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





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Speaker and Gavel

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Fourth Annual

NATIONAL FORENSIC CONFERENCE

of

Delta Sigma Rho–Tau Kappa Alpha

Wayne State University
Detroit, Michigan

March 29, 30, 31, April 1, 1967

THE PRESIDENT'S PAGE

Leroy T. Laase

This issue of the President's Page will be devoted to chapter activity. The health of our Society is contingent on the health of the individual chapters. We are always interested in adding new chapters where the outlook for a strong active chapter is promising, but even more important is the condition of our current chapters. We are a large organization containing many chapters in institutions with strong forensics programs but some chapters which are relatively inactive. HOW ACTIVE IS YOUR CHAPTER? There are a few obvious criteria by which you can gauge the strength of your local chapter.

Does your school have a strong forensics program? Do you participate in a number of intercollegiate tournaments, conferences, and other events? Do you have a squad of eager and capable students beyond the mere minimum necessary for interschool competition? Do your students participate in debate and discussion before local civic and community groups, or is your program solely one of intercollegiate competition? Do they ever participate in less conventional and even experimental forms of forensic activity, or is participation limited to traditional intercollegiate tournament debating, oratory, and extemp? How large is your forensics budget? Is it adequate to support a good program? These and similar questions should enable you to evaluate for yourself whether or not you have a strong forensics program. Certainly, forensics programs can be evaluated on more than "win and loss" records. Any institution which runs a strong program is likely to have a creditable competitive record.

Is your chapter active at the local level? A strong forensics program does not necessarily mean an active chapter. Does your chapter handle correspondence from national officers with promptness and efficiency? Do you submit chapter news and notes to the editor? Has anyone from your chapter submitted an article for publication in *Speaker and Gavel?* Have you nominated a distinguished alumnus for consideration for a Distinguished Alumnus Award (see pages 52–53)? Does your chapter hold meetings with some regularity? Does it sponsor intramural competition or a speaker's bureau? Does it assist in the hosting of forensics guests on your campus? Do you elect new members as they become eligible and worthy of membership? Does your chapter hold a formal recognition service or banquet for the initiation of new members and installation of officers? Is your chapter included in your campus annual? Is DSR–TKA represented in your university's honors convocation or in your honors recognition at commencement or in whatever manner members of national honor societies are cited for recognition on your campus? Do you, the chapter officers and sponsor, see that as many of these and similar things transpire as may be appropriate on your campus?

Does your school participate in DSR–TKA regional and national conferences? Every chapter should be represented in the Society-sponsored conferences. Your regional conference is autonomous in accordance with the wishes of the chapters within the region. Its pattern of events, when and where the meeting is held, whether it is open to non-DSR–TKA schools in the region—all these decisions and others rest with your Regional Governor and the chapters within the region. Some regions have strong regional

conferences. Some regions have chosen to designate an already-established event in the region as the regional conference. When chapter sponsors feel that the number of established tournaments in their area preclude the advisability of holding an additional and separate regional conference, such a designation is certainly better than holding no regional conference. The question that concerns me is simply: Are you participating wholeheartedly in your regional conference? Distance involving extensive travel costs might preclude attendance at some national conference, but your president can see no valid reason for not attending your regional conference.

Now that the national conference of the merged Delta Sigma Rho–Tau Kappa Alpha Society is firmly established, its pattern reasonably stabilized, and its location and dates determined well in advance, chapters can plan ahead for the national conferences. Your president urges participation in every national conference to the fullest possible extent. If distance precludes taking as many participants as you would like, try to be there with as many students as you can bring. With the current rotation plan for location of the national conferences, one will be held almost certainly within reasonable travel distance for every chapter every two or three years. Is it not reasonable to expect that chapters participate in the Delta Sigma Rho–Tau Kappa Alpha regional and national conferences?

In reading what I have written for this issue of the President's Page, I detect a "tone" that I don't like. I sound as though I were "needling" the chapters. If, when you evaluate your chapter by the questions I have raised, your chapter measures up quite well to the expectations for an active chapter, I trust you will find the tone of the article not only appropriate but satisfying. On the other hand, if you discover activities your chapter might do better, I hope you will forgive me for "needling" you. All I had intended to do was to ask that every chapter, as fully as possible, conduct a strong forensics program, be active at the local chapter level, and participate in the DSR–TKA regional and national conferences. As the health of the individual chapters improves, so will the general health of the Society be better.

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ARGUMENTATION AND RHETORIC

Ray Lynn Anderson*

> . . . nothing but nonsense and paradox will result if we ask questions about one assertion which are only appropriate and significant when asked about the other.[1]
>
> A. G. N. Flew

The purpose of this essay is to sketch out a profile or conceptual schema for that area of human knowledge sometimes called "argumentation." My specific task is three-fold: (1) to define the notion of "argument" and subsequently "argumentation," (2) to determine the general province of argumentation, and finally (3) to point out some of the ways in which rhetorical argumentation differs from philosophical and scientific argumentation. Some of the distinctions made in this essay are debatable. However, the nature of the paper itself is not argumentative but merely attempts to develop a conceptual outline for argumentation that is consistent with how argument is used, evaluated, and theorized about by most disciplines and one that students of rhetoric and public address can live with.

To begin, "What is an argument?" The answer to this question must be sufficiently broad to include that argument used in the several different academic disciplines. Irving Copi presents one possible definition. He claims an "argument" is "any group of propositions of which one is claimed to follow from the others, which are regarded as providing evidence for the truth of that one."[2] The trouble with this sort of definition is that the conclusions to which it refers must necessarily be of a restricted kind, i.e., they must be reducible to true or false claims. Many conclusions which are drawn from supporting propositions are evaluative and hence not properly reducible to a specific truth status. Thus the needed broadness does not appear in this definition. The notion of "argument" which appears to be the most reasonable to this writer comes from the ordinary language philosopher Stephen Toulmin. Toulmin believes that the concept of "argument" covers every case where conclusions are backed by reasons of one sort or another.[3] The root concepts in argument, according to Toulmin and I think most scholars, are (a) support (premises or data), (b) conclusion (claim), and (c) inference (the leap from premise to conclusion). The concept of "argument" implies the use of language, but the language (symbol system) used need not be presented publicly in oral or written form. People in fact do seem to draw conclusions subjectively from support during periods of reflection.

The next question for consideration is "What is argumentation?" The meaning of the term "argumentation" must be related directly to the meaning of the generic term "argument." "Argumentation," therefore, seems

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[1] "Introduction," *Essays on Logic and Language*, ed. Anthony Flew (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1961), p. 7.

[2] *Introduction to Logic* (New York: Macmillan, 1961), p. 7.

[3] See J. C. Cooley, "On Mr. Toulmin's Revolution in Logic," *The Journal of Philosophy*, LVI (March, 1959), 297, and Stephen Toulmin, *The Uses of Argument* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), pp. 11–15.

to refer to the study or use of the process, which implicitly entails the specific notions of support, conclusion, and inference, wherein claims are backed by reasons. In short, "argumentation" is the study or use of the process of making arguments.

The general province or limits of "argumentation" deal with two distinct but related activities. The first concerns the variety of approaches available in studying argument. The second concerns the different situations in which argument is used.

The study of argumentation, to borrow Natanson's distinction concerning the limits of rhetoric, can be viewed as dimensional or multi-leveled. The student could study the argumentative intention of discourse, the techniques of argument, the general rationale of argument, or finally the philosophy of argument.[4] Moreover, the same levels of inquiry could be developed in studying separately the distinct root concepts of argument (evidence, conclusions, and inference). The variety of approaches available in studying argument imply that the province of argumentation is exceedingly broad.

Arguments may be employed in a number of different ways and in a large variety of situations. Everyone in his daily life will at times draw conclusions which are backed by certain reasons (evidence in its broadest sense). The very business of the scientist is to draw and support conclusions about the world. The literary critic is employed only because he makes and supports specific claims about the quality of certain pieces of literature. In recognizing the variety of situations wherein arguments are used, Brockriede and Ehninger state, "The world of argument is vast, one seemingly without end. Arguments arise in one realm, are resolved, and appear and reappear in others; and new arguments appear."[5] Therefore, the multi-leveled approach available in studying argument and the variety of different situations in which the process of making arguments is employed suggests that argumentation is an instrumental discipline.[6] The province of argumentation extends to any human activity which at times studies or uses the process for rationally establishing conclusions.

The approach one takes in using arguments and hence the way he conceives of argumentation is determined largely by the purposes for which argument is employed. The purpose for using any argument is to establish a claim of some kind. The philosopher, the scientist, and the rhetorician employ argument to establish different kinds of claims. The specific nature of the claim to be established dictates the way in which the arguer uses and theorizes about argumentation. Therefore, in demonstrating how rhetorical argumentation differs from other types I shall maintain that the type of claim to be upheld and the concerns which arise from that claim are the factors which distinguish one type of argument from another and which enable the scholar to distinguish rhetorical argumentation from the argumentation employed by the philosopher or scientist.

"Philosophical argumentation" can be distinguished from the general notion of "argumentation" in a rather specific fashion. The aim of "philo-

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[4] Maurice Natanson, "The Limits of Rhetoric," *Quarterly Journal of Speech,* XLI (April, 1955), 139.

[5] "Toulmin on Argument: An Interpretation and Application," *Quarterly Journal of Speech,* XLVI (February, 1960), 53.

[6] Donald C. Bryant, "Rhetoric: Its Functions and Its Scope," *Quarterly Journal of Speech,* XXXIX (December, 1953), 424.

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sophical argumentation" is to confirm conclusions about oneself.[7] The old Socratic-Platonic notion of "know thyself first" is central to the way the philosopher uses argument. The different branches of philosophic inquiry all concern such self-oriented questions as: "How should I act in relation to others?" "What are the limits of my knowledge?" and "What do I know about the world which goes beyond scientific inquiry?" The conclusions the philosopher wishes to establish about himself dictates the sort of argument he will commonly employ. The support or content for the philosopher's arguments about himself must necessarily exist within the self. Hence, as Natanson says, "Philosophical arguments are essentially *a priori* in character; i.e., they are not about matters of fact."[8] Because the philosopher seeks to confirm a claim about himself, he must (contrary to Natanson's suggestion)[9] never conceal his argumentative techniques. To philosophize truly the philosopher must make his argumentative methodology (inferential leaps) as much available for inspection as his conclusions and explicitly stated *a priori* evidence. If the philosopher's techniques are grounded in disguise, he is not only in danger of misleading his colleagues but also himself. The individual who willingly disguises his argumentative techniques is not truthfully seeking self-knowledge from his *a priori* evidence and hence is not a philosopher. Similarly, the individual who unknowingly disguises his inferential techniques is not looking for self-knowledge in a sophisticated fashion and is therefore a poor philosopher.

The philosopher's approach to argumentation is represented in a limited sense by the activities of the professional logician. The logician makes the assumption (when he operates in a formal fashion) that all the evidence necessary for his task is independent of the world (*a priori* evidence). He then constructs a system of topic neutral logical connectives within which he arbitrarily assigns the truth status of the component parts of his arguments in order to explore systematically all of the possible inferential leaps available given those logical connectives.[10] His job is basically syntactical. His evidence is *a priori* in character and his inferential techniques are by definition public. So it is (roughly) with any type of philosopher when he uses argument. The philosopher uses argument to establish a claim about himself, and his argumentative function is made clear by his implied statement, "Given this *a priori* evidence about the self and this public inferential leap, the following claim about the self seems warranted." Hence, philosophical argumentation is characterized by (1) the type of claim it seeks to establish (self-knowledge) which (2) demands a specific kind of evidence (*a priori*) and (3) a specific type of inference (public deduction).

The species of "scientific argumentation" stands out from the genus "argumentation" in a rather special way. The aim of scientific argumentation is inherently different from that of philosophical argumentation. The basic goal of scientific argumentation is to establish conclusions about the world. Consequently, the content of scientific arguments must be dependent upon the world itself. The premises and conclusions of scientific arguments must be of an empirical nature (*a posteriori*). The scientist realizes that

[7] Maurice Natanson, "Rhetoric and Philosophical Argumentation," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, XLVIII (February, 1962), 27.

[8] *Ibid.*, 24.

[9] *Ibid.*, 25.

[10] John Dewey, "On Logic," *Readings in Twentieth-Century Philosophy*, ed. William Alston and George Naknikian (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 165–68.

if he is to establish his claim about the world from his factual data, then the accuracy of that data must be determined. Unlike the philosopher who may randomly draw from his *a priori* evidence, the scientist has developed careful standards for gathering and evaluating factual data.[11] These standards range from rules dealing with observational techniques to design features for particular experimental studies.

The type of claim which the scientist wishes to prove also determines the kind of inferences he makes. The philosopher's *a priori* data provided him with all of the needed evidence to draw his conclusion (the claim was contained in the premises). His inferential leap was therefore deductive. The scientist, however, realizes that the generalizations he makes about the world usually cover more than the evidence used in support of those generalizations.[12] Because complete evidence for the claim is not contained in his argument's premises, the scientist must resort to an inductive inferential leap. To make his inferential leap in the most reasonable fashion the scientist resorts to an independent logical standard. He usually follows the rules of inductive logic to increase the probabilities that his inferential leap is justifiable.[13] Thus scientific argumentation is characterized by (1) the type of claim it seeks to establish (factual) which (2) demands a certain type of evidence (empirical) and (3) a particular type of inference (public induction). The scientist's claim can be rejected if his evidence can be shown to be inadequate (false or inconclusive statement of fact) or if his inferential leap is improper or unclear. Most philosophical arguments are rejected on the basis of a flaw in the inferential leap employed since the philosopher's *a priori* evidence is ultimately only accessible to the philosopher-arguer himself.

"Rhetorical argumentation" must be regarded as a more encompassing notion than either scientific or philosophical argumentation. The rhetorician may, and often does, use philosophical or scientific arguments in his activities. However, the good scientist or philosopher would probably not employ the types of arguments which can be uniquely associated with rhetoric. This situation can be clarified with an analysis of the rhetorician's general aim in using argument. Karl Wallace explains the rhetorician's goal in using argument when he asserts that the very substance of rhetoric has to do with presenting "good reasons" as proof for "values and value-judgments, i.e., with what is held to be good."[14] This judgment seems to be supported by Aristotle's contention that the enthymeme (rhetorical argument as traditionally conceived) was ultimately based upon the "common conception of good."[15] Thus the rhetorician uses argument to establish value claims.

[11] See Max Black, "Observation and Experiment," *Philosophic Problems*, ed. Maurice Mandelbaum, *et al.* (New York: Macmillan, 1957), p. 22, and Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, "What is Scientific Method?" *Philosophic Problems*, pp. 47–49.

[12] Bertrand Russell, "On Introduction," *Philosophic Problems*, p. 84.

[13] See W. T. Jones, *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1952), II, 605-09, 970, and Arthur Pap, *The Philosophy of Science* (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), pp. 139–51.

[14] "The Substance of Rhetoric: Good Reasons," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, XLIX (October, 1963), 248.

[15] See Edward D. Steele, "Social Values, the Enthymeme and Speech Criticism," *Western Speech*, XXVI (Spring, 1962), 70, and Edward D. Steele and W. Charles Redding, "The American Value System: Premises for Persuasion," *Western Speech*, XXVI (Spring, 1962), 83–92.

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The "good reasons" or evidence used in supporting a value claim must be contingent upon what is acceptable to the rhetorician's specific audience. The claim that the rhetorician wishes to establish does not demand any particular kind of evidence. Some audiences may prefer factual evidence while others may respond more favorably to non-factual evidence as support for the same value claim. The rhetorician can only determine what evidence is appropriate by examining the existing epistemological assumptions of his intended audience. He must know what sorts of evidence they prefer. Needless to say, the rhetorician has no stable standard to follow in selecting his supporting materials. Many argumentation and public speaking textbooks include an analysis of different types of evidence or supporting material. Almost without exception such texts state or suggest that the speaker should select that type of supporting material which is most meaningful to his intended audience.[16]

Unlike that of the philosopher or scientist, the claim the rhetorician wishes to establish does not dictate a specific type of inference. The speaker may use such forms of reasoning as deduction, induction, the syllogism (but almost never does), analogy, correlation, etc. Baird suggests that the type of inference used by the rhetorician also depends upon a specific audience and social context. To use Baird's own words, "Logic (inferential leaps) need to be fused with the social setting that gives character to the thought."[17] Baird's observation makes sense to this writer.

Another aspect of how the rhetorician makes inferences while using argument deserves our attention. Since those arguments uniquely rhetorical contain value statements, traditional systems of logic (everything from the syllogism through the predicate calculus), which are workable for factual statements, are not particularly helpful in analyzing rhetorical arguments. Indeed, the validity (correctness of the inferential leap) of a rhetorical argument may never be clear. There has been much confusion on this issue in the past. For example, Simmons notes that "if validity is at issue, then criticism concerns the logical connectives between premises and conclusions."[18] From this statement Simmons mistakenly contends that all arguments are analyzable in terms of the concept of validity. This is not necessarily the case with arguments containing value statements (rhetorical arguments). Those logical connectives to which Simmons refers were constructed for factual statements and only factual statements. No one heretofore has developed a logic that can adequately specify the formal relations between value statements. Value statements do not lend themselves to an either/or conception (either they are acceptable or unacceptable) like factual statements (which can be conceived of as either true or false). Value statements are dimensional and are acceptable or unacceptable in many varying degrees. Hence, the relationships between the degrees of acceptability of one group of value statements and another value statement is much more difficult to calculate than the relationship between the truth or falsity of factual statements. The language of values is much

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[16] See James H. McBurney and Glen E. Mills, *Argumentation and Debate* (New York: Macmillan, 1964), pp. 91–115, and Glen E. Mills, *Reason in Controversy* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1964), pp. 97–125.

[17] "Speech and the 'New' Philosophies," *Central States Speech Journal,* XIII (Autumn, 1962), 145.

[18] James R. Simmons, "The Nature of Argumentation," *Speech Monographs,* XXVII (November, 1960), 348.

richer than that of science, and logical connectives for value statements within an argument are much more difficult to find (perhaps impossible). J. J. C. Smart has noted that the evaluative richness of the vocabularies of natural languages such as French and English makes them unsuitable for scientific and logical purposes, "because the process of calculation is not possible in natural language."[19]

The rhetorician certainly can present valid arguments. But he may not always know the validity of his arguments with the same degree of precision as the scientist or logician. The rhetorician's inferences may not be open for inspection like those of the skilled philosopher or competent scientist. An inability to calculate the logical relations within rhetorical argument does not imply that rhetorical argumentation, as Johnstone claims,[20] is grounded in disguise. To claim that the rhetorician disguises his inferential leaps is to say that he purposefully intends to mislead his audience. In truth, the sort of language with which the rhetorician deals tends to make the inferential leaps in rhetorical argument somewhat obscure. This inherent inferential ambiguity of rhetorical arguments does, however, pave the way for the unethical rhetorician who wishes to deceive his audience. Primarily because of the innate ambiguity of the rhetorician's inference leap, the good philosopher would not wish to use rhetorical argument. The scientist would tend to reject rhetorical argument because the claim he (as a scientist) wishes to establish must be non-evaluative and hence does not allow for value statements as relevant supporting materials.

In conclusion, the student who wants to understand the nature, function, and scope of rhetorical argumentation would do well to heed the words of A. G. N. Flew when he stated, "Nothing but nonsense and paradox will result if we ask questions about one assertion which are only appropriate and significant when asked about the other."[21] The questions one should ask about rhetorical argument must be determined by the sort of claims rhetoricians uniquely make. The type of claim the philosopher wishes to support determines how he uses and conceives of argument. The same is true of the scientist. And the same must be said of the rhetorician. Unfortunately, the claim the rhetorician wishes to support gives him less insight into what sort of evidence or inference he ought to employ. Consistent success in using argument, therefore, may be more difficult to come by for the rhetorician-arguer than for the philosophic or scientific arguers. When the student recognizes this fact, he is beginning to ask some of the right kinds of questions about rhetorical argumentation.

[19] "Theory Construction," *Essays on Logic and Language*, p. 222.

[20] Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., *Philosophy and Argument* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1959), pp. 46–48.

[21] Flew, p. 7.

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ON REVISING THE TRADITIONAL DEBATE FORMAT

RICHARD J. CRAWFORD*

The traditional ten-five debate format has weathered some years of criticism and apparently has achieved wide acceptance. There have been, of course, numerous adaptations, but the traditional structure used at West Point and other national tournaments approaches the "standard." Specifically, according to a 1964 survey, approximately 83% of the debate tournaments held in this country employed the traditional format, only 8% used a cross-examination plan, and other tournaments either used a combination of these two or some other entirely different structure.[1]

The claim here is that the orthodox format, although popular, has serious shortcomings and that certain simple modifications could be adopted which would result in a substantial improvement.

One is led to look for shortcomings in the format primarily because of the imbalance of negative wins over affirmative wins during a given debate season. Admittedly, this imbalance varies markedly from team to team, from proposition to proposition, and from early to late season; but a pattern of negative victories does emerge from an examination of the contests between two high-level, equally-matched teams. Doubtless, the clearly superior team can expect to win regardless of format; however, in the final elimination rounds of a quality tournament, often no team is clearly superior.

A look at the past four years of elimination rounds at West Point, for example, suggests the pattern. In the final rounds of each of those years, the negative won in excess of the affirmative, and of those sixty elimination rounds (1963 through 1966) the affirmative side won twenty-four as compared with thirty-six by the negative side. The imbalance appears significant as a pattern at West Point, although excessive negative victories in other national tournaments are often much more dramatic.[2]

That many factors contribute to such an occurrence cannot be denied, but the contention here is that the debate format is one of those factors—a factor which is both constant and controllable. Seemingly, the deficiency of the traditional format is lodged in the rebuttal structure. The affirmative side seems to have a structural disadvantage to overcome before winning a close decision. There are at least two reasons why: (1) the first affirmative rebuttal speaker is asked to overcome in five minutes what has taken fifteen minutes to establish and (2) the final affirmative rebuttal speech, in practice, is often given less weight than the final negative rebuttal.

The first of these weaknesses arises merely because the negative side is allowed two uninterrupted speeches. This "negative block" allows a skillful team to launch such an attack and establish so many argumentative obstacles

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* Mr. Crawford is Director of Forensics and Assistant Professor of Speech at Colorado State College.

[1] Donald W. Klopf, "Practices in Intercollegiate Speech Tournaments," *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, I (May, 1964), 50.

[2] One such tournament which dramatized this win-loss disparity was the 1965 United States Air Force tournament, held at Colorado Springs. Once quarterfinals were reached, only *one* affirmative victory occurred. In addition, the final debate saw two teams matched together which had met previously in a preliminary round—the negative won this final debate but had been defeated in the preliminaries by the same team when the sides had been reversed.

that the first affirmative rebuttal speaker is often left to the mercy of the critic who must ask: "Did the first affirmative do the best he could under the circumstances?" Thus, the negative block sometimes puts the contest into a framework approaching a "numbers game." The critic, one could argue, should not be put in the position of giving the affirmative the benefit of the doubt when the fault lies with the format. The negative block alone probably accounts for some of the negative-affirmative win-loss imbalance.

The second rebuttal-format weakness obviously varies considerably from one individual critic to another; nevertheless, few could deny the assertion that a substantial number of highly-qualified debate critics only listen with "half an ear" to the last rebuttal speech.[3] Indeed, common written and oral criticisms received by affirmative teams point to the last speech as being "too late" for a given answer, that the first affirmative rebuttal speaker must approach a completion of his team's case defense. The net result is that something less than full weight is given the last speech; yet the final negative rebuttal (as well as every other speech in the debate) is attended with an ear to "counting" every argument. Again, the critic should not be forced to make apologies for or compensate for a weakness which may be written into the format.

Actually, these two weaknesses are so interrelated that the second is true only if the first is true. However, the validity of both criticisms rests upon the extent to which debate critics demand that the first affirmative rebuttal speaker performs the difficult task of answering most, if not all, the negative objections. A study conducted in 1961 indicated that a majority of coaches make just such a demand. This survey, which represented the opinion of fifty-seven coaches, revealed that 88% of the coaches said that they "would penalize an affirmative team that failed to refute negative evils in the first affirmative rebuttal speech," while only 12% said they would inflict no such penalty.[4] Further, 82% of the coaches indicated that they would "penalize an affirmative team for withholding until the final rebuttal speech a refutation to one or more vital issues," while only 11% said they would not so penalize.[5]

Apparently, most critics expect the first affirmative rebuttal speaker to provide a rather comprehensive defense of his case. Furthermore, the final rebuttal speech seemingly is given less weight, particularly if the critic felt that a specific issue should have been handled earlier.

These limitations are intensified with regard to a win-loss imbalance if there is validity in the common charge that the affirmative already has the more difficult burden in a debate.[6] Perhaps the truth is that the affirmative side is plagued by both side and format.

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[3] Experimental data concerning the effectiveness of "recency" in persuasion would probably apply if the audience were large and untrained in argumentation but likely has little or no application to the unique debate-critic situation.

[4] Herbert L. James, "Standards for Judging Refutation," *The AFA Register*, IX (Spring, 1961), 21.

[5] *Ibid.*, 22.

[6] Of course, the affirmative does enjoy some advantages such as the right to define terms and set the direction of the debate, but this does not seem to be sufficient to provide an adequate balance. The mere act of opening the debate has sometimes been listed as an affirmative advantage, but that the opening speaker does not have a chance to demonstrate ability in refutation may in practice reduce that "opportunity" to a simple disadvantage.

If these limitations are real and significant, they may possibly be overcome by some simple revisions in the design of the rebuttal speeches. Without changing the traditional time and order of the four constructive speeches, the following are three options for modification of the rebuttal structure:

Alternative A

First rebuttal by first affirmative	5 min.
Second rebuttal by first negative	5 min.
Third rebuttal by second affirmative	4 min.
Fourth rebuttal by second negative	5 min.
Final rebuttal by either affirmative	2 min.

Alternative B

First rebuttal by first affirmative	3 min.
Second rebuttal by first negative	5 min.
Third rebuttal by second affirmative	7 min.
Final rebuttal by second negative	5 min.

Alternative C

First rebuttal by first negative	3 min.
Second rebuttal by first affirmative	7 min.
Third rebuttal by second negative	7 min.
Final rebuttal by second affirmative	3 min.

Alternative "A" immediately rids the debate of the negative fifteen-minute block. The result is that the pattern of alternating affirmative and negative speeches continues to the very end of the debate. This procedure probably has merit for its own sake, since two consecutive speeches on the same side seem somewhat forced and artificial in format (and are certainly difficult to explain to someone who has not been conditioned to accept such an arrangement). Next, alternative "A" would add an additional short closing rebuttal for the purpose of observing the tradition of allowing the affirmative to close the argument. There are probably no good reasons why four speeches are better than five and why adding an additional minute to the total debate to give the affirmative an adequate closing speech would not be desirable. If, as indicated above, the final speech is given less weight than any other debate speech, the problem would be minimized, if not eliminated, using this format. And finally, if this rebuttal pattern did produce a more evenly balanced contest, it would do so with a minimal disruption of the traditional method and neither strategy nor preparation should be affected significantly.

Alternative "B" accomplishes the same goal as the above suggestion but gives the first affirmative rebuttal speaker only a short three-minute speech to offset the negative constructive attack before the major thrust of the rebuttal speeches begins. In addition, this arrangement gives the last affirmative speaker the longest rebuttal speech in an effort to allow him sufficient time to meet all negative objections. Alternative "B" may seem rather unorthodox at first because the negative is allowed to close the debate, but there is probably no fundamental reason why this is undesirable. That it would not be allowed in the courtroom is hardly a reason to dismiss the practice in academic debate.

Alternative "C" asks for the least modification of the traditional format by keeping the normal rebuttal order while altering the time limits. The effort here is simply to shorten the negative block and lengthen the affirma-

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THE CASE FOR ABOLISHING *THE* NATIONAL DEBATE TOURNAMENT

THOMAS LUDLUM*

Editor's Note: Mr. Ludlum's essay was written when the decision concerning whether the national tournament sponsored by the U. S. Military Academy should be continued under new sponsorship had not yet been made. Such a tournament will be held in 1967. *Speaker and Gavel* is printing this essay because it represents a point of view as worth considering after the policy decision has been made as before it. We welcome the opportunity to publish the expression of other opinions on this question, from student members of the Society as well as from faculty sponsors.

On April 5, 1966, Colonel G. A. Lincoln of the United States Military Academy addressed a letter to the chairmen of the district committees for the West Point National Debate Tournament. Among other comments, Colonel Lincoln wrote: "The Military Academy has concluded that we should no longer sponsor the National Debate Tournament. . . . Our appraisal of the changing times has led to the judgment that this twentieth meeting should close our sponsorship."[1]

Dr. George Ziegelmueller, President of the American Forensic Association, subsequently notified the Executive Council of the AFA of these developments and solicited their opinions concerning the continuance of the national tournament under sponsorship of that association. In reply to his letter, I wrote expressing my view that the demise of "The National Tournament" was in the best interest of collegiate debate. I submitted copies of my letter to members of the executive council of AFA, the sponsors of DSR–TKA chapters, and my colleagues in Ohio.

That letter and the subsequent responses from those forensic directors have led to the thesis of this paper: that the directors of forensics of the colleges and universities of the U. S. should view the end of "the national tournament" as a propitious development and do all in their power to insure that no similar event replaces it. Such a thesis is consistent both with a belief in debate as a competitive activity and in tournaments as channels for this competitive activity. The fifteen replies I received to my letter, both the twelve affirming my position and the three contending with that position, recognized this consistency.

Neither does this thesis imply criticism of the Academy for initiating the tournament or hosting it in the past. The West Point National Tournament has brought about many desirable changes in debate in the United States. It has provided impetus for many national and international tournaments. It has encouraged high standards of competition. It has stimulated interest in two-man debate. However, the fact that the U. S. Military Academy itself recognized the need for change after twenty years of sponsorship speaks volumes. Again the Academy has contributed to growth and change in debate.

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* Mr. Ludlum is Director of Forensics, Professor of Speech, and Chairman of the Department at Capital University. He is also a former regional governor of DSR–TKA.

[1] George Ziegelmueller, "A Report on Matters Pertaining to the Discontinuation of the West Point National Debate Tournament" (unpublished communication), p. 1.

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Why, then, should we not replace this *one* national tournament with another *one* national tournament?

First, because such a tournament contributes to a misleading concept of intercollegiate debate. The type of world in which we live and communicate calls for a multiplicity of victories in many combats and not just one final achievement over a supreme foe. The national champion football team may be decided in the Rose Bowl, but many coaches, fans, and writers would demur. The national champion basketball team may be decided by the NCAA tournament. However, in many of my correspondents' opinions the best debate team (perhaps even the best athletic team) is the one which consistently does well in a variety of national competition, throughout the United States, in any given academic year.

Our graduates, the products of our forensics programs (with the possible exception of those who enter coaching), will never find it possible to aim for, let alone achieve, final permanent recognition as a champion *communicator* in one competitive event of short duration. Thus, the national tournament contributes to a misconception of the nature of debate as an oral communication activity.

Second, we should not replace "the national tournament" because it detracts from other forensic events. There are a number of fine debate tournaments now available. Among the two-man tournaments are the Ohio State Tournament, the Owen Coon Invitational, the Harvard Invitational, and the Heart of America Tournament. In addition, fine four-man tournaments offer a variety of formats from the Florida Invitational Tourney to Pitts' Cross-Exam Tournament. The special public debate series many schools sponsor also deserve mention. Many of these events were not available twenty years ago when the West Point Tournament was initiated.

In addition to these open and closed invitationals, our national fraternities, DSR–TKA and Pi Kappa Delta, have national conferences of long and distinguished standing which feature high calibre competition in both two- and four-man debate. Many states have traditional tournaments which once were viewed as important events toward which to strive.

That same "national tournament" which twenty years ago contributed to the growth and development of these events now detracts from their significance. After all, why should other tournaments be taken seriously when special "regional" tournaments qualify those teams which will have "*the*" opportunity to be "*the* national champion?" Thus the invitationals, national conferences, and state tournaments become at best practice qualifiers, losing their individual importance. In fact, the four-man tournaments become regarded as deterrents to success rather than even contributing practices.

Third, the replacement of "the national tournament" is unwise because the limited number participating does not justify the expense. It is astonishing to find that the United States Military Academy has been investing $15,000 to $20,000 a year in this event.[2] Certainly, the annual per capita expenditure for thirty-eight qualifying teams, a total of seventy-six students, is high. Furthermore, a study of the information in Windes and Kruger's *Championship Debating*[3] throws additional light on fourteen years of operation of the National Tournament from 1947 through 1960. To compare the number of schools participating in that tournament during those fourteen

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[2] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[3] Russell R. Windes and Arthur N. Kruger, *Championship Debating* (Portland, Maine: J. Weston Walch, 1961).

years (158) with the number of schools surveyed by the Academy in one year (1,247) is probably unfair. But one may reasonably compare the 158 participating schools with the 475 spaces available during those fourteen years. Moreover, 89 of these schools account for only 113 of these spaces, an average of 1.2 spaces. The other 69 schools account for 362 spaces, an average of over 5.2 spaces. The efficiency of the expenditure seems doubtful.

Thus, the directors of forensics of the colleges and universities of the United States are faced with a vital decision. They may accept the decision of the United States Military Academy with grateful appreciation and move forward to a more realistic program of forensics competition. Or they may try to patch together our outworn concept of "one national tournament" and the "one national champion" it produces.

TRADITIONAL DEBATE FORMAT

(Continued from page 44)

tive's first response to it. Further, this system decreases the time allotment of the last speech, thereby giving it less significance by format to correspond with the reduced attention it has sometimes received in practice.

Alternative "C" appears to be a good starting place for experimentation, and for that reason it will be tried in senior division debate at the annual "Forensic Freeze" tournament, held this year on January 13 and 14, 1967. The experiment will be carried on by the host school, Colorado State College, Greeley, Colorado. Both judges and contestants will be asked to evaluate the new format and, hopefully, some new insights will result from the trial.

That no format can be found which is superior to the one now in use for academic debate is a possibility. However, a willingness to "tamper" with the traditional may well produce an improved debate structure. The various modifications suggested here seem to merit a trial, and, of course, many other modifications could be proposed. Other tournament directors should be encouraged to experiment with the format, for only a minimal amount of effort is required to initiate such an undertaking, and in the end academic debate may be the winner.

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CURRENT CRITICISM

Edited by Donald L. Torrence

BROOKE'S DILEMMA

Harry P. Kerr*

Edward W. Brooke has on him the mark of greatness.

Massachusetts' new junior Senator is the most promising political figure to emerge from the Bay State in recent years—more promising at this point in their respective careers than John F. Kennedy. The steps he chooses to take in attempting to traverse the road to national prominence will almost certainly constitute one of the fascinating political stories of the sixties. And this would be true even if Brooke were not a Negro.

Brooke's style in state politics is probably a reliable indicator of the image he will try to develop in Washington. Whether or not his success in Massachusetts can be duplicated on a national scale is much less certain.

Some believe that Brooke gained support because he is a Negro, that Brooke votes have been conscience votes (and cheap penance at that since Brooke repudiates militant Negro organizations). Perhaps so, but I can find little direct or indirect confirmation in talking with voters. White voters who are asked what effect Brooke's color has on their feelings toward him most often respond: "I don't think of Brooke as a Negro."

The public statement may not be seriously at odds with the truth. Brooke's reputation for honesty and effectiveness has largely submerged the fact of his race. In eighteen months as chairman of Boston's watchdog Finance Commission and four subsequent years as Attorney General of the Commonwealth, he prosecuted venal politicians, made graft more dangerous by revising procedures for handling state funds, exposed contractors who substituted covert payments for cement, and all the while remained untouched by any hint of dishonesty or political maneuvering.

An electorate which has learned the expensive way to regard politicians with suspicion and which cannot be dissuaded that too many hands are in the statehouse till responded to Brooke's atypical record with overwhelming support. His term as Finance Commission chairman earned 1,143,065 votes and a plurality of 259,355 in his first campaign for the office of Attorney General in 1962. The incumbent Republican governor, John A. Volpe, was defeated by Endicott Peabody that year and no other Republican was elected to state-wide office.

In 1964 Volpe defeated Peabody handily, but Brooke led the ticket with 1,543,900 votes and a plurality of 797,510, the largest achieved by any Republican in the history of Massachusetts. Brooke carried every city in the state and all but two of its towns.

Volpe has been reelected governor again this year with a total vote estimated at slightly over 1,250,000 and a plurality of about 550,000. Brooke's margin over Peabody in the senatorial race was smaller but still substantial: a plurality of about 430,000 and a total vote just over 1,200,000. (The extent to which Massachusetts avoided a "white backlash," incidentally, is indicated by the fact that fewer than 5,000 of the two million people who cast

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votes for a gubernatorial candidate failed to vote in a senate race which pitted a Negro against a very liberal white.)

Since Peabody's reputation for honesty equals Brooke's, one must look to other differentiating factors. The most obvious is statesmanship, Brooke's other long suit and the one quality Peabody lacks conspicuously.

Brooke's Attorney General was not a two-fisted racket buster. He was thoughtful, methodical, inexorable. In typical photographs Brooke studies a law book or ponders a decision with head on hand. He recruited talented young lawyers as Assistant Attorneys General, and took as much credit for their recruitment as for the actions their work made possible. His office proposed an average of forty pieces of legislation a year (including a highway codification bill which ran to 390 pages), significantly reduced the backlog of land damage cases, received and processed through a new agency some three thousand complaints of wrongdoing, and successfully sought indictments of more than a hundred individuals and corporations for alleged larceny, conspiracy, and bribery.

The image which Brooke projects in public appearances complements the no-nonsense atmosphere of his office. On the few occasions when he has allowed strong feelings to color his speech—as in the striking remarks following Peabody's concession in the early hours of November 9th—Brooke has demonstrated that he can inspire and incite. His voice is deep, flexible, and pleasing, his face expressive, his gestures easy, and his instincts those of the accomplished platform orator.

But he much prefers measured tones and measured language. Pyrotechnics have been less in evidence than the intelligence, humanity, and determination he displays most convincingly in conversational style. His delivery is typically low-keyed, deliberate. The language is clear and efficient, figured sparingly, and as free from striking phrases as it is from clichés. The substance is solid: he speaks to difficult questions more directly than most, eschews platitudes, and takes the shorter course when two words will do as well as three.

He extemporizes easily and effectively with or without notes and handles a manuscript well. Listeners do not lose their awareness of his presence. When Brooke speaks, the speech *is* Brooke; his personality is strong, attractive, admirable. He wins supporters without seeming to plead his case.

The dominant tone is competence and in Massachusetts it was enough. Competence set him off sharply from the likeable but bumbling Peabody and induced a million two hundred thousand Bay Staters to vote for a statesman who happened to be a Negro. But will competence plus a degree of subdued personal magnetism be enough to impress a broader electorate or, indeed, enough to defeat a future opponent who sparks voter imagination? The history of electronic campaigning suggests that Brooke cannot increase his national stature—and perhaps not even maintain it—without the pyrotechnics he now avoids.

Therein lies Brooke's dilemma. Full utilization of his undoubted capacity for stirring, articulate speech is probably essential, but it also would probably be fatal. Brooke's political success has required dissociation from the Negro stereotype. Although they have elected the first Negro Senator of this century, Massachusetts voters did not cast their ballots for a Negro. They voted for integrity and competence of a high order—qualities not present in the Negro stereotype. Eloquence unfortunately is. Brooke delivering a

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NEWS NOTES FROM THE CHAPTERS

EDITED BY ROBERT O. WEISS

Judge Carl W. Rich Library Dedicated

THE JUDGE CARL W. RICH RECOGNITION LIBRARY was dedicated as a part of the TKA Memorial Room at Butler University, September 16, 1966. At a luncheon on the Butler campus attended by some fifty friends of Judge Rich, a check for $2,000 was presented to Dr. Nicholas M. Cripe as DSR–TKA chapter sponsor and to Butler University. The purpose of the fund is the establishment of a forensics library for research purposes. As complete a collection as possible of the journals of TKA, DSR, PKD, AFA, and the various national and regional speech journals is planned. As complete a collection as can be made of past and present argumentation and debate textbooks also will be housed in the library. A history and record of various outstanding debate tournaments might be collected here for future reference and comparisons. This library was made possible through the efforts of Mrs. Arthur O. Caldwell, former sponsor of the University of Cincinnati Tau Kappa Alpha chapter, Dr. Martin Bryan, Department of Speech, University of Cincinnati, and friends of Judge Rich in recognition of his effective and intelligent speaking.

Carl W. Rich, who was honored in 1961 as one of Tau Kappa Alpha's

Dr. Nicholas M. Cripe, Judge Carl W. Rich, Mrs. Arthur O. Caldwell, and Dr. Martin Bryan (left to right) participated in the ceremony dedicating the forensics library in honor of Judge Rich at the TKA Memorial Room at Butler University.

Distinguished Sons, was awarded an honorary degree of Doctor of Laws from the University of Cincinnati in 1959. He was born in Cincinnati, Ohio, and has lived in the Queen City all his life. After graduating from the University of Cincinnati's College of Liberal Arts and College of Law, he served as instructor on the faculty and coach of the debating team at the University of Cincinnati for seven years. In 1924, Judge Rich was admitted to the Ohio Bar; he has practiced continuously since that time.

During his career in politics, Carl Rich has served three years as Assistant City Solicitor and Assistant Prosecutor of the city of Cincinnati, three terms as Prosecuting Attorney of Hamilton County, nine years in the Cincinnati City Council during which time he served as Mayor three times, and two terms as Judge of the Common Pleas Court of Hamilton County. Also, Judge Rich has served one term as United States Representative from the First Congressional District of Ohio.

In addition to being a member of Tau Kappa Alpha, Judge Rich has been affiliated with Phi Alpha Delta, Omicron Delta Kappa, and Lambda Chi Alpha. His continued help to his fellow men will be realized as students of speech have research materials available to them in **THE JUDGE CARL W. RICH RECOGNITION LIBRARY** at the TKA National Memorial Center at Butler University, Indianapolis, Indiana.

Public Debates at West Virginia University

West Virginia University accepts the philosophy that debating is valuable training for citizens in a democracy. Thus, in addition to a full schedule of tournament debates, the University sponsors an active and diverse program of other debate activities.

One of these activities is a series of intercollegiate debates held on the WVU campus. Under the co-sponsorship of Mountainlair, the student union, four schools are invited to participate in the campus series. Last year Wayne State, Maryland, Georgetown, and Duquesne came to Morgantown for public debates. In previous years Ohio State, Pittsburgh, Kentucky, Richmond, and Michigan State competed in this series. Topics debated include diplomatic recognition of Communist China, withdrawal from Vietnam, the War on Poverty, God is Dead, and the intercollegiate propositions. The format for the public debates permits audience participation, and a neutral critic judge is invited to render a decision and offer a critique.

In addition, a series of television debates is aired, in color, from the nearby studios of WJAC-TV, Johnstown, Pennsylvania. The programs are one-half hour in length and feature a modified cross-examination format. Last year, Penn State, Clarion, St. Vincent, and Duquesne appeared on the programs with West Virginia to debate topics of national and international interest. These two activities have helped considerably in elevating the prestige of debating at West Virginia University.

Region Five Discussion Conference

The annual discussion conference sponsored by Region Five of DSR–TKA was conducted at Indiana State University on October 14 and 15, attracting fifty-one students from ten chapters in the region. Dr. Otis J. Aggertt was the conference director.

The event consisted of five rounds of discussion and speeches in the area

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of the national debate proposition. Ann Splete of Ohio Wesleyan University and John Crook of Wabash College were awarded plaques for their outstanding participation.

At this conference Theodore J. Walwik of Butler University was elected as the new regional governor.

Distinguished Alumni Awards 1967

This announcement invites all chapters to submit nominations for the annual DSR–TKA Distinguished Alumni Awards. A summary of the criteria and procedures follows. After reviewing these, chapters should forward their nominations with supporting materials (six copies) so as to reach the committee chairman no later than January 15, 1967. Inquiries or other correspondence may be addressed to any committee member. The conditions governing the award are as follows:

I. CRITERIA: By official DSR–TKA action the award(s) are intended to honor *alumni* of either of the two former societies or the present organization. It is the intent of this award to recognize alumni who are recognized as outstanding in their profession as well as effective, intelligent, and responsible speakers. Thus, opportunity is provided to consider both theorists and practitioners.

II. NUMBER OF RECIPIENTS: It is intended that this award be distinctive, not only by reason of the stature of the recipients, but by the number that are chosen each year. The committee has recommended that no minimum number of individuals be chosen, but anticipates that the customary policy will be to select not more than three or four persons.

III. PROCEDURE FOR SUBMITTING NOMINEES: Individual(s) nominated must be an alumnus(i) as indicated above, but need not be a member of the chapter submitting the nomination. Full supporting materials in outline form covering each nominee's education, public service, activities, publications (if any), evidence of contributions to the field of public address, honors, awards, and the like, should be submitted (six copies) to the chairman of the selection committee. This suggests the type of information desired and the form in which it should be presented, while providing sufficient flexibility to make possible the full presentation of any nominee's qualifications. Nominations should be signed by both the chapter president and the faculty sponsor.

IV. PROCEDURE FOR FINAL SELECTION: The present committee on the Distinguished Alumni Awards will be responsible for evaluating the nominees and recommending those to be honored.

V. NOTIFICATION AND PRESENTATION: The person or persons to receive the Distinguished Alumni Award will be notified by letter from the office of the National President. Whenever possible, recipients of the award will be urged to receive the recognition in person. When possible and appropriate, one or more of the recipients who find it possible to be present in person to receive the award will be asked to present a brief statement. Whether present or not, each recipient will be asked to send a brief statement (approximately two hundred words) accepting the award.

Presentation of the award(s) will be made by the National President

at an appropriate ceremony at the national conference, accompanied by announcements in both professional publications and the mass media concerning the nature of the award(s) and the recipient(s). In cases where recipients cannot be present at the national conference, the actual presentation of the award will be made under arrangements mutually satisfactory to the recipient and the chapter or chapters nominating the individual, or so located as to make this possible.

VI. **TYPE OF AWARD:** The recipients will be presented with an appropriately engraved scroll and a new DSR–TKA pin with the individual's name, the date, and "Distinguished Alumni Award 19—" engraved on the back, or a suitably engraved plaque.

VII. **DEADLINE:** Deadline for submission of nominees for the 1967 award is January 15, 1967. Six copies of all materials is required.

MEMBERS OF THE 1966–1967 COMMITTEE:

Robert B. Huber
Franklin R. Shirley
John Keltner
Thorrel B. Fest
Lillian Wagner, *Chairman*

BROOKE'S DILEMMA

(Continued from page 49)

spirited address to a political rally would look and sound to too many white voters too much like Stokely Carmichael inciting a riot.

Whether the nation will focus on Brooke's qualities rather than his color is the central issue which makes his career in Washington especially interesting and important.

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