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

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Speaker and Gavel

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A WELCOME FROM THE 1973 NATIONAL CONFERENCE HOST

TO ALL CHAPTERS:

A new competitive event and some different ways of scheduling the conference will make the 1973 Conference of Delta Sigma Rho—Tau Kappa Alpha a little unusual. The event is being hosted this year by the University of Illinois at Urbana—Champaign, April 18–21, 1973.

The New Event. The Conference Planning Committee has authorized a contemporary issues debate event. This event was more fully described in a previous *Speaker and Gavel.* This debate event features a topic chosen by the participating schools and encourages debaters to argue their personal convictions on a current issue.

In addition, the tournament features eight rounds in the two-man debate competition leading to octa-finals, eight rounds in four-man debate on the national topic, persuasive speaking and extemporaneous speaking, and the student congress dealing with political campaign practices.

Different Housing Arrangements. This year all participants will be housed at the Ramada Inn Convention Center next to the University of Illinois Campus. This means the entire group can be housed at one facility. The Ramada features an indoor swimming pool and free transportation from the airport to the Ramada—a distance of about five miles. The Student Congress activities, the extemp and persuasive speaking events, banquets, national council and student council meetings and the final rounds of two-man debate will all be at the Ramada. The opening and final sessions will also be held at the Ramada.

Only the banquet will be included in the registration fee for students. The coaches' fee will include both the coaches' dinner—buffet and the banquet. This means that the fees paid at registration will be lower than in previous years. Participants can match their budget to their eating style. The Ramada includes a Pancake House open from 6 a.m. to 2 a.m., and a dining room for breakfast, lunch, and dinner together with a lounge featuring a fine jazz group and dancing. Literally next door is a McDonald's, a pizza parlor, an Italian restaurant, and a grocery store-delicatessen. Several more restaurants are within a block or two. A short car or taxi ride will take people to a host of different eating and entertainment spots.

Debate events will be held on the campus with busses traveling door to door for those without cars.

Although the greater number of events and rounds in some events means a somewhat tighter schedule, participants should still have a chance to explore the University of Illinois Campus and the Urbana—Champaign community. The University of Illinois, the Department of Speech, and the local debate group are looking forward to welcoming all the chapters to the conference. Advance registration materials were sent to all chapters early in January. If you have not received a packet of materials or have any other questions, please write to me at the Department of Speech and I will be happy to answer any questions I can. See you in spring in Urbana—Champaign.

Kenneth Andersen

1973 DSR—TKA Conference Director

IMAGE BUILDING STRATEGIES IN THE 1972 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

JUDITH S. TRENT

The 1972 Presidential campaign was supposed to have been a campaign based primarily on issues—a campaign which would offer the American voter his most clear-cut choice in recent history. Whether it was the Vietnam War or the larger issue of the United States' role in the world; whether it was the future of the military or the state of the economy; whether it was in the area of crime, education, welfare, taxation or busing, Mr. Nixon's and Mr. McGovern's differences were total. And although the candidates' differing positions on these issues may have in part accounted for the overwhelming re-election of the President, it was image and not issues which ultimately determined the outcome of the 1972 presidential campaign.

The major changes which occurred in candidates' images offer credence to the belief that they rather than issues were decisive. For example, Nixon's image for twenty-four years had suggested dullness, coldness, and insincerity at best—and opportunism, shoddiness, and political hatchetry at worst, but by August, 1972, he was perceived as a "warm, sincere, and fun-loving statesman who put his country's interest ahead of politics."[1] And McGovern, the mild-mannered college professor who edged through the primaries viewed as a sincere, reliable, and credible man who stuck to his principles and possessed all the Boy Scout virtues,[2] was, by November, 1972, perceived as a demagogue who made extravagant charges and promises and was in alliance with the fringe groups—the abortion-on-demand crowd, the gay liberationists, the draft dodgers, the welfare-for-everybody politicians, and the radical elements of female liberation.[3] Equally clear and politically important image shifts were those of the Senator from Maine who was prepared to be President until his emotionally laden answer to Mr. Loeb portrayed an "un-presidential" image and the villain of Chappaquiddick who in the minds of many had, by mid-October, become the hero of 1976.

Thus, while image may not be the only element worthy of academic investigation of political 1972, it is an element which ultimately played a major role in determining the outcome of the campaign. This being

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Judith S. Trent (Ph.D., University of Michigan, 1970) is an Assistant Professor in the Communication Arts Department at the University of Dayton. This paper was presented initially at the fall conference of the Michigan Speech Association in October, 1972.

[1] In August, *Newsweek* commissioned The Gallup Organization to conduct a survey to try to discover how Americans really felt about Richard Nixon. More than 1,100 people in all regions of the country were asked how they rated the Nixon Administration's record and Nixon as a personality. "What America Really Thinks of Nixon," *Newsweek*, August 28, 1972, pp. 16–18.

[2] James J. Kilpatrick, "What Became Of The 'Mild-Mannered' College Professor?," Hamilton *Journal News*, October 1, 1972., p. 10.

[3] Andrew Tully, "Time to Clean Houses," The Washington *Post*, November 9, 1972, p. 29.

the case, it is important to examine the image building strategies of both the Republican and Democratic candidates.

Few politicians are more difficult to write about than Richard Nixon. The longer he stays in public life, the more difficult it becomes to analyze not only his public personality (the image he attempts to create) but the perception itself (the image the public has of the man). Part of the problem is, of course, that he has been around so long that his public career has seemed to pass through the center of most of the pressure points of post-war political history. Then too, when he resurfaced as a presidential candidate in 1968 it was a "New Nixon"—or at the very least, with a new public personality.[4] In 1968, Nixon changed his speaking style, changed the method of his campaigning, and, what is most important in this instance, he tried to change his image from politician to statesman. He ran as though he were already President.[5]

As we attempt to assess Nixon's image building campaign in 1972, the resemblance to 1968 is obvious.

The over-all image strategy of Nixon's 1972 campaign was to run as the President, as a hard-working statesman far above the hurly-burly of political battle. The strategy was apparent in a number of ways. For example, early in the campaign Nixon, in a speech to Republican workers, told them that he had "insisted to his strategists that he would run a high-minded affirmative campaign with no gut-fighting or even the suspicion of it."[6] And a day later, when questioned by a reporter about the Watergate Affair, he cut off questioning with the remark: "Let the political people talk on that."[7] As September drew to a close, Nixon suggested that he would have little time for politicking and, except for an occasional day or week-end trip, would remain in Washington.[8] And finally, by election day, it was obvious that Nixon had run for re-election in almost perfect privacy—emerging from the seclusion of the White House or Camp David for a few brief motorcades in Atlanta or northern Ohio or the suburbs of New York City, with two exceptions shunning television, using only radio to outline his positions, and never directly acknowledging his opponent's challenges to debate.

Running as the President, above political trenches, is not a new presidential image strategy. The newness in 1972 was the supreme skill with

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[4] One of the more interesting bits of Nixon psychological analysis is that of James David Barber as he writes about presidential character. James David Barber, "The Question of Presidential Character," *Saturday Review*, September 23, 1972, pp. 62–66.

[5] For a more detailed explanation of the 1968 Nixon see: Judith S. Trent, "An Examination and Comparison of the Rhetorical Style of Richard Milhous Nixon in the Presidential Campaigns of 1960 and 1968: A Content Analysis" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1970). For specific investigations of Nixon's sentence structure and methods of identification refer to: Judith S. Trent, "Richard Nixon's Types of Sentences in the Presidential Campaigns of 1960 and 1968: A Content Analysis," *Michigan Speech Association Journal*, 6 (1971), 12–24, or Judith S. Trent, "Richard Nixon's Methods of Identification in the Presidential Campaigns of 1960 and 1968: A Content Analysis," *Today's Speech*, 19 (Fall, 1971), 23–30.

[6] "The President," *Newsweek*, August 28, 1972, p. 15.

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] "How Mr. Nixon Woos the Democrats," *Newsweek*, October 2, 1972, pp. 15–16.

which the technique was implemented and the slightly different twist applied to the old art. For example, the Republicans did not run a "re-elect Richard Nixon" campaign, they ran a "re-elect the President" campaign—and there is a difference. Also, the two primary campaign slogans were: "Now More Than Ever" and "Re-elect the President." In addition, Nixon lieutenants seldom referred to Nixon by name as they campaigned; they referred to "The President."

Three explanations seem plausible for this strategy: it may be that Nixon strategists sought to create the perception that Nixon the man and Nixon the President were inexorably welded together. This is a positively-oriented reason. Nixon gains from the aura of the office. A negatively-oriented explanation would maintain that the strategy was based on fear that the relatively new-found trust in Mr. Nixon as an individual, while numerically strong, was thin. That is, those who were for him were not all that committed: they were voting for what they perceived as the "lesser of two evils."[9] This glimmer of doubt about Nixon as a man was perhaps a residue of a major problem for Republicans in a number of his past campaigns. The third possibility is that association as the President rather than as just Richard Nixon may have been a way of keeping the man and the office free from the Watergate, IT&T, and grain exportation profit scandals. In fact, by election day, Nixon had never personally denied White House involvement in any of these scandals, in spite of McGovern's direct challenges and accusations. At any rate, while we can only guess at the reason, the strategy was obvious: it was the President who was to be re-elected.

In addition, Nixon strategists used beautifully all of the advantages of campaigning from the White House. Theodore Roosevelt called the presidency a "bully pulpit" from which the Chief Executive can take his case to the people.[10] In election years, the high visibility of the office gives incumbents bent on re-election priceless access to publicity and free use of media time.

Political reverberations flow from every visible action of the Presidency. Massive shock waves are set up by major foreign policy moves; happy vibrations are engendered by proclamations dedicating days and weeks to special causes. Examples of Nixon's skillful use of the "bully pulpit" are numerous: a telephone call to Israel's Golda Meir occasioned by the inauguration of a satellite ground station linking Israeli and U.S. television which was promptly released by the White House Press Office; and a ceremony in the state dining room of the White House fully taped for television, at which Nixon received 120 young members of the Future Farmers of America while he signed a bill making farmers between eighteen and twenty-one eligible for federal crop insurance.

Theoretically, if there are so many advantages to the incumbent seeking re-election, there ought to be at least one disadvantage. Theoretically there is—not only is the President responsible for the accomplishments of his administration, but by the same reasoning he is also held accountable for the failures. In Mr. Nixon's case, it was a disadvantage only in theory, a fact that can be understood by examining other Nixon image strategies.

[9] "Nixon's Great Triumph," *Newsweek*, November 13, 1972, pp. 27–31.

[10] Dib Urwin, "The 'bully pulpit' is greatest of campaign platforms," *Los Angeles Times*, August 10, 1972, p. 35.

Nixon was able to maintain his Presidential posture by the skillful use of what can be termed image maintenance strategies. The first such strategy was ignoring direct policy attacks of his opponent, but sending out the reserves to counterattack and defend. This strategy was evidenced by the creation of "Democrats for Nixon" who served as Mr. Nixon's wrecking crew,[11] by the campaigning of the Nixon family, by Mr. Agnew, and by each of the cabinet officers and undersecretaries who directly responded to McGovern's policy attacks within their area of concern. At one point in mid-September, forty-nine principals in the executive branch of the government were out campaigning for the re-election of the President while Mr. Nixon remained in Washington.[12] The effect of this official blitzkrieg was staggering—at least in terms of media exposure—because these high government officials obviously received wide media coverage (wider than so-called politicians who traveled for the opposition).

The second image maintenance strategy was to emphasize accomplishments to a carefully selected audience—an audience which was highly favorable to Nixon and exhibited wild enthusiasm for the mutual benefit of the live audience and the audience provided by the media on the nightly news. For most Americans, (those who could not afford $1,000 a plate luncheons or dinners), Nixon was visible only via televised excerpts on the evening news.

The final image maintenance strategy was the old bandwagon approach with an added twist—everybody was for the President because 1) he was credible as President and 2) because the opponent seemed incredible in the role. The method was to equate Nixon's authority as President with credibility and picture the opponent as incredible because of who he was. This strategy was illustrated in Nixon's nomination acceptance speech when he called to "homeless Democrates" to join him in the battle, and by Nixon speakers' references to McGovern supporters as "McGovernites," usurpers of an otherwise honorable party.

Thus, the Nixon image building strategy was to run as President and maintain a presidential image throughout the campaign. How did the electorate perceive Mr. Nixon? The results were spectacular: the man who had just ten years earlier dedicated his own political obituary came down to the last election of his quarter-century in politics with a victory hardly matched since the earliest days of the country, by winning 521 of 538 electoral votes and 68 percent of the popular votes. Nearly every segment of society (Catholics, unemployed, blue-collar, white workers, middle income people, high income people, the farm-belt, and even 48 percent of the first-time voters—those under twenty-four) obviously felt that Mr. Nixon was more credible as President than was his opponent.

The image Nixon defeated had been created in a twenty-two month campaign by Senator George McGovern.

In the footsteps of Truman, Stevenson, Kennedy, Johnson, and Humphrey, McGovern took his case to the voters, trying in ten weeks between Labor Day and election day to reach as many as he could. In chartered jets, he crisscrossed the nation, trying to hit three, sometimes four, media markets in a day, making three, four, five speeches at out-door rallies, fund-raising dinners, union halls, college campuses, shopping centers, and

[11] *Newsweek*, October 2, 1972, p. 15.

[12] Victor Riesel, "President Exudes Confidence, Still Runs 'Scared,'" Cincinnati *Enquirer*, September 24, 1972, p. 2-B.

airports in a frantic but futile effort to work the political magic that had won him the key primaries and the Democratic presidential nomination. For all of his effort, McGovern received seventeen electoral votes, not even carrying his own South Dakota. And despite hundreds of speeches on a variety of issues, an NBC survey found that the main issue was simply the image of George McGovern himself.[13] And perhaps the only way to understand the conclusion of the NBC survey is to go back to pre-convention McGovern and try to assess his image strategy.

In the not-so-old days of presidential politics, success was equated with glamor, mystery, adventure, charisma. Handsome Jack, adventurous Bobby, mysterious and elusive Gene—each had charisma. But none of these terms can be used to describe the Democratic candidate. In fact, many who have become infatuated with the term charisma have tried to use it to describe George McGovern by saying his "charisma is in his lack of charisma."[14] Perhaps a better description is one from *New Republic* in early May, 1970, describing the Senate hearings on Nutrition and Human Needs:

> McGovern keeps asking questions. He never quits. He lacks the drama of McCarthy, the glamor of Kennedy. He's got no style or wealth. Somewhere out in the Adriatic one time he crash-landed a collapsed B-24 and got the Distinguished Flying Cross. His voice is uncoached, sounds crisp and sweet with a hint of a lisp, and he's got a slight Midwest nasal accent and a kind manner. He doesn't look like a hero. He went to Dakota Wesleyan and got into politics as a history teacher. He looks like a YMCA secretary. . . . .It is awfully hard to stop men like McGovern. They have iron in them. When they think of hungry children, it bothers them. They find the facts and get the appropriation—they don't let up.[15]

McGovern loathes the word charisma and has said: "I think people are a little suspicious of people who come on too slick, too strong. I think they over-estimate the charisma factor which most of my supporters think is superficial."[16] Thus, throughout the primary campaign, McGovern resisted all efforts of his staff to try and build a glamorous or charismatic image for him. Instead, the McGovern image strategy was simply to build on the candidate's character—honesty, sincerity, compassion, and decency as he talked to small groups of people all across the country. The twin themes of his campaign were credibility and character. And it was as if image building efforts and all campaign strategies converged on the person of George McGovern who was concerned about the lack of credibility in government.

Thus credibility and character were to be the themes as well as the image building strategy of the democratic candidate—and then came the crises that distorted the pre-convention image. Some of the problems were of his own making, others came as a direct result of his collapsed image.

One of the first problems to besiege McGovern immediately following

[13] *Newsweek*, November 13, 1972, p. 31.

[14] William Greider, "What makes George run? A surprising look at the tortoise who won the race," The Washington *Post*, September 5, 1972, p. 37.

[15] Robert Sam Anson, *McGovern: A Biography* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), p. 235.

[16] William Greider, The Washington *Post*.

the convention was the label given to him first by his Democratic colleagues during the primaries—the label, radical—the charge, too far out, fuzzy headed ideas. Nixon's official campaigners picked up the label and the charge and McGovern was having a difficult time dispelling both when the disaster hit.

It is not necessary to review the tragic incident of the Eagleton candidacy and McGovern's role during the crisis—but it was probably the most shattering blow to any presidential candidacy in the nation's 200-year history. The episode damaged McGovern's image with much of the electorate—even those who had been strong supporters. For example, a Newsweek poll taken during the last days of September found that young voters around the country mentioned the Eagleton affair as one of their main sources of disillusionment with Senator McGovern.[17] The one advantage that George McGovern had had over Richard Nixon was his aura of rock-like integrity. But the Eagleton affair destroyed that aura and reversed his momentum to the extent that he was never able to bounce back enough to get people to listen and believe his very serious charges against Nixon.

Other problems included staff power plays, internal organization difficulties, underfinancing, until the last three weeks poor media exposure, Nixon not campaigning—at least not directly, and finally that McGovern's attacks against the administration were not being heard because people had already tuned him out. Each of these problems can be traced back to McGovern's blurred image. For example, McGovern tried, for weeks, to exploit the Watergate Affair—but few listened to him, perhaps because they assumed that the President was in no way involved, or that it was just another Washington mess, or perhaps the image of the administration McGovern was attacking was far more credible than the attacker himself. The result, McGovern could only shadow box with his own image while his opponent sat cannily in the White House disdaining all confrontation.

What was McGovern's image by election day? Answers to pollsters were fuzzy thinking, opportunist, too much like a preacher, radical, and too much like a politician. And in perhaps the most telling comment of all, a Harris survey reported just prior to election day, that 55 percent of those interviewed said that McGovern did not seem trustworthy or credible like a president should. It seems ironic that the man who started his campaign under the banners of character and credibility had this turned against him.

Thus, it seems that two conclusions can be drawn from the image building strategies discussed in campaign 1972. First, image may have been the single most important element in determining the election outcome—not because either candidate possessed the personal appeal of traditional presidential candidates such as Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Humphrey—but because the one image that was in existence was the Presidential image of Mr. Nixon. McGovern's image (never that charge of excitement or electricity) was blurred, and finally there was no strong element exciting the electorate about the entire campaign. *Newsweek* labeled it the "great not-quite campaign."[18]

Second, perhaps the American people were just plain tired of hearing about the problems of America—and tired too of a presidential race that

[17] "The Youth Vote: Nixon's Ahead," *Newsweek*, October 2, 1972, pp. 18–20.
[18] "The Not-Quite Campaign," *Newsweek*, October 9, 1972, p. 29.

had started almost a year before and thus turned away from the image which suggested the country had problems, turning to the image of complacency, much as they had when Harding returned them to normalcy.

What was to have been a campaign of issues became a campaign of images. McGovern scoffed at image building politics and was buried in the landslide victory of the champion image builder, Richard Milhous Nixon, President for four more years.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

The Delta Sigma Rho–Tau Kappa Alpha National Council has established a standard subscription rate of $5.00 per year for *Speaker and Gavel.*

Present policy provides that new members, upon election, are provided with two years of *Speaker and Gavel* free of charge. Life members, furthermore, who have paid a Life Patron alumni membership fee of $100, likewise regularly receive *Speaker and Gavel.* Also receiving each issue are the current chapter sponsors and the libraries of institutions holding a charter in the organization.

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CHILDHOOD'S END: THE RHETORIC OF ERNEST J. STERNGLASS

RAY LYNN ANDERSON

I

On June 20, 1969, the downtown chapter of the Pittsburgh YWCA sponsored a "Citizen-Congressional-Consultation" on the Nixon administration's Safeguard Antiballistic Missile system. The purpose of the meeting was to promote understanding of the ABM proposal and the controversy surrounding it. This end would be best accomplished, reasoned the members of the coordinating committee, if three types of individuals would participate. First, representatives of *citizen* groups should present their respective points of view. In all, nearly thirty such groups were represented, ranging from the Unitarian-Universalist Council to the American Legion and VFW. Next, Pennsylvania Senators and Congressmen from Allegheny and adjacent counties were needed to state their positions. Only Representatives William S. Moorehead and Joseph M. Gaydos actually appeared. Being then undecided on Safeguard, Representative Robert J. Corbett sent his administrative assistant, J. Ronald Smith, to "get the facts."[1] The "facts" were to be supplied by the third group of participants, the "experts." All of the "experts" appeared. These included physicists (Ernest J. Sternglass and Thomas M. Donahue), sociologists (Morton Coleman and Jerome Laulicht), and political analysts (Joseph Coffey and Solis Horwitz).

The meeting at the Pittsburgh "Y" was, of course, only a small part of the overall ABM debate. Its impact on the public mind was minimal, limited largely to coverage on local radio and television stations. The logic and structure of the event, however, transcended its local-parochial aspects. For the organizers of the "Consultation" captured in their program format the dominant bias about the rational discussion of policy issues in the Atomic Age: the assumption that *wise policy deliberation necessitates the prudent blending of opinion from citizens and their elected officials with the rigid, truth-bound discourse of the settled sciences.*

We have, to be sure, come to regard the role of scientists in policy discussion and debate on the federal level as a work-a-day procedure for the modern Parliamentary Democracy. But when we confront this practice at the local swimming hole there is absolutely no doubt, as Professor Cornwell has stated, that "the voice of science" has "become an accepted, even a formalized matter" in the American deliberative process.[2]

For the most part the Pittsburgh "Consultation" was the kind of slap-dash affair we often expect and get when frequenting local rallies, confrontations, teach-ins, testimonials, and card burnings. The citizen representatives were

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[1] The author of this essay became a reluctant member of the Corbett *fact-finding* team after refusing to play the "expert witness" role dramatically requested at the beginning of the meeting by Mr. Smith.

[2] Clifton Cornwell, "A Rhetorical Study of the Spokesmanship of Scientists in the Decade after Hiroshima," Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Missouri, 1965, 1.

properly humble while muddling through their written "statements." The men from Congress had not prepared. "Caution" was the sign guiding their minds, and the "hedge-mark" of qualification and confusion characterized their rhetoric. The "experts," save one, were much too casual in their presentations. Displaying what appeared to be enormous patience, frequently with questions that did not warrant it, these men worked out their "expertise" with an alarming degree of boldness—indeed, even flippancy.

The exception to all this mediocrity was the carefully prepared, well-rehearsed presentation of Ernest J. Sternglass, Professor of Radiation Physics and Director of the Radiation Physics Laboratory at the University Presbyterian Hospital, University of Pittsburgh. Utilizing many of the skills of the trained science journalist[3] and speaking with the emotional force of a fundamentalist minister, Sternglass drove his audience through a mass of complicated charts which, he argued, illustrated a real *correlation* between fetal mortality in the United States and nuclear weapons tests. He encouraged questioning, and answered the ones he could with clarity and crispness—acknowledging too those questions he was not prepared to answer with any degree of confidence. In short, Professor Sternglass was the only "expert" at the "Consultation" truly prepared to meet the data responsibilities implied by that role. And he was clearly the only participant with sufficient oratorical skill to translate bloodless facts about nuclear winds from Nevada into an urgent and pathetic tale of human misery and suffering.

II

From a strictly rhetorical viewpoint, the Ernest J. Sternglass phenomenon is both significant and refreshing. Moreover, the distinctive quality of his advocacy—combining, with reasonable balance, elements of both the emotional and technical—is suggestive of a new kind of rhetor; a type of persuader that should, I submit, emerge if this society, caught as it is in the cross-currents of its own stampeding technology, is to sustain successfully an intelligent and meaningful public discussion of the problems threatening its very existence.

The significance of Sternglass' spokesmanship can, of course, be measured in several ways. The most relevant in this context, however, are the volume or number of public messages produced, general accessibility to and use of the prime media of communications (a factor which ultimately reduces to audience size), and the persuader's overall impact on the public discussion of the issue in question.

When one reviews the amount of public prose produced by Ernest J. Sternglass on the radiation hazard issue it becomes immediately apparent that one is looking at a one-man persuasive campaign. At least since the late 1950's, when he was selected by the Pittsburgh chapter of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) to assess the effects of low-level atomic radiation, Sternglass has publicly claimed that the fallout from nuclear weapons tests represents a considerable threat to the health of all

[3] My claim that Dr. Sternglass has mastered the techniques of the professional science writer is based upon my strictly rhetorical interpretation of that branch of journalism. See my paper "Rhetoric and Science Journalism," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, LVI (December 1970), 358–368.

American citizens.[4] But it has been during the last three years particularly that his major propaganda efforts have transpired. In 1969 alone, for example, Sternglass delivered scores of public speeches,[5] read papers explicating his thesis to scientific societies,[6] authored many articles for such diverse journalistic organs as the London *Observer*, *The New Scientist* (a British magazine), *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, *The Medical Tribune*, wrote letters to the *New York Times* and provided interview material for Pittsburgh's underground newssheet, *The Relative Truth*.[7]

Furthermore, in taking his case directly to the public, Sternglass has placed many of his messages quite advantageously. That is, he has maximized audience size by gaining access to the major media of communication. He has appeared on local radio programs (e.g., in Pittsburgh, KQV's "Pinpoint and Counterpoint" talk show), on such influential American television programs as the CBS Morning News, the Huntley-Brinkley Report, the Today Show, Martin Agronsky's Washington, on Canadian prime-time television,[8] as well as on BBC programs like the Thames TV pollution documentary, "On the Eighth Day."[9]

But the primary importance of Sternglass' rhetoric is seen in the fact that his persuasive presence has been instrumental in giving the public discussion of atomic energy the kind of urgency it rightly deserves. Stated differently, without the power of Sternglass' advocacy there is good reason to believe that the radiation hazard question would have once again appeared as a minor verbal battle (say, between a small group of scientists and the AEC), of interest only to a few citizens already concerned with this issue. Illustrative of the impact of Sternglass' argument is Freeman J. Dyson's (of the Institute for Advanced Study) admission that "Compared with the issues which Sternglass raised, my arguments about missile

[4] Personal interview on Tuesday, November 18, 1969.

[5] Exemplary of these speech situations would be Sternglass' Thursday, September 10, 1969 address "Hiroshima-Nagasaki 1945" at the University of Pittsburgh Public Affairs Forum and his Wednesday, November 19, 1969 speech at the Monroeville, Pa., YWCA on "The Effect of Nuclear Fallout," an address given earlier (November 13, 1969) at the first international "Time Is Running Out" symposium at Duquesne University.

[6] Typical of these presentations would be Sternglass' paper at the Ninth Annual Hanford Biology Symposium (May 7, 1969) entitled "Evidence for low-level radiation effects on the human embryo and fetus" and his paper "Strontium-90: Evidence for a Possible Genetic Effect in Man," read at the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the Health Physics Society, Pittsburgh, Pa., June 8–12, 1969.

[7] For a rather complete statement of Sternglass' position on the nuclear testing-fallout question, read the well-written "Interview with Dr. E. J. Sternglass," *The Relative Truth*, February, 1970, p. 4; "Infant Mortality," excerpts from address of May 1969, *Environment*, XI (December 1969), 9–13; and Sternglass' "Infant Mortality and Nuclear Tests," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XXV (April 1969), 18–20, an article distributed to the nearly 200 audience members at the June 20, 1969 "Citizen-Congressional Consultation" by the members of Sternglass' family.

[8] Philip M. Boffey, "Ernest J. Sternglass: Controversial Prophet of Doom," *Science*, Vol. 166 (October 10, 1969), 195.

[9] See Anthony Tucker, "Atomic Tests Blamed for Children's Deaths," *The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, January 31, 1970, 9.

defense are quite insignificant."[10] Philip M. Boffey puts the matter as follows:

> On balance, however, the country probably has more to gain than lose by letting Sternglass have his day in court. If Sternglass is right, he has performed an incalculable public service. But even if he is wrong—and the weight of informed opinion seems to think he is—he has nevertheless served a useful function by forcing others to look into the question. Nobelist Joshua Lederberg, in a newspaper column attacking Sternglass' analytical methods, acknowledged that Sternglass' "expose" had called attention to "a surprising lack of experimental work directed specifically at the genetic effects of Sr-90." And, much to the AEC's consternation, Tamplin, in preparing a detailed point-by-point rebuttal of Sternglass, has come up with an estimate of his own, namely that, in 1963, fallout could have accounted for more than 8000 fetal deaths. That's a pretty sizeable number, and while Tamplin's estimate is disputed on a number of grounds, it nevertheless raises the interesting possibility that Sternglass may be wrong in all his details but still be right in his general fear that low doses of radiation are more pernicious than previously believed.[11]

III

The lay public's response to Sternglass' advocacy has been favorable. Most physicists and radiologists, and some science journalists, on the other hand, have been up in arms about what they call Sternglass' "sensation-seeking techniques" and "unscientific approach." Dr. Leonard Sagan, Sternglass' chief professional opponent, for instance, contends that Sternglass' statements are "based largely on erroneous information and interpretation."[12] John Maddox, editor of the esteemed British publication *Nature*, publicly announced that Sternglass' articles were rejected by that journal because of his "irresponsible" science, "his dramatic conclusions on . . . flimsy evidence . . . ."[13] The New York State Health Department "officially" claimed that Sternglass' inferences were based on "incomplete" data.[14] But science writer Anthony Tucker provides the most representative criticism of Professor Sternglass' position on the dangers of low-level radiation.

> Perhaps the saddest complaint about Sternglass is that his *emotional approach* and *unscientific analysis of evidence* are damaging to serious science, especially to work involved with problems of radiation safety. The Medical Research Council, in a polite and aloof way, has pointed out that plateaux on statistical graphs are a common phenomenon, and that *a correlation is by itself meaningless* [italics added].[15]

But it is far too easy to write Sternglass off as a scientific hustler, sophistically standing behind the credibility assumed of the scientific

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[10] "Comment on Sternglass' Thesis," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XXV (June 1969).

[11] Boffey, 200.

[12] "A Reply to Sternglass," *The New Scientist*, Vol. 44 (October 2, 1969), 14.

[13] "Sternglass' Evidence," *The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, February 7, 1970, p. 2.

[14] The New York *Times*, October 12, 1969, p. 50.

[15] "Sternglass Verdict Not Proven," *The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, February 7, 1970, p. 6.

method. For, on the whole, Sternglass enjoys a reputation as a truly brilliant scientist.[16] And those researches for which Sternglass has been criticized have, significantly, been ones with considerable social implications. The issue is further complicated, however, by the fact that most of the criticisms aimed at Sternglass have originated from parties that have clear interests in America's nuclear energy establishment. Sagan, for example, may well be nothing more than the AEC's public bulldog; the tongue, as it were, to make public William R. Bibb's (another AEC-related scientist) full-time, taxpayer-supported researches on Sternglass' assertions.[17] And the New York State Health Department's attack on Sternglass' evidence might be nothing more than the common bureaucratic response to external criticsm, Sternglass' findings suggesting that that agency, by not properly investigating radiation dosage levels in New York State, violated the public trust with which it had been specifically charged. Pressing this line of reasoning to its end, the critic might be inclined to conclude that the claim that Sternglass is "unscientific" is merely the AEC's favorite rhetorical ploy on scientific dissenters (used recently on such other mavericks as Kenneth S. Pitzer and Edward A. Martell),[18] that this rejection of "correlation" as a viable research paradigm smacks of the tobacco companies' sophistic a few years ago on the cigarette-cancer issue, and that the assertion of excessive "emotionality" is just one more persuasive device to discredit an advocate who, by his effectiveness, might produce a public opinion obstacle that would have to be surmounted if President Nixon's indicated wish to pursue the Plowshare program vigorously were to be realized.[19]

IV

Yet it would, I suggest, be both unfortunate and inaccurate to depict Sternglass simply as either an irresponsible scientific maverick or as a victim of bureaucratic self-interest. For the question that Sternglass addresses is not a "scientific" one in the rigorous sense of that term. The question "Should the U.S. continue atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons?" is, rather, a question which attempts to mediate between historical circumstance (where the available evidence is necessarily incomplete) and the need for action on future contingencies. The question dealt with by

[16] Boffey, 196.

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] See, for instance, The New York *Times*, April 15, 1969, p. 9; February 12, 1970, p. 23.

[19] On the Nixon Administration's goals for Plowshare, read Gladwin Hill's piece "Future of Peaceful Atomic Energy Uses Weighed," The New York *Times*, April 13, 1969, Sec. I, p. 66. Some credibility is afforded my argument here defending Sternglass by reading the AEC's public responses to Dr. John W. Gofman and Dr. Arthur R. Tamplin's (both of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory) recent attempts to link low-level radiation with cancer dangers. In that verbal exchange, Gofman and Tamplin have been accused as being "unscientific" and "emotional." See, Anthony Ripley, "Radiation Standards Are Facing Review That Could Cripple Atomic Energy Projects," The New York *Times*, March 16, 1970, p. 47. Here Tamplin and Gofman are quoted as responding to the AEC with the comment, "It has been said that we write on asbestos paper. Our endeavor is not to inflame. But there are some people . . . who are so asleep as to require awakening before they and the world are in flames."

Sternglass is, in short, an essentially *rhetorical* proposition. And the disagreement between Sternglass and the governmentally-linked scientific establishment is just another example of the classic "type error"; a dispute arising from alternative interpretations of the same proposition. When the AEC, for example, insists upon statistically significant correlations and emotional neutrality, it assumes (a) that the question under analysis is strictly empirical and (b) that Sternglass should proceed as a scientist *qua* scientist. Sternglass, on the other hand, interprets the question as one involving "probabilities"; a question of both fact and value, and one concerning the life possibilities of all Americans. In this connection, Sternglass has persistently argued that his conclusions are not conclusive and that his data are incomplete.[20] In his interview with the *Relative Truth*, for instance, Sternglass was asked, "While the statistical correlation that you have presented are very persuasive, you, yourself have said that they do not scientifically prove the ill effects of radiation in reproduction. Has research been undertaken to test your theory?"[21] In response, Sternglass stated that

> To begin with, you know, the situation is very much like it was for tobacco and its relation to lung cancer. There's no question that today we don't really know for sure what the biological mechanism is that produces lung cancer as a result of smoking; and whenever one comes across a new set of phenomenon like that, that's the initial thing you have—the first thing you have are indications in the population and then you gradually build up more and more evidence. You test the hypothesis continuously. And such things are going on right now.[22]

As a public advocate, Ernest Sternglass has much in common with many of America's post World War II scientists who argued with strong emphasis on strictly factual data.[23] Indeed, no one can examine his materials, scientific and public, without being struck by the overall amount of data he has gathered to support his position. Sternglass' uniqueness, however, lies in his insistence on treating the nuclear energy issue from an equally strong humanistic perspective. For him, the question of atmospheric testing is so profound in its implications that it simply must be debated. It is not a question wherein we have the "academic-scientific" luxury to wait upon complete empirical data, or, better yet, a tidy "technical solution." Sternglass has argued, in fact, that one of the major problems with this country's handling of the nuclear energy question is that we have somehow gotten ourselves into what Alvin M. Weinberg has named a "technological fix";[24] i.e., we tend, as a nation, to view the entire problem as involving only fact and expertise, and therefore, find ourselves sustaining a sort of "tyranny of progress," a tyranny wherein science is

[20] Ernest J. Sternglass, "Can the Infants Survive?", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XXV (June 1969), pp. 19–20.
[21] *The Relative Truth*, p. 4.
[22] *Ibid.*
[23] I have in mind in making this reference the advocacy of such scientists as Hans A. Bethe, Neils Bohr, Arthur H. Compton, Albert Einstein, Ralph E. Lapp, Robert J. Oppenheimer, Linus Pauling, Leo Szilard, and Edward Teller.
[24] "Can Technology Replace Social Engineering?," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XXII (December 1966), pp. 4–8.

used to advance science and not, as Gerard Piel has stated, a situation where science is used "in the cause of man."[25]

When the critic turns to the more humanistic and emotional aspects of Sternglass' rhetoric, the reasons for his popular appeal become at once evident. Here we find also the reasons that so many pro-ecology and anti-military advocates have publicly supported Sternglass' conclusions. For instead of talking, for instance, of the concentrations of strontium 90 in plankton, fish and ducks, like Albert Schweitzer and Willard Libby in the mid-50's,[26] Sternglass spoke of "The Death of All Children." His message transcended instantly the mundane. Appearing as an authoritative "footnote to the ABM controversy," neatly stapled to the "Contents" page of *Esquire* magazine, and marked (in bold red letters) URGENT, Sternglass claimed that "The fact is this: a full-scale A.B.M. system, protecting the United States against a Soviet first strike, could, if successful, cause the extinction of the human race."[27] The essence of his argument, which was also quoted in *Esquire's* full-page advertisement in the *New York Times*, was that

> . . . even if anti-missile systems were to work with ideal perfection on both sides, preserving every home, every school, and every factory from destruction, the release of long-lived radioactive materials would produce more than a hundred times as much radioactive poison as during all the years of peacetime testing. Based on the excess mortality observed during the period of testing, this would most likely be sufficient to insure that few if any children anywhere in the world would grow to maturity and give rise to another generation.[28]

It is, therefore, with the dramatic tension-of-choice born of this thought-arresting analysis that we confront the truly refreshing aspects of Sternglass' spokesmanship. For in tallying up the profits and losses of the new science, Sternglass rises above the language of physics and, quite justly, portrays the terrible destructive "potential" of modern science as a problem of truly massive moral proportions, a problem wherein fathers may well be bequeathing to their sinless children their own deadly sins. To be sure, if the critic were to emphasize a predominantly "scientific" perspective, Sternglass' argument could easily be dubbed as "emotional," "unscientific," as mere "doomsday prophesy." But such a perspective is rendered absurd precisely because the whole business of technology assessment is not simply "scientific" in nature. As Lynton K. Caldwell testified before the "Technology Assessment Seminar" conducted by the House of Representatives' Committee on Science and Astronautics in 1967,

> The purposive fusing of technical and teleological knowledge seems to be an uncommon but acquirable skill. Our educational system has not produced it to the degree now needed. The smaller need for it in traditional societies could be approximated, if not met, by conventional education. One consequence of this understandable neglect is that we do not possess reliable means for *a priori* identification of persons

[25] Read, for example, Robert Gomer, "The Tyranny of Progress," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XXIV (February 1968), 4–8 and Gerard Piel, *Science in the Cause of Man* (New York: Vintage Books, 1964).

[26] See the "fallout" debate between Schweitzer and Libby in *The Reporter*, XVI (May 16, 1957), pp. 26–27.

[27] "The Death of All Children," *Esquire*, LXXII (September 1969), p. 1a.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 1d; New York *Times*, July 29, 1969, p. 15.

> possessing the aptitudes required. We must, therefore, await the test of performance to assess the potential of men and women for the combination of capacities that management of a science-based society requires.[29]

In the rhetorical machinations of Ernest J. Sternglass we see, in conclusion, a man possessing the "combination of capacities" necessary for the sane discussion and deliberation of policy issues in the Atomic Age. Moreover, the Sternglass phenomenon offers a promissory note for the future of rhetoric in a scientifically-supercharged Parliamentary Democracy. For here we have suggested the notion that rhetoric is *the* instrument by which we can forge new value-laden consensus patterns that will in turn more beneficially guide the consequences of our giant technological systems.

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[29] United States House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Astronautics, *Technology Assessment Seminar.* Proceedings, 90th Congress, 1st Session, No. 7, September 21 and 22, 1967. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1968, p. 72.

CHAPTER NEWS AND NOTES

Several dozen chapters answered our call for news of their activities and expectations for the current year. In alphabetical order of chapters, we here report the bulk of what they said.

Sponsor Annabel Hagood reported that the Alabama chapter looked forward to a challenging year of regional and national competition. J. Edward Culpepper, chapter president, will serve as student director of the Region IV DSR-TKA Tournament. John Bertolotti is the current national student president of DSR-TKA.

The annual Butler University High School Debate Clinic in September was attended by 347 students and teachers. The Butler DSR-TKA chapter of Isakson, Nielsen, Ullman, Flood, Neher, and Cripe, ably assisted by Benson from Ball State, were primarily responsible for the clinic.

The University of Colorado—Denver Center has added an off-campus speaking program to provide realistic speaking opportunities for the members. Elliot Wager is the director.

Colorado College will continue its emphasis on second topic debating this year and will generally attend tournaments which offer an opportunity to debate an alternate topic.

DePauw University's second Intercollegiate Legislative Assembly, modeled upon the DSR-TKA student congress event, attracted 30 delegates from seven schools this November. The topic was "Sexual Morality and Conduct." The DePauw chapter will host its 26th annual debate tournament on February 17, and the speech department will also entertain a high school debate tournament and the Indiana Oratorical Association's state contests.

Max B. Huss, sponsor at Eastern Kentucky University, reports that their program has secured increased support for this year, plus a new staff member to work solely with individual events activity, so prospects look good for the future.

The King's College Forensics Union sponsored its 7th annual debate clinic on October 7. John Witting, of SUNY-Geneseo, and Lt. Col. Bill Taylor were the featured speakers, and there was an exhibition debate between St. Brendan's of Brooklyn and Scranton Central High School. In December, the 22nd annual high school debate tournament attracted top-flight competition from 40 schools. In February King's will sponsor its annual Garvey Collegiate Debate Tournament, as well as an international debate with the University of Warsaw. (Last year's international debate had an evening audience of 1,000.)

At Knox College, Dr. Robert Seibert is currently the chapter sponsor.

Plans for the year at the University of Massachusetts included; (1) attending 35 intercollegiate tournaments, (2) sponsoring six on-campus intercollegiate or interscholastic tournaments, and (3) putting on 40 demonstration debates before audiences at such places as high schools, prisons, and service clubs within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. A special project for the year will be a comprehensive survey of summer high school debate workshop practices.

For November 29, 1972, a special observance was planned for the 100th anniversary of intercollegiate debate at Northwestern University. Northwestern's first debate, against the old Chicago University 100 years ago, concerned the tariff question. Northwestern will also host three tournaments this year: the National High School Invitational Debate

Tournament in November, the Owen L. Coon Memorial Debate Tournament in February, and the Chicago National Novice Debate Tournament in March.

Oberlin College announces the appointment of Richard P. Lewis as Director of Forensics for 1972–73.

Oregon State University has a new director of forensics, Dave Droge, who recently received his M.A. degree from San Francisco State College, where he was an associate in the forensics program.

Chapter sponsor Frank Colbourn has been promoted to full professor at Pace College. Pace last year sponsored its 11th annual C. Richard Pace Memorial Tournament, which drew about 40 teams. Also, the chapter has started an annual tournament for high schools in the New York City area; held in January, the City Hall Forensic Tournament attracted about 75 contestants. In April, the Pace DSR-TKA chapter hosted the 7th Annual New York Metro Championship Public Speaking Festival, jointly sponsored with the Eastern Forensic Association.

Southern Methodist University has been named the site for the 1974 National Forensic League national tournament.

Robert A. Trapp, past national student president of DSR-TKA, has recently been appointed Director of Forensics at the University of Northern Colorado, according to Texas Tech sponsor Vernon McGuire.

From the University of Toledo, sponsor Donald Terry reports plans for a college tournament to be held in December and a high school all-events tournament in February. Chapter officers Kathy Semetko, Dan Carey, and Tom Truckor plan to expand the chapter soon as well as to organize an affiliate chapter of future DSR-TKA members.

The University of Utah chapter planned several activities for 1972–1973, including: (1) participation in OUTREACH, local fund-raising drive for minority scholarships; (2) sponsorship of a series of Soap Box Debates, initiated during 1971–1972, which are center-of-the-campus public debates on timely local and national issues; and (3) sponsorship of a special DSR-TKA Award at the annual Great Salt Lake Invitational Forensics Tournament in January.

Wabash College debaters Greg Adams and Dave Worrell engaged in split-team audience debates with DePauw University (USA) and with Oxford University (UK) in November.

Washington and Jefferson College's DSR-TKA chapter has initiated a series of public exhibition debates on the national and non-national topics. Last year W & J debated the University of Pittsburgh at the Western Pennsylvania Penitentiary. W & J also hosted a team from the University of Kansas for an on-campus exhibition. This year W & J will sponsor at least three public exhibitions.

Dr. Halford Ryan, director of forensics at Washington and Lee University, has initiated a speakers' bureau there.

Governor Arch Moore was awarded the "speaker of the year" honor by the West Virginia University chapter at their annual banquet at the Lakeview Country Club. A number of public debates were sponsored at West Virginia with such schools as the Naval Academy.

Gerald H. Sanders, College of Wooster chapter sponsor, has returned from a year at the University of Minnesota working on his Ph.D. degree. While in Minnesota, Sanders wrote a debate text intended for the beginning debater, entitled *Introduction to Contemporary Academic Debate.*

The University of Wyoming Forensic program has moved into new

facilities which include a large forensic lab equipped with video equipment, an audio lab for work from tape equipment, and three new offices for the forensic staff. In addition, the university has purchased a new Chevrolet for the exclusive use of the debate team. The new facilities will help implement the expanded program that will include regular campus programs as well as additional tournament activity.



ELIZABETHTOWN INITIATION

Initiation of three distinguished Elizabethtown College alumni as members-at-large of DSR-TKA was a feature of the banquet at that college's 1971 forensics tournament. Members of a class in oral interpretation performed the ceremony, projecting the symbols via an overhead projector and overlays.

In the picture (l. to r.) are: DSR-TKA Regional Governor Raymond S. Beard; Member-at-Large Robert V. Hanle, Assistant to the President at Elizabethtown College; Member-at-Large Thomas Bradley, Attorney with the State of Pennsylvania at Harrisburg; Member-at-Large Michael Payne, Washington D.C. attorney; President Emeritus Ralph W. Schlosser of Elizabethtown College; and students Dianna Close, John Hoffacker, and Melinda McCandless.

CHENOWETH ESTABLISHES AWARD AT INDIANA

Because of Eugene C. Chenoweth's strong belief in the educational values of intercollegiate forensic participation, he has funded the Eugene C. Chenoweth Intercollegiate Debate-Discussion Award for outstanding students in intercollegiate debate and discussion competition at Indiana University.

The first winner of the award was James Edward Lobert, left above. Also taking part in the presentation were; William Starosta, debate coach; Prof. Chenoweth, one-time forensics director and DSR-TKA chapter sponsor; and J. Jeffrey Auer, Chairman of the Deparment of Speech.

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Please send all communications relating to initiation, certificates of membership, key orders, and names of members to the National Secretary. All requests for authority to initiate and for emblems should be sent to the National Secretary and should be accompanied by check or money order. Inasmuch as all checks and money orders are forwarded by the Secretary to the National Treasurer, please make them to: "The Treasurer of Delta Sigma Rho–Tau Kappa Alpha."

The membership fee is $10.00. The official key of 10K (size shown in cut on this page) is $10.50, or the official keypin of 10K is $11.75. A lapel button is available for $7.00. **Prices include Federal Tax.** Individual key orders add 50c.

The names of new members, those elected between September of one year and September of the following year, appear in the November issue of SPEAKER and GAVEL. According to present regulations of the society, new members receive SPEAKER and GAVEL for two years following their initiation if they return the record form supplied them at the time their application is approved by the Executive Secretary and certified to the sponsor. Following this time all members who wish to receive SPEAKER and GAVEL may subscribe at the standard rate of $5.00 per year.

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