish the fact alleged" always in my opinion needs explanation in ordinary argument.

Thus I would conclude that the term *prima facie* might be useful, but it points to systems of analysis which must be understood and applied. The arguer will be unwise if he assumes that everyone will see a case, contention, or a set of data as he does. Further, he will be unwise if he assumes that his listeners will necessarily share his knowledge of particular schemes of analysis. He will, therefore, not simply peg his refutation on a few technical terms.

It is the job of a debater to make cogent replies to arguments. It is the job of his teachers to help him learn to do so. The task of judges is to evaluate the quality of the debating he does.

Incidentally, although I failed to mention it earlier, I do not believe that Mr. Markgraf made a *prima facie* case for his modest proposal. Would I have been wise to have simply said this at the outset? Well, I chose to make my case on other grounds. But the alternative course certainly would have saved time.

⁴ Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

THE ORIGINS OF INTERCOLLEGIATE FORENSIC COMPETITION IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Often we tend to think and act as though the current way of doing things had always been the accepted way and that any change would be undesirable. Although the tournament structure as we know it has been in use for about 25 years, it should not be assumed that this is the only way to handle a forensic program. Indeed, we may find "new" ideas by examining what has been done in the past. This paper has just such a purpose. Through examination of available records, correspondence, and personal interview, a brief sketch of the competitive forensic program in southern California at the turn of the century has been constructed. This specific case is fairly typical of the collegiate forensic programs of that area.

Around 1900, with the exception of the Prohibition Oratoricals mentioned later, there was no regional or national forensic organization or competition. On the local level, except for the prohibition group, the sole organization and competition was the Intercollegiate Oratorical. The Intercollegiate Oratorical Association was founded in the fall of 1891 when students from three schools which now have D.S.R.—T.K.A. chapters—the University of Southern California, Pomona College, and Occidental College—met and agreed to hold an Intercollegiate Oratorical Contest. The first such contest was held in May, 1892. The contest was the major part, but still only a part, of the evening's program. After an invocation there was a number played by a string quartet. The first oration was presented. This was followed by a declamation, the second oration, and a vocal solo. The third oration was given and followed by a piano solo while the judges reached their decision. The climax of the evening was the announcement of the results and the presentation of a cash award of \$25 to the first-place speaker, a student from U.S.C.

This pattern was followed annually for the next several years. The evening of the Intercollegiate Oratorical Contest among the three schools was a gala occasion. Except for the years when the contest was held in Claremont, a large public hall in downtown Los Angeles was secured for the contest. The hall was lavishly decorated with ivy and floral displays. Audiences for the oratoricals were large, often filling the auditorium to capacity. These audiences included not only almost the entire student bodies of the three schools but also a large representation from the general public. The students usually sat in school groups and were quite vocal in their support of the speakers. Often they were led in cheers especially prepared for the occasion, which in itself led to competition among the three schools. These contests were free to the public until 1901, when a 25 cent admission was charged.

The judging was done by a group of six men, usually ministers and lawyers. Occasionally a public figure such as a senator or congressman took part in the judging. Three judges evaluated the composition from written manuscript. The other three judges evaluated the delivery of the speech. A system of comparative, competitive ranking was used. The winner was the speaker who had the lowest total score when all six rankings were added together. In general, this ranking pattern is followed in judging today.

The Intercollegiate Oratorical was preceded by a local competition in each of the three colleges to choose a representative to compete in the intercol-

legiate contest. For example, at Occidental College, while the Home Oratorical Contests were usually held in April, the month preceding the Intercollegiate Oratorical, preparation for the contest began in the fall. In early October six speakers were chosen for the Home Oratorical. Selection consisted of speakers submitting a statement of their desire to enter the contest. When more than six speakers so announced, the number was cut to the required six by the Oratorical Association with the advice of the faculty. This problem seldom came up due to the fact that a class or a literary society seldom had more than one entry. In fact, in one year when a literary society had two strong orators this fact resulted in the breakup of the society and the formation of two new societies. One of the new groups was even named after the orator around whom it was founded.

The selected speakers spent about six months preparing their speeches.

These speeches were written out and memorized. Most of the six months was spent in composing the speeches. Often various members of the faculty aided the students. The practice of delivery was not as thorough. While some help was available, it was not the extended advising which occurred in regard to the composition. The shortage of aid in regard to delivery is most clearly demonstrated by the petition presented to the Occidental College Faculty by the Student Senate and seconded and forwarded to the trustees by the faculty in March, 1895 requesting that a full-time elocution teacher be appointed to, among other things, aid in the preparation of orators.

Except as indicated above the faculty took no active part in the oratorical contests. All the arrangements for the contests and the administration of them were handled by student organizations. The Intercollegiate Oratorical Association handled the Intercollegiate Oratorical while the college oratorical associations were in charge of the Home Oratoricals. It must be stressed that this student responsibility was total. The students arranged for the auditorium, decorated it, secured judges, and wrote the rules under which the contests were run. Today all these arrangements are almost always handled by faculty forensic directors.

The support for both the Home and the Intercollegiate Oratorical Contests was great. The audiences and their reaction has already been indicated. An enthusiastic student body and college community was vitally interested in the contests. The college papers expressed keen interest. Editorials exhorting the contestants to work harder in their preparation were frequent. By the time the contests were held six or seven months after the earliest articles had appeared, interest had reached a high point due in part to the continuing publicity. Even the college administrations were actively interested in the contests, and the college presidents almost always attended. The Occidental College catalog usually devoted about a page to the oratorical contests and often even included the results from the previous year.

The second competitive forensic event to be held was the Prohibition Oratorical Contests which started in 1903. The same three schools—U.S.C., Pomona, and Occidental—were involved at the outset, and in 1905 Whittier College was added to the group. The contests were run by the college Prohibition Leagues and the Intercollegiate Prohibition League. The total structure was the same as that of the oratoricals with only two important differences. The first was that the cash prizes were larger. In 1908 the winner of the Intercollegiate Prohibition Oratorical was awarded \$100. The second difference was that there was regional and national competition. The winner of the Intercollegiate Prohibition Oratorical in southern California went to the West Coast Prohibition Oratorical, and the winner at that contest

took part in a national contest. The west coast contest was held at the school which had won the previous year. For example, in 1907 the contest was held in Whittier due to the fact that Whittier College won the west coast contest in 1906. Ocean Grove, New Jersey, was the popular site for the national contests.

An interesting feature of the prohibition contests which deserves mention is the administration of the regional and national contests. These contests were not administered by students. However, these administrators were not necessarily members of any academic community. They were, rather, members of the national Prohibition League which sponsored both the college leagues and the contests. Thus again the responsibility for the administration of the contests was taken out of the hands of the faculty. It should be noted that the prohibition contests have a modern counterpart in the Women's Christian Temperance Union oratorical contests. These contests have a local, state, and national structure similar to that of the Prohibition League contests and are administered by the W.C.T.U.

Although it was strictly secondary in importance, competition also took place on many levels in debate. Debate activity was sponsored almost exclusively by the literary societies which were the students' principal center of academic and social extracurricular activity. The usual form of such intrasociety debates was a parliamentary form similar to that of the Oxford Union in which two assigned speakers would present opposing positions on a proposition and the rest of the group would then join in the debate. The principal speakers usually summarized the arguments at the end, and a formal vote would be taken which would accept or reject the proposition and thus determine the winner of the debate. Topics for these debates covered almost the entire field of knowledge from philosophy to science to literature and back again. Topics were both questions of policy and questions of fact: both "should" questions and "is" questions. Often the principal speakers would draw their topics and sides from a hat immediately prior to speaking. Thus, in a real sense these debates were also impromptu speaking contests, particularly for the affirmative speaker. Occasionally the topics were announced in advance.

A more formal type of competitive debate took place between societies. One society would challenge the other to a debate on a given topic. The challenged society would accept and choose the side which it wished to defend. An evening would be arranged, and often an entire college student body would attend. These debates were not conducted in a parliamentary fashion. Each society would select a three-man debate team which would spend the two or three weeks between the challenge and the debate preparing their speeches. The three-man debate form involved three constructive speeches on each side and a single rebuttal for each team. The topics were similar to those used in the intrasociety debates in that they were questions both of policy and fact and that they dealt with a variety of subject matter. Also like the intrasociety debates a topic was usually used only once.

The first intercollegiate debate in southern California was in May, 1905, between Occidental College and Whittier College. The only information recorded about this debate is that Occidental College won. The first debate of which there is a detailed record was in December, 1905 between Occidental College and Pomona College. The debate was arranged for by the Oratorical Association. The Pomona students issued the challenge, and the Occidental students chose the sides. The topic dealt with government subsidy of the merchant marine which, like so many other topics, is still with us today. The

arrangements for the debate to be held at Claremont were completed in October. At that time preliminary intramural contests began to select the three best debaters in each college. The elimination debates, judged by the faculty, did not include rebuttals since the contest was among individuals rather than between teams.

From the time of the original challenge until the debate not a single issue of the weekly Occidental College paper failed to contain at least one article and/or editorial about the debate. This publicity reached a climax in the issue before the debate which contained a story about the debate covering the entire front page and an editorial as well. This publicity campaign was met by an overwhelming lack of interest which was in marked contrast to the student support for both the oratorical contests and the society debates. Only eight Occidental College students, including the three debaters, attended the debate at Claremont, which was probably just as well since the three lawyers judging the debate awarded the decision to Pomona College.

To summarize, a list of some of the major differences between today's practices and the competitive forensic program in southern California around the turn of the century is in order.

(1) As opposed to a program run by faculty members, the forensic program was almost entirely in the hands of the students. With the exception of the regional and national prohibition contests the entire responsibility for the program rested with the students. The total responsibility of the faculty was to offer occasional advice and criticism.

(2) In comparison to the meager public support of the forensic program today, competitive events were as eagerly and actively supported as are today's football games. The forensic program in 1900 was a part of almost every student's life.

(3) Rather than debate, oratory was the important competitive event. Debate was strictly of secondary importance and apparently more important on the intramural than the intercollegiate level.

(4) While today's speakers may compete almost every weekend and speak many times in each competition, the speaker in the 1890's had few opportunities to speak. He might spend an entire year working on an oration or debate speech which would be delivered only once.

(5) Finally, unlike today, the structure in which competitive forensic events took place was relatively simple. There was no network of administering, no professional leagues, organizations, and honor societies, nor, with the exception of the Prohibition League, was there any national topic or competition.

FULL OF SOUND AND FURY?

. . . THE ROLE OF SPEECH IN PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE

TOM JOHNSON

Rockford College

There seems to have developed in America a commonly held myth that discussion or debate on the floor of a deliberative assembly is of little consequence, that for most people the question has been settled long before debate is over; and hence that the role of public speech on the floor of a deliberative body is of little significance.

Since the vast majority of deliberative groups in America are at least remotely modeled after Congress and utilize a parliamentary authority, the procedure which invariably can be traced back to Congressional rules, it may be helpful to examine debate and discussion in Congressional deliberations, treating any conclusions as trends affecting smaller parliamentary groups now and perhaps more significantly in the future.

Near the end of the 1951 session, Matthew Neely, Senator from West Virginia, pointed to a stack of *Congressional Records* piled high upon his desk which included the session record and, with verbal flourish, accused his colleagues of being "irresponsible windbags." Comparing the United States Senate to the tower of Babel, he urged all Senators with speeches at hand to deliver them during the recess "in highly secluded places . . . where the only auditors will be hoot owls, turkey buzzards, and shitpokes. These, when vexed, as they certainly would be, could take the wings of the morning, noon or night and fly far, far away."¹

While the Senator in this case may have been more colorful and candid than his colleagues would be apt to be, essentially this opinion would be shared by a significant percentage of his fellow Senators who are forced, at least theoretically, to listen to the vast amount of verbal discourse which supposedly is debate but for the most part boils down to plain and unadorned talk.

Likewise, discussion within the House of Representatives is oftentimes also of little significance. Thomas B. Reed, the long-time and controversial Speaker of the House, once after listening for hours to a series of seemingly trivial speeches, gave rise to the classic description of what some consider to be the exception rather than the rule. "They never open their mouths," he audibly remarked to the Sergeant at Arms, "without subtracting from the sum of human knowledge."²

These opinions of Congressional speech quality are by no means reserved exclusively for the Congressmen themselves. Raymond Moley, widely read columnist in *Newsweek* magazine, has characterized much Congressional speaking as consisting of "flagrant appeals to the stomach and pocketbook . . . irrelevant lint-picking, and canned, ghost written speeches—all clothed in jargon which only partially covers the stark nakedness of thought." The *Congressional Record*, he continues, consists of little more than speeches

¹ Donald R. Matthews, *U. S. Senators and Their World* (Chapel Hill: The University of N. Carolina Press, 1960), p. 243.

² Edward Boykin, *The Wit and Wisdom of Congress* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls Company, Inc., 1961), p. 165.

"written by hack assistants, embellished by voluminous insertions of stuff clipped from newspapers."³

DeAlva Stanwood Alexander, in his classic volume *History and Procedure of the House of Representatives*, attempts to explain the reason for the quality of speeches by pointing out that a vast amount of oratory on the floor is delivered to an empty house and is intended not to win votes in Congress but rather to win them at home. The custom of allowing a member to revise his remarks for the *Congressional Record* gives him an excellent opportunity to impress the voters at home since the *Record* gives the impression of a full-scale speech before an enthusiastic House. While the *Hansard*, the official record of the British Commons, marks any changes with an asterisk, no such device is used in Congress and hence "much that is spoken is never printed and much that is printed has never been said."⁴

Samuel W. McCall, himself a Congressman, in his *Life of Thomas B. Reed*, states that "the petty practice of editing the report of speeches by inserting 'applause' and 'laughter' in the printed version has made the House appear to be a very stupid sort of body, going wild with enthusiasm over eloquence the cheapest and most fustian, and convulsed with 'laughter' over jokes the point of which years of subsequent study have failed to disclose."⁵

Thus the character of the *Congressional Record* is such that Congressmen at times are apt to use the floor of Congress a means for publicity via the record. Since almost every Congressman is apt to have use for this device, there are seldom any objections to the request for unanimous consent to make a speech on any subject during the "morning hour" which lasts from noon until 2 P.M. Reciprocity seems to rule the day.

The House is the most indulgent of audiences. "It smiles at feeble jokes," one observer remarked, "encourages with occasional applause, and conceals an inclination to laugh if an impassioned orator upsets an inkstand or sets a glass of water flying over his neighbor. Even the bore is held sacred lest in the struggle for relief from tiresome talk the right to free speech be lost."⁶ *Jefferson's Manual*, originally designed as rules of the Senate and since adopted for the House, makes specific provision that "No one is to disturb another in his speech by hissing, coughing, spitting, speaking or whispering to another. . . ."⁷

The story is told that when Mr. Gladstone introduced his first Home Rule Bill on the floor of the British Commons he was forced to complain pathetically that "it struck a fatal blow at the liberties of debate and at the dignity of Parliament." When objection was taken, the opposition prevented his speech by "yelling continuously for one hour."⁸

Thus, in addition to the character of the *Record*, the nonskeptical attitude of the membership itself as developed through history reinforces such speech. While it is apparent that this attitude of indulgence is designed in part to allow members to make speeches for political consumption at home, another cause is a sincere attempt to preserve free speech and prevent overly rapid action.

As early as August of 1789, Elbridge Gerry, representative from Massa-

³ Raymond Moley, "Perspective," *Newsweek*, July 31, 1961, p. 84.

⁴ DeAlva S. Alexander, *History and Procedure of the House of Representatives* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1916), p. 291.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Alexander, *op. cit.*, p. 290.

⁷ *Jefferson's Manual* (House Document No. 413), p. 152.

⁸ Alexander, *loc. cit.*

chusetts, rose during discussion on the Bill of Rights and commented, "The Gentlemen seem in a great hurry to get this business through. I think, Mr. Chairman, it requires further discussion; for my part, I had rather do less business and do it well, than precipitate measures before they are fully understood. . . ." ⁹ This attitude is even more prevalent in the Senate, which points with pride to its reputation as the freest debating society in the world, explaining perhaps why it is extremely hesitant to invoke cloture in a filibuster situation. ¹⁰

Another consideration which may help explain the quality of speeches is their authorship. Needless to say, Congressmen in general and Senators in particular are for the most part extremely busy men and as a result have little time to write speeches. Even those men who do not read from manuscript, as many do, and who "write their own" speeches have most of the work done by staff assistants in their offices. Kenneth Kofmehl, in his recent book *Professional Staffs of Congress*, reports that in many cases even the office does not do much of the actual writing, rather "the office was little more than an assembly plant," receiving parts from administrative agencies, committee staffs, lobbyists, and others. Often, he points out, a staff aid will merely ask for finished speech drafts from several places and combine them. ¹¹ This being the case, it should be a surprise to no one that the quality at times leaves something to be desired.

Consequently, due to personal considerations, the character of the *Congressional Record*, the method of preparation, and the tradition of free speech on the floor of Congress, a good number of speeches are of little significance, change no one's mind, and accomplish very little. Senator Carter Glass went so far as to observe that he never knew of a speech in Congress to change a single vote. ¹² As a result there seems to be a generalization of wide acceptance that floor speaking is all but worthless, and that Congress is no longer the Great American Forum that it once was. This generalization, while perhaps true in a great many cases, is not justified. Indeed, speech can and does play an important role in many instances.

While most of the time Congressional debate lacks color and drama and while in most cases it changes no one's vote, still it does have several important functions. First, it is an important means of communication between members of like view. Oftentimes, especially with controversial legislation, there are two opposing coalitions in operation, and internal communication is difficult. B. M. Gross, in his book *The Legislative Struggle*, states that "signals passing between leaders and followers are by no means always given behind the scenes. Floor statements are often the quickest and most effective method of passing the word around." ¹³

In addition, arguments expressed over and over again often reinforce views of the various members of each coalition. "He really didn't feel strongly about it at first," one staff assistant remarked concerning his boss's attitude toward a controversial bill. Only as the fight progressed and he had to argue for the bill and defend it from attacks, did he become convinced that it should pass. ¹⁴

⁹ Alice Sturgis, *Learning Parliamentary Procedure* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953), p. 59.

¹⁰ John B. Anderson, from an unpublished letter included in the appendix.

¹¹ Kenneth Kofmehl, *Professional Staffs of Congress* (Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1952), p. 172.

¹² Boykin, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

¹³ B. M. Gross, *The Legislative Struggle* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953), p. 366.

¹⁴ Matthews, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

Debate also plays an extremely important role in overall strategic considerations since it is often an effective means for delaying the final vote. In so doing, added time is made available for lobbying and intrahouse negotiations. Delay through debate will also in some instances allow an absent member to come to vote when his vote would be decisive and allow public opinion to apply pressure upon Congressmen to vote a certain way. Likewise, delaying or threatening to delay a bill by extended debate, i.e., filibuster, is often an effective means of obtaining concessions from the bill's supporters. Consequently, in this way, speech by its length if not its subject matter can play a decisive role in determining policy.¹⁵

In addition, debate is extremely important for future consideration. As Gross points out, "For the winning side, help in the task of keeping the campaign alive until victory is won in the other house, in the conference committee, or at the stage of presidential signature."

Gross also observes that the original Congressional debate can have important results after the bill becomes law. "An innocent-sounding explanation of a section or clause, totally ignored by most members of Congress, when first made, may later be used as proof of 'congressional intent' and become highly important in administrative and judicial decisions."¹⁶

"Finally, despite much folklore to the contrary," Donald Matthews observes, ". . . speeches do influence votes." While in most instances debate influences and reinforces beliefs, providing rationalizations for voting a certain way, on almost every bill there are some members who are unable to make up their minds, especially in light of the fact that debates and floor amendments have raised new and unanticipated questions. "A sizable number of senators," Matthews continues, "may be susceptible to a skillful speechmaker who provides them with a simple, appealing, and defensible justification for voting his way."¹⁷

Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen, writing in 1963, stated that "it depends upon the subject matter before the Senate as to whether a speech actually accomplishes a change of viewpoint or sharpens the conviction of a Senate member with respect to a given bill . . . on some occasions a carefully prepared speech, not delivered from manuscript, has actually changed a good many votes and in two cases certainly in the last session determined the fate of the pending bill."¹⁸

In addition to Dirksen there are a great number of excellent speakers in Congress who deliver speeches of significance far above mere political discourse. "To hear a Clinton Anderson expound on atomic energy, a Hubert Humphrey on agricultural problems, a Mike Mansfield on foreign policy, a Eugene Milliken on taxation, a Robert Taft on labor, or a Joseph O'Mahoney on antitrust legislation is to be impressed by their mastery of highly complex and technical fields. It may not be debate, but it is political talk of a very high order."¹⁹

In conclusion then, although many speeches are apt to be little more than "the dreary drip of pointless twaddle,"²⁰ still speech can play an important role even on the floor of such a complex institution as Congress.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Gross, *op. cit.*, p. 367.

¹⁷ Matthews, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

¹⁸ E. M. Dirksen from an unpublished letter included in the appendix.

¹⁹ Matthews, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

²⁰ Alexander, *op. cit.*, p. 296.

The critics of Congressional speech may with justification echo Shakespeare's words describing typical legislative oratory as "a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing,"²¹ to which the speakers could promptly and properly reply with Dirksen himself, "So long as mankind exists, the spoken word in whatever form will be effective in its impact on human conduct."²² And both are right.

²¹ William Shakespeare, *Macbeth*, Act V, Scene 3.

²² Dirksen, *loc. cit.*

A NEW LOOK AT ETHOS AND ETHICAL PROOF

DONALD O. OLSON

JOHN L. PETELLE

A concept reexamined is not a new method of research. Yet in many instances we believe it is not only desirable, but also necessary, to reevaluate old concepts long taken for granted and examine them anew in the light of contemporary thought. Such is the case with the Greek concepts of ethos and ethical proof. What we propose to do is not redefine the terms of ethos and ethical proof but rather approach them in a different manner; to examine them not so much in a rhetorical sense but rather with a sociological point of view, and consider them as essential elements in the communicative process of interaction.

Confusion has long existed over the concepts of ethos and ethical proof as to whether they are synonymous or dichotomous.¹ The term ethos, as it was derived from the ancient Greek language, meant a custom, habit, or usage. To define this term in the same way and put it in 20th-century vernacular, we would say it refers to social mores or class consciousness. The term ethos, however, as we shall point out later, does not carry this same interpretation today.

As we turn to the Greek master of rhetoric, we find the concept of ethos conveyed in rather subtle shades of meaning. Rather than identifying ethos with social custom or widespread acceptance, Aristotle speaks of this phenomenon as being the character of man. The three aspects which most readily gain our belief are intelligence, character, and goodwill.² The character of the man, remarks Aristotle, ". . . is a cause of persuasion when the speech is so uttered as to make him worthy of belief; for as a rule we trust men of probity more, and more quickly, about things in general, while on points outside the realm of exact knowledge, where opinion is divided, we trust them absolutely."³ While the character of the speaker as a factor in creating trust and effecting persuasion may be in part a function of past behavior, this in itself is insufficient, for this trust should be ". . . created by the speech itself, and not left to depend on antecedent impression that the speaker is this or that kind of man."⁴

At this point, therefore, while not explicitly saying so, we can observe how Aristotle is subtly distinguishing between ethos and ethical proof. The ethos, or character of man, contends Aristotle, ". . . is manifested in choice; and choice is related to the end or aims."⁵ Thus, the establishing of character or ethos of man is a function of choice which in turn is dictated by the end or aim of the speaker. The three factors which gain our belief then (intelligence, character, and goodwill), and their relationship to ethos and ethical proof, now become clear. The character of man, in its broadest sense, is ethos. The means by which this ethos is established is through the display of intelligence, goodwill, and the establishing of character itself within the speech. Ethos

¹ William M. Sattler, "Conception of Ethos in Ancient Rhetoric," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, Vol. 14, 1947, p. 55.

² Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, Book II, Chap. 1, Trans. by Lane Cooper, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York: 1932, p. 92.

³ *Ibid.*, Book I, Chap. 2, pp. 8-9.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, Book I, Chap. 8, p. 46.

(character), therefore, is manifested in choice (intelligence, character, and goodwill) and the specific choice, or means, is dictated by the end or aim of the speech, the speaker, or both. We may conclude then, that Aristotle did recognize and acknowledge the separate concepts of ethos and ethical proof.

While the contemporary rhetorician acknowledges and indeed makes use of many of the Aristotelian principles of rhetoric, one may also observe a shift in emphasis in certain areas today. While Aristotle, in his analysis of the speaker and the audience, constructed the beginnings of a psychological framework which pervades the rhetorical situation, he tended to consider the speaker and the audience as separate entities. While we may consider these elements to be separate entities, sociologically speaking we must also consider them as interacting elements. To take this approach then, we must consider ethos and ethical proof as important factors in the total process of communicative interaction. By approaching ethos and ethical proof from a sociological standpoint, we believe the rhetorician can come to a more complete understanding of what these concepts involve in the interaction process today.

In essence, we believe we may speak, in part, of ethos today in essentially the same terms as did Aristotle—the character of the man. But this in itself does not convey to us a greater understanding of what this concept represents. It is through ethos that the speaker represents himself to his audience. To better understand what is involved in this representation, we might examine the meaning of ethos through the philosophy of G. H. Mead's concept of the "I" and "Me." The "Me," according to Mead, is the social self of the individual. It is the self in interaction with society. The individual becomes a truly social being when he begins to be able to differentiate between the "I" and the "Me." In essence, we might contend that the "Me" of the individual is society's image of the individual. Or, we might also say that the "Me" of the individual is Mead's way of expressing the ethos of the individual. A person's full comprehension of the concept of the "Me" involves the ability to take the role of the generalized other. That is, to be able to place himself in society and examine and see himself as society sees him. When the individual is able to do this, then he is able to understand the concept of "Me." An understanding by the speaker of his ethos, image, character, or self, then, involves taking the role of the generalized other and understanding the phenomenon of the "Me." Only when the speaker does this, will he really be cognizant of the audience's reaction to him and to the image he purports to represent. Only then will he be able to analyze himself as to the most effective means by which he may represent himself to his audience.

The difference between the Aristotelian concept of ethos and a sociological concept of ethos, then, is fundamental. While the Aristotelian approach tends to regard ethos as man himself, a sociological interpretation is that ethos is the manifested image of man and in so doing takes into consideration how this image is perceived. Thus, a psychological approach involves a greater degree of emphasis upon the processes of interaction. Another basic difference between a sociological vs. Aristotelian concept of ethos is that through the sociological approach, the image of the speaker, as perceived by the audience, is not only dependent upon the immediate situation but is also, in part, a function of predetermined attitudes and opinions. These attitudes and opinions are, indeed, just as important for the speaker's consideration as anything he may do during the speech. While we should not disclaim the contributions of Aristotle on this subject, we should at the same time be willing to view ethos from a more extended interpretation. Turning to ethical proof, we find that while the sociologist's views on ethos (image) may be more sophisticated

than was Aristotle's, when we consider the concept of ethical proof we find the rhetorician to be more advanced in his thinking.

Proof, maintains Webster's dictionary, ". . . is the effect or result of evidence; evidence is the medium of proof." Ethical proof, therefore, is that type of proof which is the result of ethical evidence or, in the case of the speaker, that evidence which is so designed as to enhance the ethos of the speaker. Ethical proof, according to Aristotle, then, was that evidence (intelligence, character, goodwill) which was presented to augment the ethos (character) of the speaker. To restrict ethical proof to intelligence, character, and goodwill, however, seems to be a rather severe limitation. If ethical proof is that evidence specifically designed to enhance the ethos of the speaker, then might we not consider this term in greater dimension? Might we not, for example, consider ethical proof to be everything that affects the speaker's image before as well as during the speaking situation? Might we not contend that ethos is a function of ethical proof and as such is based upon such factors as who the man is, what he is reputed to be, what he has or has not done, what positions he has held, his dress and manner of appearance, his style of speaking, indeed anything and everything which reinforces, negates, or modifies in some fashion, the audience's image of him?

What we are really saying, then, is that while the field of sociology allows us a more complete or at least a clearer picture of what ethos is, we are unable to derive from the sociologist a set of rules or even general advice as to how one may better control this image before an audience. Aristotle, on the other hand, while expressing a less complete concept of ethos, did attempt to formulate the means by which this ethos could be enhanced. Today's rhetorician, therefore, in attempting to come to a more satisfactory explanation of these concepts of ethos and ethical proof, would do well to make use not only of what the ancients have given us, but add to this what new knowledge we have at our disposal.

For purposes of this paper, then, perhaps we can clearly define what we mean by ethos and ethical proof and establish the relationship between them. Ethos is the mirror of the man; it is his self, his character, his image, in essence his being as it is perceived by an audience. Ethical proof, on the other hand, is the means by which a speaker portrays his image before an audience; it is everything the speaker either consciously or subconsciously does which results in a perception of his image by other persons.

Now that we have defined the phenomenon, we are confronted with the question the rhetorician has been wrestling with for centuries. What process is necessary for the speaker to understand and thus better control his image before a group? Any attempt to construct such a methodology of image control involves a consideration of the concepts of ethos and ethical proof, not so much in a rhetorical sense, but rather that these concepts be considered within a sociological frame of reference. Let us try, then, to sociologically establish the steps required in such a process of image control.

Certainly the most important of these steps involves a factor already mentioned; the need for self-analysis, the need for an awareness of one's image through the process of taking the role of the generalized other and perceiving the self, in as much as it is possible, with the same cognizance as it is perceived by the audience. Such a process is admittedly difficult, but it is not a new process. Rather it is an activity engaged in from the time of early childhood, and is merely a facet (granted a most important one) in the total process of socialization. Take a young child for example. The child makes his needs known from the time of birth. As he grows older, he makes these needs known

with greater degrees of sophistication. For some time, however, the child sees everything with relation only to himself. He is only aware of the existence of an "I." At some point in the maturation process, he becomes aware that the image he holds of himself is not necessarily shared by others. At this stage, the "Me" or social self is born. Essentially, then, this is what the speaker must do in order to realize what image he does present to an audience and in order to present the image he desires. An understanding of one's image, therefore, while requisite to sustained successful communication is not an overnight product. Rather, it is the result of gaining maturity, experience in social interaction of all kinds, understanding of human behavior, and a willingness to closely scrutinize one's self. Self-analysis then, is the first step in the process of image control.

The second step in this sociological process involves a careful audience analysis. Much of the audience's perception of the speaker's image will be based upon the general frame of reference from which that particular group operates. That is, the attitudes, social mores, cultural, social, political, and religious climate will all have played their part in helping this particular group regard the speaker in the manner in which they do. Thus, the second step is for the speaker to understand his audience.

The third step naturally follows from the second. That is, once the speaker has a reasonably sound understanding of himself and of his audience, he must once again take the role of the generalized other and by this process of role taking attempt to make certain generalizations about himself. The more accurate the speaker is in his predictions of what the audience's perception of his image is, the more successful he will be in controlling his image. Accurate role taking, however, is not a simple process and as we previously pointed out, is a result of added maturity, experience in various instances of social interaction, and an understanding of one's self in particular and human behavior in general. Once this point is reached, the speaker can then examine the various means available to him which will allow him to present to his audience the image he desires. As we have defined it, the combination of rhetorical and sociological means the speaker chooses to present his image before an audience becomes his ethical proof.

To enumerate specifically the constituents of ethical proof would be an endless task. As we have already indicated, ethical proof is everything the speaker does in influencing the audience toward his image. The crucial question, therefore, comes to this: Given a particular image the speaker wishes to present, what means does he choose? Again the question has an infinite number of answers, for the specific answer will vary from individual to individual and from situation to situation. Perhaps our point may be illustrated from an episode in Moss Hart's *Act One*. As a nineteen-year-old, lacking experience and confidence, Moss Hart faced an amateur theatrical group one night as their new director. Totally lacking in experience of this nature, Hart could feel the distrust and insecurity the group had in him. Realizing his future relationship with the group depended upon the initial image placed before the troupe, Hart in his best style of role playing, played the part of a tough, caustic director whom he had observed in rehearsal. The ruse was successful and Hart won his audience. Now we are not advocating that the public speaker is an actor; nor are we implying that it is necessary or desirable for him to deceive an audience. Our point is merely that there are means available to the speaker to present the image he desires once he has decided upon what image he wishes to present. The politician, for example, after analyzing his audience and deciding that the "plain folks device"

would be the best approach, continues by identifying with his audience, by establishing common ground with them, and so forth.

The speaker will, of course, attempt to present the image most favorable to his predetermined end. Rhetorically and sociologically, the image he decides to portray will be the result of his self-analysis, his audience analysis, and his role taking. The means through which he intends to represent this self will be those he feels most likely to represent this image most successfully. Behind all of this, however, lurk a number of ethical questions. To what extent does the speaker's end justify his means? To what extent, if any, does the speaker compromise his principles and ethical mores in order to present the image he feels would be most favorable before a given audience? To what extent does the speaker present only a part of what is his true self and allow the other part to be what he believes his audience would like to see? The answers to these questions are not forthcoming from these writers. The answers to these questions must be pondered by each individual and found for himself. We may point out and identify such concepts as ethos and ethical proof; we may analyze them and discuss the processes involved in their application; we may even set a general standard for their use. But we cannot dictate a formula for one to follow, for what the individual does in applying these concepts becomes a basic tenet in his philosophy of communication and in a greater sense, reflects in part, his philosophy of life. As teachers of communication our job is not so much to tell a student what ethos he should attempt to portray, but rather to lead him to an understanding of what is involved in such a concept; as teachers of communication our job is not so much to define for a student what ethical proof he should utilize, but rather to help him understand the relationship between what he does and what he is.

CHAPTER NOTES*

WITTENBERG

The recently elected student officers of Wittenberg's chapter of DSR-TKA are President, David Frederick, Secretary, Georganne Banks, and Historian, Timothy Kuryla. Our faculty advisor is Dr. G. Vernon Kelley, professor of Speech and our Treasurer is faculty member Dr. Raymond Kreuger of the math department.

The Wittenberg chapter recently increased its size to more than fifteen members with the addition of four new members this month. They were sophomore Richard Ashby from Lancaster, Pennsylvania, Marcia Biszantz, a Lakewood, Ohio junior, Robert Fisher, a senior from Crestline, Ohio, and sophomore Janet Love from Beach City, Ohio.

The chapter has already engaged in an active role on the Wittenberg campus. On January 15, we held the first of our semiannual Intramural

Public Speaking contests. They are sponsored by the chapter in conjunction with the department's classes of Elementary public speaking. Each section selects a representative to enter the contest, and the winner is determined through a series of two preliminary rounds and one final contest. Fifteen contestants participated in the first semester contest. The judges for the contest are all faculty members.

Further activities have already been planned. The second public speaking tournament will be held in early May. The society's intramural debate tournament will be held in mid-April. It consists of representative teams from all fraternities and sororities and the independent dorms competing on a chapter-selected topic. To wind up the year's activities the chapter cosponsors the annual Speech Recognition Banquet with the college's chapter of Theta Alpha Phi, dramatics honorary. Here, those who have achieved distinction in speech and drama work during the year are presented with plaques, trophies, and certificates of merit.

* The Editor encourages chapters to send their notes along—with sufficient numbers we will maintain a special section for them.

T.V. DEBATES

Championship Debate 1946 will be shown on some eighty stations of the National Educational Television network beginning the week of April 27. The series of seven programs may be available to commercial stations, as a public service offering, in communities not served by educational television. For information on the series consult your local television stations or write to: Mr. Larry Pickard, National Educational Television, 10 Columbus Circle, New York 19, N. Y. High school and college debate directors should take the initiative in promoting the series in their communities, the seven video tapes may be available to local non-NET stations—they will not be shown automatically, unless teachers and students express their interest and exert influence on local broadcasters.

The programs will appear in the following order:

1. Southwest Missouri State vs. University of Minnesota. Topic: That there should be a uniform national divorce law.
2. Northeastern State College, Oklahoma vs. University of South Caro-

lina. Topic: That gambling should be legalized in all states.

3. Georgetown University vs. Harvard University. Topic: That loyalty oaths for teachers should be abolished.

4. University of Redlands vs. University of the Pacific. Topic: That the federal government should subsidize the performing arts.

5. Semifinals: Midwestern winner vs. Southern winner. Topic: That our free press has too much freedom.

6. Semifinals: Eastern winner vs. Western winner. Topic: That Congress should be given the power to reverse decisions of the Supreme Court.

7. Finals: Winner of Midwest-South debate vs. winner of East vs. West debate. Topic: That prayer should be permitted in public schools.

Each debate is judged by a panel of three prominent AFA directors who render a verdict immediately following the debate. The program, a joint project of the American Forensic Association and the American Student Foundation, is being produced by NET at the studios of WTTW in Chicago.

Watch for May Issue
and the
First D.S.R.-T.K.A. Congress

VOX POP

January 25, 1964

My dear Sir and Editor:

I have read with great interest the first issue of the *Speaker and Gavel*. It promises much for the new day of the two uniting societies. As one who helped bring Delta Sigma Rho to birth in the long ago, I rejoice in the promise of a larger service in the future. As a token of my faith, I enclose five dollars for a subscription, and I promise to be a faithful reader.

At the risk of seeming presumptuous, let me add a bit of biographical data to what Professor Beuhler has reported on pages 12 and 14.¹ I was present, as he notes, at the organization meeting in Chicago on April 13, 1906. My real service to the cause, however, was given before that.

In the autumn of that academic year I was made secretary of the society promoting debates and oratorical contests at Northwestern. In looking through the book, I found an unopened letter from either Trueblood or McDermott addressed to a member of the faculty. Since it was not a personal letter, I opened it and

found there the proposal to establish a society such as ours became. I wrote and made inquiry, asking if plans were still under way.

On receiving an urgent reply to organize the group at Northwestern, I hastily called together the former debaters and orators in or near Evanston and laid the matter before them. They enthusiastically organized there and then and made me the representative to meet with others to form the national society.

This brief word will set the record straight. I do not mean to challenge the statement that there had been correspondence with my one-time teacher Kellogg. If there had been, nothing came of it and the origin of the Northwestern Chapter came about as I have here related.

If I need a sponsor, Kenneth Hance will remember me. I still wear my key along with that of Phi Beta Kappa along with a pendant, all of which I carry each day in a pocket over my heart.

Best wishes to you and all the officers.

Sincerely yours,
Horace B. Smith

¹ E. C. Buehler, "History of Delta Sigma Rho," *Speaker and Gavel*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1963).

Chapters and Sponsors

Code	Chapter Name, Address	Faculty Sponsor
AA	Alabama, University, Ala.	Annabel D. Hagood
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