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SPEAKER and GAVEL

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College Debate and the Reality Gap—Wayne Brockriede

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CHAPTER INSTALLATIONS OF VALDOSTA STATE COLLEGE AND THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH ALABAMA, NOVEMBER 14, 1969

Standing: Elinor Davis, Valdosta; Paul Green, South Alabama; Donnie Akridge, South Alabama; Howard Pelham, South Alabama Chapter Sponsor; Riley Wade, Valdosta; Nadeene Green, Valdosta.

Seated: Marcia Owens, Valdosta; Joseph Wetherby, Governor of Region IV, Installing Officer; Elissa Landey, Valdosta; Karen Luke, Valdosta.

Not in picture: Helen Thornton, Valdosta Chapter Sponsor.

NEWS OF REGION IV

The twenty-second annual tournament of the Southern Region (IV) was held on November 14 and 15 at Valdosta State College.

A high point of the meeting was the installation of two new chapters of Delta Sigma Rho—Tau Kappa Alpha: Valdosta State College at Valdosta, Georgia, and the University of South Alabama at Mobile, Alabama. Helen Thornton is the sponsor of the Valdosta chapter and Howard Pelham of the South Alabama organization.

The chapters represented at the tournament were: Alabama, Auburn, Clemson, Duke, Emory, Florida State, Georgia, Mercer, Samford, South Alabama, South Carolina, Spring Hill, Tennessee, Tulane, Valdosta, Wake Forest and Western Kentucky. The Governor’s Cup for the first place school went to the University of Alabama. Samford University was second and Tennessee was third. Affirmative awards went to Alabama, South Alabama and South Carolina, and the top negative teams were Alabama and Spring Hill. Dr. Thornton was tournament director.

Final action was also taken to establish the Hall of Fame for debaters in the Southern Region.
COLLEGE DEBATE AND THE REALITY GAP

Wayne Brockriede

At one time the relationship between intercollegiate debating and public debating in the society at large was quite close. What happened in public debates on college campuses in the first twenty-five years or so of this century was not very far removed from what happened in the law courts or the legislative halls of the country. No small number of intercollegiate debaters moved fairly easily into state legislatures, into the national congress, and into the law courts.

When functioning in college debates, a person could assume that his role was to make the best rational case for his side of the proposition to a critic judge who tried to make the wisest possible decision after hearing arguments on both sides. The college debater could assume that his method was to follow a rational procedure of determining the issues of a proposition, of discovering the best case he could make for his side of the proposition, of developing the best arguments he could make for that case, of supporting these with the best specific evidence available, and of mounting the best possible criticism of his opponent’s arguments. This was a method appropriate for the college debater. He could use a similar method for debating public policies in the society at large, although he would have to make a few adjustments to somewhat different formats. In school he could gain experience and develop skills he could put to good use when he graduated.

Then in the late 1920s and early 1930s the format of intercollegiate debating shifted from the individual public debate to the collection of semi-private debates called the tournament. The primary reason for the change was an economic one. During the depression the idea of having the experience of participating in several debates per trip became attractive. The idea caught on rather quickly, and by the 1940s the debate tournament became the staple of intercollegiate debate programs. Its popularity maintained itself and developed during the 1950s and 1960s. The primary change in recent years is a movement from a relatively low-budget program in which a debate squad was limited in travel, for the most part, to several hundred miles—with an occasional tournament at greater distance thrown in as a reward—to a situation in which a rather large number of schools do a great deal of their traveling at great distances. The tournament has become a coast-to-coast phenomenon. The original rationale of leaving your own territory to meet new schools from a different geographical area no longer applies; the large tournaments are attended by many of the same schools each weekend.

The shift from the individual debate to the tournament has widened the gap between what happens in college extracurricular programs and what happens after graduation. The tournament itself has no counterpart in the real world. More important, the preparation for many debates on the same proposition for seven months calls forth methods of efficiency and standard-

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ization that would be appropriate rarely, if ever, in public debating. Gradually, the tournament debate has become more and more artificial.

Even so, students and faculty members involved in tournament debating could feel that their activity was developing skills of analysis, case construction, reasoning, evidence usage, and refutation that would be helpful in public debating beyond graduation. Many faculty members spent much time and energy working with bright students who one day would be debating public policies of one kind or another.

Today, however, a serious gap is developing between tournament debating and the realities of public debating. The reasons for the gap are two: (1) tournament debating has developed increased artificiality and (2) public deliberation has changed radically in recent years.

First, the tournament has seemed to breed a host of devices and attitudes that must seem strange to anyone not initiated into the mysteries. For one thing, language standardization has escalated. The cliches and jargon of tournament debate seem to have become almost universal. The introduction of one first affirmative speech sounds like the one you heard in the preceding round and will hear again in the next round. Such phrases as “lines of analysis,” “members of the opposition,” “my last stand upon the floor,” and others are heard repeatedly on the tournament circuit—and hardly anywhere else.

But language standardization is not only something debaters do; it is something coaches seem to sanction. This point was illustrated strikingly during a meeting of a committee in charge of a qualifying tournament for the national tournament in the mid-sixties. The question was whether the judging should be done exclusively by experienced debate judges who had listened to many tournament debates that year. A case can be made for that point of view, but the principal argument advanced was that if a judge had heard enough debates on the proposition, then a debater would not have to waste time explaining his arguments. Yet in any kind of public debate after graduation, a debater may well win or lose precisely on his ability or inability to explain an argument to people who may not know the jargon.

A second development in tournament debating that has contributed to something of a reality gap is the use of many devices aimed at efficiency, in part due to a lengthening of the season and an increase in the number of debates participated in. In the 1950s and 1960s a premium was placed on collecting lots of good evidence and in developing creating arguments. When the season was four months long instead of seven, and when a debater might have twenty rounds a year instead of more than a hundred, a debater could hope to beat an opposing team by out-evidencing and out-reasoning it.

Today, by midseason, most teams will have a massive amount of evidence and highly polished affirmative cases and negative defenses. The margin between two teams in an elimination round of a tournament now is often which team is more efficient in using evidence and arguments that both teams know thoroughly. And so quotations are shortened, explanations are omitted, the speed increases, and the number of arguments escalates ridiculously—and the debate becomes an artificial game. The use of such efficiency devices is a kind of overkill that public debaters rarely utilize, a kind of nicety of gamesmanship that causes the intercollegiate tournament to seem to exist in never-never land.
A third change is a growing soberness. One of the attractions of judging a tournament debate in the 1950s and early 1960s was that you might well hear some argumentative wit—a joke, some satire, some funny bit of *reductio ad absurdum*, a clever turn of the phrase. Many of the better debaters then were capable of this sort of thing. In 1961, during a debate on compulsory health insurance, an affirmative team tried to avoid the negative argument that the proposal would encourage hypochondriacs by putting a plank in their plan calling for a three-man board which would have to grant permission before a person could enter a hospital. The second negative debater set up a hypothetical emergency situation as it might happen under the affirmative plan. He invented a telephone conversation in which a friend of a dying man tried in vain to get the victim into a hospital. This sort of approach seems rare in 1969. Most debaters now are too deadly in earnest about the whole affair. The better debaters of an earlier day seemed to have fun during a debate and during the tournament as a whole.

A fourth difference, and one that may be a consequence of the other three, is that debaters now relate in a different way personally to the debate process. Debaters then were not opposed to the idea of letting their own personalities show through during a debate. Many debaters I have judged made a vivid personal impression on me. I still remember them as individuals. They came through as real and unique people who demanded that I listen to them as people who had something to say to me.

The emphasis today is on the materials of debate almost exclusively—on evidence, on strategies, on cases, on devices. Although the experience of debating requires knowledge and skills of analysis, evidence, reasoning, and refutation—the debater must have something of substance to say—we seem to have forgotten that debating is an *experience* and that it is a person, the debater, who is doing the experiencing.

At any rate, debaters today do not often come across as persons. As a matter of fact, I have a dominant, overwhelming image now when I hear a tournament debate. I cannot escape the feeling that I am judging a contest of computers—intelligent, well-informed, ultraefficient computers—but unattractively impersonal and nonunique computers, all standardized. I have a further feeling that I am supposed to behave that way, too. I have something of a horror when I judge the final round of an elimination tournament; I cannot avoid the fear that ten seconds after the decision is announced, the losing team will self-destruct.

But the second reason for the gap is at least as important as the first. Even if tournament debaters have tended to become too jargonated, too efficient, too sober, and too impersonal, that change by itself would not have made the reality gap as large as it has become. No, in addition, the practices of public debating have also made drastic changes, revolutionary changes, in the past five or ten years. And it is the contrast between the changes of tournament debating in one direction and the changes of public debating in the other that defines the reality gap.

A number of people in the field of speech have tried to characterize the new rhetoric. Leland M. Griffin speaks of "body rhetoric," Franklyn Haiman calls it "the rhetoric of the streets," Robert L. Scott and Donald K.

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Smith talk of “the rhetoric of confrontation,” Charles W. Lomas and Mary G. McEdwards use the phrase “rhetoric of agitation,” and James R. Andrews speaks of “coercive rhetoric.” But whatever the name, any look at the public debates on such topics as civil rights, black power, the war in Vietnam, law and order, student militance, and the influence of mass media in such confrontations as the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago, all these show a radically new approach in the deliberation of questions of public policy. The proposition has been replaced by the demand, the argument by the demonstration, the debater’s presence by body rhetoric, and the debate itself by a confrontation. Whether we like it or not, and cases can be made both for and against the growing use of militant methods, the use of insistent techniques for arguing a position is with us, is likely to stay with us for a while, and may even grow in frequency and intensity.

Franklyn Haiman, in a remarkably provocative lecture at the University of Kansas, analyzed the tendencies of rhetoric in 1968. The title of his lecture was “The Rhetoric of 1968: A Farewell to Rational Discourse.” One can agree or disagree with the thesis implied by the title, for rational discourse may not be altogether dead—it may be alive in some situations; but surely it faces a stiff challenge. The old rationalism certainly seems out of place in the new rhetoric of confrontation, and it is not likely to reappear in all its neo-Aristotelian glory merely by the clucking of a few speech teachers. Even the institutions, like the law courts, that have been committed traditionally to the premise that wise decisions are more likely to follow rational methods of argument appear to be affected by the new rhetoric.

Whatever the new emphasis is called, an emphasis on people determined to make their maximum influence felt on other people represents a trend in a direction opposite of that of the impersonalized trend of college debating. The existence of the gap constitutes a problem for those interested as students or teachers of college debating.

That this gap implies a problem may be illustrated if you will imagine two scenes in close proximity. One is a college classroom populated by four debaters, a timekeeper, and a judge. The first affirmative debater is saying, “My colleague and I are happy to be here today to debate the vital resolution that the federal government should grant annually a specific percentage of its income tax revenue to the state governments. In order to insure that both teams understand the proposition in the same way, we shall define three terms...” Meanwhile, outside the classroom building, students are shoving one another to get at a microphone so they can debate the question of whether they should seize the administration building or merely march on the president’s home.

6 In The Ethics of Controversy: Politics and Protest, ed. Donn W. Parson and Wil A. Linkugel (Lawrence: Department of Speech and Drama, University of Kansas, 1968).
Or, if you prefer real examples to hypothetical ones, recall the 1968 Democratic National Convention. Inside, delegates go through the ritual of nominating favorite-son candidates; outside, policemen and demonstrators engage in a violent confrontation. Either scene by itself says something. The two happening together almost simultaneously is perhaps the best definition of the reality gap.

What can be done to narrow the gap? One approach is simply to ignore it. We can continue to play our game in the tournament, and real advocates for and against change can play their new and very different game in public deliberation. But unless a teacher or a student wants ivory-towerism with a vengeance, he cannot find that approach very satisfying. Somehow education of any kind ought to have some sort of relationship to the society beyond academia.

A second approach, optimistic but unrealistic, is to hope for a return to the world of rational discourse, to hope that the ugly scenes of violent confrontation will go away and leave us alone. My prediction is that this will not happen. We shall never go home again to the world that was. The rhetoric of demanding has been too important and too effective for black groups and young people to give it up. Some people have been denied participation in decision-making on matters that deeply affect their lives. They are likely to get continued denial from establishments of all kinds by following established procedures that involve traditional patterns of rational discourse. At the very least they have gained attention, and in rather frequent instances results, by attaching some of the pressures of body rhetoric to their arguments.

A third approach should be included for reasons of logical completeness, although, frankly, it seems ludicrous and distasteful. This approach is to join the movement and adopt exclusively the methods of militance. One imagines a first affirmative debater pressing his demands on a judge, while his colleague backs the judge to the wall. Meanwhile, the negative team interrupts with its counterdemands and forcibly prevents the judge from leaving the room. The timekeeper is replaced by the campus police, and they do their thing. This approach does have one advantage, however: It may solve one of the problems in current forensics, namely, that it might cause debaters to have more fun. In addition, debaters may use this approach in demanding more meal money from coaches.

A fourth general approach seems the most promising one, although, unfortunately, I have not thought through thoroughly the kind of shape it might take. But if rational discourse functions as a kind of thesis, and if radical confrontation functions as a kind of antithesis, then perhaps students and teachers of debating might be able to forge some kind of synthesis that would find a place for rational argument and also a place for the determination and commitment and personal involvement that characterize the new rhetoric. Perhaps some of the debating can be done on the campus and in relation to the issues and concerns of students there. Perhaps the form for such debates might have to be modified to take into account the new life-style of students. Perhaps intercollegiate debaters should spend a bit less time in the library and a bit more time participating actively in the real debates on

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campus. Perhaps debaters should glory less in their differences from other students and develop more tolerance and empathy for nondebaters.8

But debaters, even in the tournaments, can take some significant steps to close the reality gap. They can talk the language of people and develop a style of their own rather than, as freshmen, slavishly imitating seniors so other freshmen later can imitate them when they are seniors. They can become less obsessed with the efficiency devices and the gamesmanlike tricks of winning debates and more concerned with the development of real arguments that will make sense to real people. They can take a lighter approach to the activity and have fun with it. And, finally and most importantly, they can assert their own personhood, their own individuality, in the debate. Each debater can play the role of himself, not the stereotyped role of “the college debater.” If debaters could do these things, upon graduation they would have less distance to travel to go from college debating to public deliberation.

THE RHETORIC OF ALIGNMENT: CAN NIXON'S QUEST FOR POWER UNITE THE NATION?

JAMES W. CHERSEBRO AND SANDRA E. PURNELL

During the 1968 Presidential campaign, Richard Nixon said he possessed a "plan" to reduce America's involvement in Vietnam. Because of diplomatic and military considerations, Nixon argued that the details of the "plan" could not then be released. After nine months in office and after a major Vietnam moratorium, people were even more anxious to know how and when the conflict would be resolved. In October, Nixon committed himself to a November 3rd policy statement on Vietnam. For three weeks, expectations rose and predictions regarding the speech were made with increasing frequency. The address was perceived as a significant statement for both the nation's survival and Nixon's political success. Because of the political significance of this address, then, a rhetorical analysis is appropriate.¹

Rhetorically, the November 3rd speech has three major structural divisions. In the first third of the speech, the President provides a history of the war. Strategically, Nixon identifies the war with the last three administrations and argues that the war represents an emerging and developing policy—a policy not to be dismissed hastily. This section subtly merges into the second third of the speech by way of a discussion of the negotiations in Paris and other secret negotiations. In the second section of the speech, Nixon outlines his proposal for ending the war, including a summary of his correspondence with Ho Chi Minh and of the process of Vietnamization of the war. The final section of the speech seems to be an attempt to control and direct the reactions of the audience. He recaptures a great American "national destiny" for the "great silent majority" and apparently seeks to reduce the antagonism of the "vocal minority." After identifying this three-part division in the speech, a critic might terminate his descriptive analysis. However, this division provides the foundation for an examination of how Nixon was able to use such a descriptive analysis for significant, yet unstated, persuasive purposes.

As a result, we shall focus upon the November 3rd speech in terms of its purposes. We shall ask: (1) What purposes are overtly stated in the speech? (2) What are the unstated but actual or operational persuasive purposes of the speech? (3) How effective was Nixon's rhetorical effort? An examination of the transcript reveals two apparent purposes for delivering this speech. First, Nixon sought to increase unity in the nation and reduce the degree and significance of dissent. Second, he wanted to improve his own political power base or position by uniting the majority of the nation behind the Nixon plan. Initially, these two goals are theoretically

¹ All quotations are from the Nixon speech as completely reported in the Minneapolis Tribune, November 4, 1969.
compatible. Perhaps the best way to reduce dissent would be to unite the conflicting groups behind a universally appealing Nixon program. The question this article will attempt to answer is whether Nixon was able to achieve both objectives. The major thesis developed here is that Nixon successfully achieved a renewed and powerful political base, but failed to unite the nation.

RECAPTURING THE POWER BASE

The “great silent majority” represents the essential power that Nixon must possess to sustain viable political control. The upper and middle class whites provided the financial support for Nixon’s campaign, provided the ballots for his election, and appear to be the only group capable of sustaining his national prestige. Nixon must sustain the confidence of this majority. However, the Vietnam issue threatened the security of this majority. The strong and active support of this group began to “splinter” into factions. The Vietnam war had reinforced perplexing problems for this group and thus threatened Nixon’s political power base. How did this occur? The universality and significance of the war brought all disparate elements and minority values to the foreground, constituting a direct threat to the majority. Youth had again been pitted against the “older generation.” The wild-eyed hippie and yippie, automatically a threat to traditional values, appeared to be successfully undermining respect for the President, the national prestige and the “free world.” Withdrawing from Vietnam also carried the connotations that America will lose a war, that young people will not fight for their nation, that Communism should be allowed to grow and subjugate the weak nations of the world. These were the issues and the rhetorical problem Nixon had to address in his November 3rd speech. Nixon did, in fact, effectively respond to this situation as defined by the majority. Rhetorically the situation required that Nixon employ two major families of rhetoric—a rhetoric of placement and a rhetoric of power.

A rhetoric of placement requires that strategies be employed which define and defend a believable view of world events—an acceptable reality. Rhetorically, a speaker may define reality in many ways. For instance, he may divide the world into friendly and unfriendly forces as he sees them or as he wishes to see them. Nixon was forced to define reality in such a fashion that his Vietnam proposal appeared to be an effective response to the war and yet allowed the majority again to be united in their perception of reality.

The rhetoric of power is a major family of terms that provides the basis for effective assertion—the potential of action behind the word. Kenneth Burke argues that several kinds of strategies might be selected from this family and, in list form, these strategies might be one or more of the following:

- social power, sexual, physical, political, military, commercial, monetary, mental, moral, stylistic (powers of grace, grandeur, vituperation, precision)—powers of emancipation, liberalization, separation (“loosing”), powers of fascination and fascization (“binding,” as in Mann’s “Mario and the Magician”)—and powers of wisdom, understanding, knowledge.²

A rhetoric of power was needed by Nixon. A rhetoric of power would provide a set of strategies to guarantee the security and control desired by the majority.

Initially, then, the rhetoric of placement, for Nixon, involved a redefinition of the circumstances and events involved in the war. By choice, reality is redefined or created in the traditional language and values of the majority. For Nixon, however, this placement strategy might be aptly entitled, “the celebration of a lost heritage.” In essence this strategy assumed that the audience felt a powerful commitment to an active and strong form of American leadership in international affairs. This pride leads easily to the rhetorical assertion that America should act—act to control and eliminate evil in the world. Nixon defines the major question of Vietnam in terms of America’s role or place in international affairs. He states:

Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether some Americans are for peace and some against it. The great question at issue is not whether Johnson’s war becomes Nixon’s war. The question is: how can we win America’s peace?

For some observers, the rhetorical question might have been “how can peace be achieved in the world?” For Nixon, however, the question implies that America must win the war, and that America’s peace, not world peace, is the issue. The traditional role of America in international affairs is reasserted. The language and world view of this celebration of a lost heritage allowed the majority to identify in a potent and united fashion. Why? Clearly, the traditional values of the “older generation” were reasserted as viable and significant. National prestige, a “free world,” the use of war as a tool of international relations, and the casting of Communism as the enemy to be fought—all of these values and perspectives of the 1950’s are reasserted to appease generations of the ’50’s.

Moreover, the first third of the speech, although some might call it a historical description, functions to redefine reality with America as the central focus of power and control. This description of America persuasively reasserts the traditional values and perspectives of the older, silent majority. The basis for unity is again provided. In this first third of the speech, Nixon phrases his first question of concern as a question of fact. Why and how did the United States become involved in Vietnam in the first place? Note, however, that such a description would involve choices—not all data can be presented, and the data selected must also allow Nixon to argue that his proposal ultimately is responsive to the Vietnam situation. Thus, the first third of the speech is more aptly perceived as a strategy, not a historical description. This “historical” strategy functions ultimately to define America as a force of good fighting the Communistic forces of evil. Thus, Nixon describes the initial inception of the war:

Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistic support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution.

The effort of all three Presidents before him, argues Nixon, was to “prevent a Communist takeover.” For Nixon, the problem remains much the same—the United States must pit itself against the forces of Communism: “Our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the massacres which followed their takeover of the North fifteen years ago,”
with the “atrocities of Hue” becoming the “nightmare of the entire nation,” and “For the United States, this first defeat in our nation’s history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership, not only in Asia but throughout the world.” Thus, Nixon would reassert a foreign policy which gives the United States a major role as an acting, not reacting, agent:

For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would thus be a disaster of immense magnitude. —A Nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends. —Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam would without question promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest. —This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain peace—in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere.

For the great majority, Nixon, then, offers a celebration of a lost heritage. Overtly, Nixon notes:

I know it may not be fashionable to speak of patriotism or national destiny these days. But I feel it is appropriate to do so on this occasion. Two hundred years ago this nation was weak and poor. But even then, America was the hope of millions in the world. Today we have become the strongest and richest nation in the world. The wheel of destiny has turned so that any hope the world has for survival of peace and freedom in the last third of this century will be determined by whether the American people have the moral stamina and courage to meet the challenge of free world leadership.

The heritage, once lost, shall be regained and the United States shall once again become the active and controlling agent in world affairs. This strategic “celebration of a lost heritage” leads easily to Nixon’s second major strategy.

Nixon moves, in the second and third sections of the speech, through a proposal and assessment of the proposal on his audience. Specifically, the second section of the speech—the Nixon proposal—is acceptable because the situation is defined in terms that allow Nixon the right slowly to withdraw troops, given the objectives of America and the nature of Communism as the enemy. In the third section of the speech, there is an apparent appeal for unity. Clearly, the majority is provided with security. The minority, however, becomes a scapegoat for the guarantee provided to the majority. A rhetorical analysis seems to support this view of the two last parts of the speech. While the rhetoric of placement and the strategy of celebrating a lost heritage provides a partial basis for this analysis, one must also identify Nixon’s second major family of rhetoric. The rhetoric of power and Nixon’s specific strategy are complementary to his first strategy, yet also provide credibility to the Nixon proposal and a basis for our suggestion that the minority is the sacrificial lamb employed to secure the support of the Nixon proposal by the majority.

Given that America should define itself as an active and powerful force in world affairs, Nixon is ready to become the means or powerful force necessary to achieve that placement for America. For Nixon, the rhetoric of power becomes a strategy of “leadership—a personal assertion.” The emphasis shifts from a concern for what Nixon might propose (“I have not and do not intend to announce the timetable of our program.”) to faith in Nixon as an effective and decisive leader. Nixon would identify American foreign
policy with his personal decisions. Indeed, the plan is a “Nixon plan.” Underscoring his personal commitment to leadership, Nixon states:

I recognized that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public forum. That is why in addition to the public statements and negotiations, I have explored every possible private avenue that might lead to a settlement. ...I did not wait for my inauguration to begin my quest for peace.

Later, regarding the Nixon plan:

If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.

Power and leadership shall reside in Nixon himself. The majority is given confidence—a strong and dynamic leader is promised to ensure that the majority shall rule. Nixon will become the “figurehead of America” and assume the “burden” of a “first defeat” if that occurs. Philosophically, Nixon has made a renewed commitment to idealism—the world experiences and values of a man, Nixon, will become the basis for action in international affairs. While clearly responsive to the great silent majority, such a philosophical choice does exclude other philosophical positions. Materialism, the nature of circumstances and events around men, shall not be the basis for action. However, the rhetoric of placement and power do become the basis for strategies that do recapture the power base for Nixon. The “celebration of a lost heritage” and “leadership” as “a personal assertion” redefined reality and provided both the means and end desired by the great silent majority. However, for the vocal minority, the November 3rd speech apparently rejects the significance of dissent.

ALIENATION OF THE VOCAL MINORITY

The vocal minority sees Nixon as rejecting their philosophical orientation, their view of reality, and their view of meaningful dissent in a democracy. These three fundamental differences ensure that the minority will not be drawn into the Nixon coalition. For the minority, Nixon elicits a response of silent disgust and sets the stage for permanent division in America.

In this speech, Nixon promises to recapture a lost heritage. Because the American people are an active, “do-it-yourself” people, likewise American foreign policy might again act—direct and control international affairs. Clearly, such a position directly counters the volumes of material that define the philosophical orientation of the minority.3 The minority sees America’s...
role as essentially one of reacting to world events. The United States should react to, not attempt to establish, the relationships among other nation-states, and should sustain only a supportive military role. Specifically, then, regarding Vietnam, protestors argue that the United States, as a third party to a civil war, is not and should not be in a position of power in Vietnam. Moreover, the United States should play a secondary role, it is noted, because Vietnam is not in the self-interest of the United States and the outcome of the war cannot be controlled. It is also noted by the minority that a commitment to a third-world revolution and anti-colonialism requires that America react to the needs of the third-world nations, remaining in a supportive position if involved at all. This philosophical orientation of the minority strongly conflicts with Nixon’s action orientation and would make the speech unacceptable to the radical. These philosophical differences are reflected in a second major area of disagreement—the nature of reality.

The radical’s view of reality directly conflicts with Nixon’s view of the history of the Vietnam war in the first third of his speech. Several apparent conflicts exist. The conflicts cannot be developed here but their nature can be identified.

1. Nixon suggests that this is a traditional war of aggression: “Fifteen years ago North Vietnam...launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution.” The dissenter would argue that the war was originally a civil war among indigenous elements of the Vietnamese people. Ho Chi Minh was motivated by nationalism and a desire for independence from both France and Red China.

2. Nixon suggests that there has been a single policy on Vietnam carried out by four Presidents: “Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done.” Opponents of the war have constantly observed that Eisenhower was extremely wary of a land war in Asia and provided only support for the French Army, not American troops. Kennedy, although he spoke of defending the independence of South Vietnam (not necessarily against an independent Communist state), sent Americans only in an advisory role as part of an economic program. It is apparent that military assistance is quite different from the commitment of 500,000 American troops.

3. Nixon suggests that immediate withdrawal would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership. Opponents have argued that our involvement has already cost us the confidence and respect of many allies and awakened fears among the other small third-world nations.

4. Nixon suggests that Vietnam is vital to the national self-interests of the United States. The assumption has been questioned: How can so small and poor a nation be significant to the United States? Vietnam, it has been proposed, might be strategically most effective as an independent, perhaps Communist, buffer state between our Pacific allies and Communist China.

5. The President suggests that failure in Vietnam would result in further wars "in the Middle East, in Berlin and eventually even in the Western Hemisphere." This appears to be an indirect expression of the fear of wars of national liberation directed by Moscow or Peking. This fear rests on the assumption that there is an aggressive, monolithic Communist conspiracy, an assumption which has been shaken by the Sino-Soviet split and by the relative failure of attempts to export revolution in Africa and South America. The dissenter would reject the emphasis Nixon places upon the "great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest."

6. Finally, the dissenter would probably disagree with Nixon's interpretation of the Paris negotiations. Nixon implies that he is waiting for the enemy to capitulate, while the dissenter might be more interested in seeing the United States make more major concessions. This is further exemplified in Nixon's definition of the nature of Ho Chi Minh's letter. Nixon implies that the letter is merely a restatement of North Vietnam's hard-line position on a settlement. The tone of the letter, however, and the fact that it was a direct response to Nixon outside of normal diplomatic channels suggests a slight softening of attitude in the North.

Thus it appears likely that the Vietnam war dissenter would disagree almost completely with the first section of Nixon's speech and, as a result, disagree with the basis for the second part of the speech, the Nixon plan. Nixon's view of reality appears diametrically opposed to the interpretation of reality offered by war opponents. This second area of disagreement upon the nature of reality becomes even more significant when the image of the dissenter is discussed by Nixon. Nixon's image of the dissenter appears to differ from the dissenter's self-image on two counts: (1) the political position of the dissenter and (2) the impact of dissent on American foreign policy.

First, Nixon equates the dissenter's political position with "taking the easy way out" and losing the war. He suggests that there are only two options—complete withdrawal or Vietnamization of the war. Nixon states:

I have chosen the second course.
It is not the easy way.
It is the right way.

Thus, the President sets up a dichotomy, putting himself on the side of "rightness" and the dissenters on the side of "easiness." This is not a flattering interpretation of the dissenter's political position. But moreover, the fact that Nixon seems ready to make such a dichotomy in the first place—the dissenter and Nixon occupy different political positions—reminds one of Carmichael's analysis of LBJ: "Johnson drew the color lines." Perhaps the dissenter would say, "Nixon drew the battle lines."

Having defined the political position of the dissenter, Nixon suggests the impact that these young people are attempting to exert:

...as President of the United States, I would be untrue to my oath of office if I allowed the policy of this nation to be dictated by the minority who hold that view and who attempt to impose it on the nation by mounting demonstrations in the street.

Later, Nixon argues, "If a vocal minority, however fervent its causes, prevails over reason and the will of the majority this nation has no future as a free society." Thus, the demonstrators, rather than contributing to democratic decision-making by exhibiting support for one side of the issue via
the constitutional right to petition the government, are attempting to dictate policy and circumvent reason. In the radical’s view, demonstrators certainly do not expect to dictate government policy. Most seem to bemoan their apparent lack of influence in high councils. Nixon’s statement must be counted as either entirely unreasonable or as an indication that he feels threatened, overpowered by the demonstrators.

As a form of summarizing position, the total impact of the minority is dealt a final blow by Nixon when he states: “I respect your idealism.” When the entire tenor of the speech suggests that everything the dissenter believes is either wrong or unpatriotic, it is not credible that the President could respect their “idealism” except in a very peculiar and perhaps insulting way. The statement in this context seems to imply a kind of youthful, starry-eyed and quite foolish idealism. Certainly the dissenters do not view themselves as so incredibly naive.

Thus this speech was incapable of winning the support or even indulgence of the antiwar demonstrators. Though Nixon mentioned the desire to draw the people together and listen to every group, this speech seems almost designed to alienate the already disenfranchised youth of the United States. Nixon’s rehearsal of the events of the war would outrage many. If that did not, the discussion of the unpatriotic, undemocratic demonstrator in the street no doubt would result in outrage. Operationally Nixon may have in this speech received political support from the majority by using the minority as a scapegoat or sacrificial lamb to gain the laurels of the majority.4

CONCLUSION

Focusing upon the purposes of Nixon’s November 3rd speech, we have suggested that the descriptive emphasis of the speech should not prevent us from recognizing Nixon’s strong persuasive effort. The first third of the speech, while cast as a historical description, nonetheless is a persuasive attempt to redefine reality. The second part of the speech, while cast as a description of the Nixon plan, nonetheless is a persuasive attempt to unify the majority. The third part of the speech, while cast as an appeal to national unity, nonetheless is a persuasive attempt to use the minority as a scapegoat to guarantee the security of the majority. Thus, Nixon’s rhetorical effort is persuasive, and the question we have asked is whether Nixon could recapture his political power and also unite the nation. Employing the strategies that would celebrate a lost heritage with a commitment to a personal assertion of leadership, Nixon did, we have argued, regain his political power base provided by the great silent majority. For the vocal minority, however, different philosophical orientations, views of reality, and the image of the dissenter permanently separated Nixon and the dissenter, thus dividing, not uniting, the nation. From an even larger perspective, however, a critic might argue that Nixon denies the role of dissent in a democracy and minimizes the significance of free communication. Thus, major ethical questions may emerge regarding Nixon as a public speaker.

4 The rhetoric and proposals of Spiro Agnew might be perceived as an extension of Nixon’s use of the minority in this fashion. If this is the case, Nixon is overtly aware of his use of the minority. Such an analysis might provide the foundation for an ethical judgment of Nixon.
SPIRO AGNEW'S DIVERSIONARY RHETORIC

BERNARD L. BROCK

Spiro T. Agnew has again become an outspoken, controversial political figure. During the Presidential campaign Mr. Agnew gained a reputation for "shooting from the hip" which caused many people to question his qualifications as a Vice President, much less as a possible President. But during the 10 months following the election he was a different man—he quietly slipped into the background. However, this month with a series of speeches in which he attacked the moratorium peace leaders and the TV and press news media, Mr. Agnew has returned to the limelight, reinforcing his previous "reckless" image.

After successfully assuming a subordinate role and gaining a great deal of favorable comment because of this role change, one must question why Mr. Agnew suddenly reverted to a role which most observers would agree reduces his chances ever to be a Presidential candidate for his party. Was this a sudden whim which seized him, or is this role change part of a broader strategy within the Nixon administration? In considering the timing of his recent speeches and the effects that they've had on Mr. Nixon's major problem, Vietnam, the conclusion that Mr. Agnew's speeches are a co-ordinate part of Mr. Nixon's Vietnam effort is hard to reject. In fact, it appears as if Mr. Agnew is presently engaged in diversionary rhetoric.

Having previously attacked the leaders of the peace movement, on October 30th Mr. Agnew made a formal speech in which he took a stand on Vietnam: "Chanting 'Peace Now' is no solution, if 'Peace Now' is to permit wholesale Bloodbath." Then after Mr. Agnew's position received reasonable public acceptance, on November 3rd Mr. Nixon in a nation-wide TV address on Vietnam took a similar stand. It now appears as if Mr. Agnew's October 30th speech was a trial balloon which allowed Mr. Nixon to make his Vietnam policy more vague and to move toward the political right.

Following his address Mr. Nixon's public acceptance seemed to go up, but his Vietnam critics reopened their attacks. As a fairly direct response to these criticisms, on November 13th Mr. Agnew attacked the TV news medium for its lack of objectivity. Again the public response seemed to be more favorable than unfavorable. This time Mr. Agnew's speech counteracted the criticisms of Mr. Nixon's Vietnam policy by questioning the credibility of the TV news medium and by drawing attention away from Vietnam.

Then, moving from a defensive position to an offensive one, on November 20th Mr. Agnew indicted the press news medium. This speech focused attention on the news media and further undermined public confidence in anything the media might say by questioning its objectivity.

So what are the immediate and long-term effects of Mr. Agnew's strategy of diversion in the evolving Nixon administration rhetoric? Initially it has been very effective. It has strengthened the political right by making its rhetoric more dominant—Mr. Agnew echoes the 1964 Republican campaign. This of course is consistent with Mr. Nixon's recent strategy of blocking the movement of public opinion to the left on Vietnam—he is against acceptance

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of rapid disengagement. However, it is most successful as a diversionary tactic, taking attention away from Vietnam and giving the President more time to implement his policy without severe criticism.

The long-term effects are more difficult to assess. It is already clear that the series of speeches have added significantly to the division in society that is already present—we are now also divided over acceptance of the sources of all public information. And by making the attack so personal and emotional, bitterness has resulted from the ensuing charges and countercharges. One must question what is to be gained by attacking and undermining public confidence in the mass media. In the past this strategy has not been fruitful—Mr. Nixon in 1962, Mr. Goldwater in 1964, Mr. Romney in 1967, and Mr. Humphrey in 1968.

Mr. Agnew’s strategy of using the mass media as a diversionary scapegoat has initially been successful, but in the long run it could backfire. In the current situation with the cities already powder kegs and the youth across the nation quite restless, this is a dangerous strategy. No one can accurately predict how much more pressure the situation can stand before there is an explosion.
A KIND OF ALICE IN WONDERLAND: THE RIOT REPORT—AN ANALYSIS OF ITS EFFECTS

RICHARD HESS AND PAUL HARPER

In January of 1968, Lloyd F. Bitzer defined and discussed what he termed "the rhetorical situation." Noting that rhetoric belongs "...to the class of things which obtain their character from the circumstances of the historic context in which they occur,"1 Bitzer defined the rhetorical situation by saying:

Let us regard rhetorical situation as a natural context of persons, events, objects, relations, and an exigence which strongly invites utterance; this invited utterance participates naturally in the situation, is in many instances necessary to the completion of situational activity, and by means of its participation with situation obtains its meaning and its rhetorical character.2

As Bitzer saw it, rhetorical situations not only gave significance to discourse but were in fact a needed condition before meaningful discourse could exist. Just as an answer is viewed as a response to a question and is therefore dependent upon the question, so is discourse a response to a rhetorical situation and therefore dependent upon the situation.

Of special interest was the notion that "...many rhetorical situations mature and decay without giving birth to rhetorical utterance."3 It was further noted that at times responses which are unfitting are given to the situations. Bitzer noted many reasons for such failures, but he also claimed that such failures should be of interest to the critic of rhetoric. He asserted in fact that they constitute grounds for condemnation of the public speakers who fail to respond in a fitting manner.

In March of 1968 a situation occurred which did indeed "strongly invite utterance." A commission of the Federal Government declared in effect that America was a society embracing racism to such a degree as to jeopardize its future. One would expect that such a contention would result in wide-spread debate among all public figures, complete and thorough examination by the mass media, and national controversy. Strangely however, response to the report has been muted and ineffective. The critic of rhetoric must ask why. The purpose of this paper is to provide an answer for that question.

The report itself was a reaction to nearly a decade of national unrest. In 1960, a panel of distinguished Americans reported to President Eisenhower that the first goal for America in the 1960's had to concern the individual. The Commission reported that:

All our institutions—political, social, and economic—must further enhance the dignity of the citizen, promote the maximum development of

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2 Bitzer, p. 5.
3 Bitzer, p. 6.
his capabilities, stimulate their responsible exercise, and widen the range of effectiveness of opportunities for individual choice.\(^4\)

The Report on National Goals also noted a "contagion in the air" in the Negro community.\(^5\) Negro unrest in the 1960's has been the major domestic issue in the United States. The pattern of that unrest, until 1963, was legalistic and non-violent. After 1963, the pattern of unrest became violent to the point of civil rebellion. Negroes had taken to the streets with rioting, looting, and the destruction of property.

During 1967, America witnessed the most devastating internal attack upon itself since the Civil War. In Newark and Detroit frustrated Negroes served notice that the time for action by the White community was past. In all, the summer of 1967 saw 24 civil disorders in 23 cities. For those Americans who were not living in the cities under attack, the magnitude of the disorder was brought into their homes by way of the mass media.

On July 27, 1967, President Johnson appointed eleven distinguished citizens to the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders.\(^6\) The Committee Chairman and Vice-Chairman, Otto Kerner and John V. Lindsay, were noted for their sympathetic handling of civil disorders. The President charged the Commission with: 1) finding the basic causes and factors leading to civil disorders; 2) suggesting methods and techniques for averting or controlling such disorders; 3) determining appropriate roles of local, state, and federal authorities in dealing with civil disorders; and, 4) such other matters as the President might place before the Commission.\(^7\)

On March 1, 1968, four months in advance of the date called for in the original charge, the Commission submitted its Report. According to the Commission, the reason for the early issuance was so that the recommendations might have an effect on the events of the upcoming spring and summer months. A cynic might have been inclined to note that not only was the Report issued early to help head off disturbances in the summer of 1968, but also to greatly reduce its effect on the 1968 Presidential Elections.

The recommendations of the Report embraced three basic principles:

1) That the nation needed to mount programs on a scale equal to the dimensions of the problems.
2) That these programs be aimed for high impact in the immediate future in order to close the gap between promise and performance.
3) That the nation undertake new initiatives and experiments to change the system of failure and frustration that dominates the ghetto and weakens our society.\(^8\)

As of the winter of 1969, the impact of the Report has not been felt. President Johnson and President Nixon appeared to have consigned the Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders to the bookshelf. One would hope that such a consignment was not intentional, but, rather,

\(^7\) Report, Appendix A, pp. 534–535.
\(^8\) Report, p. 2.
that the fateful political events of 1968 pushed the Civil Disorders Report into the background.

A chronology of the events which negated the impact of the Civil Disorders Report must include the following: 1) the Report itself; 2) President Johnson’s abdication from active political life in 1968; 3) the assassinations of Dr. Martin Luther King and Senator Robert F. Kennedy; 4) the events surrounding the 1968 Democratic National Convention; 5) the Presidential Elections of 1968; and, 6) the Vietnamese Peace negotiations. All of the factors combined to divert America’s attention from the sound recommendations of the Commission.

The first point was that the Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders tended to negate its own effectiveness. As an advisory report, the suggestions of the panel were not assured of implementation. The panel did not have the power to institute policy which could have met the problems outlined in its study. Further, the Report was so comprehensive and so thorough that it tended to suggest that each course of action had to be started at once. To the extent that the Commission was impotent to institute policies and to the extent that it failed to establish definite priorities, the Commission was responsible for the lack of enthusiasm for the Report.

The second factor which tended to negate the effectiveness of the Report was a lack of strong commitment to its findings by President Johnson. One reason the President ignored the Report may have been his concern with the uneasiness created by the Vietnamese War. On March 31, 1969, thirty commentless days after the issuance of the Report, President Johnson removed himself from the forthcoming Presidential campaign partly in order to still the hostility toward his policies. The President caught the entire nation flatfooted with his announcement. Immediately the country’s attention was drawn from the Civil Disorders Report to the vacuum created by the President’s abdication.

The assassination of Martin Luther King created the third distraction. While trying to assist a group of garbage collectors in Memphis, Tennessee, Dr. King was shot to death on the evening of April 4, 1968. With the killing of this nonviolent man, the chief figure in the effort to bridge America’s racial gap passed from the scene. The immediate effect of Dr. King’s murder was widespread rioting, looting, arson, and sniping in dozens of American cities. More important was the creation of a void in the leadership of the Negro cause. Americans of all creeds and colors lost their prophet, and Dr. King’s non-violent movement became threatened with the possibility of fading into nothingness. The Vice-Chairman of the Civil Disorders Commission, John Lindsay, asked that the Commission be reconvened. Mayor Lindsay’s request was denied by the Chairman of the Commission.

On the morning of June 5, 1968, a murderer’s bullet again found a prominent American. Following the celebration of his California Presidential

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9 Don McKee, “Dr. King was ‘Bridge’ Between Law, Disorder,” The (Phila-
Primary victory, Robert F. Kennedy was assassinated. America was again grief-stricken. It is ironic that the tandem murders of these two who were so closely identified with Negro problems should distract from the Report. Their effect was, however, to shift attention away from the problems of racial confrontation to a preoccupation with outcries against violence.

The Report became even more obscured as Americans found that even after the spring riots of 1968 and daily news coverage of military actions in Vietnam, they could still be shocked by domestic violence. In Lincoln Park of the city of Chicago, during a traditional National Nominating Convention of the Democratic Party, America's youth were rioted against by the Chicago Police Force. The television viewer was subjected to on-the-spot coverage of the youth of the country in civil disorder. Civil Rights soon found itself being replaced by a new war cry, "Law and Order."

In September, 1968, America turned from domestic disorders to the Presidential election and the Vietnam peace negotiations. The Civil Disorders Report was no longer fashionable for news coverage.

Perhaps the best way to illustrate America's apathy toward the Report is to survey the efforts of the mass media to disseminate information about it. First, let us consider the recommendations of the Report in the areas of (a) newspaper coverage of problems in the Negro community and (b) the role of television coverage of problems in Negro areas. Second, let us consider the response of newspapers to the recommendations of the Report. Third, let us consider the response of television to the suggestions of the Report.

The Civil Disorders Report found that in the 1967 disturbances there was an imbalance between what actually happened and what was reported. The Report commented that there was a 

\[ \ldots \text{significant imbalance between what actually happened in our cities and what newspapers, radio, and television coverage of the riots told us happened. The Commission, in studying last summer's (1967) disturbances, visited many of the cities and interviewed participants and observers. We found that the disorders, as serious as they were, were less destructive, less widespread, and less a black-white confrontation than most people believed.}\]

Upon closer inspection, however, the Commission found that the imbalance in media coverage of the riots was not deliberate. The causes of the imbalance in coverage were attributed to: (1) poor journalistic practices such as the use of "scare" headlines by some newspapers, reporting of unsubstantiated rumors, and, in some instances, businessmen staging "riot" scenes; (2) the press obtaining its factual information about the scale of the disorders from local officials, who often were in no position to give accurate information; and, (3) "the coverage of the disorders—particularly on television—tended to define the events as black-white confrontation." The Report continued by leveling a fundamental criticism at news coverage when it stated that "the news media have failed to analyze and report adequately on racial problems in the United States and, as a related matter, to meet the Negro's legitimate expectations in journalism."


\[13\] Report, p. 363.

\[14\] Report, p. 365.

\[15\] Report, p. 366.
Specifically, newspaper coverage of the 1967 civil disorders was more calm, factual, and restrained than outwardly emotional or inflammatory. However, in general, newspapers were and are held suspect by the Negro community. Because there are few Negro editors, reporters, or working journalists in the newspaper business, the Negro community does not believe in “the white man’s press.” In fact, newspapers are only a secondary source of information for ghetto residents. The prime source of information in the ghetto is television news coverage.

The Report made several recommendations for coverage of racial problems in America. In the area of riot coverage, the Report suggested (1) that planning for and cooperation between the police and the press be emphasized; (2) that the civil authorities designate information officers of experience and position who could provide vital information for newsmen; (3) that a Central Information Center be established for the use of all media representatives; and, (4) that the news media establish and enforce codes of conduct for racial coverage.

In the area of news coverage of general racial problems in the United States, the Report concluded that there was a major “failure to report adequately on race relations and ghetto problems and to bring more Negroes into journalism.” To solve the problems of the press, the Report urged the news industry to make a concerted effort to entice young black people into journalism, to place qualified Negroes in higher decision-making positions, and to establish relations with the Negro community. In short, the press was asked to realize that part of its duty in news reporting was to provide total coverage.

When the Report considered the role of television in covering racial matters, it concluded that everything said in criticism of the newspaper industry could be attributed to that medium. Since television has a more pervasive influence in the ghetto than newspapers, a duplication of the criticism of newspapers is even more damaging. Television must, according to the Report, employ more Negro reporters and report on the misery, degradation, and hopelessness of ghetto existence. In the area of entertainment, television was urged to employ more Negroes in dramatic and comedy series.

What was the response by the media to the Report’s criticism? The answer to that question is varied. For instance, no matter how receptive the newspaper industry might have been to the Report’s criticism, no matter how desirous to quickly change basic policy and admit Negroes as reporters, editors, and columnists, one basic fact remained. In order to revitalize the newspaper industry, time and journalistic training were needed. Nonetheless, the newspaper industry did offer a feeble response to the Report’s comments on codes of behavior.

Mr. William M. Ware, executive editor of the Cleveland Plain Dealer, surveyed members of the Freedom of Information Committee of the Associated Press Managing Editors on the issue of riot coverage and codes of conduct. From Dayton, Ohio, to Washington, D.C., from Buffalo, New York, and elsewhere, Mr. Ware’s survey revealed a wide range of responses. Some newspapers had established codes of conduct, while others had taken no action. The response of the AIDS Industry was mixed. Some newspapers were receptive to the Report’s criticism, while others were not.

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18 Report, p. 382.
York, to Los Angeles, California, the editors surveyed expressed their confidence in each other’s ability to edit the news and their lack of confidence in codes of behavior. Thus a minor aspect of the Civil Disorders Report was rejected.

The response of television to the Report’s criticism has also been varied, but, on the whole, more favorable. Journalism in television is less demanding than that of the newspaper industry. Such is particularly the case on the local level. Due to the fact that most of the spade work in journalism is done by news services, a local television “journalist” need not be as highly trained as a newspaperman. He does need training in visual/vocal aspects of presentation, but not in news gathering. Consequently, most metropolitan television news programs have made efforts to hire Negro reporters.

On the national level at least one major television network has made an effort to integrate its entertainment series for 1968-1969. The Columbia Broadcasting System put Negro actors and actresses into eight different shows and hired three new Negro newspapermen “who’ll have the status of the network’s top reporters.” The National Broadcasting Company, the first major network to costar a Negro actor in a regular series, countered with Diahann Carroll as the star of her own series about a widowed Negro nurse who has a young son. The television industry has responded favorably to the criticism and suggestions of the Civil Disorders Report.

But in terms of the coverage of the Civil Disorders Report, per se, what has been the response? Only one major network has devoted any time to that report. On April 23, 1968, at 10 p.m. the Columbia Broadcasting System’s news department did a half-hour Special Report on “What Happened to the Riot Report.” The program covered the period from March 1, 1968, to April 23, 1968. The host was Harry Reasoner.

“What Happened to the Riot Report” was a twenty-four minute program which included comments from Otto Kerner, John Lindsay, Ike Pappas reporting from Newark, New Jersey, the Mayor of Newark, and Charles Dallas, a Negro citizen from Newark; reports from Capitol Hill and the White House by Roger Mudd and Dan Rather; comments by Ramsey Clark, Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago, and Kenneth B. Clark, a Negro social scientist; and a report from New York City on the efforts of public and parochial school children to disseminate the Report in their neighborhoods. The program was amazingly comprehensive in its coverage; it was equally amazing in its lack of depth. The (Philadelphia, Pa.) Evening Bulletin television critic, Rex Polier, summarized the entire program with the succinct understatement, “It was pretty brief but fairly informative.”

Although the mass media have, in a few instances, done an outstanding job of facing the realities of America’s racial problems, as a social force

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21 Bill Cosby in the “I Spy” series.
22 Recorded from the WCAU-TV, Channel 10, Philadelphia, Pa., broadcast.
it has not lived up to its potential. The general fashion of the news has been directed toward Vietnam, assassinations, gun control, political campaigns and conventions, and occasionally with civil disorders. It is ironic that so powerful a force as the news media has permitted itself to become as apathetic toward America’s cancer as is the rest of society. Thus far America has had to agree with the prognostication of Kenneth B. Clark on the fate of riot reports in general, and on the 1968, Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders in particular. Dr. Clark said:

I read that report...of the 1919 riot in Chicago, and it is as if I were reading the report of the investigating committee on the Harlem riot of ’35, the report of the investigating committee on the Harlem riot of ’43, the McCone Commission on the Watts riot.

I must again in candor say to you members of the Commission—it is a kind of Alice in Wonderland—with the same moving picture re-shown over and over again, the same analysis, the same recommendations, and the same inaction.25

A less articulate but more affected Negro summed the situation for the CBS News Special Report with: “The Riot Commission Report hasn’t changed anything, it was the riots that did the changing.”26 Unfortunately most observers of the American scene would have to agree with Mr. Clark and Mr. Dallas.

This paper has outlined the reasons for the failure of American leaders and American mass media to respond to a rhetorical situation of magnitude. Bitzer noted that some situations are so compelling that responses are a necessity. Our society and its leaders have not responded to the rhetorical situation. As Tom Wicker noted of the 1969 riots, “this is not to say that the riots were justified or the best way for black Americans to have proceeded; but the fact remains that violence got action, got something done, when it seemed that nothing else would move the dominant whites.”27 We had our chance in March, 1968. The rhetorical situation matured and decayed without giving birth to substantive rhetorical utterance.

MINUTES OF NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETINGS

DELTA SIGMA RHO—TAU KAPPA ALPHA NATIONAL COUNCIL
27 December 1969, Statler-Hilton Hotel, New York, New York

Persons present for all or part of the meeting: McBath, Walwik, Freeley, Hance, Weiss, Ewbank, Brock, Laase, Beard, Buehler, Pelham, Eubank, Moorhouse, Ludlum.

Meeting was called to order by President James McBath at 4:10 p.m.

Report of the Secretary, Theodore Walwik:

1. Distributed a list of twenty-seven delinquent chapters.
2. Reported that three persons have been nominated as members-at-large: Motion, Walwik; Second, Hance: The National Council approve Bonnie Buenger of Maryland, Samuel V. O. Prichard, Jr., of Pennsylvania State, and Edward G. Skirde of Pennsylvania State as members-at-large. Motion passed.
3. The question of the nature of Chapter Reports was raised. By common consent, the Council agreed to a shortened, postcard form.
4. The possibility of shortening the membership application forms was suggested. Motion, Hance; Second, Ewbank: The Secretary is instructed to develop a simplified form if possible, after consulting with the Allen Press. Motion passed.

President McBath noted the receipt of a letter from Historian Herold T. Ross advising of his temporary (to June 1, 1970) address, 316½ McGoodwin Street, Warrensburg, Missouri 64093.

Thomas Ludlum read a report received from Historian Herold T. Ross. Historian Ross advises that a new supply of the Short Histories of DSR—TKA have been printed; revised instructions for initiation procedures have been noted in the Speaker and Gavel; and that a new chapter of the history of the society will be prepared in the summer of 1970.

Report of the Treasurer, Kenneth Hance:

1. The Internal Revenue Service was advised on September 30, 1969 that form 990-SF for 1968 had been filed properly and that Hance is the appropriate officer to supply such information.
2. Insurance has been secured on copies of Speaker and Gavel stored at Allen Press. The premium is $33.00 per year.
3. On 31 October 1969, a letter was received from Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, publishers of the TKA textbook, on securing appropriate Congressional action in the matter of library photocopy rights. Hance responded by writing Senators Hart and Griffin of Michigan.
4. Hance presented the report of the Treasurer for the period 1 July 1969–30 June 1969. (appended)
5. Hance presented the proposed budget for 1 July 1969–1 July 1970 (appended)

E. C. Buehler, Trustee Emeritus, reported that since the merger the society has spent approximately $10,000 more than our income. Harold Allen of Allen Press reports that printing costs are up radically. Some adjustment
in our income-expenditure ratio is therefore indicated. Two alternatives, raising membership fees and reducing costs of the Speaker and Gavel, were suggested. Specifically, Speaker and Gavel costs could be reduced by updating the subscriber lists and by limiting the number of “free copies” distributed.

Discussion followed of other ways of reducing costs and/or increasing income. Suggestions included the reduction of Speaker and Gavel to three issues per year, raising the charter fee to $100, establishing a fee for the reactivation of delinquent chapters, increasing the number of initiations per year, and the development of a procedure which would permit the payment of membership fees as a part of the National Conference fees.

**Motion, Brock; Second, Ewbank:** The Speaker and Gavel subscriber lists should be updated to delete unnecessary exchange copies, special subscriptions, and address unknown or deceased life subscribers. **Motion passed.**

**Motion, Brock; Second, Freeley:** Limit free library subscriptions to one per institution. **Motion passed.**

**Motion, Laase; Second, Freeley:** The number of copies of Speaker and Gavel sent to chapter sponsors should be reduced from three to two. **Passed.**

**Motion, Brock; Second, Beard:** A membership fee of $10.00 should be re-established for members-at-large. **Passed.**

**Motion, Freeley; Second, Laase:** The subscription price for Speaker and Gavel should be raised from $1.50 to $5.00 per year. **Passed.**

**Motion, Freeley; Second, Laase:** Alumni dues for members of DSR—TKA will be $5.00 per year and will include a subscription to Speaker and Gavel. **Passed.**

**Motion, Ewbank; Second, Brock:** The practice of selling life subscriptions to Speaker and Gavel be discontinued. **Passed.**

**Motion, Laase; Second, Hance:** A DSR—TKA Life Patron alumni membership should be established. The cost of such membership will be $100.00, the amount received to be considered capital for the society. The trustee may provide for installment payments. DSR—TKA Life patrons will receive an appropriate certificate and will receive a life subscription to the Speaker and Gavel. **Passed.**

In light of the measures taken to effect economies in the operation of the society, Treasurer Hance suggested that the budget be considered.

**Motion, Hance; Second, Laase:** The proposed budget for 1 July 1969—30 June 1970 be approved. **Passed.**

Treasurer Hance presented a financial report of the 1969 National Conference prepared by Donald Olson of the University of Nebraska.

**Motion, Walwik; Second, Hance:** The Editor of Speaker and Gavel be requested to print the financial statement of the 1969 National Conference in the next issue of Speaker and Gavel, subject to editing by Weiss and Laase. **Passed.**
Wayne Eubank, presented his report summarizing DSR—TKA capital investment as of 1 July 1969. Report appended.

Glenn Pelham, representing Joe Wetherby of Duke, reported on the status of several chapters in Region IV. Wetherby requests a delay in further action concerning the chapter at Duke. Pelham strongly urged that Wetherby's request be honored.

The National Council adjourned, to reconvene at 7:00 p.m. on December 28, 1969.

MINUTES, 28 December 1969

Persons present for all or part of the meeting: McRath, Walwik, Freeley, Adamson, Eubank, Ewbank, Moorhouse, Kane, Beard, Huber, Phifer, Weiss, Ludlum, Laase, Hance, Buehler.

Meeting called to order at 7:10 p.m. by President James McBath.

Gregg Phifer, Chairman of the Speaker of the Year Board, reported:

1. The preliminary balloting for Speaker of the Year has been completed. The final selection will be made soon.
2. The possibility of issuing censure resolutions by the Speaker of the Year Board has been suggested. The sentiment seems to be that such action would not be appropriate for DSR—TKA.

George Adamson, Chairman of the National Conference Committee, reported:

1. After a trip to the University of Alabama to confirm details, all arrangements for the 1970 National Conference have been completed.
2. The budget for the 1970 National Conference has been finalized. Fees, including all meals, have been set at $19.50 per student and $11.50 per faculty member. It was noted that the University of Alabama is providing generous financial underwriting for the National Conference.

   Motion, Adamson; Second, Laase: The proposed budget for the 1970 National Conference should be approved. Motion passed.

3. Pending final commitments from the university, the Conference Committee recommends that the 1971 National Conference be held at Indiana State University in Terre Haute, Indiana.

   Motion, Laase; Second, Hance: The National Conference Committee is authorized to complete negotiations with Indiana State University. Motion passed.

4. The National Conference Committee recommends that the 1972 National Conference be held at the University of New Mexico in Albuquerque.

   Motion, Adamson; Second, Hance: The National Council approves of the location of the 1972 National Conference at the University of New Mexico. Motion passed.

Robert Weiss, Editor of Speaker and Gavel, reported:

1. Malthon Anapol of the University of Delaware has been named as Associate Editor.
2. A continuing effort is being made to attract student contributions and notices of chapter and regional activities.

https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol7/iss3/1
Some discussion followed of the need for a policy concerning permissions to reprint from *Speaker and Gavel*. President McBath suggested that Editor Weiss look at the statement developed by the American Forensic Association for the *Journal of the American Forensic Association*.

Robert Huber, Chairman of the Distinguished Alumni Awards Committee, reported that his committee had been formulated and was to begin deliberations while at the SAA Convention. Members of the committee are Robert Huber, Chairman; Franklin Shirley, John Keltner, Nicholas Cripe, Thorrel Fest.

*Motion, Huber; Second, Hance:* Andrew Cordier be elected as member-at-large, without fee. *Motion passed.*

Ray Beard, Governor of Region II, reported that a request for a charter had been received from the University of Scranton, the chapter of Pace College was installed on May 8, Beard has been reelected Governor, and that a tournament at Susquehanna was held with special awards for DSR—TKA schools.

Tom Ludlum, Governor of Region V, reported that the chapter at Hanover, although delinquent, faces extenuating circumstances, and is deserving of additional consideration. Ludlum raised the question of the status of branches of state universities with respect to DSR—TKA. The consensus of the National Council was that the charter rests with the parent institution. Initiation of students can be arranged through the parent chapter. However, when a branch acquires its own accreditation, then it is considered a separate academic unit and must apply for its own charter.

Mel Moorhouse, Governor of Region VII, reported general strength among chapters in his region. Especially noteworthy was the revival of interest at the University of Missouri.

Henry Ewbank, A.C.H.S. Representative, reported:

1. A.C.H.S. will meet in February at Auburn. The A.C.H.S. Council is being urged to endorse the *A.A.U.P. 1940 Statement of Principles*.
2. The A.C.H.S. film has been produced and will be available soon.

Henry Ewbank, Chairman of the Standards Committee, reported receipt of a petition for a charter from the United States Naval Academy. The Standards Committee recommends approval.

*Motion, Ewbank; Second, Moorhouse:* A charter be awarded to the United States Naval Academy. *Motion passed.*

*Motion, Weiss; Second, Moorhouse:* The Charter Fee be increased to $100.00. *Motion passed.*

*Motion, Weiss; Second, Moorhouse:* A fee of $50.00 be established for reactivation of a chapter that has been declared inactive. *Motion passed.*

President McBath suggested the desirability of the society cooperating in the project for the compilation of a joint index to the forensics journals. *Motion passed.*

*Motion, Laase; Second, Hance:* The President is authorized to appoint Lillian Wagner as DSR—TKA representative to the committee to prepare a proposal for an index of forensics journals. *Motion passed.*
The status of delinquent chapters was discussed.

**Motion, Laase; Second, Ewbank:** The following action be taken with respect to delinquent chapters:

President McBath should write letters to the Presidents of:
- Alma College
- University of Arkansas
- Morehouse College
- Case-Western Reserve University
- Occidental College
- Waynesburg College

President McBath should write letters to the chapter sponsors of the following schools:
- Berea College
- Birmingham-Southern University
- Carlow College
- University of Chicago
- Clemson University
- University of Florida
- University of Georgia
- Grinnell College
- New York University—Washington Square
- Northwestern University (to McBumey)
- Queens College (to Cathcart)
- St. Lawrence University
- University of Virginia
- University of Wyoming

Secretary Walwik would write letter of inquiry to:
- Bates College
- University of North Carolina
- Vanderbilt University

Secretary Walwik would write an encouraging letter to Duke University and Hanover College.
A final letter of warning should be sent from President McBath to San Francisco State.

**Motion passed.**

Discussion followed concerning the advisability of increasing membership fees. Henry Ewbank, A.C.H.S. Representative, was requested to prepare a memorandum reviewing fee practices of other honoraries.

Laase suggested that budgeting procedures would be more realistic if the budget were adopted at the National Conference for the fiscal year to follow.

**Motion, Laase; Second, Kane:** A budget for the 1970–71 fiscal year be prepared and presented for approval by the National Council at the National Conference in March. **Motion passed.**

The National Council adjourned.

Respectfully submitted,
Theodore J. Walwik
Secretary

### INCOME

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<tr>
<td>Initiations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investment Income (cash)</td>
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<td>Charters</td>
<td>200.00</td>
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<td>Special Gifts</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>500.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Members-at-large</td>
<td>50.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Keys</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Income</strong></td>
<td>$8550.00</td>
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### DISBURSEMENTS

**Speaker and Gavel**
- Four Issues: $4000.00
- Editor's Office: 300.00
- Printing and Postage: 200.00
- President's Office: 200.00
- Secretary's Office: 1000.00
- Treasurer's Office: 200.00
- Historian's Office: 200.00
- Maintenance of Records by Allen Press: 700.00
- Dues and Expenses re. Association of College Honor Societies: 150.00
- Expenses re. SAA Committee on Debate-Discussion: 150.00
- Membership Certificates: 400.00

**Awards:**
- Speaker of the Year: 50.00
- Distinguished Alumni: 25.00
- Trophy for NFL: 125.00
- SAA Life Membership Payment: 200.00
- Student Council: 150.00
- National Conference: 800.00
- Miscellaneous: 75.00

**Total Disbursements:** $8925.00

Probable Deficit: $375.00

Note: The Treasurer's Report, covering income and disbursements for the period from July 1, 1968 to June 30, 1969, may be found on page 30 of the November, 1969, issue of Speaker and Gavel.

## FINANCIAL REPORT—1969 NATIONAL CONFERENCE

Note: The following financial report of the 1969 National Conference at Lincoln, Nebraska, was prepared by the Conference Director, Donald O. Olson, so that chapter sponsors and other members might have a better understanding of the conference expenses in a typical year.

### Receipts

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>97 Faculty entry fees @ $10.00</td>
<td>$970.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>303 Student entry fees @ $13.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSR-TKA subsidy</td>
<td>800.00</td>
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</table>
22 Alumni dinners @ $3.50 77.00
686 Lunches @ $1.15 788.90
284 Dinners @ $1.40 397.60
Judges 250.00
University of Nebraska subsidy 625.02
Total Receipts $7,821.52

Expenses

Conference fees to Center—394 people @ $4.40 $1,773.00
Conference banquet at Center—440 people 1,540.00
1035 Conference breakfasts @ $.50 517.50
310 Conference dinners @ $1.40 434.00
640 Conference luncheons @ $1.15 736.00
KUON-TV crew dinners 34.45
Bus transportation 327.38
Tournament supplies, paid Center 13.42
Certificates—Balfour Company 43.33
Trophies—Balfour Company 515.75
Framing 4 certificates for outstanding alumni 40.00
Judging 610.00
Typists and secretaries—$1.50/hour 188.50
Co-chairmen—5@ $50 250.00
Faculty reception 236.95
Student entertainment 160.00
Tournament program 88.45
Advertising and mailing 36.71
Telephone 29.15
Caretaker—Hall of Youth 18.00
Photographic laboratory 47.12
Postage 16.90
AFA Ballots 40.00
Conference Committee inspection tour 19.00
Checking account and checks 2.13
Supplies for Congress 14.74
Tournament supplies 59.04
Total expenses $7,821.52

The first item under expenses is for the use of the Center, an item of expense which did not occur in former years. Without that item, a large sum could have been turned over to the organization as a financial cushion toward expenses.

Furthermore, $1.00 per student less was charged this year than was charged last year, which would have provided an additional cushion of 300 dollars.

Submitted by Donald O. Olson, Conference Director
## Chapters and Sponsors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter Name, Address</th>
<th>Faculty Sponsor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama, University, Ala.</td>
<td>Annabel D. Hagood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albion, Albion, Mich.</td>
<td>Jon Fitzgerald</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alma, Alma, Michigan</td>
<td>Frank H. Jackson</td>
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<tr>
<td>American University, Washington, D. C.</td>
<td>Jerome B. Polisky</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arkansas, Fayetteville, Ark.</td>
<td>Jimmie Neal Rogers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Auburn, Auburn, Ala.</td>
<td>Marsh Trew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ball State, Muncie, Ind.</td>
<td>David W. Shepard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bates, Lewiston, Me.</td>
<td>Thomas Moser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berea, Berea, Ky.</td>
<td>Margaret D. McCoy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham-Southern, Birmingham, Ala.</td>
<td>Robert A. Dayton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridgeport, Bridgeport, Conn.</td>
<td>C. F. Evans, Jr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridgewater, Bridgewater, Va.</td>
<td>Roger E. Sappington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigham Young, Provo, Utah</td>
<td>Jed J. Richardson</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brooklyn, Brooklyn, N. Y.</td>
<td>Donald Springen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brown, Providence, R. I.</td>
<td>Jim Townsend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucknell, Lewisburg, Pa.</td>
<td>Frank W. Merritt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Butler, Indianapolis, Ind.</td>
<td>Nicholas M. Cripe</td>
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<td>California State, Long Beach, Calif.</td>
<td>Jack Howe</td>
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<td>Capital, Columbus, Ohio</td>
<td>Thomas S. Ludlum</td>
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<td>Carlow, Pittsburgh, Pa.</td>
<td>Thomas A. Hopkins</td>
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<td>Case-Western Reserve, Cleveland, Ohio</td>
<td>Donald Marston</td>
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<td>Chicago, Chicago, Ill.</td>
<td>Clair Henderlider</td>
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<td>Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio</td>
<td>Rudolph F. Verderber</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colgate, Hamilton, N. Y.</td>
<td>H. G. Behler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado, Boulder, Colo.</td>
<td>George Matter</td>
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<td>Colorado College, Colorado Springs, Colo.</td>
<td>James A. Johnson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut, Storrs, Conn.</td>
<td>Joseph Seearst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornell, Ithaca, N. Y.</td>
<td>Rev. H. J. McAuliffe, S.J.</td>
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<td>Cornell, Mt. Vernon, Iowa</td>
<td>Walter F. Stromer</td>
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<td>Creighton, Omaha, Neb.</td>
<td>Arthur N. Kruger</td>
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<td>Dartmouth, Hanover, N. H.</td>
<td>Herbert L. James</td>
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<td>Davidson, Davidson, N. C.</td>
<td>Rev. Will Terry</td>
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<td>Delaware, Newark, Del.</td>
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<td>Denver, Denver, Colorado</td>
<td>W. R. Dresser</td>
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<td>DePauw, Greencastle, Ind.</td>
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<td>Dickinson, Carlisle, Pa.</td>
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<td>Eastern Kentucky State, Richmond, Ky.</td>
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<td>Elizabethtown, Elizabethtown, Penn.</td>
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<td>Florida, Gainesville, Fla.</td>
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<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>Charleston</td>
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**Note:** The above table lists some of the chapters and their faculty sponsors. The full list can be found in the document.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter Name, Address</th>
<th>Faculty Sponsor</th>
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<tr>
<td>Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Ind. South Bend</td>
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<td>Ohio Wesleyan, Delaware, Ohio</td>
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<td>Oklahoma, Norman, Okla.</td>
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