

Complete Issue 15(4)

Follow this and additional works at: <https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel>



Part of the [Speech and Rhetorical Studies Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

(1978). Complete Issue 15(4). *Speaker & Gavel*, 15(4), 71-94.

This Complete Issue is brought to you for free and open access by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato. It has been accepted for inclusion in *Speaker & Gavel* by an authorized editor of Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato.

PN 4071.56

speaker and gavel

Truman and the A-Bomb Decision: The Rhetoric of Incrementalism— J. M. Williams	71
Good Deliberative Form—H. L. Ewbank	80
New Initiates of DSR-TKA 1977–78	88
Minutes of DSR-TKA National Council	92
Announcement of New Editor	94

PERIODICALS SECTION
 JUN 18 1978
 MINNESOTA STATE
 UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

volume 15, number 4

summer, 1978

SPEAKER and GAVEL

Official publication of Delta Sigma Rho—Tau Kappa Alpha
National Honorary Forensic Society

PUBLISHED AT LAWRENCE, KANSAS
By ALLEN PRESS, INC.

Second-class postage paid at Lawrence, Kansas, U.S.A. 66044
Issued quarterly in Fall, Winter, Spring and Summer. The Journal carries no paid advertising.

NATIONAL OFFICERS OF DSR-TKA

President: THOMAS KANE, University of Pittsburgh
Vice President: DAVID ZAREFSKY, Northwestern University
Secretary: BERTRAM W. GROSS, Marshall University
Treasurer: JACK H. HOWE, California State University-Long Beach
Trustee: WAYNE C. EUBANK, University of New Mexico
Historian: JACK LYNCH, Saint Anselm's College

REGIONAL GOVERNORS, MEMBERS AT LARGE, AND REPRESENTATIVES

Regional Governors: WOODROW W. LEAKE, JR., University of Vermont; JAMES J. HALL, St. John's University; HALFORD RYAN, Washington and Lee College; KASSIAN KOVALCHECK, Vanderbilt University; ROBERT O. WEISS, DePauw University; VERNON R. McGUIRE, Texas Tech University; MELVIN MOORHOUSE, Wichita State University; LARRY SCHNOOR, Mankato State College; WAYNE CALLAWAY, University of Wyoming; JOHN DeBROSS, University of Southern California.

Members at Large: GEORGE W. ZIEGELMUELLER (Past President) Wayne State University; JEAN CORNELL, Davidson College, WOODROW W. LEAKE, JR., University of Vermont.

ACHS Representative: JAMES H. McBATH, University of Southern California.

Representative on SCA Committee on Intercollegiate Debate and Discussion: JOHN GREG, St. John's University.

COMMITTEE CHAIRS

Standards Committee: DAVID ZAREFSKY, Northwestern University

National Conference Committee: CULLY CLARK, University of Alabama

Research and Publications Committee: WOODROW W. LEAKE, JR., University of Vermont

Distinguished Alumni and Service Awards Committee: RONALD MATON, University of Massachusetts.

Speaker of the Year Committee: WILLIAM BALTHROP, University of North Carolina

STUDENT OFFICERS

President: BETH BOWER, University of West Virginia

First Vice President: SHARI OLENICK, Vanderbilt University

Second Vice President: ROBIN MEYERS, Wayne State University

Secretary: STEVE KRATSCH, Vanderbilt University

EDITORIAL STAFF

Editor: KENNETH E. ANDERSEN, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois 61801.

Associate Editors: BERNARD L. BROCK, Wayne State University; KURT RITTER, University of Illinois.

Speaker and Gavel

Volume 15

Summer 1978

No. 4

TRUMAN AND THE A-BOMB DECISION: THE RHETORIC OF INCREMENTALISM

J. M. WILLIAMS

Between the acting of a dreadful thing,
And the first motion, all the interim is
Like a Phantasma, or a hideous Dream;
The genius and the mortal instruments
Are then in council; and the state of man,
Like to a little Kingdom, suffers then
The Nature of an insurrection.

Julius Caesar, Brutus II, i

No man has ever walked with less preparation into a greater tangle of problems than did Harry S Truman when he stepped across the Constitutional threshold that separates the Vice-Presidency from the Presidency. According to Cabell Phillips, after his inauguration on January 20, 1945, he saw President Roosevelt privately only three times, and each occasion was brief and inconsequential. In his established role as presiding officer of the Senate, he was almost totally isolated from the flow of issues and decisions in the executive branch of government. What he knew of the grand strategies of war and peace, then approaching an apocalyptic climax, he picked up largely from the papers and the gossip of the Senatorial cloak-rooms.¹ "The President," Woodrow Wilson wrote nearly half a century ago, "is at liberty both in law and in conscience to be as big a man as he can."² But a Vice-President can be only as big a man as his President wants or permits him to be. Roosevelt groomed no one to be his successor, and if he ever regarded Harry Truman as anything more than a congenial make-weight on the Democratic ticket in 1944, it is lost to history.³ Truman, in turn, had avoided any attempt to prepare himself for higher office. "I had been afraid for many weeks that something might happen to this great leader," he recalled years later, but "I did not allow myself to think about it after I became Vice-President."⁴

J. M. Williams is an Associate Professor of Communication and Media Studies with a degree in Presidential Rhetoric from the University of Pittsburgh, and currently serves as president-elect of the Speech Communication Association of Pennsylvania.

¹ Cabell Phillips, *The Truman Presidency, The History of a Triumphant Succession* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966), p. 52.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Harry S Truman, *Memoirs: Year of Decision*. I (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956), p. 6; See also Margaret Truman Daniels, *Harry S Truman* (Garden City: Williams Morrow & Co., Inc., 1973), p. 205.

Of all the vast complexities that leaped out at Truman when he was thrust into the White House with Roosevelt's sudden passing on April 12, 1945, none was more formidable and demanding than the atomic bomb. After a brief first Cabinet meeting, hastily convened after Truman was sworn into office, Secretary of War Henry Stimson remained behind. He would explain the details later, he said, but before departing he wanted to inform the President of a new explosive under development of almost unbelievable destructive power. That was all he wished to say at the moment.⁵ These terse, enigmatic remarks became Truman's introduction to a decision-making scenario of epic proportions: the decision to use the atomic bomb against Japan.

As is frequently the case, hindsight clouds rather than clarifies our view. The notion is that Truman staked his 'Give 'em hell, Harry' reputation on the A-bomb decision and won. The facts, some of them only quite recently declassified and unveiled for public scrutiny in a valuable book by historian Martin J. Sherwin, offer a different interpretation. Was Truman an unwitting bystander or an unwilling participant in the decision-making process? Real world decision-making can be subjected to argumentative analysis as discussed in the works of Braybrooke and Lindblom, Graham T. Allison and Irving L. Janis.⁶ The present essay attempts such analysis and examines two propositions: 1) Truman's role as presidential decisionmaker was one of passive acquiescence, characterized by blind allegiance to the policy leanings of his predecessor, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and strict adherence to the advice of the seasoned counselors who surrounded him as Roosevelt appointees. 2) The series of decisive actions surrounding the development and deployment of the bomb, which emanated from the political and scientific communities between 1939-1945, reflect a rhetoric of incrementalism. Left unimpeded, the process of incremental decision-making contributed to the creation of an A-bomb policy too formidable to halt.

Decision By Default

Truman approached the decision to use the atomic bomb from the distinct disadvantage of one kept purposely and thoroughly in the dark, having been uninformed prior to Roosevelt's death in April, 1945, that the United States was engaged in the Manhattan Project and was nearing completion of what promised to be the most devastating and destructive weapon in the history of the world. While it is true that secrecy was imperative for national security, it impinged on the decision-making process at the presidential level by denying Truman access to necessary information. He did not know, upon taking office for example, of the secret *aide memoire* of September 19, 1944, initialed by Roosevelt and Churchill which, couched in the tones of diplomatic reservation, suggested however discreetly that the bomb "might perhaps, after mature consideration, be used against the

⁵ Harry S Truman, *Memoirs*, p. 10.

⁶ See David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, *A Strategy of Decision, Policy Evaluation as a Social Process* (New York: The Free Press, 1963); Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971); Irving L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink, A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972).

Japanese.”⁷ Though hardly an irreversible declaration of intention, it early predicts a gain in momentum for the decision to use the bomb. In this extraordinary situation, Truman as president was not in control. According to Major General Leslie R. Groves, commanding general of the *Manhattan Engineer District* (code name for the A-bomb project), Truman “was like a little boy on a tobaggan,” who perhaps never even had an opportunity to say yes.⁸ Churchill was to write in his memoirs: “We can now see the deadly hiatus which existed between the fading of President Roosevelt’s strength and the growth of President Truman’s grip of the vast world problem. In this melancholy void, one president could not act and the other could not know.”⁹ Truman mistrusted his own judgment, and the men who might have backed him up, such as Churchill and Harriman, were figures whom he knew but slightly or not at all. On the other hand, the men whom he did know and on whom he was forced to rely daily, Stimson, Leahy and Marshall, were obsessed with the military rather than the political implications of the war. At the first Cabinet meeting, Truman told his inherited advisers that his intention was to continue both the foreign and the domestic policies of the Roosevelt administration. Lacking any policies of his own, he really had little alternative.¹⁰ Leahy tells us that Truman took a firm stand that “commitments already entered into must be upheld.”¹¹ He labored under a sense of obligation to continue in the steps of his predecessor.¹²

During the early months of his Presidency, Truman made a conscious effort to appear decisive. But, until the war ended, until he freed himself from Roosevelt’s encumbering legacy, he was, in fact, at the mercy of events. To compensate for his lack of experience, his inadequate knowledge, and his profound concern over his ability to do the job so suddenly thrust upon him, Truman relied upon those advisers who offered decisive advice. The image of Truman as a tough-minded, confident President, the man who displayed a sign on his desk reading, “The Buck Stops Here!” was one he cultivated after the war was over.¹³ It was perhaps symbolic of his situation that when, a few days after his inauguration, President Truman entered the East Room of the White House for Roosevelt’s funeral service, no one stood up. As Robert E. Sherwood noted, “All they could think of was that *the President* was dead. But everybody stood up when Mrs. Roosevelt came in.”¹⁴

Did Truman intentionally avoid all responsibility? For the most part, circumstances prevailed, and he operated, at least initially, in a sort of vacuum. Often the real grist of the information needed to make a decision never entered his domain, having been filtered through channels such as the Interim Committee or the Science Advisory Panel or was altered by

⁷ Martin J. Sherwin, *A World Destroyed—The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), p. 144.

⁸ Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow, *The Truman Administration: A Documentary History* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 2.

⁹ Cabell Phillips, p. 71.

¹⁰ Martin Sherwin, p. 149; Cabell Phillips, p. 71; Harry S Truman, *Memoirs*, p. 9.

¹¹ William Leahy, *I Was There* (New York: Whittlesey House Publishers, 1956), p. 349.

¹² Cabell Phillips, p. 71.

¹³ Martin Sherwin, p. 147.

¹⁴ Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (New York: Harper & Row, 1950), p. 881; See also Sherwin, p. 148.

gate-keeping practices on lower levels, as in the case of the Franck Report of June 1945 and Leo Szilard's petition of July 17, 1945, both of which reflected an opposing view.¹⁵ Therefore, his position on the bomb developed without benefit of full knowledge of prior diplomatic activities and in response to the situation as presented by his advisers. Obviously, this was not an example of *enlightened decision-making*. Truman's role was reduced to little more than a ceremonial function. As President and commander-in-chief, he was merely the nominal leader of military action and as such, yielded to the expertise of those who knew better. His was decision by default.

One conclusion that emerges clearly from a close examination of wartime policy formulation is that policymakers never seriously questioned the assumption that the bomb should be used. From the first meeting to organize the atomic energy project in October 1941, Stimson, Roosevelt and other members of the Top Policy Group conceived of the development and use of the atomic bomb as an essential part of the total war effort.¹⁶ They asked whether it would be ready *in time*, not whether it should be used if it was ready; what were the diplomatic consequences of its development, not the moral implications of its military use.¹⁷ Although the suggestion to build the bomb was initially made by scientists who feared that Germany might develop the weapon first, those with political responsibility for prosecuting the war accepted the very fact of the bomb's existence as sufficient justification for its use against the enemy.¹⁸ Winston Churchill stated: "The historic fact remains and must be judged in the aftertime, that the decision whether or not to use the A-bomb to compel the surrender of Japan was never an issue. There was unanimous, automatic, unquestioned agreement around our table; nor did I ever hear the slightest suggestion that we should do otherwise."¹⁹ Secretary of War Stimson wrote, "It was our common objective throughout the war to be first to produce an atomic weapon and use it."²⁰ Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, the scientist in charge of making the bombs at Los Alamos, said, "We always assumed if they [bombs] were needed, they would be used."²¹ At the last meeting between Stimson and Roosevelt on March 15, 1945, a few weeks before his death, neither man expressed any doubts as to whether the bomb would or should be used.²² The problem-solving nature of the question related to the bomb itself—not to the strategic value. *We have it—will it work* was the issue.

Early in the summer of 1941 the British government forwarded to Vannevar Bush, director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, a copy of the MAUD Committee's report entitled, "The Use of Uranium for a Bomb," which held out the possibility that plutonium could be used for a bomb; that plutonium or uranium bombs could be made small

¹⁵ Martin Sherwin, p. 212; See also Bernstein and Matusow, pp. 16, 17.

¹⁶ Martin Sherwin, pp. 37, 42.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 194, 195.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁹ Winston Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953), p. 639.

²⁰ Henry L. Stimson, "The Decision To Use The Bomb," *Harpers Magazine*, February 1947, p. 98.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Martin Sherwin, p. 138.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

enough to carry in existing aircraft; and finally, that a bomb could be produced within two years.²³ Bush informed Roosevelt on July 16, 1941, and although the matter was "still highly abstruse," Bush considered, "one thing certain: if such an explosive were made it would be thousands of times more powerful than existing explosives, and its *use* might be determining."²⁴ Likewise, from Secretary Stimson's point of view, the atomic bomb had this unique peculiarity. He mused the day before Roosevelt died, "although every prophecy thus far has been fulfilled by the development and we can see that success is 99% assured, yet only by the first actual war trial of the weapon can the actual certainty be fixed."²⁵ Charles Sherwin notes that Truman did not inherit the question of whether that certainty ought to be fixed; he inherited the answer.²⁶

Incremental Decision-Making

At first glance, the decision to drop the atomic bomb would appear to be one of the largest and most consequential decisions a nation might make, yet the pattern is incremental. Braybrooke and Lindblom point out, not surprisingly, that incrementalism is central and fundamental to the democratic system, even if it does not wholly characterize it. Policy making proceeds through a sequence of approximations. A policy is directed at a problem; it is tried, altered, tried in its altered form, altered again, and so forth. In short, incremental policies follow one upon the other in the solution to a given problem.²⁷ Just how far the practice of incremental politics permeates the activity of our government can be illustrated even by decisions that, on superficial inspection, appear to be nonincremental.²⁸ Braybrooke and Lindblom suggest that since policy analysis is incremental, it is to be expected that stable long-term aspirations will not appear as dominant critical values in the eyes of the analyst.²⁹ Truman, for example, made his decision almost exclusively on the basis of the more immediate military and calculable criteria. As a typically pragmatic American politician, he dealt with the tangible features of the situation, the immediately probable results: to end the war; to save American lives; to continue the Anglo-American entente; to achieve atomic supremacy; and to create a diplomatic bargaining wedge with Russia. Inevitably, his bias was toward the more short-run and controllable elements of the equation. No matter how compelling the longer-term implications of dropping the bomb might have seemed, they posed such high imponderables and contingencies that they defied easy calculation. The bias was toward immediate results, short-run implications, calculable sequences of action.³⁰ As we now see, the use of the bomb flowed out of the momentum of events, out of the locked-in quality of men and institutions who, once committed, saw no way to rearrange their priorities and decision.³¹

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 36, 37.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 140.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Braybrooke and Lindblom, p. 73.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 75.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 102.

³⁰ James MacGregor Burns, *Presidential Government, The Crucible of Leadership*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973), p. 216.

³¹ Gar Alperovitz, "The Use of the Atomic Bomb" in *The Origins of the Cold War*, 2nd ed. Thomas G. Paterson (Lexington: D. C. Heath & Co., 1974), p. 56.

PERIODICALS SECTION

MAY 18 1970
MANKATO STATE
UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

During the seven months between the Hyde Park Conference in September 1944 and Roosevelt's death, steady progress had been made on the development of the bomb at Los Alamos and the other facilities of the Manhattan Project. In a memorandum written about two weeks before Roosevelt died, General Groves expressed his confident opinion that atomic weapons would be available in time to use against Japan. He was certain that the weapon would bring the war to a rapid conclusion, thereby justifying the years of effort, the vast expenditures, and the judgment of the officials responsible for the project. Two bombs would be ready by August 1, 1945. Even before Truman took office, the race for the bomb had already changed from a race against German scientists to a race against the war itself. "I don't think there was any time where we worked harder at the speed-up than in the period after the German surrender and the actual combat use of the bomb," Oppenheimer recalled after the war.³²

Already in December, 1944, President Roosevelt was shown a report prepared by Groves for General Marshall, outlining the expected schedule for production of atomic bombs. At least one bomb that did not require testing would be ready by August 1, 1945. Another, less reliable weapon would be available in July for testing. Plans were already underway for training the crews of the 509th Composite Group for their mission against Japan.³³ All these items Roosevelt approved.³⁴ This was seven months before the A-bomb decision was credited to Harry Truman.

The evolution of the famous Interim Committee was in answer to the need for an evaluative body, to serve in an advisory capacity to the President on atomic energy.³⁵ Stimson sought to keep it small enough to carry on meaningful discussion but sufficiently varied in its membership to represent all the relevant policy making segments of the Executive Branch, to include individuals familiar with atomic energy problems, and finally, to have influence with the President. On May 31, 1945, three days after Truman set the date for the Potsdam Conference, the Interim Committee (so named by Stimson so as to assure legislators that this was a *temporary* body and that the Executive was not trying to usurp Congressional authority) submitted a formal recommendation that the atomic bomb be used without warning against Japan.³⁶ The Committee had met officially on three previous occasions: May 9, 14 and 18.³⁷ Its members had reviewed the history of the Manhattan Project; received a background briefing from Groves, Bush, Conant and others; discussed the Quebec Agreement and the Combined Development Trust; appointed a Scientific Panel; considered the appointment of industrial and military panels; and designated William L. Laurence, science editor of The New York Times, to prepare statements to be used after the atomic attacks.

Yet the question of whether the bomb should be used at all had never actually been discussed.³⁸ The minutes of the Interim Committee suggest why. These committee members had come together as advocates, the responsible advisers of a new force in the world, convinced of the weapon's

³² Martin Sherwin, p. 145.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 133, 231.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 169.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 202.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

diplomatic and military potential, aware of its fantastic cost, and awed by their responsibilities. Four years of war and the pressures to end it, four years of secrecy and the prospect of more, two billion dollars and the question for *what?*; Japan's tenacious resistance and America's commitment to unconditional surrender; Soviet behavior and the need for international control—all these bolstered the accepted point of view.³⁹ There is no suggestion in the memorandum of May 30, 1945, unearthed by Sherwin, or in the questions the Secretary of War Stimson placed before the assembled group, that his memory was serving him well when he wrote in his autobiography: "The first and greatest problem (for the Interim Committee) was the decision on the use of the bomb—should it be used against the Japanese and if so, in what manner?"⁴⁰ The *fact is* that a discussion of this question was placed on the agenda only *after* it was raised casually in the course of conversation during lunch.⁴¹ Arthur Compton reports in a summary of the morning session of the Interim Committee on May 31, "Throughout the morning's discussion, it seemed to be a forgone conclusion that the bomb would be used. It was regarding only the details of strategy and tactics that differing views were expressed."⁴²

Stimson accepted Conant's suggestion that the most desirable target would be a vital war plant employing a large number of workers and closely surrounded by workers' homes. *No member* of the Committee spoke to the contradiction between this conclusion and their earlier decision not to concentrate on a civilian area.⁴³ The critical discussion was over. It had not only confirmed the assumption that the new weapon was to be used, but that the two bombs that would be available early in August should be used. Sherwin points out that the destruction of both Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the result of a single decision.⁴⁴ The next day, Byrnes suggested that the Secretary of War should be advised that the members of the Interim Committee agreed: ". . . while recognizing that the final selection of the target was essentially a military decision, the present view of the Committee was that the bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible; that it be used on a war plant surrounded by workers' homes; and that it be used without prior warning."⁴⁵ On June 6, 1945, Stimson informed Truman of the Committee's decision.

Nearly two weeks after the Interim Committee's recommendation, on June 12, James Franck, a Nobel Laureate, tried to present a report to the Secretary of War from the Committee on Social and Political Implications, composed of seven scientists in Chicago who had worked on the preparation of the nuclear explosive, plutonium. He managed to see only a lieutenant in the office of George Harrison, alternate chairman of the Interim Committee. This report, which became known as the Franck Report, argued for a demonstration of the weapon on the desert or a barren island, before the eyes

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 204; See also Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), p. 617.

⁴¹ Martin Sherwin, p. 204.

⁴² Arthur H. Compton, *Atomic Quest: A Personal Narrative* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 238.

⁴³ Martin Sherwin, p. 209.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 302 (Appendix L: Notes of the Interim Committee Meeting, May 31, 1945).

of representatives of all the United Nations, suggesting that "the military advantage of saving lives achieved by the sudden use of A-bombs against Japan may be outweighed by the ensuing loss of confidence and be a wave of horror and repulsion sweeping over the rest of the world and even at home."⁴⁶ Yet the Scientific Panel reported to Stimson on June 16 that they could "propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war . . . no acceptable alternative to direct military use."⁴⁷ Ends versus means, as Braybrooke and Lindblom point out, characterizes incrementalism. The evidence suggests that the *use* of the A-bomb became an *end in itself* versus the moral and political impact which the bomb might generate after the war.

Incremental decision-making is more than a simple sequence of rhetorical events. As characterized by the rhetoric surrounding Truman's decision to deploy the atomic bomb, incrementalism reflected a series of *planned* policy approximations, interlocked in a building-block effect to strengthen a sense of false security and control over the impending outcome of the decision and with misplaced emphasis on immediate ends rather than long-range goals. Even Truman's unwillingness to act decisively was itself a form of incremental decision-making.

Conclusion

As John Kennedy observed, "The essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer—often, indeed, to the decider himself. . . . There will always be the dark and tangled stretches in the decision-making process—mysterious even to those who may be most intimately involved."⁴⁸ It may remain largely a question of values as to the final assessment of Truman's A-bomb decision. Yet, it must be recognized that the uninterrupted flow of incremental decision-making surrounding the use of the atomic bomb facilitated a politics of expediency which denied the inclusion of rhetorical alternatives. This was not Truman's finest hour. His reluctance to break with the Roosevelt precedent of support for the bomb's development nullified his claim to active participation in the decision and rendered it impotent. Truman admittedly was caught in the momentum of events. The juggernaut was advancing irresistibly toward the bombing of Japan. A strong presidential decision, however, would have indicated his willingness and tested his ability to control the outcome. Instead, the power of the Presidency was reduced to consent by resignation. Truman remained only a figurehead in the process, one who danced to the tune of the piper. But the price he paid was not his to give. More than one hundred twenty thousand Japanese and, as Sherwin notes, an undisclosed number of American POWs lay dead and dying in the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—unsuspecting victims of the holocaust, who bore the pains of the nuclear birth.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ "The Franck Report" in *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, I, May 1946, pp. 2-4, 16.

⁴⁷ Martin Sherwin, p. 304 (Appendix M: Science Panel Recommendations on the Immediate Use of Nuclear Weapons, June 16, 1945).

⁴⁸ John F. Kennedy, "Preface" to Theodore Sorensen, *Decision-Making in the White House: The Olive Branch and the Arrows* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963).

⁴⁹ Martin Sherwin, pp. 232, 232n, 234.

If the radiance of a thousand suns
Were to burst at once into the sky,
That would be like the splendor of
 the Mighty One . . .
I am become Death
The Shatterer of Worlds.

Bhagavad-Gita

ATTENTION!!! 1975-76 DSR-TKA INITIATES

**Your complimentary subscription
probably ENDS with this issue!**

**To continue receiving
Speaker and Gavel
you must subscribe—**

Order by sending \$5 to:

Speaker and Gavel
Allen Press
P.O. Box 368
Lawrence, Kansas 66044

NEW ADDRESS FOR OUR NATIONAL SECRETARY

Effective now:

**Professor Bertram W. Gross
Secretary, DSR-TKA
Department of Speech
Marshall University
Huntington, West Virginia 25701
Telephone: (304) 696-6786**

GOOD DELIBERATIVE FORM

H. L. EWBANK

Edmund Burke's speech to the electors of Bristol in 1774 described the English Parliament as a "deliberative assembly," that is, a group of people who meet under certain conditions to discuss and determine common actions. Those conditions for meeting include the following: an autonomous group, large enough to warrant some degree of formality, meeting to share opinions and ideas in order to reach a decision concerning a course or courses of action determined through the votes of members, recognizing that failure of any member to concur does not constitute withdrawal from the assembly.¹

The aggregation of common law, statute law, rituals and rules which have come to be known as "parliamentary procedure" constitutes the basis for proper behavior in deliberative assemblies, which make up a substantial element of our democratic society. They range from governmental bodies at the several levels to interest groups, social clubs, and voluntary organizations of all sorts. The forms, the concerns, the sizes, and the members of these assemblies differ widely from each other. Specific rules prescribing appropriate actions in any given group necessarily differ along a comparable range. As individuals seek to learn how to participate effectively in such deliberative assemblies, any of three possible paths might appear useful.

One might undertake to learn effective participation in a deliberative group simply by becoming a member of such a group and actively observing how they behave for some time before volunteering to speak. This is a relatively unsatisfactory course of action, if for no other reason than that one really needs to become sensitized to the significant elements of a situation in order to know what to look and listen for. As Sidney Hook observed, we learn *through*, not *by*, experience, "And what we learn *through* experience is more likely to be valid when we confront experience with a prepared mind. It is the cultivation and development of the prepared mind, and its attendant functions of trained observation and disciplined imagination, which is or should be the objective of all schooling, and especially schooling on the college and university level."²

Some choose to join deliberative assemblies and to join in their problem-solving activities from the start. This mode of beginning is disruptive to the rest of the members, who then must translate the new member's contributions into messages with which they are prepared to deal, and, in all probability, divert time from the substance of their considerations to an explanation of the rules so that the new member will in time accommodate himself to the usual ways of the organization.

A third and more direct way to learn to be a contributing member of a deliberative assembly is to focus on the ways to prepare and to present

Professor H. L. Ewbank is Professor of Speech Communication at the University of Arizona.

¹ Sarah Corbin Robert, et al., eds., *Robert's Rules of Order Newly Revised* (Glenview: Scott Foresman and Company, 1970), p. xxvii, p. 1.

² Sidney Hook, "Conflict and Change in the Academic Community," in Sidney Hook, ed., *In Defense of Academic Freedom* (New York: Pegasus, 1971), p. 111.

one's views concerning such problems as one might seek to resolve in that type of group, or to focus on the rules which generally obtain as decisions are sought. Intercollegiate forensics activities provide a means of implementing the former path. Participants explore agreed-upon problem areas and organize their ideas according to agreed-upon rules which prescribe form, sequence, and time restrictions. Courses in parliamentary procedure constitute the usual way of studying the rules, using whatever subject-matter might be convenient in order to gain experience and develop confidence in working within the patterns adopted by deliberative assemblies.

As one adopts either of these modes of study, his concern for one interest is very likely to make him impatient with any problems engendered by the other. Debaters, for instance, may become so engrossed in the substance of their brief or their case that they object or refuse to devote the time and effort necessary to adapt the substance to different organizational formats. Students of parliamentary procedure may take the view that it doesn't make any difference whether or not they use accurate information in their consideration of a matter, because they are interested primarily in using the rules confidently. They ignore, in this instance, the fundamental parliamentary principle that demands that they consider the reliability of information and the validity of arguments as they determine whether they should adopt or reject a proposal. As a practical matter, it is worse than useless to try to deal with either form or substance without at the same time considering the other.

Unhappily, evidence of this exclusive concern for form without relevance to substance is not difficult to find. A recent issue of the *Speaker and Gavel* included, without comment or embellishment, a table of parliamentary motions.³ In similar fashion, the text prepared under the auspices of Tau Kappa Alpha before the merger with Delta Sigma Rho, entitled *Argumentation and Debate: Principles and Practices*, included an appendix which was a "Simplified Classification Chart for Parliamentary Law," contributed by Robert Allen.⁴ A scan of the index affirms that these are the only pages bearing reference to parliamentary law or procedure. Even the description of a parliamentary debate was simply a narrative indicating what might transpire in a debate with the British, but contributing little to the understanding of where and how parliamentary motions and laws are germane to debate—either as practiced in intercollegiate competition or by those engaged directly in the deliberative assemblies for which such activity is expected to provide valuable experience.

When we realize that it is at least unwise if not literally impossible to learn to deal with substance apart from form or form apart from substance, it becomes apparent that the traditions of parliamentary rules and procedures are part and parcel of today's forensics enterprise. Numbers of the basic assumptions and practices of intercollegiate debate and forensics events rest in the province of parliamentary common law or parliamentary rules.

One of the most basic rules of intercollegiate debate requires that speakers confine their remarks to one subject at a time. The question of "topicality" which may now be raised by the jargon-bound debater reaches back through the question of "germaneness" that may be raised as a point of order in any parliamentary meeting to the rule found in the Journal of the House of

³ *Speaker and Gavel*, 14 (1977), 98.

⁴ David Potter, ed., *Argumentation and Debate: Principles and Practices* (New York: Dryden Press, 1954), pp. 457-459.

Commons requiring that: "When a Motion has been made, that Matter must receive a Determination by the Question, or be laid aside by the general sense of the House, before another be entertained."⁵ The pattern of alternating speakers supporting opposite points of view was adopted in 1592, as the Journal carried the notice that: "It was made a Rule, That the Chair-man shall ask the Parties that would speak, on which side they would speak . . . and the Party that speaketh against the last Speaker, is to be heard first."⁶ And the practice of *ad hominem* argument was proscribed soon after, in 1604, through the provision that: "He that digresseth from the Matter to fall upon the Person, ought to be suppressed by the Speaker. . . . No reviling or nipping words must be used."⁷

These primary considerations of debating find contemporary restatement within the first few pages of one of the most recently published debate texts. Wayne N. Thompson reminds us that debate is both cooperative and investigative. Debate, he says, "systematically presents and contrasts the affirmative and negative sides. . . ." There are hearers, in addition to the debaters themselves (even if only a tournament judge) whose appraisal and acceptance of arguments, opinions, and ideas is sought. "In debate," Thompson summarizes, "the intellectual task is to test a single proposition by following a procedure previously agreed upon."⁸

One of the universal principles of parliamentary law is that each deliberative assembly has the God-given right to determine its own rules, and, corollary to that right, the responsibility to agree upon the rules before they are to take effect, i.e., there must be no *ex post facto* penalty or punishment. This principle gives rise to differences among deliberative assemblies as well as to the variety of forms and formats which have been developed for intercollegiate debate. It points up, too, the responsibility for each participant to discover and comprehend the rules under which he is to perform. He needs to develop facility in adapting his own performance to the rules and practices of different situations such as tournament competition, public debating dealing with civil or political issues of the day, or, perhaps, participation in student government policy-making.

Within the province of competitive debating, the TKA text previously referred to lists three major alternatives to the standard, or traditional format: the problem-solving debate, cross-examination or Oregon-style debate, and legislative debate. Procedural rules for direct clash, heckling, mock trial, and split-team debate are provided briefly. Obviously, the distinctions between these several forms lie in the rules rather than in the substance under consideration. The stated aim of varying forms was "to produce more realistic setting and treatment" for the debaters themselves, and "to involve the audience directly and actively in the discussion."⁹ Thus they were intended to provide students with experience applicable to the variety of deliberative assemblies which they would encounter elsewhere.

The problem-solving debate format did not gain wide acceptance, and has been superseded in intercollegiate forensics by the discussion event. Indeed, because the procedure provided that the topic was to be stated

⁵ Robert, *Robert's Rules*, p. xxxi.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Wayne N. Thompson, *Modern Argumentation and Debate: Principles and Practices* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 8.

⁹ Gifford Blyton, "The Problem-Solving Debate in Potter, *Argumentation*, p. 251.

as a question, rather than a proposition, there was little difference between the two. The team was comprised of two or three speakers, and designated "A" or "B," rather than "Affirmative" or "Negative." Teams received their designation, which served only to determine speaking sequence, just before the event. Team "A" speakers were to appear first, third, and sixth. Team "B" appeared second, fourth, and fifth, thereby maintaining the tradition that the initiator of debate is permitted the closing remarks. In each instance, the first speaker was to present an unbiased analysis of the problem, including background and facts necessary to an understanding of it. When time permitted, he was to present a set of criteria by which solutions might be judged. Ten minutes was allotted for this analysis. Each second speaker presented a solution and demonstrated why it was the best, and how it would solve the problem as initially described. Twelve minutes were allotted for this presentation, followed by an eight-minute speech by the third speaker (or the first, again, if only two were on the team) in which he was to evaluate the solutions already presented and explain why one was superior. He might question other speakers for clarification, might agree or disagree with the proposal of his colleague, and could, if the situation warranted, set forth an entirely new solution. If the debate was to be judged, "scientific research, an unbiased point of view, and cooperative thinking" were to be the bases for determining which team did the better job.¹⁰ It seems apparent that these rules were conceived in such a way that they promote achievement of certain desired substantive goals, but the goals themselves were not so competitively oriented as other forms of debate. (This may well explain the lack of acceptance of the problem-solving format.)

Cross-examination debate, on the other hand, has gained widespread adoption, especially in high school competition. It has been hailed as better adapted to training for "thinking on your feet" and as a procedure which is more interesting for audiences.

Precise parliamentary rules for cross-examination debate vary considerably. The initial "Oregon" format was initiated by twenty-minute presentations of the entire affirmative and the entire negative cases. Ten-minute question periods followed, with the second negative interrogating the first affirmative, followed by the first negative responding to questions from the second affirmative. The second speakers closed with ten minutes of refutation and summary by the negative and affirmative in sequence. The complete debate, then, occupied one hour and twenty minutes.

Variations in the rules of cross-examination debate are many. Most provide for one constructive speech from each of four speakers, followed by a question period by that member of the opposition who is not to be the ensuing speaker, and one summary-rebuttal speech from each side. Speaking times vary from five to twelve minutes; questioning times range from four to eight minutes, usually approximating half of the speaking time; and summary-rebuttals are allotted three to eight minutes. One format used by the University of Michigan provided for a single constructive speech from each side, followed by opposition questions, followed by an equal period for audience questioning and concluding with a brief rejoinder by each side.

Throughout the range of rules respecting time limits there persists the more general parliamentary traditions of "platform decorum," courtesy, fairness in intent of questions and in the extent of answers, relevancy, and finally, the

¹⁰ Blyton, "Problem-Solving Debate," pp. 251-255.

authority of the judge or the chair to act as final arbiter of any dispute or appeal. Descriptions note that the chair in a cross-examination style debate is much more important than the chair for a traditional debate. "The chairman should not only set the tone for a friendly, courteous contest but should also see that each speaker receives fair play. The chief responsibility of the chairman is the enforcement of the rules of the contest, and he should familiarize himself with them." This, of course, is identical with the expectations for the chair of any other parliamentary situation.¹¹

Legislative debate designates those varieties of forensics events which include larger numbers of participants, provide for more than one step in a problem-solution process, operate under an accepted set of rules, and are presided over by an officer or officers who have been delegated to direct the work of the group according to those rules.¹² The National Student Congress of Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha is an exemplar of this style. Its rules are necessarily more complex and detailed than those of the styles described above, because more people are engaged in the process, and the process itself involves four distinct and discrete organizational structures dealing with several different problem areas, which must interact effectively in order for the process to be complete. The many participants, most of whom are previously unknown to each other, must be guided in appropriate ways to get together, to organize themselves with respect to parties and committees and with respect to the agenda and proper functioning of the legislative assembly itself. Because the total available time is severely limited, each element of the process must be circumscribed and clarified so that the rules will serve to facilitate consideration of the substantive matters, rather than becoming the focus of greatest concern.¹³

The purposes cited at the outset of the Rules affirm that this event will provide experience in a situation which is "realistic." It parallels the organization and operation of legislative bodies at the state and national levels. Procedures and rules employed in the legislative debate in the Student Congress mirror those of Congress, except for such modifications as are necessitated by the demand that all organization, determination, and decision occur within a matter of days. The press of time makes it all the more important that members be familiar not only with the specific rules but also with the philosophy and spirit of parliamentary rules of deliberative assemblies in general. A table of motions alone, or even such a table supplemented by the Rules of the National Student Congress, will not provide adequate and reliable support for effective participation in the Congress. Only prior study of or experience in organizing politically for elections, drafting and redrafting legislative bills in committee, and debating those bills in a deliberative assembly can clarify the interdependence between the ideas considered and the principles and procedures which govern their consideration.

A similar, but identifiably different version of legislative—or, more precisely, "parliamentary"—debate is now practiced at the University of Toronto and the University of Chicago. Their format provides for a traditional

¹¹ Emil R. Pfister, "Cross-Examination, or Oregon-Style, Debate," in Potter, *Argumentation*, pp. 256–262.

¹² Paul R. Brandes, "Legislative Debate Procedure," in Potter, *Argumentation*, pp. 262–272.

¹³ *Speaker and Gavel*, 14 (1977), 33–41 prints the Rules of the National Student Congress of Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha.

parliamentary seating, with speakers for the Government (the affirmative of the proposition) seated to the left of the House as one faces front, and the Opposition speakers on the right. The Government opens the debate with an eight minute statement by the first speaker, who is Prime Minister. He is followed by one speaker for the Opposition, and a second Government spokesman who are granted the same amount of time. The second, and final speaker for the Opposition, who is Leader of the Opposition, then has eleven minutes, followed by a three-minute rebuttal by the Prime Minister.

Procedural rules demand that all remarks be addressed to the Speaker of the House, who is the judge of the event. No speaker is to be addressed or referred to by name, and each is to commence his remarks only after being called upon by the Speaker. It is the responsibility of the Government to set forth reasonable definitions of the terms of the proposition early in the debate. The Opposition may contest those definitions but will succeed only by providing a more reasonable definition. Debate may be interrupted only by a point of order or a point of personal privilege. No points of information are permitted. The rules remind the participants that the point of order "involves a breach of the procedure or the customs of the House. It includes such things as unparliamentary language, and introducing new affirmative arguments during rebuttal." The point of personal privilege may be raised only on one's own behalf, "when a speaker feels that his speech has been materially misrepresented or when he feels that his character has been defamed." The Speaker is empowered to rule on such points, and speakers are cautioned that they must not be frivolous in their use of points of order or personal privilege, but reassured that the mere fact that a ruling might go against them would not damage the case "if the objection appeared to be reasonable and in good faith."¹⁴

Finally, in keeping with the traditions of the British and Canadian Parliaments, the Toronto rules provide that: "Heckling is permitted and it should be remembered that heckling will enter into the evaluation. If a speaker's heckle is irrelevant or flat it will be counted against him. Heckling is a very important part of Parliamentary debating and the ability to make timely and incisive heckles is a great asset to any debater. Heckling should be short and to the point."¹⁵ These rules are similar to those which were provided for the "Heckling Debate" format described in the TKA text. There it was noted that heckling "demands thorough knowledge of the question and considerable poise and self-control on the part of the debater." The purpose of heckling was explained as "intended to get at the heart of the matter at issue, to demand specific evidence, to expose fallacies or the like, never to waste time, to embarrass the speaker, or to inject irrelevancies."¹⁶

Such explanations of proper purposes, attitudes and practices enable the participant to develop a sense of what to expect and how to behave in order to realize these expectations. As is true in any area of endeavor, there is some parliamentary jargon—some words and phrases which have become traditional in certain circumstances, and which show familiarity and assurance as they are used. Fortunately, most of the jargon is straightforward.

¹⁴ "Rules of Debate," Mimeographed, Hart House, University of Toronto, September, 1977, 3 pages.

¹⁵ "Rules of Debate," p. 3.

¹⁶ William E. Umbach, "Other Forms of Debate," in Potter, *Argumentation*, pp. 274-275.

When, for instance, in a Student Congress one wants to propose an action which is not possible under the usual rules, he has only to "move to suspend the rules"; when he wants to reverse an earlier action, he moves to "rescind." Even in those instances where terms are confusing, recognized and accepted parliamentarians have proposed modern wording which may be used without fear of misunderstanding or of appearing naive. For example, after debate has proceeded for some time in a Student Congress, and it appears that numbers of participants are ready to vote, the motion, "I move that we vote immediately," or "I move that we close debate" is acceptable in form because it expresses clearly what is intended. If the presiding officer then wishes to transpose the proposal to the more traditional phrase, "The previous question has been moved," he may do so without any implied criticism of the member who offered the motion, and the other members may well have a better understanding of what is intended than if the motion had been initiated with the phrase, "I move the previous question."¹⁷

A participant in any sort of a parliamentary meeting must know enough of the principles underlying the rules to understand that the responsibilities and the rights of each individual member are just the same as the responsibilities of every other member. He does not need to be especially concerned about remembering which motions might demand a vote more substantial than a simple majority of *those voting*. He should know that a simple majority (over fifty percent) of the legal votes cast will affirm the adoption of a motion. In certain instances by-laws might require that a majority of *those present* must approve, though this is rare. Legislative bodies sometimes demand a "constitutional majority" or a majority of *the total membership* for adoption of some kinds of legislation. In each case, every individual member may choose to vote or not to vote, but the effect of that choice has different impacts on the results depending on the specific demands of the situation. Similarly, in situations where the usual rights of members will be limited in some way by the adoption of a motion (viz., the motion to limit debate, to vote immediately, or to suspend rules) the usual provision is to require the affirmative vote of more than a simple majority—usually a two-thirds majority of those voting. The apparent reasonableness of this cautious provision which assures that eleven members cannot force an immediate vote on ten others who want to continue the debate is brought into some question when it is observed that the same rule permits the negative vote of only eight members to prolong debate when thirteen are ready to vote. And when it is extended to its ultimate, as it is when unanimity is demanded, the collective will of all but one of the members is frustrated so long as that one member refuses to agree. This is the ultimate in the tyranny of the minority. It is a dictatorship.

So long as one is concerned with "trying to remember all of the rules" his contribution to substantive decisions in a deliberative assembly will be severely limited. Only after a good deal of thought and practice does one gain the understanding and knowledge that gives him "the feel" of what he is doing. Effective participation in forensics activities is akin to driving a car, because each requires the coordination of a series of observations,

¹⁷ Alice F. Sturgis, *Sturgis' Standard Code of Parliamentary Procedure*, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956), pp. 67-70, substitutes the words "vote immediately" for "previous question" on grounds that confusion will be decreased. Ray E. Keesey, *Modern Parliamentary Procedure* (New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1974), pp. 51-54, uses "close debate."

instantaneous judgments, and coordinated movements, taking account of the general laws, the individual circumstances, and the desired goal or destination. The more experience one gains, the more automatically some of the elements are accommodated and the more the conscious thoughts can focus on getting done the substantive business that needs to be done. It is only after a thorough understanding of the principles has been developed that the summary charts of specific details about the motions are really useful to reaffirm aspects which one can only partially recall and about which some doubts may linger.

Real ease and skill in any activity or any game come only through the understanding of reasons for doing things in specified ways. Research in library or laboratory is awkward and frustrating at first, until one discovers that there is a pattern which saves time because it takes each necessary step in the appropriate sequence, avoiding omissions and backtracking. While one is learning this pattern she may need to make frequent reference to the research guide or "rules." When she has arrived at the point where the sequence is "natural," because she understands why each step is necessary, and which follows what, she can devote her undivided attention to the substance of what she is doing, rather than sharing attention between substance and form. The system then begins to work for her. Similarly, when one has come to understand the deliberative or parliamentary process she does not have to refer constantly to the rules because she knows what needs to be done. She simply and readily proceeds to do it.

It is, perhaps, too much to expect that each participant in forensics events should have a semester's study of parliamentary procedure. Yet it cannot be denied that a person who undertakes to participate—especially in a legislative assembly—without having engaged in some conscious and serious study of parliamentary procedure is at a definite competitive disadvantage. Nor can it be denied that that person will decrease the efficiency and effectiveness of the entire activity. The parliamentarily naive tend to be slow to contribute, lest they display their lack of *savoir faire*. And worse, they often take the position that the member who knows what she wants to do and moves confidently to seek support for her proposals is, somehow, being unfair as she demonstrates mastery of proper procedure. In fact, the individuals who presume to participate in any deliberative assembly without adequate comprehension of proper procedures are unfairly obstructing the substantive deliberations of the assembly because of their inadequate mastery of the forms those deliberations should take.

NEW INITIATES OF DSR-TKA 1977-78

UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA

Mark S. Boardman
Joan C. Crowder
John R. Genter
Charles R. Mandly

Linda Sue Leedy
Bernadette Nagel
Robin Paisley
Karl Scheuermann
David Schlueter

AUBURN UNIVERSITY

Constance C. Bacon
Wm. Dennis Harmon

CLEMSON UNIVERSITY

Susan M. Cockrell
Franklin F. DeHaven, Jr.
Brian H. Melton
William D. Nicholas
Mary J. Senn
Mabel P. Shuler

BALL STATE UNIVERSITY

David W. Conard
Debra A. Freeman
Byron W. Kaiser
Susan L. Mace
Shawn L. McGee
Adele Mongaraz
Fred E. Reese
Susan J. Roberts
Steve A. Russell
John B. Wantz
Michelle Ann Whiteman

DEPAUW UNIVERSITY

William C. Clyde
James O. Cupp
Peter DeBenedittis

DUKE UNIVERSITY

Michael Jay Berger

BEREA COLLEGE

Vicki E. Allums
Terri L. Choy
Vivian D. Davis

EASTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY

Randall Ross Ballard II
Tim Butler
Karen Garrett
Chris Kremer
Jennifer Staples

BRIDGEWATER COLLEGE

Dale E. Mekeel

ELIZABETHTOWN COLLEGE

Mark C. Ebersole

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY

Connie Lund
Keith L. Stoney

EMERSON COLLEGE

Kay Shirley Bartley
Donald T. Egan
Donna E. Goldsmith
Francis X. Hansen
Wilson T. MacDonald
Laura A. Roy
Joseph M. Tennyson
Paul Le May Tondreau
Andrew T. Velonis

CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY

LONG BEACH

Ralph Black
Alison L. Lienesch

CAPITAL UNIVERSITY

Ted Irvin Coulter
Thomas H. Rice
Erick R. Zanner

EMORY UNIVERSITY

Robert S. Kahn
Steven W. Smith

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

Mark Bongard
Jay Dascenzo
Paula Fitzsimmons
Patricia E. Friel
Anthony George

FAIRMONT STATE COLLEGE

Thomas E. Haller
Janellen Ware

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

Charles W. McBurney, Jr.
Jeffrey A. Rynor

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

Gary J. Anton
Ernest A. Beasley
Kent R. Colbert
D'Mrtri L. Crafton
Sheila E. Fox
Robert P. Ingram
Lorin J. Lee
Robert L. Lord
George G. Love
Jamie I. Lovelace
Sara P. Martin
Joy H. McClintock
Sandra W. Rackley
Nancy T. Schreiber
Joseph W. Stanco
Andrew F. Susko

UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA

Jasper Dorsey
Steven M. Loving
Steven J. Lownds

HIRAM COLLEGE

Paul T. Bacher
Brian D. Fisher

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

Michelle M. Arnopol
Daniel F. Cooley
William T. Donahue
Ronald M. Gootzeit
Richard S. Myers
Michael L. Resis
Delbert H. Rich
Andrew D. Schau
Stephen Albin Turbak
Elizabeth Ann Whelan
Donald R. Zoufal

INDIANA STATE UNIVERSITY

Steve Lee Barker
Cynthia J. Curry
Ruth A. Erickson
Kay Bohannon Holley
Darrell Osborne
Douglas Oneal Shelton
Sam M. Smith

Jody Wilson

Larret Wright

UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

Robert E. Breckenridge
Mark M. Deatherage

IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY

Clark D. Olson

JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY

Keith D. Brechtelsbauer
Angela B. Hochmeister
Steven Scott Holsinger
Elizabeth L. Johnson
James M. McCauley
Paula M. Mergenhagen
William R. Mitchell
Stephen E. Nunn
Deborah Lynn White

UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS

Jeffrey E. Brunton
Charles Fairchild

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY

Wendy J. Schiappa
Vicky B. Walton

KINGS COLLEGE

Deborah A. Ezbitski
Carol A. King
Mark Peter Pazuhanich

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

William R. Cupach
Mark S. Rzepczynski
John T. Steward

MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY

Arthur Richard Kimball
David Robert Liners
Douglas Oakley Smith
Linda Marie Wellstein

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Robert L. Corn
Lynne D. Reeck
David A. Smith

MERCER UNIVERSITY

Edith Jan Vardaman

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

Barbe Ann Johnson
Karen Marie Olsen
Paul G. Ross
Randy Curtis Trullinger

MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY

Gary K. Dearing
Pamela F. Jamison
Alan P. Kurtzberg
M. Terry May

MURRAY STATE UNIVERSITY

Wes Bartlett
Laurie J. Beatty
Charles T. Riley
Jimmy Stubblefield
Isaac M. Thacker
Richard J. Thomas
Russell E. Walker

**UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA-
LINCOLN**

Mark Flanders Adams
Virginia A. Eman
Martin J. Kushner
Jeffrey K. Lukehart

UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA-RENO

Mark Broadhead
David S. Hoffman
Kim Perkins
Mark S. Westergard

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH ALABAMA

John V. Conway
Linda K. Gundlach
Helen L. Howard
Renard Ricks
Shauna E. Saliba
Colleen A. Sparks
Jack L. White

OCCIDENTAL COLLEGE

April L. Adams
Arthur R. Andrade
Richard W. Bell
Paul A. Caryotakis
Peter J. Marston

PACE UNIVERSITY

Mark Stehlik

PACIFIC UNIVERSITY

Suzanne K. Nakama
Elizabeth L. Stanley
Curtis Y. Yokoo

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND

Julia Geier
Charles D. Graeber

ST. LAWRENCE UNIVERSITY

Bob C. Griffo
Nathan E. Larkin

**SOUTHERN METHODIST
UNIVERSITY**

Charles K. Hauser
Brian D. MacLeod
Paul E. Staffeldt

SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY

Beatrice L. Botelho
Marshall S. Channell
Catherine M. Costanzo
Robert E. Gibbons
Brian R. Greeley
Alice Henderson
Brian F. McNulty
Donald W. Orcutt
John A. Ryder
Barbara J. Saint Andre
Ann M. Scheurer

UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE

Lewis Paul Snyder

TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY

Richard J. Lysiak
Melanie W. Neal
Vera L. Simpson

TULANE UNIVERSITY

Chris Austin
Mike Carbo
Alice Oppenheim
Barbara P. Warnick

**UNITED STATES NAVAL
ACADEMY**

Gregory C. Kolodziejczak
Michael R. Shumaker

UNIVERSITY OF UTAH

Thomas Melton
Frank W. Mitchell

Kevin P. Peters
 Martin R. Sadler
 Layne William Weber

VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

William Bruce Brannan
 Randall R. Kucera
 Shari D. Olenick
 Sophia Eloise Wheeler

UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT

Ferald J. Bryan
 Heather W. Marshall
 Patricia A. Murphy
 Martha K. Wilson

VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE

Robby W. Burke
 Charles T. Moses
 Paul R. Thomas

**WASHINGTON AND JEFFERSON
 COLLEGE**

Debra G. Logan
 Sandra L. Rosenberger

WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY

Darrell E. Garth
 Scott L. Harris
 Ruth E. Kay
 Greg King
 Robin D. Myers
 Michael F. O'Connor
 John Anthony Pfeifer
 Michael D. Wavada

WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY

Steven I. Peretz
 Gregory Wilcox Powell

WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY

N. Elizabeth Bower
 James A. McKowen

WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY

James T. Keffer

WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY

David Mark Clarke
 James H. Richards

WESTMINSTER COLLEGE

Joanne L. Smith

WICHITA STATE UNIVERSITY

Denise Franklin
 John Hambricht
 Michelle Martin
 Mark Parkinson
 Robert Wilson

**COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND
 MARY**

Monty Estis
 John L. Gerner

**UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-
 MADISON**

Laurie K. Robbins
 Nancy Schultz

COLLEGE OF WOOSTER

Adele N. Rapport

YESHIVA UNIVERSITY

David A. Bart
 Allen R. Friedman

DELTA SIGMA RHO-TAU KAPPA ALPHA MINUTES OF NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING

November 2, 1978

Minneapolis, Minnesota

The meeting was called to order by President Thomas Kane at 9:05 p.m. Present for all or part of the meeting were Kane, Weiss, Balthrop, Clark, Ziegelmüller, Zarefsky, McGuire, Schnoor, Howe, Cornell, Matlon, R. Flaningam, Lynch and Gross.

Report of the President: Thomas Kane. Kane announced that Woodrow Leake had resigned as chair of the Research and Publications Committee. Michael Overking has been appointed to replace Leake. The Nominating Committee has been appointed as follows: Jack Lynch, chair, George Ziegelmüller, Lucy Keele, Carl Flaningam, and Bill Balthrop. An ad hoc committee to examine the By-Laws provisions for active chapters has been appointed as follows: George Ziegelmüller, chair, Kenneth Andersen, David Zarefsky, Jean Cornell, and Bert Gross.

Report of the Secretary: Bert Gross. The minutes of the previous meeting were approved as published in *Speaker and Gavel*.

Report of the Treasurer: Jack Howe. The Society concluded the 1978 fiscal year in sound financial condition. Income for the fiscal year was \$12,021.91 and expenses were \$8,372.64.

Reports were received from Regional Governors Weiss, McGuire, and Schnoor.

Report of the Standards Committee: David Zarefsky. The Standards Committee has received no new applications for chapters since last spring. The disposition of the Committee's report on problem chapters which was made last spring awaits the re-examination of the By-Laws by the newly appointed ad hoc committee.

Report of the National Conference Committee: Cully Clark. The National Conference will be held at Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia from March 22-25, 1979. A discussion followed about the desirability of continuing to have a banquet at the National Conference. The consensus of the Council supported the continuation of the banquet. Clark noted that the prices of trophies from Balfour had become excessive. An effort would be made to locate another supplier who would provide similar quality awards at lower prices.

A discussion of the financial status of the National Conference ensued. Clark observed that a final statement had not yet been received for the 1978 Conference, but that it was possible that a deficit had been incurred due to the weather. Howe recalled that he had paid a bill for \$68.64 for a deficit from the 1977 Conference even though the budget did not include such an item. Clark/McGuire moved that the Treasurer be authorized to pay any deficit incurred by the 1978 National Conference. The motion passed. Ziegelmüller/Lynch moved the following: It is the sense of the National Council that the National Conference be self-supporting. However, the Treasurer is authorized to pay up to \$250 to cover any deficits which are incurred. The motion passed.

Report of the Alumni and Service Awards Committee: Ron Matlon. A letter soliciting nominations will be mailed shortly by the Secretary. A dis-

cussion ensued about the desirability of having the award recipients attend the banquet at the National Conference.

Report of the Speaker of the Year Committee: Bill Balthrop. A number of nominations have been received as a result of the first announcement by the committee. A second announcement will be made. In the discussion which followed, all agreed that it would be desirable to have the Speaker of the Year attend the National Conference banquet. It was noted that the Council had earlier authorized paying the expenses of the person to be honored.

The size of the Speaker of the Year committee was discussed. Ziegelmueller/Howe moved that the National Council authorize the Secretary to prepare an amendment to the By-Laws to make the Speaker of the Year Committee a five member committee. The motion passed. (PLEASE NOTE THAT A COPY OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT IS ATTACHED.)

There being no further business to come before the Council, President Kane declared the meeting adjourned at 10:10 p.m.

Respectfully submitted,
Bertram W. Gross, Secretary

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE BY-LAWS

A proposal to amend the By-Laws, Article II, Section 5 by deleting "at least fifteen and not more than twenty" and inserting "five."

Section 5 currently reads: "This committee will consist of at least fifteen and not more than twenty members, geographically distributed, who will serve for a term of two years. The committee will be charged with the selection of the Speaker of the Year in accordance with the rules approved by the National Council."

ANNOUNCEMENT OF NEW EDITOR

William Balthrop of the University of North Carolina is the new editor of *Speaker and Gavel*. President Thomas Kane made the announcement at the Speech Communication Association National Convention in Minneapolis in early November. Editor Balthrop begins his three-year term with the Fall, 1978 issue. All manuscripts and editorial correspondence should be sent to the new editor.

As an editor, I have profited from the services of many people. Professors Bernard Brock and Kurt Ritter served for three years as members of the Editorial Board. John P. Davidson during his tenure as Second Student Vice-President was practically an Associate Editor for some issues as was Mæe Jean Go, former National Student President. Many people in the Department of Speech Communication at the University of Illinois contributed to the journal. Jerri Moorman, Sharon Medlock, June Lenenski and Sharon Perschnick retyped many articles before they were sent off to the printer. Often they helped with proofreading as well as normal correspondence. Their willingness to help in a measure far beyond that which would be expected is warmly appreciated. Ruth Bowman, Administrative Secretary for the Department, helped in many respects, giving both sage advise and specific aid on editorial matters.

A special word of appreciation must go to those who submitted essays for publication. We were forced to reject many essays which were of good quality. And the Editorial Board appreciated those who cared enough to write the Board, whether in praise or condemnation.

I have enjoyed my period of service with *Speaker and Gavel*. The Journal plays an important role in Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha and it has been a privilege to serve the society in this way.—Kenneth E. Andersen.

SPECIAL SALE

Current Criticism

Individual copies of *Current Criticism* are available to readers of this journal at a 20% discount from now until December 31, 1978. The special price will be \$2.00 per copy provided payment is sent with the order.

Current Criticism may be adopted as a text in courses in criticism and contemporary public discourse. Examination copies are available on request and discounts available on quantity orders.

Order from Kenneth E. Andersen, Editor, *Speaker and Gavel*, Department of Speech Communication, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois 61801 or Bert Gross, National Secretary, DSR-TKA, Department of Speech Communication, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia 30602.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

The Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha National Council has established a standard subscription rate of \$5.00 per year for *Speaker and Gavel*.

Present policy provides that new members, upon election, are provided with two years of *Speaker and Gavel* free of charge. Life members, furthermore, who have paid a Life Patron alumni membership fee of \$100, likewise regularly receive *Speaker and Gavel*. Also receiving each issue are the current chapter sponsors and the libraries of institutions holding a charter in the organization.

Other individuals and libraries are welcome to subscribe to *Speaker and Gavel*. Subscription orders should be sent to Allen Press, P. O. Box 368, Lawrence, Kansas 66044.

TO SPONSORS AND MEMBERS

Please send all communications relating to initiation, certificates of membership, key orders, and names of members to the National Secretary. All requests for authority to initiate and for emblems should be sent to the National Secretary and should be accompanied by check or money order. Inasmuch as all checks and money orders are forwarded by the Secretary to the National Treasurer, please make them to: "The Treasurer of Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha."

The membership fee is \$15.00. The official key (size shown in cut on this page) is \$10.50, or the official key-pin is \$11.75. A lapel button is available



for \$7.00. **Prices include Federal Tax.** The names of new members, those elected between September of one year and September of the following year, appear in the Fall issue of *SPEAKER* and *GAVEL*. According to present regulations of the society, new members receive *SPEAKER* and *GAVEL* for two years following their initiation if they return the record form supplied them at the time their application is approved by the Executive Secretary and certified to the sponsor. Following this time all members who wish to receive *SPEAKER* and *GAVEL* may subscribe at the standard rate of \$5.00 per year.

SPEAKER and GAVEL

Allen Press, Inc.
P. O. Box 368
Lawrence, Kansas 66044

Return Postage Guaranteed

Second Class Postage Paid
at Lawrence, Kansas, U.S.A.

Main Library
Mankato State College
Mankato, Minn. 56001