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
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Volume 6 November, 1968 Number 1

The President's Page—*Leroy T. Laase* 2

CURRENT CRITICISM:

Anti-War Rhetoric and the Paris Peace Talks—*David H. Smith* 4

Robert Kennedy: A Study of Image Change—*James W. Pratt* 10

A Quantitative Analysis of First Affirmative Rebuttal Speeches from "Winning"
and "Losing" Debates—*Thomas H. Willett* and *Charles R. Gruner* . . . 16

Senator "Scoop" Jackson Speaks on Speaking—*Howard Schwartz* 21

Delta Sigma Rho—Tau Kappa Alpha, 1967-68—*Herold T. Ross* 24

ORGANIZATIONAL NOTES:

News of the Chapters 26

Nominating Committee Report 27

New Initiates of DSR-TKA 28

Chapters and Sponsors 34

PLAN AHEAD

Sixth Annual DSR-TKA Forensic Conference
University of Nebraska
Lincoln, Nebraska
April 6, 7, 8, 9, 1969

THE PRESIDENT'S PAGE

LEROY T. LAASE

Your President wishes to extend a personal invitation to you and your chapter to attend the Sixth Annual Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha Conference to be held at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebraska, April 7, 8 and 9, 1969. This is the Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday following Easter Sunday. Registration will be held the evening of April 6. Headquarters for the Conference will be the Continuing Education Center on the East Campus, 33rd and Holdrege Streets. If the Nebraska State Unicameral Legislature is in recess, we hope to hold some of the Congress events at the State Capitol Building, which is one of the most beautiful state capitol buildings in the nation. Because it will be Easter Vacation, the entire Campus will be available for contest facilities. The Continuing Education Center will provide numerous Conference Rooms and Housing for many of the delegates. It is but a short drive from the Center to motels in the area for those who plan to drive and stay in the neighboring motels. Food service is available in the Center. More specific information on the Conference facilities, schedule, housing accommodations and transportation will be mailed to each chapter by Dr. Austin Freeley, Conference Committee Chairman and Dr. Donald Olson, Tournament Director. In the meantime, we suggest that you put the dates on your forensic calendar and plan to budget for the trip to Nebraska.

Despite the riots in Washington, D.C. following the Martin Luther King assassination, the Society experienced a quiet and highly successful National Conference in Washington, D.C. last year. On the Friday evening prior to the Conference, most of the Officers and several other members of the National Council were in attendance at the Central States Speech Convention in Chicago. When the rioting broke out in Washington, D.C., the question arose as to whether or not we should go ahead with the Conference as planned. Many chapters were already enroute. A quick check with responsible public officials in Washington revealed that in their judgment, if the delegation would stick to the George Washington University Campus by day and the Willard Hotel during the evenings and nights, we should encounter no serious difficulties. Every chapter was still on its own to make the decision as to whether or not they would attend. Only a few cancelled. Under the most able direction of Dr. George Henigan, George Washington University and Tournament Director, a highly successful Conference was held. Eric Sevareid, Speaker of the Year, despite his heavy emergency schedule during that week, did speak at the National Conference banquet and was highly appreciated by those present. Your President wishes to express his appreciation to George Henigan, the National Conference Committees, Council Members and Officers, and especially to the highly responsible students and their Directors who cooperated in holding the Washington, D.C. Conference without any major incident.

At the Washington Conference, a major business matter was acting on the status of delinquent chapters—those who had not initiated any new members, attended any of the National Conference, sent in their annual chapter reports or otherwise maintained communication with the National Secretary's Office, with few exceptions since the merger of the two Societies. Regrettably, seventeen chapters were deactivated and dropped from the rolls; seventeen others were given one year to re-activate. (See National Council

Minutes, May 1968, *Speaker and Gavel* for listing of chapters.) All delinquent chapters had been previously warned of their possible deactivation, and the Society is pleased that nine of the original 43 delinquent chapters took steps during the interim to re-establish themselves in good standing. Those chapters deactivated or given one more year in which to re-establish themselves have all been notified as to what they need to do to reactivate their chapter or regain good standing. Essentially, this involves: the maintenance of an active forensic program, the election and initiation of new members when they qualify, and that the Chapter sponsor meet the minimum responsibility of filing the annual chapter reports (now overdue—is yours in?) with the National Secretary.

We sincerely hope to see most chapters in attendance at the forthcoming National Conference at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebraska, April 6-9. Since the National Conferences are planned on a rotating geographic basis, we especially hope to see every chapter from the Central and Western States areas. For those of you who live in the East, I would plead with you to remember that it is no further from where you live to Lincoln than it was from the Midwest and West to Washington, D.C. The public transportation into Lincoln by air, train and bus is excellent. For those of you who drive, Lincoln is on Interstate 80. Make your travel plans and reservations early. Welcome to Lincoln and the 1969 National Conference.

DISTINGUISHED ALUMNI AWARDS: 1969

Nominations are now being encouraged for the Distinguished Alumni Awards for 1969. These awards are intended for alumni of DSR-TKA (or of DSR or of TKA) who have been outstanding in their profession as well as those who have been intelligent, responsible, and effective speakers. Six copies of each nomination and supporting material should be mailed to the chairman of the Distinguished Alumni Committee, Lillian R. Wagner, Department of Speech, University of Northern Iowa, Cedar Falls, Iowa 50613. They should reach her by Dec. 16, 1968. (For further details concerning this award, see *Speaker and Gavel*, November, 1967, pp. 39-40.)

ANTI-WAR RHETORIC AND THE PARIS PEACE TALKS

DAVID H. SMITH

Throughout their analysis of President Johnson's Vietnam Address in the *May Speaker and Gavel* Brock and Scott consider its impact on the possibility of serious negotiations to end the Vietnam war. While we now know that that speech did ultimately lead to the current Paris talks, some question remains as to whether those talks can be termed "serious" negotiation. Brock and Scott argue that North Vietnam would be likely to stall any negotiations until after the inauguration of a new United States administration. The question of what constitutes a serious bargaining strategy aside, their prediction seems to have been accurate. Few Americans are likely to view the Paris activities as progress toward settlement. Whether or not this will change dramatically in January is, of course, another question.

My purpose here is not to examine the Brock and Scott article point by point. I propose, rather, to deal with the assumption, only indirectly stated in their article, that there is a relationship between political rhetoric in the United States and the likelihood of a negotiated settlement in Southeast Asia. I will consider the strategic nature of negotiation, the relevance of typical American assumptions about negotiation, and, finally, the impact of anti-war rhetoric on the Paris negotiations.

Negotiation is, first of all, a decision-making system based on tactics. The element of conflict which is part of the relationship between the parties requires the implementation of strategies designed to exact the most favorable terms from one's opponent with the least cost to oneself. The sole constraint on the use of tactics is the possible failure of the parties to reach a mutually acceptable settlement, thus forfeiting the advantages of settlement and continuing the costs of the unsettled relationship.

Two important strategic problems face the negotiator: 1. Shall he invoke a "hard" or "soft" bargaining strategy? 2. How can he obtain and use information about minimum dispositions?

The first strategic problem relates to how conciliatory or adamant his pose will be. If the negotiator chooses a "hard" strategy, he will make large demands very firmly, be quite unyielding and bring great pressure to bear on his opponent. In so doing he increases his chances for a more favorable settlement, but he risks a greater chance that his opponent will cease to bargain and become willing to endure the costs of no settlement. If he chooses the "soft" strategy, he places a high value on achieving agreement and on developing alternative solutions which are not initially apparent. Since the soft strategy emphasizes obtaining agreement rather than specific demands, it leaves the negotiator vulnerable. If one party chooses a hard strategy and the second a soft strategy, the first party enjoys a large advantage, gaining the benefit of the hard strategy without its risk. The soft strategy can succeed only if both parties use it; but if one thinks his opponent may use a soft strategy, then the hard approach becomes the most advantageous tactic. If, on the other hand, one is not sure his opponent will use a soft strategy, one cannot afford to chance a soft approach himself. The result is a virtual prisoner's dilemma. The hard strategy is overwhelmingly the

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more attractive tactic.¹ Only in the presence of considerable trust or in the face of horrendous consequence such as nuclear war can soft strategies be employed.

The second strategic problem involves the minimum disposition, the least favorable settlement a party is willing to accept. A party will prefer not to agree rather than settle on terms less favorable than his minimum disposition. Since the most either party can attain is a settlement which is identical with his opponent's minimum disposition, information as to what constitutes the opponent's minimum disposition is of great strategic value. If the first party can determine what terms comprise the least favorable settlement the second will accept, the first can aim his hard tactics at those terms, again confident that he has lessened the risk of no settlement inherent in the hard strategy. At the same time as he attempts to determine his opponent's minimum disposition, however, the negotiator must take care not to reveal his own. As a result the claims and demands of negotiating parties are frequently distorted to obscure rather than reveal the nature of what settlement terms are acceptable. Demands must always be far greater than that which will ultimately be accepted in order to maintain the hard strategy.²

The above considerations lie at the heart of the problem of low credibility of negotiators' statements. Tactical considerations require that the parties lie, so observers and interpreters are forced to examine actions rather than words. The negotiators' arguments are ignored in favor of speculation about the significance of the length of coffee breaks.

The above analysis of the tactical choices of negotiators is, of course, too static. In practice strategies are not hard or soft, but harder or softer. Statements are not always completely untrue, for some exchange of reliable information is necessary for the mere maintenance of negotiations, let alone minimal progress toward a solution. Minimum dispositions are subject to change. But tactical pressures of negotiation do create forces pressing toward firmness and distortion. These are countered only by the costs of continuing without a settlement.

For much of the American public, negotiation as an important public decision-making system is most often linked with labor-management bargaining. Last-minute strike-avoiding agreements are frequently newsworthy, and negotiated settlements which end walkouts rate headlines, even on the sports page. Labor negotiations generally succeed in reaching agreements. Compared to contract negotiations which succeed without strikes, those in which strikes are called are few, and most strikes are brief. Although many citizens may find strikes wasteful, they do get settled by negotiation in a relatively short time. To Americans negotiation is a decision-making system which operates under certain rules of fair play and which, while it may bring some inflationary pressures, usually works reasonably well. When we are told that negotiations offer a way to end the Vietnam war, we are likely to think of negotiations in terms of our most frequent experience, collective bargaining.

International negotiation, however, differs in at least four fundamental ways from collective bargaining.

¹ For a more thorough discussion of the hard and soft positions see Richard B. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, "Bargaining Dilemmas in Mixed-Motive Decision Making," *Behavioral Science*, vol. 11, #5 (December 1966).

² For a more thorough discussion of the minimum disposition problem see David H. Smith, "Communication and Negotiation," in *Communication Spectrum*, ed. Lee Thayer, Milwaukee: NSSC, 1968.

First of all, collective bargaining operates under a contract expiration deadline with the governmental requirement that the parties bargain in good faith. Neither a deadline nor the requirement for good faith bargaining exists in Paris. A deadline changes the tactical mix. The deadline marks the time when costs increase. Although the talks in Paris differ from the familiar model of collective bargaining, American war critics have proposed negotiation as the means to end our involvement in Vietnam. As a deadline approaches, negotiators become more willing to reveal information and less willing to risk the failure to settle. Last-minute labor agreements are so common that they are no longer surprising, but rather expected. International negotiations, by contrast, do not have a fixed deadline which coerces the parties to bargain. Increased costs for not settling are not associated with a particular point in time. Consequently, international negotiations are much more likely to be protracted than are negotiations under the system most familiar in the United States.

A second difference between collective bargaining and diplomacy is that the strike is a specific, virtually inevitable, mutually punishing consequence of not agreeing. The strike is a highly credible threat. There is little doubt that it will occur at a certain time, that it will bring dramatically increased costs to both sides, and that it can be avoided only by the softening of strategy and decreasing of deception. No similar threat exists in the Paris talks. No threat is built into the system. If, for example, the United States threatens to use nuclear weapons in North Vietnam, the North Vietnamese are not likely to believe that the threat is sincere, and their anticipated disbelief renders an attempt to use such a threat useless as a lever to soften the North Vietnamese tactics. All such threats are arbitrary and depend on specific acts by the parties rather than on the normal functioning of the system. Furthermore, world opinion constrains deliberate acts to punish the other party, and such acts are likely to provide him with an attractive propaganda opportunity which necessitates his withdrawal from the bargaining table. Finally, the strike harms both parties and, consequently, provides pressure on both, whereas a unilateral act punishes only one side and, as such, is seen as part of a hard strategy by one party rather than a pressure for softening by both.

The third difference between the talks in Paris and labor negotiation is that in collective bargaining there is a convention of reciprocal concessions. Both parties assume an exchange of concessions, and opening positions clearly contain demands included for trading purposes only.³ The opening high demands are viewed by Americans only as a prelude to a scaling down through concessions to a set of mutually acceptable terms. Communist negotiators, on the other hand, do not generally follow the concession trading convention. As in Korea, they tend to offer a position and argue it firmly for a long time. Concessions by their opponents do not bring reciprocal concessions. As a result, systematic progress toward agreement is not apparent to observers, but rather the Communists appear not to be bargaining in good faith.

The fourth important difference between labor relations and international relations is that labor relations require a much closer working relationship between the parties after the agreement. The contract must be administered

³ Interesting in this regard is the National Labor Relations Board's ruling that the "final offer first" strategy of "Boulwarism" used by General Electric which eschewed the trading of concession, was a failure to bargain in good faith and hence an unfair labor practice.

day by day and a new contract negotiated periodically. This continuing relationship constrains the parties from bargaining behavior which will destroy that relationship. But North Vietnam and the United States will not have the same kind of day-to-day relationship; consequently the constraints against invective and bad faith bargaining are much less. Concern for the continuing relationship does not soften international bargaining strategy.

While many Americans think of negotiations as a reliable and not conspicuously inefficient decision system, on an international level, as in Paris, the forces which counter the tendencies to hard strategy and deception are much weaker than they are in the familiar model of collective bargaining.

Although the talks in Paris differ from the familiar model of collective bargaining, American war critics have proposed negotiation as the means to end our involvement in Vietnam. The rhetoric of Vietnam war critics in the United States began before the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution, but it widened its appeal to increasing numbers of politically moderate Americans following Eugene McCarthy's entry into the presidential campaign. McCarthy's showing in the Minnesota precinct caucuses and the New Hampshire primary brought Robert Kennedy into the presidential race and, ultimately, forced Lyndon Johnson out. The arguments which produced these changes were clearly problem centered. Vietnam, it was argued, costs too much in lives and dollars, diverts the attention of the nation from critical problems here at home, divides the generations and races, sacrifices the nation's moral leadership and world position, gives the military undue influence in American life, sets a tone of violence through television coverage of the war, puts the United States on the side of exploitative governments and against the popular will in underdeveloped countries, and robs us of the ability to respond flexibly to problems in other parts of the world. When advocates, whether on the public platform or in the suburban living room, were pressed for a solution to the Vietnam problem few mentioned unilateral withdrawal. Most talked about letting the South Vietnamese do more of the fighting but finally settled the issue by invoking the prospect of a negotiated settlement. Some proposed settlements they would find desirable, but these were to be obtained, of course, at the bargaining table.

At this writing the peace movement has failed to nominate a major party candidate for the presidency, and the Paris talks continue without any indication of substantial progress in the near future. Many doves may find partial satisfaction in Lyndon Johnson's absence from the presidential race, in the anti-war sentiment revealed in the polls and primaries, and in the substantial peace vote on the Democratic platform report in Chicago. But anti-war rhetoric cannot be judged a major success on the basis of its impact on the national political scene. The new politics may have eliminated the unit rule in Texas, but it has not given the American people a presidential choice which promises a real change in Vietnam.

The larger goal was, of course, not just political victory, but peace. Has the rhetoric of doves been any more successful in achieving an end to the fighting in Southeast Asia? The pressure of the peace movement unquestionably influenced Lyndon Johnson's successful effort to begin talks last spring. But have the persuasive efforts of the anti-war speakers made a negotiated settlement more likely? To answer this question we must look not at the American public as the primary audience, but at the North Vietnamese. If one objective of the peace movement was to enable the United States to end its Vietnamese involvement through a negotiated settlement and if the movement had failed to nominate a potentially dovish administration as a means

to that goal, then one could speculate on the direct effect of the anti-war rhetoric on the Paris negotiations themselves.

If the North Vietnamese face the two tactical questions mentioned earlier, how hard a negotiating stance to maintain and how much to reveal about the terms they are really willing to accept, then anti-war rhetoric in the United States may have decreased rather than increased the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. The doves focused on the problems Vietnam created for the United States and offered negotiation as a solution clearly with more hope than realism. International bargaining does not have the same built in forces toward quick solution as the more familiar collective bargaining system. Rather, the pressure for softening strategies comes from the costs of continuing without a settlement. How have these pressures been affected by the peace movement?

Ground action doesn't take place in North Vietnam, only part of the fighting is done by North Vietnamese, and weapons and supplies come from Russia and China. It is difficult to assess the war's impact on North Vietnam, but she has apparently found herself able to sustain the costs involved in her single international commitment. The limitation on American bombing that came with President Johnson's peace move last spring reduced those costs. A complete elimination of bombing in the North as advocated in the peace plank debated at the Democratic convention would reduce them further. Just how much bombing hurts North Vietnam we don't know, but a reduction in the cost of not settling can hardly be regarded as a pressure likely to soften North Vietnamese bargaining strategy.

In deciding how hard or soft a strategy to invoke, the wise negotiator anticipates the likely posture of his opponent. If his opponent appears likely to soften his position, the best strategy is to remain firm rather than to soften in return. What influence can widespread support for positions softer than Mr. Harriman's have? Clearly when no deadline makes time pressure important and when costs of not settling are not being increased, the possibility of further United States softening is worth waiting for. If Lyndon Johnson has responded once to dove pressure by limiting bombing, isn't it probable that he will respond again? And as more and more Americans become persuaded by anti-war problem-centered arguments, such a line of reasoning must become more and more persuasive to the North Vietnamese. Brock and Scott argued that North Vietnam would not bargain seriously until a new administration is in office. They apparently mean by serious bargaining the softening of the North Vietnamese bargaining position. But if there were any prospect that the new administration would be headed by a peace candidate with a promise to keep to end the war, North Vietnam might need to soften little at all. Such a prospect would be doubly worth waiting for, particularly if the costs of not settling are not unbearable and increasing.

Thus in regard to the Paris negotiations, the impact of the anti-war rhetoric in the U. S. is ironic. The more successful that rhetoric is in persuading Americans that the war should not continue, the more difficult becomes the task of securing the compromise solution from the North Vietnamese that the doves want so badly.

The term "negotiated settlement" is, of course, ambiguous. The fact that George Wallace, Richard Nixon, Hubert Humphrey, and Eugene McCarthy all favor a negotiated settlement demonstrates that the term is high on the abstraction ladder. If the doves do not mean some compromise which achieves at least some of the United States' policy goals, but rather a virtual unilateral withdrawal, then the result of their success is not as likely to be

ironic. If Americans become increasingly eager to get out of Vietnam and if as a result North Vietnam continues to be unyielding, then perhaps the nation will become more willing to accept a unilateral withdrawal and the administration will also become willing to settle for simply pulling out. Some doves undoubtedly mean unilateral withdrawal when they say negotiated settlement, but it takes a cynical analysis indeed to read this intention into the actions of the majority of an idealistic group so dedicated to "telling it like it is." Even those who have favored unilateral withdrawal all along may find their hopes frustrated if, having had its expectation of negotiated settlement aroused and then finding it unfulfilled, the American public turns to the extreme hawks for a quick military end to the war. Here again the irony of rhetorical success at home breeding the ultimate defeat of the foreign policy objective presents itself.

With the nominations of Nixon and Humphrey the possibility of a substantial softening of the United States bargaining strategy seems unlikely. Indeed the prospects for a Nixon victory and/or a strong Wallace showing could lead the North Vietnamese to want to settle with Lyndon Johnson, particularly if they believe what he says about eschewing another term to work for peace.

The nature of international negotiations has created a situation in which the success of the peace movement in persuading the American people that we should negotiate our way out of Vietnam makes the achievement of that end more difficult, while the failure of that persuasion to nominate a peace candidate makes a negotiated settlement more likely. To those of us who have worked for McCarthy, Kennedy, Rockefeller, or other "peace" candidates this irony adds to our already heavy burden of political frustration. The prospect that a potential Nixon victory creates the most favorable conditions for a Vietnamese settlement is almost too much to bear.

ROBERT KENNEDY: A STUDY OF IMAGE CHANGE

JAMES W. PRATT

Immediately after his assassination, *Time* magazine featured Robert Kennedy as its cover subject for the eighth time. The story highlights Kennedy's musing "on all the things he wanted to do and all that he felt he could do: reconcile the races, summon the 'good that's in America,' end the war, get the best and most creative minds into government, broaden the basic idea of the Peace Corps so that people in all walks of life would try to help one another." The writer concludes, "He was ambitious, but not for himself."¹ Less than a month earlier, because of his entry into the contest for the Democratic Presidential nomination, Kennedy had been featured by *Time*. The article relates, "The timing of his entry into the race was proof to many that Kennedy had been slyly scheming all along. . . . His argument that an earlier challenge would have been interpreted as merely anti-L.B.J. animus did not save him from being colored ruthless and opportunistic once again."²

The differing evaluations represented in these two quotations—which both refer to Kennedy's entering the Presidential race, appeared in the same magazine, and were written less than a month apart—are typical of the radical change in image which followed Robert Kennedy's assassination and which was expressed by many different journalists. Prior to his assassination, a gradual image change had been taking place. This evolution of Robert Kennedy's public image illustrates a characteristic time lag in the formation of new public images. How, then, is it possible for a striking image reversal such as the one described above to take place within a few weeks?

Kenneth Boulding in his book *The Image* provides a useful framework for examining Kennedy's image. Boulding offers a detailed description of the concept of the public image, which he terms "the basic bond of any society."³ Although any particular image is the product of an individual mind, Boulding argues that "an enormous part of the activity of each society is concerned with the transmission and protection of its public image; that set of images . . . which is shared by the mass of its people."⁴ Important to Boulding's concept of public image is the "transcript" which such an image produces in the form of a relatively permanent record which preserves and publicizes the shared image. Boulding also emphasizes the role which the mass media play in circulating or creating the image of public figures.⁵ With this understanding of public images in mind, it might be possible to shed light on the image reversal by examining periods during Robert Kennedy's career when his image "transcript" revealed this time lag in the formation of his public image.

Mr. Pratt is a graduate student and teaching associate in the Department of Speech, Communication, and Theatre Arts at the University of Minnesota.

¹ "Politics and Assassination," *Time*, June 14, 1968, p. 19.

² "The Politics of Restoration," *Time*, May 24, 1968, p. 24.

³ Kenneth Boulding, *The Image* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956), p. 64. For a further development of Boulding's concept of the public image, see his chapter V, "The Public Image and the Sociology of Knowledge." Theodore Clevenger, Jr., in his book *Audience Analysis* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1966) presents a compatible description of images in Chapter 5, "Images in the auditor."

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

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Early in his public career, Kennedy's image was almost wholly a personal one. An examination of the "transcript" of his image as represented by periodical articles during the period prior to 1960 reveals virtually no political comments and a heavy emphasis upon personality description. It is not difficult to understand why this might have been the case. Kennedy's official occupation as legal counsel to Congressional committees during those early years of his career was one which cast him as a representative of other men. Warren Weaver, Jr., called Kennedy the "voice" of Senators Joseph McCarthy and John McClellan and concluded, "To the limited public that was aware of him at all, he was a very young and impersonal legal questioning machine."⁶ Kennedy did not—and could not—develop an independent political image during those years. He made no speeches which were available to the general public; and the substantive positions which he supported were always those of the committees which he represented. These early associations were to shape Kennedy's image far into the future. Kennedy biographer William V. Shannon describes those actions which were to associate the images of Kennedy and McCarthy:

When the Junior Chamber of Commerce chose Kennedy as one of the nation's "Ten Outstanding Young Men," he stayed out of the banquet hall during the main address by Edward R. Murrow because the speech was critical of McCarthy. In McCarthy's last months, when he continued to drink despite a serious liver ailment, Kennedy was one of those who visited him and tried to sustain his morale. At McCarthy's death in 1957, Kennedy not only attended the funeral Mass in Washington but also flew to Appleton, Wisconsin, for the interment.⁷

Several years later, as the chief counsel for John McClellan's Senate Investigating Committee, Kennedy was known for that Committee's exposure of labor union corruption and the prosecution of Teamsters Union presidents Dave Beck and Jimmy Hoffa. Portions of the committee hearings were televised, exposing Kennedy's cross-examination techniques to a national audience. *Time* reported that, as a result of this coverage, "Bobby overshadowed his big brother as a national figure."⁸ Although Kennedy was still relatively unknown, his image transcript revealed him as a promising young political conservative.

In 1960, after his brother's election to the Presidency, Robert Kennedy became Attorney General, the first official position in which he was able to establish an independent record. No longer was he the "voice" of other men; and, despite the close public and private relationship which existed between the Kennedy brothers, the Attorney General was not viewed as simply executing the President's wishes.

Kennedy worked quickly to establish a record as an active and liberal Attorney General. Although he readily acknowledged the recency of his interest in civil rights, Kennedy did not allow this to hinder his department's actions in that area. The Justice Department record reveals the accomplishments, particularly in the attempt to gain increased voting rights for Negroes: the number of cases involving Negro voting rights quadrupled in two years,

⁶ Warren Weaver, Jr., "Will the Real Robert Kennedy Stand Up?" *New York Times Magazine*, June 20, 1965, p. 8.

⁷ William V. Shannon, *The Heir Apparent* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 57.

⁸ "Little Brother is Watching," *Time*, October 10, 1960, p. 26.

and twenty-three voting rights lawsuits were introduced in the deep South.⁹ Kennedy also sent U.S. marshals and deputies into the South to protect “freedom riders” and to control rioting following federally-ordered school integration. He worked with the Interstate Commerce Commission to insure the integration of transportation facilities. Kennedy was instrumental in drafting the civil-rights bill in 1963 which included fair employment and public accommodations provisions. And he argued his first case before any court when he appeared before the U.S. Supreme Court to seek an end to Georgia’s “county unit” voting system because it was contrary to the “one person, one vote” principle.¹⁰

Kennedy’s actions during his term as Attorney General, particularly those connected with civil rights, are ones which clearly represent a liberal political position. His speaking, too, reveals a liberal orientation. There is a critical basis for assuming that a speaker will reveal his political orientation in his speaking. Richard Weaver has argued that the sources of argument used by a speaker relate to his political position and that the liberal argues from circumstance whereas the conservative argues from definition.¹¹ Bernard Brock has developed a set of operational definitions of political positions, based upon the rhetorical strategies employed by the speaker. Among his conclusions are that the liberal seeks to speed the pace of societal change within the existing structure of society and that he characteristically argues from scene (similar to Weaver’s “circumstance”); the conservative seeks to slow societal change while emphasizing the role of agent.¹² Kennedy’s political speaking while he was Attorney General, when viewed from the perspective of these definitions, reveals a clearly liberal point of view.

Speaking at the University of Georgia on May 6, 1961, Kennedy gave his first formal speech as Attorney General—and one of the earliest public speeches of his career.¹³ Perhaps the most salient aspect of the United States civil rights movement at that time was the integration of public schools; Martin Luther King had not yet led his March on Washington, and the destructive summer riots were still in the future. Working within this societal context, it is possible to assess Kennedy’s liberal rhetorical strategies in this speech.

Kennedy’s scenic, or situational, emphasis emerges early in this speech when he points to the importance of analyzing “the events of the last few weeks” as a basis for governmental action. He is conscious of the role of the United States in the world scene when he points out that “50 per cent of the countries in the United Nations are not white” and comments upon their importance to the United States. Kennedy stresses the importance of understanding and working within the context of Southern society in implementing federal law. Throughout the speech he makes clear his attitude toward change, one which emphasizes accelerating existing programs. Kennedy refers to the necessity of “moving forward” and stresses particularly the

⁹ “What Makes Bobby Run?” *Newsweek*, March 18, 1963, p. 30.

¹⁰ “The Bobby Kennedy Record,” *U. S. News and World Report*, May 6, 1968, p. 52.

¹¹ Richard Weaver, *The Ethics of Rhetoric* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1965), pp. 112–113.

¹² Bernard L. Brock, “A Definition of Four Political Positions and a Description of their Rhetorical Characteristics” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1965), pp. 40–50, 333–354.

¹³ U. S., *Congressional Record*, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, CVII, Part 6, 7753–7755.

need to "make progress" or "take action." The entire speech is cast within the framework of the rule of law which provides Kennedy with the means for indicating the importance of achieving change within the structure of society. The changes which he advocates are all to take place through the legal process, with an attempt to change and expand law but not to reject it.

The rhetorical techniques which Kennedy uses in this speech identify his political viewpoint as being a liberal one. He indicates his respect for the structure of the legal system, but he advocates more rapid change within this structure. And the basic emphasis of his speech is upon scenic considerations, both in terms of a description of the problems involved in civil rights and the solution required.

Later in his career as Attorney General, on August 12, 1962, Kennedy gave another major speech which also reflects his liberal political orientation.¹⁴ Even the title of the speech—"Much Has Been Accomplished—Much Remains to be Done"—suggests a liberal attitude toward change, which is reiterated a number of times throughout the speech. Kennedy continually refers to achievements made and the need for greater accomplishments. Developing detailed examples, Kennedy points to the specific number of Negroes working in federal agencies and the improvement which this situation represents. A central point of focus in this speech is Kennedy's emphasis upon the beneficial situation which the guarantee of voting rights will create. He says, "We have taken a tremendous amount of action in the field of voting, because it has been our feeling that once you gain the franchise, once an individual is allowed to register and to vote, many of these other rights that we are making an effort to secure for minority groups will come." The emphasis continues through the speech; and, although it is apparent that Kennedy views the achievement of voting rights as a primary aim by itself, he clearly regards their most important function as being the establishment of a favorable situation within which other rights may be gained. This view toward the acquisition of voting rights is also consistent with a liberal attitude toward change: working within the structure of the legal system, Kennedy encourages more rapid change. In this same vein, he comments on federal integration accomplishments in education by saying that "we have a great deal more to do and certainly the job is not done."

The liberal rhetorical characteristics are clearly present in this speech. Always accepting the legal structure of society, Kennedy advocates more rapid change and the need for greater accomplishments. The discussion of civil rights which he offers concentrates heavily upon the importance of situational factors in making the gains which he encourages.

On the basis of these observations, one can conclude that Kennedy represented a consistently liberal position, in his actions and in his speeches, during his term as Attorney General. An examination of the "transcript" of Kennedy's public image during that period, however, reveals a marked preference for characterizing Kennedy as being a conservative.

Typical of the judgments of Kennedy's political position is this observation by Robert Manning: "His reflexes are by background conservative and, a close friend says, 'Liberal' is still apt to be a dirty word to Bobby."¹⁵ Dan Wakefield expresses the confusion regarding Kennedy's political position—and the reluctance to accept perceived change—when he writes, "The term

¹⁴ U.S., *Congressional Record*, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, CVIII, Part 12, 16805-16806.

¹⁵ Robert Manning, "Someone the President Can Talk To," *New York Times Magazine*, May 28, 1961, p. 29.

'liberal' is usually uttered with an inflection of irony by Bob Kennedy, yet many of his political convictions would have to be described by that label. It no more adequately describes his outlook, however, than the word 'conservative.'¹⁶ Gore Vidal evaluates Kennedy as being basically conservative when he writes, "It is apparent that Bobby's view of men and actions is a good deal closer to that of Barry Goldwater's than it is to that of his brother."¹⁷ Although several writers tentatively suggest Kennedy's liberal outlook during this period, none seems willing to categorize him as being a liberal without significant qualification. The position revealed in Kennedy's actions and speeches during this period does not appear to justify such reservations.

By the time Kennedy entered the Senate, in 1965, much of this journalistic reserve had disappeared. Writers seemed to be more willing to categorize Kennedy as a liberal, although several express surprise at what they regard as a recent change: William V. Shannon wrote as recently as 1966 that those who had seen Kennedy as a conservative "are now doing an about-face."¹⁸ *U.S. News and World Report* expressed similar reservations, reporting that "Robert Kennedy is suspected of having latent 'conservative' tendencies" despite the fact that "the ADA now credits him with a 94 per cent 'liberal' voting record."¹⁹ A very frequent judgment was that Kennedy had moved "slightly to the left of center." Even more reservation had been expressed before Kennedy's election to the Senate, when *Time* reported that New York's reform Democrats considered Kennedy "much too conservative for their liking."²⁰

2

What might account for this failure of Kennedy's public image to reflect his actual political position? Few aspects of the empirical record of Kennedy's actions and speeches during this period can be found to justify a conservative political image. Perhaps best remembered is Kennedy's persistent prosecution of union leader Jimmy Hoffa (although the consensus of legal opinion seems to be that Kennedy did not abuse Hoffa's civil liberties); less known, but still publicly discussed, is Kennedy's advocacy of government-authorized wiretapping. Yet these instances seem to be quite overshadowed by Kennedy's liberal civil rights record as Attorney General and his consistently liberal voting record while in the Senate: he scored a 100 per cent liberal record during his last two years in Congress, as judged by the Americans for Democratic Action, and the AFL-CIO rated his record 100 per cent pro-union during his first three years in Congress.²¹

The key to this image lag seems to lie primarily in the record of Kennedy's early associations. Joseph McCarthy's negative image was highly salient to the American people; and his political position was conservative to reactionary. That Kennedy was associated with such a highly public conservative figure—and that he maintained this association with overtly public acts,

¹⁶ Dan Wakefield, "Bobby," *Esquire*, April, 1962, p. 126.

¹⁷ Gore Vidal, "The Best Man: 1968," *Esquire*, March, 1963, p. 60.

¹⁸ William V. Shannon, "Bob Kennedy's Future," *Commonweal*, March 18, 1966, p. 686.

¹⁹ "Kennedy vs. Humphrey: What It's All About," *U.S. News and World Report*, March 28, 1966, p. 55.

²⁰ "Carpetbagger," *Time*, August 21, 1964, p. 18.

²¹ Robert Yoakum, "Kennedy and McCarthy: A Look at Some Votes," *New Republic*, May 11, 1968, p. 23, and "The Bobby Kennedy Record," p. 53.

in spite of McCarthy's general disfavor—identified his political position with that of McCarthy. There were no independent public actions to counteract this impression for several years; and Kennedy's highly publicized cross-examination of union leaders during his term as chief legal counsel for the McClellan committee did nothing to change this established public image. When Kennedy began to develop his own record of actions and statements in regard to political issues in the office of Attorney General, his conservative image by association had already been built and was firmly established in the public mind. Kennedy's associations were all the raw material on which the "transcript" could be grounded. As a result, his record of liberal actions and statements appeared to be new—and the "change" was regarded with skepticism.

The observations presented here are not intended to negate the validity of Kennedy's public image as a reflection of his actual record. Rather, they reveal some important characteristics of his public image. The development of Kennedy's image demonstrates the significance of early images in influencing the later development of the image. Important, too, is the effect in shaping later images which resulted from the association between Kennedy, whose public image was latent and undeveloped, with Joseph McCarthy, whose public image was salient and clear. Great difficulty and little success surrounded Kennedy's extensive and repeated attempts to change that already well developed image, despite the somewhat tenuous basis for its initial formation. Kennedy's image development also reveals an apparently inevitable time lag which follows a change in a person's record of actions and statements and precedes a change in that person's public image. The assassination, a sudden and dramatic terminal event, rapidly accelerated an image change already underway. The traditional ethic of refraining from criticizing the recently dead dictated a concentration upon the favorable aspects of Kennedy's image; and the immediacy of the event required a consultation with those most recently associated with him for formation of the image. At death, Kennedy's image was changed rapidly because it was instantly updated.

Few would deny that John Kennedy's assassination had a profound effect upon the public image of his younger brother Robert, and Robert Kennedy's assassination has already significantly altered the public image of his younger brother Edward—so much so that many feel that the last of the Kennedy brothers could have won the Democratic Presidential nomination simply by appearing at the Democratic convention. To assert that the Kennedy assassinations alone have changed Edward Kennedy's image to that of potential President would be overstatement; but it is apparent that Robert Kennedy's assassination has had an impact on the formation of more images than his own.

A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF FIRST AFFIRMATIVE REBUTTAL SPEECHES FROM "WINNING" AND "LOSING" DEBATES

THOMAS H. WILLETT AND CHARLES R. GRUNER

Debate experts differ on the relative importance of the first affirmative rebuttal speech. Kruger says that it is "perhaps the crucial affirmative presentation, crucial from the standpoint that the debate can easily be lost here."¹ Brockriede seems to concur with Kruger: "I suspect that many people, myself included, believe that this speech [the first affirmative rebuttal] is the most critical speech of the debate, but I know of no one who has quantified the degree of its importance."² On the other hand, Moulton discounts the importance of any one speech because of its position in the debate:

My experience has shown that it is the debater that makes a speech important, and not the position in the debate. . . . Attaching importance to particular speaking positions in the debate over others is at best a game of what came first, the chicken or the egg.³

A recent study at the University of Nebraska attempted to shed some light on the importance of the first affirmative rebuttal to the winning or losing of the debate. To find what importance judges and debaters attach to the speech, all the debaters and judges attending the University of Nebraska Invitational Tournament of 1967 were surveyed via a questionnaire on the subject. In order to investigate what differences, if any, exist between first affirmative rebuttal speeches from winning debates and those from losing debates, a quantitative content analysis was conducted on first affirmative rebuttal speeches from winning and losing debates in that tournament.

Survey Procedures and Results

Forty-three judges, 84 junior division debaters, and 88 senior division debaters were handed a questionnaire form just before the first preliminary round of the tournament. The questionnaire asked, among other things, for the debater or judge to specify which of the eight speeches in a typical intercollegiate debate is, in his opinion, most important in affecting the win-loss decision. The questionnaires were filled out before the start of the round and were turned in at the end of the round.

The returns of 34 judges, 79 junior division debaters, and 83 senior division debaters were complete, and, thus, usable. The results, in Table 1, show that the first affirmative rebuttal speech was picked most often by each group as the most important to a win-loss decision.

Analysis of Speeches

Procedures. The first affirmative rebuttal speech in each of three senior division debates was tape recorded in each of the six preliminary debate

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¹ Arthur N. Kruger, *Modern Debate: Its Logic and Strategy*, New York, McGraw Hill, 1960, p. 97.

² Personal letter dated January 25, 1967.

³ Personal letter dated February 10, 1967.

TABLE 1
Debate Speeches Named by Debaters and Judges as Most Important in Affecting Win-Loss Decisions.

Speech	Jr. div.		Sr. div.		Judges		Total	
	No.	rank	No.	rank	No.	rank	No.	rank
1st Aff. Const.	8	5	2	5	0	7	10	6
1st. Neg. Const.	12	2	8	4	6	2	26	3
2nd Aff. Const.	10	4	2	5	4	4	16	5
2nd Neg. Const.	11	3	17	2	5	3	33	2
1st. Neg. Reb.	5	7	1	7	2	5	8	7
1st Aff. Reb.	21	1	40	1	16	1	77	1
2nd Neg. Reb.	4	8	1	7	0	7	5	8
2nd. Aff. Reb.	8	5	12	3	1	6	21	4

rounds. The debaters were not selected for the taping in a random fashion, since they were chosen so as to insure that no team would be recorded twice; however, the debates were chosen by taking their tournament code number, instead of by school name, to insure against bias caused by choosing by school. From the 18 resulting tape recorded speeches, five were chosen from debates where the affirmative won and five were chosen from debates in which the affirmative lost. The criterion used for choosing the speeches for analysis was relative speaker ratings: the five "losing" speeches came from the debates in which the affirmative lost by the largest number of speaker points, and the five "winning" speeches came from the debates in which the affirmative won by the most speaker points. These speeches were then transcribed by a professional typist and former debater.

Each speech was subjected to a quantitative content analysis. Specifically, the speeches were analyzed according to the following categories of content:

1. The total number of words in each speech.
2. The proportion of words devoted in each speech to "Introductions and Conclusions," "Transitions," "Need for the affirmative plan," and "Affirmative plan (including advantages and practicability)."
3. Average rate of speaking.
4. Number of times quoted or paraphrased evidence of statistics, opinion, and example appeared.
5. Number of times the various methods of refutation were utilized.⁴
6. The "reading ease" of each speech, according to the Flesch formula.⁵

The senior author of this paper performed the content analysis; he repeated his analysis for each criterion after a two-week delay, and the results of the repetition produced reliability coefficients of at least .90.

Results. Table 2 shows the total number of words and speaking rate for each speech, and the percentage of words used in discussing the Need, the Plan, and in making transitions, and in introducing and concluding. Inspec-

⁴ The methods utilized for this analysis were those of "Finding Deficiencies In a Unit of Proof," "Turning the Tables on Opposing Proof," "Reducing to Absurdity," "Arguing Insufficiency of a Series of Proofs," "Presenting Counter Proofs," "Exposing an Inconsistency," and "Dilemma," as defined in Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede, *Decision by Debate*, New York, Dodd, Mead, 1963, pp. 254-260.

⁵ Rudolf F. Flesch, *How to Test Readability*, New York, Harper, 1951.

TABLE 2

Speaking Rate, Total Number of Words, and Percentage of Words Allotted to Various Elements of Each Speech.

Speech	Speaking rate (words per min.)	Total no. of words	Percentage of words devoted to:			
			Need	Plan	Transitions	Intros. and Conclusions
Losing I	203.31	1003	0%	83.3%	6.3%	10.5%
Losing II	179.00	1074	83.3%	0%	10.4%	6.3%
Losing III*	185.00	907	0%	88.0%	7.4%	4.6%
Losing IV	208.8	1002	13.1%	71.7%	8.9%	5.4%
Losing V	203.7	977	79.7%	0%	6.5%	13.9%
Winning I*	212.8	1046	0%	74.2%	15.6%	10.2%
Winning II	157.7	786	34.9%	56.0%	3.4%	5.8%
Winning III	232.3	1200	42.4%	40.3%	6.4%	10.8%
Winning IV	219.6	1120	15.3%	65.1%	12.1%	7.6%
Winning V	202.1	1080	31.0%	55.2%	11.5%	1.9%

* Indicates a comparative advantage case.

tion of the data in this table reveals little difference, quantitatively, between the winning and losing rebuttal speeches, with one exception: it appears that the winning speeches did a better job of balancing the number of words allotted to the two major arguments, "Need" and "Plan," than did the losing speeches. Disregarding the comparative advantage case in each category, each of which would be expected to emphasize Plan and disregard Need, it is clear that the losing speeches either emphasized "Need" and slighted "Plan" or vice versa, whereas the winning speeches did not emphasize one argument to the extent that the other was slighted.

Table 3 shows the percentage of total words each speech allotted to the presenting of quoted and paraphrased evidence. Again, there appears little difference between the winning and losing speeches on this criterion. Of particular note among these data are two points worth mentioning: first, virtually no statistics and no evidence of example were used—almost the only form of evidence used was evidence of opinion; and, second, very few words, comparatively, were actually devoted to the presenting of evidence. This latter point will be discussed further, below.

TABLE 3

Percentages of Total Words in Each Speech Used to Present Evidence.

Speech	Quoted Evidence			Paraphrased Evidence		
	Stats.	Opinion	Example	Stats.	Opinion	Example
Losing I	0	9.2	0	7.2	0	0
Losing II	0	8.7	0	0	3.9	0
Losing III	0	4.6	0	0	2.2	0
Losing IV	0	15.6	0	0	0	0
Losing V	0	6.0	0	0	9.3	0
Winning I	9.6	9.3	0	0	0	0
Winning II	0	10.3	0	0	0	0
Winning III	0	7.8	0	0	0	0
Winning IV	0	1.4	0	0	8.2	0
Winning V	0	0.7	0	0	1.9	0

TABLE 4
Frequency of Use of Refutation Techniques in Winning and Losing First
Affirmative Rebuttal Speeches.

Refutation Technique	Number of times used by	
	Losing	Winning
Deficiencies in Unit of Proof	3	1
Turning the Tables	1	1
Reducing to Absurdity	0	0
Insufficiency in Series of Proofs	1	5
Counter Proofs	13	12
Exposing Inconsistency	4	1
Dilemma	0	0
"Explanation"	24	29
Unidentifiable	2	0
TOTAL	48	49

Table 4 shows the number of times in each group of speeches each of the refutation techniques was used. Again, there seems little in the way of quantitative difference between the winning and losing speeches. Note that most of the refutation arguments were not classifiable as any of the seven technique categories as specified by Ehninger and Brockriede—but are classified simply as "explanation." The category of "explanation" had to be utilized because so many of the rebuttal counter-arguments could not be classified according to the Ehninger-Brockriede system, but were simply "explanation" of the affirmative case. (Example: "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is going to be completely destroyed. But in place of it we're going to have under our plan that Unified European Force and it's going to be capable of doing everything NATO is doing today.") It perhaps should not seem so very unusual that so much of the first affirmative rebuttals should be taken up in this manner when one considers that it is the purpose of this speech to *explain* why the affirmative case should still stand despite the negative attack upon it. Perhaps in this respect *affirmative* refutation differs from *negative* refutation? This looks like an interesting question for future research.

Conclusions. The admittedly limited survey reported here indicates that the first affirmative rebuttal speech is most likely to be picked as the most important speech in affecting a win-loss decision in tournament competition. Most debate coaches, furthermore, probably expect the first affirmative rebuttalist to cover most of the issues in the debate. As Jack Howe puts it, for instance, "I definitely feel that all issues in the debate should be dealt with by the first affirmative rebuttalist and if he fails to do so (and the second negative rebuttalist has sense enough to point this out), then ordinarily I would reach my decision at this point."⁶ Thus it is not surprising that the winning first affirmative speeches in this study presented a more balanced support of their case issues whereas the losing rebuttal speeches emphasized one issue to the neglect of the other. This difference in balance in rebuttal support, however, was the *only* clear *quantitative* difference to be found between these two sets of speeches on the criteria on which they were compared. This general lack of clear quantitative differences may simply result from the smallness of the sample of rebuttal speeches selected for

⁶ Personal letter dated February 22, 1967.

analysis, of course; but it may also be evidence for the inference that many debate people might reach: that simple quantification, while perhaps useful for analysis, is no replacement for careful and disciplined application of *qualitative* evaluation, within the context of the entire debate, by a trained debate critic-judge. This seems an area in which more research would be enlightening.

Despite the fact that debate textbooks tend to emphasize specific refutation techniques, such as "turning the tables," "dilemma," "reduction to absurdity," etc., it appears that simple *explanation* of the affirmative case is a heavily-used technique of refutation in first affirmative rebuttal speeches.

The first affirmative rebuttalists in this study tended to use very little of their speaking time for the presentation of evidence and, when they did use evidence, it was evidence of opinion almost exclusively. This extensive use of generalized opinions as opposed to specific examples and statistics probably results from the first affirmative rebuttalists' attempts to cover the maximum territory in a minimum of time in refuting the negative "fifteen-minute block."

SENATOR "SCOOP" JACKSON SPEAKS ON SPEAKING

HOWARD SCHWARTZ

Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson has used public speaking and debate training to his advantage ever since his junior high school days in Everett, Washington. Like most of today's speech students, he "found it a little hard at first, especially while debating before large auditorium audiences," but after some experience and considerable practice, speaking became "easier and easier."

Certainly the Senator's political career attests to his desire to speak, his sincere enjoyment of speaking, and his acceptance by the voters of Washington as a political speaker and debater. Senator Jackson has been reelected to the Senate twice by the largest vote margins in the history of Washington State for the office of Senator. Today he is an articulate spokesman for three Senate and one joint House-Senate committee.¹ He is considered a strong advocate of internal security and our continued presence in Viet Nam. He is still one of President Johnson's strongest "hawk" supporters, despite the preliminary peace talks which are now underway in Paris. He has spoken often and loudly about the war, and in October, 1967, in a Senate speech, suggested that the floor of the Senate be used to "set an example for the nation of how reasonable men reasoning together may find unity through honest and vigorous but temperate debate."²

Senator Jackson is not a newcomer to debate or speaking publicly. He began his formal speech training in junior high school and credits his debate training, in particular, with preparing him for a speaking career as a lawyer, Congressman, and Senator. In high school, Senator Jackson had an "excellent" debate coach to whom the Senator gives credit for making suggestions as to what points could be made more effectively and by what means this could be accomplished. *Senator Jackson emphasized quite strongly that all of his future speech presentations had a direct root in his debate training.*

The Senator's forensic experiences also taught him the importance of audience analysis. He feels that the audience is his most important concern and, therefore, needs to be "checked out" before a speech. As most effective speakers do, the Senator tries to find out in advance what the composition of his audience will be. This is hardly new to students of public address, but it does indicate that the Senator is a "conscious" speaker as opposed to a Barry Goldwater type whose 1964 remarks on social security, Vietnam (perhaps prophetic now), and the TVA, indicated either a flaw in audience analysis or audience concern. Jackson is vitally concerned with his audiences. This is by no means a one way concern, however. Jackson is also interested in the way his audiences "check him out." "People," says Jackson, "are looking for logical, intelligent, and convincing remarks from their speakers and will not take less." He believes that most audiences insist upon one characteristic above all else, and that is "speaker sincerity." The term now in vogue

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¹ *Biographical data on Senator Henry M. Jackson.* A mimeographed sheet distributed by Senator Jackson's office.

² Statement by Senator Henry M. Jackson on United States Policies in Vietnam, Senate Floor, October 19, 1967.

because of the alleged "credibility gap" in the Johnson Administration, means to Jackson that his audiences can always trust him and his motives. This is one of the reasons that he, seldom if ever, uses emotionalism for its own sake in any of his speeches. Senator Jackson believes that emotion often stands in the way of logic. An investigation of his recent remarks on the *Pueblo* incident, indicates that emotionalism takes a back seat even in an emotionally charged situation. The Senator is even more vehement about the indiscriminate use of emotionalism on television because as a medium for the dissemination of information, television tends to magnify everything that is said.

Senator Jackson can not be considered one of the Senate's more prolific speakers. He thinks that many of his colleagues speak too much without thinking about the intrinsic value of the speech itself. Senator Jackson speaks in the Senate only when he truly believes that he will make a significant contribution to an issue. This would indicate that speaking into the *Congressional Record* is not a normal practice for him. Judging from the voluminous amount of speaking in the *Congressional Record*, many of Senator Jackson's colleagues do not share his philosophy of speaking.

Senator Jackson limits his formal speaking outside of the Senate Chamber to about one speech a month, but increases his output considerably when he is back in his home state of Washington. In one day he may make as many as six speeches on the stump, not including numerous radio and television interviews. This sharp increase in output is due to a strong desire on Jackson's part to inform his constituents about "what is going on."

Senator Jackson's speech preparation strongly reflects his earlier debate training, and he adheres quite rigidly to the "textbook" theories of public address. If he is to make an extemporaneous speech, the Senator begins with an outline of the remarks he wishes to include. This outline is usually prepared about one week in advance of the actual speech. He keeps this outline with him during the week so that he "can jot down any thoughts" that come to him. About two days before the speech is given, he gives final form to the outline, but continues to make changes right up to the moment of delivery. Senator Jackson enjoys speaking extemporaneously and finds it easier than manuscript speaking. He prepares all of his own extemporaneous speeches and outlines, but relies upon his staff for all formal manuscript speeches. It is interesting to note here that Dorothy Fosdick, the daughter of Harry Emerson Fosdick, a legendary figure in public address, is the head of Jackson's speechwriting staff. The Senator normally dictates to the staff members what he wants covered in a formal speech. The staff prepares a draft which the Senator reads and then reworks to fit his own way of thinking. In this respect, the Senator is very honest and a realist. He admits that he does not write all of his own speeches, and he has "real reservations" about other Senators who claim that they write all their own speeches.

In addition to being concerned about speech content, Senator Jackson is acutely aware of his delivery. He never rehearses in front of anyone prior to the delivery of a speech (as does Senator Margaret Chase Smith),³ because he feels that it would create artificiality in both presentation and environment. He reads his notes or manuscript over several times out loud to get the "feel for emphasis." Senator Jackson feels that the major goal in delivering a manuscript speech (much the same as the first affirmative presenta-

³ For additional reading in this area of contemporary speakers and what they think about their own speaking, see Howard Schwartz, "Senator Smith Speaks on Speaking," *Today's Speech*, XV (February, 1967), 19-22; and "Jacob K. Javits Speaks on Speaking," *Today's Speech*, XV (September, 1967), 15-18.

tion) is to read it so that what the speaker says and how he says it will appear credible to the audience, despite the fact that the speech is prepared. One of Jackson's hopes is to read a speech as Franklin Roosevelt did. He chose Roosevelt as the one speaker whom he would hope to emulate. President Roosevelt was "the greatest speaker in my lifetime to read a text," according to Jackson. Using Roosevelt's delivery as a model, Senator Jackson tries to speak slowly and deliberately in order to give each word in his speech its own meaning.

Senator Jackson's reflections on speech and debate should leave no doubt in the student's mind that speech training, and particularly debate training, is a crucial matter. He knows that he has profited from this training and values it highly. Certainly we in speech and debate should find it both encouraging and inspirational to know that so successful a man and political figure as Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson considers his speech and debate training to be a vital tool of democracy.

DELTA SIGMA RHO—TAU KAPPA ALPHA 1967—1968

When the officers, chapter sponsors and collegiate members departed from the National Conference at Wayne State University in April 1967, they were proud of the fact that they had participated in the largest conference the society had held, with 89 chapters in attendance. At the same time the officers realized that less than half of the collegiate chapters had attended and that the number of students being initiated was not up to expectation. Under the National Bylaws chapters, to retain good standing, must initiate two members in any three-year period. In addition the Standards Committee had recommended that chapters also be required to submit annual reports to the Secretary and to attend one regional or national conference in three years. Fear that a number of chapters were failing to meet the requirements was confirmed at the National Council Meeting held in Los Angeles, December 27th. One hundred eight chapters had not submitted annual reports and forty-three had not initiated two members within the last three years. The Council authorized a letter to the forty-three chapters informing them that the society would deactivate them if they did not take steps to meet the requirements. Consequently, at the next meeting of the Council held in Washington, D.C., eight chapters were deactivated; ten chapters were removed from the rolls and seventeen chapters were given one year in which to reactivate. Happily, six new charters were granted: to Anderson College, Anderson, Indiana; to Susquehanna University at Selinsgrove, Pennsylvania; and to the University of Bridgeport at Bridgeport, Connecticut; Elizabethtown College, Elizabethtown, Pennsylvania; Pace College, New York City and University of Hartford, Hartford, Connecticut.

A full program of activities was carried on at the National Conference in Washington, D.C. Eighty chapters entered two-man debate teams; forty-six chapters had teams in the four-man tournament. Fifty-six students gave extemporaneous speeches and thirty-one entered the competition in persuasion. While these events were being carried on, fifty-two students participated in the Student Congress. The high light of the conference was the awarding of the Speaker-of-the-Year for 1967 to Mr. Eric Severeid, and the presentation of a special award to Mr. Norman Thomas. Distinguished Alumni Awards were made to Professor Robert Griffin, University of Nevada, and to Doctor Ward Darley, University of Colorado.

The year saw a change in the editorship of the *Speaker and Gavel*. At the time of the merger, Charles Goetzinger, who had been editing the *Gavel*, became the first editor of the new journal. A year later, however, he resigned and Wayne Brockriede was named to the post. He served two years. The National Council then named Robert Weiss as Editor. Professor Weiss, Head of the Department of Speech and Forensic Director at DePauw University, had been serving as an Associate Editor.

Following the merger, there had been some question as to the procedure for the election of members-at-large. Consequently the National Council adopted an amendment to the Bylaws to the effect that "persons who meet the requirements for election to membership and who are no longer resident undergraduates may be elected as members-at-large upon recommendation of any campus chapter and the approval of the National Council." Under these provisions, 22 members were elected.

The National Student Council was active throughout the year. Member-

ship in the Council was changed to include the delegates from each chapter together with the National President. In the future, the Second Vice President will serve as an Associate Editor of the *Speaker and Gavel*. Bob Shields of Wichita State University was named Student Speaker of the year for 1968.

The National Council approved a resolution asking the candidates in the political campaign in 1968 to engage in one or more television debates.

Financially, the society was prosperous. Investments had grown to over \$73,000 and the royalties and general income showed a healthy balance.

1967-68 was an excellent year. Capital investments had grown to over \$70,000 furnishing financial stability to the program of the society. The Chapters which were active had experienced good tournaments and conferences. While the deactivation of some chapters was disappointing, the society hopefully expects that many of them will soon return to active status. Many institutions are expressing interest in charters. Thus at the end of its fifth year, Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha looks forward to many years of high achievement.

HEROLD T. ROSS, Historian

ORGANIZATIONAL NOTES

NEWS OF THE CHAPTERS

From the chapter reports submitted to the National Secretary early this summer, we glean some information about forensics programs across the country.

Most institutions reported an impressive record of tournament activity. Michigan State University, for instance, led the pack in reporting participation in 72 tournaments during 1967-68. Other schools reporting 35 or more tournaments included Ohio State, Kentucky, Lehigh, and Stanford.

Stanford University was highest in number of individuals participating, reporting that 126 students took part in intercollegiate forensic tournaments away from campus, with the number rising to 164 when exhibition debates on campus were included. Other institutions with 50 or more participants were Pennsylvania State, Alabama, Texas Tech, Long Beach, Michigan State, and Kansas State.

Twenty-four schools described a public debate series or other type of audience debate which they had presented during the year. No doubt a number of sponsors neglected to mention this phase of their program and, for that matter, a number of them neglected to send in their reports at all. Anyway, debating appearances on television were noted by Colorado, Iowa State, Hawaii, John Carroll, and Washington and Lee. Yeshiva sent four teams on debating tours across the country.

The University of Hawaii program included a series of debates with a Japanese championship team: ten performances in Hawaii, ten in Japan. They also had four debates with the touring British team, in addition to the above-mentioned series of debates on television using a variety of current questions. They even had debates with, as they say, "mainland" teams. This year there is tentatively to be an exchange of debaters with Australia, and the Japan tour is being expanded to include Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines.

Chapters which reported that their members during the year judged in high school debate and speech tournaments included Miami University, Kansas State, Southern Methodist, Tennessee, and Virginia Polytechnic Institute.

Among the other interesting events reported were an "alumni debaters reunion" at Hampton Institute, debates with inmates at Leavenworth Prison by Kansas State, and a Viet Nam Forum by Texas Tech.

Wayne State University

In conjunction with the Wayne State University centennial celebration, that school's Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha chapter published a commemorative booklet which was distributed at their annual banquet in May.

The 35-page booklet is divided into five sections, including a brief history of forensics at Wayne State University, a review of the 1967-68 forensic year, alumni reports, a Wayne chapter DSR-TKA membership directory, and a list of forensic personnel for 1967-68.

According to the forensic history recounted in the booklet, the school's first debate was held March 27, 1918, against the Detroit College of Law. The story since then has been one of steady, and at times spectacular, expansion. A chapter of Delta Sigma Rho was established on May 1, 1937. The account of the current active and successful program includes Wayne State's first place in the 2-man division of debate at the DSR-TKA National

Conference of 1968. The Director of Forensics at Wayne State University and sponsor of the chapter is Dr. George Ziegelmueller.

In a prefatory letter to the chapter, Dr. George V. Bohman, chairman of the speech department at Wayne State, told them, "I am proud that the many staff members who have led the program through the years have kept uppermost the fundamental values and objectives of forensics and have never ceased to stress the importance of breadth and variety in the program. . . . We are proud, too, of the outstanding successes of the alumni of the forensic program and of the high standards in law, teaching, the ministry, government service, and business which they hold."

DePauw Initiation

At the DePauw chapter's annual initiation of new members, President John Peterson this year instituted a discussion of the principles of Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha as a part of the initiation meeting, with the aim of giving added meaning and significance to the ceremony. The members of the chapter each gave a short talk on one of the principles set forth in the formal ritual, raising questions and stressing its contemporary application. Following the talks, these members joined the new initiates and the sponsor in a group discussion of the validity and relevance of the principles. These matters turned out not to be beyond dispute.

In keeping with this impulse toward relevance, the chapter at the same meeting also voted to approve a resolution taking a public stand on a current campus issue at DePauw. Since the chapter membership included both of the student members of the university educational policy committee, the president of the student court, and a candidate for the student body presidency, not to mention the homecoming queen, they felt that a statement of their considered conclusions might add weight to the campus dialogue on this issue.

Personal Notes

Theodore J. Walwik, Governor of Region Five, has moved to Indiana State University, Terre Haute, Indiana.

Herold T. Ross, national Historian, is teaching at Central Missouri State College, Warrensburg, Missouri, this year.

Leroy T. Laase, President of Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha, is taking a leave of absence during the current semester. While he is on leave, his teaching duties at the University of Nebraska are being handled by E. C. Buehler, long-time Trustee of DSR-TKA.

NOMINATING COMMITTEE REPORT

The Nominating Committee will present the following slate of national officers at the meeting of the National Council in Chicago in December:

- President James McBath
- Vice President Austin Freeley
- Secretary TheodoreWalwik
- Treasurer Kenneth Hance

In addition to the above national officers, three Members-at-Large of the National Council will be nominated. They are: Annabel Hagood, Peter Kane, and Leroy Laase.

Wayne C. Eubank, Chairman
 Wayne Brockriede
 Robert Weiss

NEW INITIATES OF DELTA SIGMA RHO-
TAU KAPPA ALPHA

1967-1968

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