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The editorial policy of Speaker and Gavel is to publish refereed articles dealing with the theory, practice or criticism of public argument, and it welcomes contributions from established scholars and especially encourages submissions by those who are making their early efforts to achieve publication. We will give preference to topics drawn from the contemporary period, i.e., since 1960, and to manuscripts in the 1500–3500 word range. Speaker and Gavel will also publish survey articles, mostly commissioned, about major society projects.

Manuscripts should be typed double-spaced, documented with endnotes beginning on a new page at the conclusion of the text, and conform to the MLA STYLE SHEET (2nd edition). Manuscripts and correspondence should be directed to the editor at the address given above.
What in the world can one say at this early date about the rhetoric of President Ronald Reagan? That question has plagued me for the past month as I have sought to prepare this address. His Inaugural Address originally struck me as stylistically plain and substantively repetitive. Just a re-hash of his campaign speeches. In fact, in an interview with United Press International in late January, I assigned Reagan a C+ for his opening rhetorical effort.

Yet, at a Conference on “Independence and Interdependence” in Washington a month ago, a conference sponsored by the Center for the Study of the Presidency, I heard scholars and journalists alike speak about the effectiveness (and in one case, the “genius”) of President Reagan as a communicator. Judy Woodruff of NBC and Anne Compton of ABC spoke glowingly of how the Reagans have already dazzled Washington in a way that reminds the old timers of the halcyon days of Kennedy and Camelot. Very heady stuff!

Such comments disturbed me. Thus, I returned to the texts and video tapes of Reagan’s Inaugural, his speech to the nation on February 5, and his address before the joint session of Congress on February 18. In revisiting them, I still discovered none of the stylistic soaring that occasionally set President Kennedy in flight; little of the social concern for the down-trodden that made Lyndon Johnson memorable; and none of the logical or psychological complexities of a Richard Nixon.

On the other hand, Reagan’s speeches are refreshingly attractive after the dull, dog days of Ford and Carter.

What is one to make of all this, I wondered? And then several clippings caught my eye. In a column entitled “A Sweet Fellow …” James Reston observed that Reagan “seems to be an improviser with a half-conscious awareness of where he wants to go and a firm conviction that the people, if not the Congress, will go with him.”1 A senior foreign policy adviser is quoted as saying: “The public has the capability of understanding on a net basis, in monosyllables, simply communicated by a man such as this President, the state of the world in regard to this nation.”2 On the other side, Senate Minority Leader Robert Byrd warned against the now abandoned television advertising blitz planned to build public support for Reagan’s

Theodore Otto Windt, Jr. is Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Pittsburgh. This text is a transcript of a speech delivered at the 72nd Annual Convention of the Eastern Communication Association, Pittsburgh, April 23, 1981.

2 Ibid, p. 4 E.

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programs but still called it "a perversion of the political process," "a sinister approach." More recently, at the National NAACP meeting in Pittsburgh, Benjamin Hooks described Reagan’s politics as "Alice in Wonderland," a "taking from the poor to give to the rich." Supporters of Reagan hail him as the man who will restore America to greatness. Detractors score him for practicing the politics of nostalgia, for longing for a day that never was and never will be.

What is one to make out of this confusing din of discordant clanging? What is one to make of Reagan’s rhetoric? This morning I want to try to answer three questions. First, how well has President Reagan thus far used the rhetorical advantages available to him? Second, what meaning can we assign at this early date to the fundamental substantive and strategic rhetorical efforts he has used to get his Economic Renewal package passed? And finally ethos: Is President Reagan an authentic political voice of the present or nothing more than a voice from the nostalgic past? In posing these three questions rather than a host of others, I am taking primarily an analytic position of trying to figure out how well or ill President Reagan has used an essential part of his power as President, this rhetorical power to persuade many Americans to support his economic policies. And I want to pose at least tentative answers to the questions about what all this means and whether Reagan is authentic.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.’s The Imperial Presidency truly mesmerized journalists and scholars alike. It summarized the public mood of frustration, anger, and betrayal that had begun with Vietnam and culminated in Watergate. Schlesinger echoed what Edward Corwin had warned against in his magisterial The President: Office and Powers, to wit, that concentrated personalized power in the Presidency is dangerous. As all of us recall, charges of abuse of power became commonplace. Calls for reining in the President came from all quarters.

But with all this concern, an essential fact was overlooked. A President may commit illegal or improper acts precisely because he does not have the constitutional or statutory authority to act in areas where he deems action imperative. In making this statement, I am not excusing any past President for acting illegally. What I am saying is that Presidents do not have as much power to act as we sometimes believe, at least they do not have the constitutional authority invested in them the public believes they may have.

And in domestic economic affairs a President has hardly any legal power to act. To many weened on the gospel of the President as the most powerful man in the world, such a statement may seem heretical. But it is true nonetheless. Franklin Roosevelt knew it. In his First Inaugural Address, Roosevelt declared that he would “ask the Congress for the one remaining instrument

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to meet the crisis [of the depression]—broad Executive power to wage a
war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given me
if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.”6 Bruce Lederwitz, a Professor
of Law at Duquesne University, recently pointed out the passive nature of
Presidential executive power and the limits on the President’s ability to act.7
In a slim volume appropriately entitled, Congress Against the President, Rich-
ard M. Pious described the President as “initiator-in-chief,” rather than
actor-in-chief. He pointed out what most of us know: real legal power in
economic matters resides with Congress. The President can only request or
initiate.8

Faced then with demanding domestic problems, how is a President to
act? What I want to concentrate on is not the President as requester but
the President as initiator-in-chief.

The first months of a new administration provide a unique opportunity.
The first six to nine months offer a new President the opportunity, if he
seizes it, to impress his agenda, his perspectives, his language upon the
American people in such a way as to galvanize public support for his pro-
grams. Apparently, Reagan and his aides realized this. One of his aides in-
cisively described these early months as the “rhetoric stage” of the admin-
istration.9 Once this unique period passes, his speeches may become
repetitive, and thus lose vitality and eventually the public’s attention. But
at the beginning, a new President has this opportunity to mobilize opinion
as a weapon to persuade Congress to pass his legislative bills or to grant him
authority to act through Executive orders. How well has Reagan used this
opportunity? We may answer that question by looking at what he has done
and by comparing his rhetorical actions with those of recent Presidents.

In Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion, E. E. Cornwell observed:

The President’s prime weapon for influencing policy-making is his ability to
command and influence a national audience … Since little is likely to be
done constitutionally to strengthen the President’s hand, his ability to lead
and mold public opinion, for all its inherent limitations, remains his prime
reliance. More than ever before, the times demand strong Presidents and
more than ever before, the strong presidents will be the skillful leaders of
public opinion.”

I believe President Reagan has been exceptionally effective in these opening
months, effective enough for me to revise my grade from a C+ to an A−.
He set his priorities firmly. He would stress domestic affairs, not foreign
affairs. He would concentrate on economic issues that affect all Americans,
rather than controversial social issues so favored by one-issue interest groups.
These choices—limited and concentrated—give precise coherence to the
beginning of his Presidency and direction not only to his subordinates but

7 Bruce Lederwitz, “The Uncertain Power of the President to Execute the Laws,”
8 Richard M. Pious, “Source of Domestic Policy Initiatives,” Congress Against the
President, ed., Harvey C. Mansfield, Sr., Vol. 32, No. 1 of Proceedings of the Academy
10 E. E. Cornwell, Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion, (Bloomington: Indiana
to the public as well. Furthermore, he has acted swiftly, putting together a rhetorical package of three major speeches, each intended to function as part of a coherent campaign to make his economic programs easily understood by the public. By advancing quickly, President Reagan caught Congress still in its organizing state of disorganization.

Reagan's Inaugural Address restated basic themes of his campaign in the more or less general terms appropriate to an Inaugural. On that same day, he acted symbolically by issuing an Executive Order freezing government hiring. Probably, Reagan did not have the legal power to order the freeze, and it is now being contested in the courts. But the symbolism is more important. The hiring freeze is an existential symbolic act that demonstrates the authenticity of the speaker to his audience, an act that tells them he literally means what he says.

In his second nationally televised speech of February 5, Reagan sought to impress his audience with the gravity of our economic situation. He called it "the worst economic mess since the Great Depression." And he stressed the four general policies—tax cuts, budget cuts, regulation reform, and a consistent monetary policy—that would have to be enacted to solve our economic difficulties. Of course, this speech was intended to prepare the American people for the details that would be forthcoming in his next speech, to dispose them favorably by impressing upon them the imperative to act swiftly. The speech was intended to create a linguistic perceptual lens for the people (and thus Congress) to see the gravity of the problem, its specific causes, and its general solutions.

This speech is critical. If a President is going to make major changes in the direction of government and propose entirely new policies to deal with problems, he must first change the language by which one thinks about those problems and policies. Thought does not exist without language. Thus, the kind of language one has conditions the ways in which one can think. If a President proposes policies (i.e., the Economic Renewal Programs) that are radically different from past policies, he must also discredit the prevailing political language (i.e., New Deal federalism) and replace it with one congenial to his policies. That two-fold purpose is too much for a single speech. A President must discredit the language first and then in a separate speech present details of his proposals.

Therefore, before a joint session of Congress on February 18, President Reagan articulated specific policies in each of the four areas that comprise his "economic renewal" for America. Two major themes run throughout these speeches: (1) the persistent fear that if his programs are not enacted soon, our situation may grow hopeless; (2) the persistent confidence that if these programs are enacted, our present distress will be alleviated. These observations may seem commonplace. But after eighteen months of drift and disarray under President Carter, the decisive rhetoric of Reagan may convince many that once again they can master their own fates. The image of confidence may spawn a real confidence in people, a confidence essential if Reagan's programs are to have a hearty chance for passage in Congress.

Moreover, representatives of the administration ushered forth carrying Reagan's message through the media and before Congressional committees. The week-end following the speech before Congress, administration offi-
cials appeared on each of the nationally televised news conferences: "Meet the Press," "Face the Nation," and "Issues and Answers." And they repeated the President's message almost verbatim.

All in all, I believe President Reagan seized the rhetorical opportunities available to him in a masterful manner. Probably, his most effective argument, however, came in the February 18 speech. He challenged any potential opponents to come up with a better program:

Have they an alternative which offers a greater chance of balancing the budget, reducing and eliminating inflation, stimulating the creation of jobs and reducing the tax burden? And if they haven't, are they suggesting we can continue on the present course without coming to a day of reckoning?

Opponents did not have an immediate, coherent set of programs to answer him. Thus, the challenge he laid down to come up with an alternative was answered either by silence or by picking at parts of his proposals. Reagan's initial rhetoric and that of his surrogates was decisive, repetitive, and glowingly optimistic. Congress quickly found itself on the defensive, and prior to the assassination attempt, Reagan's Presidency had that mysterious, elusive ingredient necessary for passage of domestic bills—"momentum."

But how do Reagan's efforts compare with those of other recent Presidents? Neither Kennedy nor Nixon nor Ford nor Carter used this "rhetoric stage" of a new administration as effectively. It is not enough that a President grab hold of the opportunities confronting him. He must also avoid major mistakes that weaken him politically and thus rhetorically.

From a rhetorical standpoint, Kennedy was not very competent. Within three months of his inauguration he destroyed his "honeymoon" with Congress by approving the disastrous Bay of Pigs. Additionally, he played most of his "power chips" in getting the House Rules Committee enlarged. For the next two years Kennedy usually found himself on the defensive, defending policies-in-place rather than advancing the programs he had so vigorously advocated during the 1960 campaign. Furthermore, after his stirring Inaugural Address, he abandoned oratory for the televised press conference. Certainly press conferences are a worthwhile means for exploring disconnecting policies and even clearing up occasional misunderstandings, but they are not an effective substitute for speeches in marshalling public support for programs.11 Not until after the mid-term elections of 1962 did President Kennedy begin to creep forward with the most important items on his domestic agenda. By that late date, the list of items had been severely cut back.

More concerned with foreign policy and building a workable constituency, President Nixon waited until June, 1969 to begin a serious rhetorical offensive. Most of these efforts were spent expanding his constituency (through the Southern Strategy and later by concentrating on the so-called "Social Issues"), instead of pressing for domestic legislation. Indeed, with the notable exception of environmental legislation, President Nixon hardly had any of his priority domestic programs passed (e.g., welfare reform, etc.).

President Ford, that accidental President, never had a chance. He was

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rhetorically inept. William Safire said of him somewhere that Ford was the only President in the 20th century not to utter one memorable phrase during his administration. The pardon of Nixon—only one month after the resignation—destroyed the era of good feeling Ford’s ascension to the Presidency created.

President Carter had opportunities similar to Reagan’s, but he squandered them. He waited three months before presenting his comprehensive energy program. By then, Congress was organized and waiting. Carter attempted the same kind of rhetorical blitz as Reagan: first, a fireside chat to the people on the need for an energy program; second, an address before a joint session of Congress on the details; finally, a press conference intended to clarify any points not covered by the speeches. But all these efforts were squeezed into a single week! Carter’s rhetorical attempts were rather like a skyrocket that burst beautifully against a dark night, then fizzled and finally fell to ground unnoticed and forgotten. It took President Carter practically three years to get major portions of his energy package passed.

Only Lyndon Johnson realized the advantages of the “rhetoric stage” and exploited them fully. Five days after the assassination of President Kennedy, Johnson used the collective grief of the American people to urge passage of Kennedy’s tax cut bill and the public accommodations civil rights bill. Within a year, both passed. Then, on January 8, 1964 Johnson declared war on poverty and solicited from Congress a variety of programatic weapons with which to wage that war. Johnson so seized the advantages of the “rhetoric stage” that both his opponents and Congress found themselves on the defensive for the next two years. And during that time Johnson compiled a domestic record only a few Presidents in American history can match.

President Reagan has made an equally auspicious start. He has done about all he can do rhetorically to gain passage of his programs. Whether the assassination attempt will roll back the “momentum” originally gained remains at this date to be seen.

2.

Now, to the second question: what meaning can we assign to the fundamental substantive and strategic efforts Reagan has initiated? Since this paper is principally an overview of Reagan’s rhetoric, I shall leave it to my colleagues and others for detailed and intensive analysis. The substantive issues turn on two points: (1) the package itself of tax cuts, budget cuts, monetary stability, and regulation reform; and (2) Reagan’s conception of the responsibilities of the federal government. Interestingly, the emphasis in Reagan’s speeches has been on policies and programs rather than conservative principles. That seems to fly in the face of the conventional wisdom that Americans are more conservative in principle but more liberal about specific policies, especially those governmental programs that directly benefit them. The obvious answer is that President Reagan had to present specific proposals to Congress. But two other things seem also to be at work.

12 For some of the other problems President Carter had as a speaker, see Presidential Rhetoric, pp. vii–viii, 235–37.
First, by presenting the Congress and the people with his economic package, he is projecting the image of a decisive President acting immediately on his domestic agenda. And the image of acting may be more important initially than the action itself, especially to an electorate suffering distress. Second, President Reagan has persistently argued that all of us (with the notable exceptions of the “truly needy” and the military establishment) must sacrifice now, so that all may benefit in the future. Such a strategy may cause grumbles from some whose programs are being cut, but it forestalls for the time being a major revolt against his budget cuts. That length of time may just be sufficient to get the bills passed.

On the other hand, Reagan’s political philosophy has not been taken as seriously as it deserves. Part of this is due to the emphasis on programs instead of conservative principles. Part is due to the belief among some that Reagan is a media creation, not a substantive man. And part is due to the simplicity with which Reagan presents his ideas. But I believe that he is substantive and even revolutionary.

In his speech before Congress on February 18, Reagan stated:

The taxing power of government must be used to provide revenues for legitimate government purposes. It must not be used to regulate the economy or bring about social change. We’ve tried that, and surely we must be able to see it doesn’t work.

Spending by government must be limited to those functions which are the proper province of government.

These statements succinctly summarize Reagan’s political thinking. Federal money should not be used to regulate the economy; federal money should not be used to bring about social change. The first suggests a laissez faire economic system, and few Reaganites deny that interpretation. Instead, they champion the virtues of “supply-side” economics. The second is more ambiguous. Denying the use of federal money for social change implicitly means bringing forth another kind of social change. For skeptics of Reagan, it means a retreat from social justice, human rights at home, and equal opportunity for minorities. For rabid Reaganites, it means a return to basic American values which translates into eventually returning prayers to the public schools, an anti-abortion amendment, and an end to school busing. But there is another layer of meaning beneath this level. If Reagan limits government involvement in economic and social matters and if he is able to return federal revenue sources to the states, he may be changing the uniformity with which the federal government has administered and enforced some laws for the past fifty years. Such a change in federal responsibilities will surely dwarf the changes wrought by the New Deal.

Reagan’s revolutionary vision of federal responsibilities seems to be accompanied by a political revolution in the making. A careful reading of his speeches reveals appeals not to clearly defined constituencies but rather to a more general constituency—the American people. I want to be very careful here because every American President makes appeal to his “fellow Americans.” But if Reagan continues these appeals, and if he means to change drastically the direction of American government, and if he is successful in his programs, this rhetorical strategy portends a move away from traditional coalition politics to the outskirts of ideological politics. In his speech before
the Conservative Political Action Conference, Reagan said almost as much: "our victory was not so much a victory of politics as it was a victory of ideas, not so much a victory for any one man or party as it was a victory for a set of principles." Such a shift, if successful, would mean a radical change in both our institutions of government and our political parties. It could portend a purge of moderate Republicans and cause conservative Democrats to change registration. The Democratic Party surely would have to respond. It might re-align itself as the liberal party, thus insuring a shift to ideological politics. Or it might move to the right, though not as far as Republicans, and become a moderate imitation of Republicans. Though imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, it seldom wins prizes or elections. Were Democrats to do so, nonetheless, they would probably find themselves as shadows of Republicans for the next twenty years.

3.

Finally, ethos: the character and personality of the man, the President. In the Rhetoric Aristotle said ethos is the most potent means of persuasion, more potent than logic or emotion. Certainly in these first 3 months of the administration, Reagan's simple phrasing, easy good humor, consistent positions, and honorable treatment of his adversaries have stood him in good stead with the American people. But is Reagan's voice authentic to our times or merely an echo from the days of Calvin Coolidge?

I tend to believe it is an authentic voice of today speaking from the vast reaches of the Southwest and West. Certainly, it is not one we here in the East are accustomed to hearing, what with its concern for the 55 mile an hour speed limit, the need to be born again not only in our private lives, but our public lives as well. But it is a voice, rambunctious and full-throated, shouting the age-old cry of Westerners: "Don't Fence Me In!"

In an insightful book, Power Shift: The Rise of the Southern Rim and Its Challenge to the Eastern Establishment, Kirkpatrick Sale detailed the characteristics of this new "establishment" emerging to challenge the old: a "cowboy era" buttressed by agribusiness, extensive defense contracts, expanding high technology, expansive real estate, and an aggressive, optimistic style of living.

Ronald Reagan is no sedate nostalgic throw-back to the days of Harding and Coolidge. He is an authentic representative of the rising new establishment of the Southwest. The Cowboy era is upon us. And it may be ushered in more forcibly by that authentic voice—smooth and sincere, honed to just the right pitch through the many years of practice in movies and television—than by all the elaborate rhetorical strategies his advisors have devised.

Whether it is the prophetic voice of the future, however, will ultimately rest on the success or failure of economic policies President Ronald Reagan has proposed.
RONALD REAGAN'S RHETORIC:
AN UPDATE
Theodore Otto Windt, Jr.

During the first year of his administration President Reagan scored a stunning series of rhetorical and political successes. He got the first set of budget cuts in social programs through Congress, even as he increased defense spending dramatically. Equally, if not more important, President Reagan signed a bill initiating the largest tax cut in American history, a 25% reduction in federal taxes to be phased in over three years. His success was due in no small measure to his rhetorical effectiveness. Commentators call him a "master communicator." And I can personally attest to that.

Last summer (1981), I worked as a speech-writer and consultant for a State Democratic Party Chairman (in a state other than Pennsylvania) attempting to frame a response to Reagan's rhetoric and even, on occasion, an alternative to the Reagan Revolution. Our efforts met only with moderate success among the party faithful and usually with tepid responses elsewhere. Generally, audiences seemed to say: "You've had your chance and botched it. Why not give the President a chance?" My only consolation is that our predictions that the federal deficit would exceed $90 billion and that unemployment would increase turned out to be accurate, even conservative. I do hope that our prediction that the prime interest rate will soar to about 25% within the next year will prove to be inaccurate. I fear that may not be the case.

There is a marked contrast—rhetorically and politically—between the President's position last May and his position this May. Last year, the President was riding the high crest of popularity and support for his programs. This year, the President's programs have begun to bog down, and the President has frequently been on the defensive. From the crest to the trough, one might say.

I take my purpose this afternoon to speak about the beginning rhetoric of Mr. Reagan's second year. I intend to give more an overview than a detailed examination of a single speech. And we may best understand Reagan's rhetoric if we begin to understand the cyclical nature of the Presidency.

The Presidency—or at least the modern Presidency—runs in cycles. The first year of an administration is the "rhetoric phase" of the Presidency.\(^1\)

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The President has the advantage over Congress and his opponents in this initial year to place his programs and priorities before the American public. Mr. Reagan effectively exploited this period of the Presidency last year, as effectively as any President in modern times. Indeed, his effectiveness led to the passage of budget and tax cuts. Reagan achieved these remarkable results by presenting reactionary ideas in non-reactionary language. In fact, he was successful in convincing many people that these economic policies—many drawn from the Coolidge administration that Reagan so admires—were not only in the mainstream of American life, but also that they would lead quickly to the economic recovery he had promised the American people during the 1980 Presidential campaign. By quoting approvingly on occasion from Democrats rather than conservative ideologues, he shied away from an ideological analysis of our economic problems, thus avoiding alienating conservative Democrats and moderate Republicans. Furthermore, he was successful because he made his priorities limited and specific. Above all, he side-stepped the potentially divisive social issues of abortion, busing, and school prayers. It was a tour de force.

The second year of a Presidency is one of policy results and partisan politics. Attention shifts from promises to performance. Part of this is due to what James Ceaser and his co-authors have called the "rhetorical Presidency." Because of the rise of the rhetorical component of the Presidency, candidates have had to promise as much as possible to get elected and then have to begin producing as soon as possible. Usually, they raise expectations that cannot be fulfilled. Additionally, the second year problems are compounded by the fact that it is an election year. Thus, ideological coalitions formed to pass policies during the first year may dissolve in the heat of partisan concerns for re-election. I want to return to this topic, which is the main thrust of this paper, after completing the cycle.

The second phase ends with the off-term elections in November. In the twentieth-century the President's party has lost an average of thirty seats in the House and three Senate seats in these elections. Voters apparently blame the President's party for his failure to solve problems as rapidly as they believe they ought to be solved. But more important is the symbolism attached to these results. Usually, the elections are seen as a referendum on the President, his performance and his prospects. If the President's party loses between fifteen and thirty seats, the results are perceived as inconclusive. But if his party loses more than thirty—as Democrats did in 1966 under Johnson when they lost forty-nine seats—the President is believed to be unpopular and vulnerable. Partisan politics—both political and ideological—intensifies, and the President finds himself increasingly on the defensive, his other powers weakened. On the other hand, if the party loses less than fifteen, the President is perceived as a stronger Chief Executive whose programs have popular support. The most dramatic example of this

2 Ibid.
kind of victory occurred in 1962 when the Democratic party did not lose any net seats in Congress. The public, politicians, and pundits saw this as a smashing victory for President Kennedy. And it allowed Kennedy to move away from his very conservative policies of his first two years to advocate a nuclear test ban treaty and to submit (finally) civil rights legislation to Congress. Thus, the political environment of the third year is greatly dependent upon the results of the off-term election.

The fourth period, of course, is the election year. At this time much of legislative politics—except for crises such as the taking of the hostages in Iran—almost ceases as a President either becomes a lame-duck President or concentrates on running for re-election. In the latter case, policies tend to become campaign issues to be placed before the public rather than bills to be negotiated with Congress.

Let me return then to this second year. There have been three distinct rhetorical efforts by the President during the first four months. First, the President sought to seize once again the initiative for the second phase of his economic renewal program; second, he has been on the defensive about the performance thus far of the budget and tax cuts enacted last year; and finally, he has engaged in a subtle shift from party politics to ideological politics. Each of these three is inter-related.

2.

On January 26 President Reagan launched his second assault wave on the beaches of “big government” and liberal politics. In his State of the Union address that evening Reagan proposed returning some $47 billion in Federal programs to state and local governments during the next ten years. He stated: “In a single stroke we will be accomplishing a realignment that will end cumbersome administration and spiraling costs at the Federal level while we ensure these programs will be more responsive to both the people they’re meant to help and the people who pay for them.” He insisted that his administration had “faith in State and local governments and the constitutional balance envisioned by the Founding Fathers,” and that he believed “in the integrity, decency, and sound, good sense of grassroots Americans.” A second major endeavor, the President announced, was his attempt to have private agencies take greater responsibility for social programs previously administered by the Federal government:

Our Private Sector Initiatives Task Force is seeking out successful community models of school, church, business, union, foundation, and civic programs that help community needs. Such groups are almost invariably far more efficient than government in running social programs.

We’re not asking them to replace discarded and often discredited government programs dollar for dollar, service for service. We just want to help them perform the good works they choose and help others to profit by their example. Three hundred and eighty-five thousand corporations and private

7 Ibid.
organizations are already working on social programs ranging from drug rehabilitation to job training, and thousands more Americans have written us asking how they can help. The volunteer spirit is still alive and well in America.  

These proposals—long favorites in Reagan’s approach to the responsibilities of the Federal government—elicited little enthusiasm, and certainly nothing approaching the public support that attended his call for tax and budget reductions the previous year. One major reason for this apathy lay in the fact that there was no urgency, no immediate deadline to enact these proposals. The transfer of governmental responsibilities would be phased in over ten years. Obviously, the volunteer programs could only be activated by voluntary compliance. Furthermore, some governors appeared lukewarm toward these policies and presented an alternative proposal that they believed would not be as burdensome to them as the President’s program.  

These difficulties were compounded as the Presidency moved from the “rhetoric” stage to the policy period, and events began overtaking the President. Despite his predictions of the year before, the economic news was not good. The prime interest rate dropped from its high of 21% to about 16%, but rates for individual borrowers remain incredibly high. Inflation dropped dramatically, ending the year at 8.9% and currently running at about 3% per annum. Some would say the oil glut had a great effect on this reduction. Others contend that prices are stable because people don’t have enough money to buy things these days. But the two greatest problems for the President are unemployment and the impending huge Federal deficit. Unemployment reached 9% in March, and this morning [May 7] authorities announced that it reached 9.4% for April. Last year, the President predicted the Federal deficit would be 42.4 billion dollars. Now with unemployment increasing, it is more probable that it will be beyond 100 billion dollars. That will be the largest deficit in American history and may even double the 66 billion deficit of the Ford administration, previously the record high.  

Within the uncomfortable economic facts, the President has developed three rhetorical strategies to deal with them. The first two lines of argument have been persistently and repetitively used in practically every speech he has given concerned with the economy. The third has been tried out, but now apparently has been abandoned as counter-productive.  

First, the President has taken credit for reducing inflation and lowering the interest rate. In his State of the Union address, he stated:

We have an economic program in place, completely different from the artificial quick-fixes of the past. It calls for a reduction of the rate of increase in government spending, and already that rate has been cut nearly in half. But reduced spending alone isn’t enough. We’ve just implemented the first and smallest phase of a three year tax-rate reduction designed to stimulate the economy and create jobs. Already interest rates are down to 15½ percent, but they must still go lower. Inflation is down from 12.4 percent to 8.9 percent and for the month of December it was running at an annualized rate of 5.2 percent. If we had not acted as we did, things would be far worse.

8 Ibid., pp. 80-81.
for all Americans than they are today. Inflation, taxes, and interest rates
would all be higher. But even as the President has taken credit for these positive signs, in his second line of argument he has sought to shift responsibility elsewhere for unemployment and the deficit. Sometimes, this line of argument has been expressed in ideological terms; sometimes, in partisan terms. Again, in the State of the Union, President Reagan took an ideological line:

First, we must understand what's happening at the moment to the economy. Our current problems are not the product of the recovery program that's only just now getting underway, as some would have you believe; they are the inheritance of decades of tax and tax and spend and spend.

Second, because our economic problems are deeply rooted and will not respond to quick political fixes, we must stick to our carefully integrated plan for recovery.

The only alternative being offered to this economic program is a return to the policies that gave us a trillion dollar debt, runaway inflation, runaway interest rates and unemployment. The doubters would have us turn back the clock with tax increases that would offset the personal tax rate reductions already passed by this Congress.

I call this argument ideological because during the past three decades Republicans have controlled the White House sixteen of those years. Moreover, some Republicans now are expressing second thoughts about the validity and rigidity of Reagan's programs. But last Thursday [April 29] Reagan placed responsibility for these problems in partisan terms. He directly accused Democrats of refusing to compromise on the budget and stated that the break-down of talks between the administration and representatives from Congress resulted from basic philosophic differences between the two political parties. He labelled Democrats as those who would tax and tax, spend and spend.

The third line of argument Reagan briefly broached was to blame the media—particularly network news—for some of our economic problems. In an interview with reporters from the Daily Oklahoman on March 16, President Reagan accused the media of a "lack of responsibility" and went on to say:

And you can't turn on the evening news without seeing that they're going to interview someone else who's lost his job, or they're outside the factory that has laid off workers and so forth—the constant downbeat that can contribute psychologically to slowing down a new recovery that is in the offing.

After his well-publicized remark about "some fellow out in South Succotash someplace," President Reagan accused the media of doing a "pretty good job" of presenting a distorted image of him to the public. "I'm a Scrooge to a lot of people," he complained.

This line of argument is becoming a staple topos for Presidents in trouble.

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10 "State of the Union," pp. 76-77.
11 ibid., p. 77.
13 ibid., p. 315.
After the Bay of Pigs disaster, President Kennedy spoke before the National Association of Newspaper Publishers and called for self-censorship on the part of the press. On April 1, 1968—the day after President Johnson announced he would not seek reelection—he laid many of the problems of his administration on television and on his inability to communicate effectively because of the press. Most of us, I'm certain, recall all too vividly Nixon's and Agnew's attacks on television news and the press.

What all of this reveals is a President on the defensive, and certainly this is a major change rhetorically from last year. These problems, moreover, have been compounded by some unfortunate mis-statements by the President and members of his administration. His suggestion that a nuclear war might be limited to Europe did little to reassure Europeans that he is not a "trigger-happy" President. Secretary of State Haig's suggestion that a demonstration nuclear explosion might be a way to inhibit other powers from aggression added fuel to the anti-nuclear movement. Such mis-statements led the President to give his first major speech on nuclear arms on November 18, 1981 in which he advocated the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons (START). But his out-of-hand dismissal of Secretary Breshnev's freeze on nuclear weapons backfired and thus he was required to open his March 31st press conference with a formal statement about his abhorrence of war and a reiteration of his START position.

All of this is fairly predictable in this second phase of the Presidency. Presidents promise too much, and the public expects results too rapidly. And President Reagan doesn't seem to have learned his lesson on creating expectations. He has now promised that the economy will turn around and be on an upswing by the end of the second quarter in June. Democrats most certainly will hold him to that prediction, and if it does not come true, they will use it against him in the off-term election which the President has already described as a referendum on his administration and policies.

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But more important politically and rhetorically is Mr. Reagan's move from procedural politics to ideological politics. During the first year he kept the controversial social issues on the back-burner as much as possible so as to focus public attention on his economic recovery program. But in recent weeks, Reagan has proposed constitutional amendments for a balanced budget and for allowing prayers in public schools as well as a tax credit for parents sending children to private schools (some of which practice or preach segregation of the races). The conservative ideology implicit in his rhetoric last year is now becoming explicit and marks a new rhetorical development in the Reagan administration.

Let me be precise about what I mean by ideology since it is a word used loosely. To me, ideology is a distinct and specific form of politics that creates

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16 One of the more absurd examples of this ideological rigidity came from James Watt, Secretary of the Interior, who redesigned the seal of the Department so the buffalo faced right instead of left.
a different rhetoric from standard deliberative rhetoric. To understand this
distinction one needs to distinguish between procedural politics and ideo-
logical politics, for it is in this distinction that the differences in rhetoric
reside.

Politicians committed to procedural politics believe primarily in form and
are deeply concerned about means. No matter how deeply beliefs are held,
these beliefs must be adjusted to the rules and laws—the form—of a dem-
ocratic society and to the prevailing public climate. This form then sets the
perimeters of what action and rhetoric are permissible. The doctrinaire
ideologue believes primarily in content—his particular doctrine—and wants
to adjust rules and the public to his doctrine. Edward Shils remarked that:

Ideologies contend more strenuously than does the prevailing outlook or the
constituent and overlapping creeds for a purer, fuller, or more ideal realiza-
tion of particular cognitive and moral values than exists in the society in
which the ideology obtains. Ideologies are more insistent on continuous
contact with sacred symbols and with a fuller manifestation of the sacred in
the existent.\textsuperscript{17}

Henri Lefebvre aptly summarized the essence of ideological rhetoric in this
way:

Within a group that takes up the ideology, it serves as pretext for zealously,
ness, sense of common purpose, and then the group tends to become a sect.
Adherence to the ideology makes it possible to despise those who do not
adhere to it, and, needless to say, leads to their conversion or condemna-
tion.\textsuperscript{18}

The rhetoric of the ideologue is one of truth explained. The ideology is
true, not probable. Thus, the veracity of the ideology is not open to argu-
ment. In this sense, ideology stands as the secular counter-part to religion.
Each makes absolute truth claims. Each possesses an authoritative dogma.
And each is essentially moral.

In an angry diatribe, Nicholas von Hoffman pointed to the ideological
content of Reagan’s thinking:

We are encouraged to underestimate [Reagan] the more because we think
he’s weak on his civics, that he gets his facts wrong. Actually he gets our
facts wrong; he gets his facts right. When he asserts at a press conference
that there were once two separate nations, one North and one South Viet-
nam, he’s getting our facts wrong, not his. In the social and political circles
he’s lived in for the last three decades, there were two nations, one of which
invaded the other. It is a fact.

What we call the errors, mistakes, and inaccuracies that come out of Ron-
ald Reagan’s mouth are of a pattern conforming to the reactionary view of
the world’s geography. That’s why, whether it’s Vietnam or some inane tale
of $100,000-a-year families getting food stamps, whenever he gets called on
one, it is pulled back, the names are changed, and it is spoken again. For the
ideologue, facts are what you believe are facts. Reagan, like a hard-core
Marxist-Leninist, holds no brief for bourgeois objectivity.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{17} Edward Shils, \textit{The Intellectuals and the Powers & Other Essays} (Chicago: University

\textsuperscript{18} Henri Lefebvre, \textit{The Sociology of Marx}, trans. Norbert Guterman (New York: Pan-

Despite the hyperbole, von Hoffman has a legitimate point in viewing Reagan as a reactionary ideologue.

If we understand that Reagan is an ideologue and that the sources for invention come from the truth of his conservative dogma, then some recent events become more understandable. When Mr. Reagan is criticized for getting his facts wrong, he or one of his aides replies that it didn't matter because the principles were true.

To see this contrast even more vividly, one need only compare one of President Reagan's recent televised speeches with his speech on February 26th to the Conservative Political Action Conference. In describing his victory in 1980 he said it was a victory "not . . . of politics so much as it was a victory of ideas; not a victory for any one man or party, but a victory for a set of principles that had been protected and nourished during the years of grim and heartbreaking defeats by a few dedicated Americans." President Reagan went on to quote approvingly from Russell Kirk, guru for the conservative cause, President Coolidge—Reagan's favorite President—and that late lamented expert on foreign policy, Whittaker Chambers. Of course, one might expect this kind of speech before such an audience. But I believe we are going to hear more ideological rhetoric especially on social issues (the sacred issues of the ideological Right) for two substantial political reasons.

First, part of Reagan's Republican constituency is beginning to have second thoughts about his economic programs and is beginning to distance itself from him. So too, the "boll weevils" are distressed over the impending deficits and will go along only reluctantly. Therefore, the President has to activate that conservative constituency that served as his power base for so many years and that has been relatively quiet for the past fourteen months.

Second, Democrats are going to make the economic issues the campaign issues for the off-term elections. Mr. Reagan, I believe, will attempt to raise the social issues against Democrats so as to activate conservative, one-issue voters against them and also deflect attention away from the results of his economic programs.

In making this change to an ideological rhetoric, Mr. Reagan is pursuing a risky strategy. But then again, Ronald Reagan, as he's already proved, is a high risk President.

THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF INHERENCY IN POLICY ARGUMENTATION

William L. Benoit

While the concept of inherency has recently played a decreasingly important role in academic debate, it would be a mistake to assume that it has no contribution to make to policy deliberation. This essay first explicates the nature of inherency, then discusses two functions this concept can serve, and finally explores the appropriateness of these functions for several decision-systems (stock issues, policy making, hypothesis testing, and rules). This paper limits itself to policy argumentation.

The Nature of Inherency

Inherency arguments can occur in two distinct contexts in deliberation over the merits of particular policies. They can focus on the question of whether X causes Y to persist. Here "X" refers to an attribute of the present system (e.g., a law or court ruling), while "Y" refers to a potential benefit of the policy under consideration. Inherency arguments can also deliberate over whether Z can adequately attain Y. Here "Z" refers to an attribute of the present system (e.g., a law or an agency). These two types of inherency arguments can be characterized as "casual" and "remedial," respectively. An example of the former is an inherent barrier which the affirmative claims prevents the present system from achieving the affirmative plan's benefits; an example of the latter is a status quo policy which is asserted by the negative to alleviate that situation. Four criteria exist for determining whether an attribute of the present system is inherent.

Permanence

One criterion for determining whether or not a given characteristic—a cause or a remedy—is inherent in its substance is permanence. Funk and Wagnall's New Standard Dictionary states that to "inhere" is "to be a firm and permanent part, as qualities or adjuncts.""' "Inherent" is defined therein as "permanently belonging to, as an element or quality to its substance.""' Similarly, Webster's Third New International Dictionary asserts that "inherent" is "permanent existence as an attribute.""' The authoritative Oxford English Dictionary holds that "inherent" means "existing in something as a perma-

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2 Ibid.


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nent attribute or quality." While every dictionary does not actually utilize the word "permanent" in its definition of inherent, other definitions are consistent with this conception of inherency.

This standard of inherency as a permanent attribute of the substance under consideration has also been accepted in general by the debate community, either implicitly or explicitly. LaGrave's historical survey of discussions of inherency discovered that permanence is one of the dimensions of inherency consistently occurring in treatments of inherency (the other two are causation and reformability). One recent debate text articulates this view of inherency quite explicitly: "We can say that a factor, element, or quality which exists in something as a permanent and/or inseparable attribute of that something is an inherent factor, element, or quality." Other definitions from texts are generally consistent with this notion.

Thus, one criterion for determining whether a given characteristic is an inherent attribute of a particular object is if that characteristic is likely to remain a permanent attribute of that object. Of course, "permanent" in this context does not mean eternal or ever-lasting, but rather that the characteristic is likely to remain an attribute of the object under consideration for an extended period of time (assuming that the object remains essentially unchanged).

With this criterion for inherency in mind, let us examine one governmental source of inherency, the legislature. Congress passes public bills (statutes) which deal with matters of public concern—these are typically adopted for indefinite periods of time. Congress also passes appropriations bills, which are intended to provide short-term financing for governmental activities. Many members of the debate community hold statutory law to be inherent and funding levels (appropriations acts) to be non-inherent. Thus, if an affirmative could prove that harms exist because the relevant law

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5 For example, Webster's New World Dictionary (Cleveland: William Collins & World Pub. Co., 1978) and College Ed., defines inherent to be an attribute which is a "natural and inseparable quality, characteristic, or right" (p. 724). An inseparable quality must, of course, be a permanent one.
8 For instance, George W. Ziegelmueller and Charles A. Dause, Argumentation: Inquiry and Advocacy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1975), seem to imply that an inherent problem is a permanent one: "A totally new policy approach is warranted only if it can be shown that by its very nature the present system cannot achieve the goals" (p. 34—italics original).
9 The analysis presented in this paper is of the federal government; however, it should generally apply to other levels of government as well.
10 Joseph P. Harris, Congress and the Legislative Process (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), notes that joint resolutions are similar to statutes, except that joint resolutions "are used for actions of a non-permanent character" (p. 84).
does not prescribe any safety standards for a given occupation, some are willing to concede that this defect of the present system is an inherent one. However, if the affirmative links the existence of harms instead to an underfunded agency's insufficient enforcement of adequate safety standards, many of these same members of the debate community would hold that the problem was not an inherent one; all we need to do is increase the agency's budget and therefore its enforcement—it is not necessary to resort to adoption of the resolution to secure the advantages.  

This may seem odd at first glance, for statutory law and funding levels are passed by the same policy-making bodies in essentially the same policy-making process (except that appropriations bills are traditionally introduced in the House of Representatives). So, despite the fact that both bills are enacted in essentially the same process by exactly the same policy-makers, one is considered inherent and one non-inherent by some. The criterion of permanence provides an explanation for this situation. Statutes are (generally) intended to be permanent and thus are inherent; appropriations levels are intended to be temporary and thus are non-inherent (one exception to this generalization will be discussed below). This position is justifiable, for less risk is likely to be entailed by increased funding of an existing program than in change to an entirely new program, all things being equal.

Inherency in the realm of administrative agencies will be considered next. Administrative agencies include offices, departments, and agencies of the Executive branch, as well as the various regulatory agencies. Any inherency argument which applies either to the enabling legislation or the appropriations for these bodies should be treated in the manner outlined in the section discussing the legislature. However, the rules and decisions promulgated by these administrative agencies must be treated in a different manner from that.

Acts of administrative agencies are frequently argued to be inherent because they have the force of law. *Corpus Juris Secundum* reports that:

> Provided it is a valid duly promulgated or adopted in pursuance of properly delegated authority, a rule or regulation of a public administrative body or officer ordinarily has the force or effect of law, and is an integral part of the statute under which it was made just as though it were prescribed in terms therein.

However, the claim that administrative agency actions are inherent because they have equal weight with statutes in the courts oversimplifies the matter, ignoring the criterion of permanence.

First, it is important to note that administrative agencies can change their rules at will. *Corpus Juris Secundum* explains:

> A public administrative agency ordinarily has the authority to change, alter, amend, or correct the rules and regulations duly promulgated by it ... it is discretionary with such as agency whether it will take such action ... It is

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13 Harris, p. 30.

discretionary with a public administrative agency whether it will repeal a rule or regulation promulgated by it.\textsuperscript{19}

This view is echoed by American Jurisprudence: "The power to establish rules and regulations implies the power to modify or repeal, or to create anew."\textsuperscript{16} This discretion is quite important, for administrative flexibility is one of the reasons for the creation of administrative agencies.\textsuperscript{17}

Pfiffner and Presthus explain the effect of the discretionary power and flexibility of administrative agencies, noting that administrative "rules are easily amended. Compared with statutes, they permit rapid adjustment to the rapid changes in our complex industrial society."\textsuperscript{18} Greene and Parthemos reach similar conclusions about the ease of alteration of rules and statutes:

[Legislative bodies] are not in continuous session. They are pressed for time and subjected to an enormous amount of work. The most that can be expected of legislative bodies is that they should lay down an acceptable and broad policy, depending upon the administrative agencies to carry out those policies by detailed adaptation to individual problems as they arise.\textsuperscript{19}

Administrative agencies have certain advantages over the judiciary as well as over the legislature, for, as American Jurisprudence notes, "initiatory functions and flexibility are the marks of the administrative process in contrast to the judicial process."\textsuperscript{20}

Thus, administrative agencies have wide discretionary power to enact, alter, or repeal their rulings at their own initiative. They are more flexible than either the legislature or the judiciary. Rules can be easily and rapidly adjusted to changes in society. They can adapt to specific problems as they arise. The rulings of administrative agencies, therefore, are likely to be as permanent as legislative statutes; rather, they are flexible enough to respond rapidly to problems as they arise or are discovered.

Furthermore, many administrative agencies also perform quasi-judicial functions. However, unlike the regular courts, they are not bound by precedent, the doctrine often referred to as stare decisis (to stand by previous decisions). Corpus Juris Secundum explains that:

The doctrine of stare decisis . . . is not generally applicable to the decisions of administrative tribunals; nor does a prior administrative determination ordinarily preclude a subsequent one on the grounds of equitable estoppel. Accordingly, administrative bodies are not ordinarily bound by their prior determinations or the principles or policies on which they are based.\textsuperscript{21}

This holding has tended to discourage the courts from even considering previous administrative decisions for consistency. American Jurisprudence

\textsuperscript{19} C.J.S., § 109.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{20} AmJur, § 17.
\textsuperscript{21} C.J.S., § 148.
points out that "the courts have declined to inquire into the consistency of conclusions in one case with those reached in similar cases." This does not mean that administrative agencies totally ignore previous determinations. However, the fact that they are not held rigidly to them allows great flexibility to deal with new situations, and they are able to alter their decisions to better deal with changing conditions.

For these reasons, the rules and decisions of administrative agencies cannot be assumed to be permanent, and therefore, cannot be assumed to be inherent. It seems that the only circumstances under which it could be safely assumed that a particular administrative rule or decision was permanent is if the administrators are attitudinally predisposed in favor of that particular rule or decision. Therefore, it is in the realm of administrative agencies that attitudinal inherency is particularly appropriate. It is also useful with appropriations acts. Earlier it was noted that one exception to the generalization that funding levels were not inherent, because they were temporary, would be discussed later. If Congress is attitudinally predisposed to keep a funding level at a certain level, that amount of appropriation is likely to be permanent, and so inherent.

This criterion of permanence can also be applied to the judicial system. On the federal level we have a three-tiered system. At the bottom are the District Courts. These are trial courts, and the United States is divided into 90 districts. Above these are the Circuit Courts of Appeals. There are eleven circuits in the U.S., and each has an appellate court which functions to "review the decisions of the District Courts located within their Circuits." The Supreme Court is located at the top of the appellate hierarchy and reviews decisions of the lower courts. It is generally conceded that Supreme Court decisions are inherent, but it will be argued here that in fact Supreme Court decisions are more inherent, or, a better basis for an inherency argument, than lower court decisions because of the criterion of permanence.

Supreme Court decisions are likely to last longer than lower court decisions, due to its position in the judicial system. Lower courts are bound by the decisions of higher courts, as Early explains: "Judges below cannot ignore with impunity what those on the level next above them have said or may say, for to depart radically from (or totally ignore) precedent is to invite appeal and probably reversal." Thus, lower court decisions can be overruled and reversed by higher courts. This can occur if they ignore a pre-

22 AmJur, § 470.
26 Early, p. 33.
28 Early, p. 56.
cedent, or if the lower court rules on an issue which the higher court has not yet ruled upon, and, on appeal, the higher court disagrees. In this sense the District Courts’ decisions constitute the weakest inherency evidence, for they can be reversed by their Circuit Court of Appeal and by the Supreme Court. Circuit Court of Appeals decisions provide stronger inherency evidence than District Court decisions, for Circuit Court decisions can be reversed only on one appeal—to the Supreme Court—instead of on two appeals. Supreme Court decisions are the best type of evidence for judicial inherency, for there is no court of appeals above it to reverse it, and so its decisions are likely to endure.29

Scope

The second criterion is scope. This criterion addresses the question of whether or not the alleged inherent characteristic encompasses the entire problem area. For example, in the legislative arena, Medicare and Medicaid programs do not cover all people in the U.S.; only selected populations are eligible for assistance in payment of medical care costs (of course, whether a need exists for coverage beyond that provided by these programs is a separate question). Or, for an affirmative team to claim a causal inherency, the “X” which they identify as the cause of their “Y” must encompass the entire area where “Y” can be found.

This is particularly important in the judicial system, for only one court covers the entire U.S. as its jurisdiction. District Courts have as their district the geographical area of one state or less. Their decisions are binding only in this area. Other District Courts (as well as higher courts) may choose to adhere to or to disregard one District Court’s decision as they please.30 Similarly, decisions of the Circuit Courts of Appeals are authoritative only in their own circuit. Other Circuit Courts of Appeals, the Supreme Court, and even District Courts outside of their circuit are free to adopt or reject the decisions of a Circuit Court of Appeals.31 Of course, Supreme Court decisions are binding on all lower courts. Thus, District Courts decisions have less scope than Circuit Courts of Appeals decisions, which in turn have less scope than Supreme Court decisions. Thus, two reasons exist for the superiority of Supreme Court decisions in establishing inherency—permanence and scope.

This question of scope is important also for administrative agencies, which could formulate a rule or decision so as not to encompass the entire scope of the problem, as the legislature can. Furthermore, it is applicable to remedial inherency, when the negative would argue that “Z” can deal with

29 Two exceptions do exist. First, the Supreme Court can ignore its past decision, overruling and reversing its own decision. This is a relatively infrequent occurrence—see, e.g., Loren P. Beth, Politics: The Constitution: and the Supreme Court (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 49–50. The second exception is even less likely: Congress can attempt to interfere with Supreme Court decision-making. For an interesting, in depth discussion, see Raoul Berger, Congress v. the Supreme Court (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1969).

30 Early, p. 103; Jacobs, p. 193.
"Y," the mechanism that they identify as "Z" must cover the entire problem area under consideration, or the "Y."

This criterion is related to claims of significance. In causal inherency, the affirmative must prove that the causal factor(s) they isolate are responsible for a significant portion of the problem, or they have no inherent significant problem. In remedial inherency, the negative must prove that their inherent mechanism(s) can affect a significant portion of the problem for it to take on affirmative significance. Thus, to be inherent, a characteristic must not only be a permanent attribute of the substance under consideration, it must also encompass a significant part of the problem.

Relevance

A third criterion is relevance. It should be obvious that a statute, or an administrative ruling or decision could cover the entire population and yet be irrelevant to the specific affirmative problem. A Supreme Court decision encompasses the entire U.S., but could well be inapplicable to the specific problem area.

Efficacy

A fourth criterion is efficacy. Again, it should be obvious that an inherent mechanism could be permanent, complete in scope, and relevant to the problem area and yet be dismissed because it exerts no influence on the problem. In causal inherency, the "X" identified by the affirmative must actually cause their "Y." In remedial inherency, the "Z" defended by the negative must be capable of actually dealing with the affirmative's "Y."

Thus far, two conclusions can be drawn about the nature of inherency. First, four criteria are appropriate for deciding whether a particular characteristic is an inherent attribute of the object under consideration: permanence, scope, relevance, and efficacy. Second, the nature of inherency appears to be highly field variant, to use Toulmin's terminology. That is, inherency is best approached in different fashions according to the domain of the inherency. Appropriation levels are not inherent, along with administrative agency rules and decisions, unless attitudinal inherency can be demonstrated. This is not necessary for Congressional statutes or for judicial decisions. Decisions of our courts are better evidence for inherency if they originate in a higher court, because of both the possibility of lower court reversal by higher courts, and the more limited scope of lower court decisions.

However, it must be stressed that these are intended to be only a general set of criteria and suggestions. Other considerations could, in particular instances, take precedence over these suggestions for inherency. For example, an affirmative team could argue that a certain administrative agency's rule or decision was likely to remain inadequate, and therefore, inherent, not because of attitudinal predispositions against appropriate change, but because their source of data (upon which they must base decisions) is in-

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adequate or biased. Nevertheless, these criteria and suggested applications should prove useful in debate by further clarifying the nature of inherency.

The Functions of Inherency

The concept of inherency as a permanent part of the present system which is causally related to the affirmative harm can serve two functions in policy deliberation. First, it can assist the affirmative in proving that benefits stem from the plan. When the plan removes inherent barriers to achieving an advantage, then, absent other overlapping barriers, the benefits linked to those barriers should result.

Although it is occasionally possible to point to pilot studies or experience in other countries, such evidence is simply not always available. Furthermore, even with such evidence, factors could exist in the present system which were not present in the empirical example which would render that example inapplicable to the present system. In short, only if the affirmative can identify and eliminate (or circumvent) the inherent barriers in the present system can it be assured of plan efficacy. Thus, identification of inherent barriers is essential to show that the problem can be solved under the affirmative plan.

A second function inherency can perform is to determine where presumption lies in a counterplan debate. Policies which include inherent changes are likely to entail more risk than those which alter only temporary attributes of the present system. Thus, if the counterplan makes no inherent changes, it is probably less risky and deserves to retain presumption. So, this conception of inherency facilitates decision-making in close counter-plan rounds.

Inherency in Decision-Making Systems

The first function identified here—to aid in demonstration of plan efficacy—is appropriate to all systems. The need for the affirmative to prove a benefit created by their plan inheres in stock issues, policy making, hypotheses testing, and rules alike. There is no reason why elimination of the cause of the problem or barriers to the advantage cannot satisfy this requirement in any system.

The second function is not universal. Most systems are ambiguous on the question of presumption in a counterplan. Does the negative retain it because they are negative, or do they lose it because they abandon the status quo? In hypotheses testing, presumption is always against the resolution, so the second function is not appropriate for this decision-making system.

33 For those who distinguish between minor repairs and counterplans, the former consists of non-inherent changes and retains presumption. The latter includes inherent changes and presumption should be determined on the basis of degree of risk or psychological presumption. See, e.g., Vincent F. Follert and William L. Benoit, “Argument About Argument,” SCA Convention, Anaheim, November, 1981.


35 See David Zarefsky, “A Reformulation of the Concept of Presumption,” CSSAC,
The decision rule for a counterplan in the rules perspective is risk (then psychological presumption), so it manifestly is appropriate there. The ambiguity in stock issues and policy making decision systems can be remedied by incorporating the criterion suggested here.

Summary

Thus, two functions which inherency can perform are: to demonstrate plan efficacy and to distinguish between counterplans. The first is useful in meeting another affirmative burden, the second in deciding whether the negative retains presumption in a counterplan round. The first function is appropriate for all decision-making systems. The second is appropriate for the rules perspective, not appropriate for hypothesis testing, and could easily be incorporated in stock issues and policy making.


36 Follert and Benoit.
CARTER'S FIRST FIRESIDE CHAT

Dan F. Hahn

Except for his Inaugural Address, a ceremonial speech not expected to be heavily weighted with substance, this was Carter's first speech to the nation as President. Thus, it was his first chance to lay out his program to the people and, through them, to put pressure on Congress.

But he chose not to do that. Rather, the speech was more of a campaign address than a Presidential call to action. That decision may have been the beginning of the end for his presidency. Certainly there were precedents for another approach, for pushing harder. In 1933 F.D.R. utilized the "first 100 days" to push through his recovery program, and Lyndon Johnson relied on the sympathy evoked by the assassination of John Kennedy to establish the major outlines of his Great Society programs.

But President Carter did not try to capitalize on the so-called "honeymoon" period. Rather, he chose to downplay his program to build his following. The goal, apparently, was to consolidate his constituency, "to store up goodwill and high ratings to be expended against the Congress and other possible centers of resistance" at a later point.

Given that goal, the speech was relatively effective. "His syntax matched the simplicity of his sweater. He came across as friendly and solicitous..."

The fireplace not only evoked F.D.R. but suggested the White House might be short on natural gas, like a lot of other American homes. With Amy in public school, the White House staff hailing taxis, and the promise of Government regulations written in 'plain English,' Mr. Carter [showed] how well he [understood] public discontent at the distance and insensitivity of government.

Beyond the generalized appeal to "the people," the language of the speech provided tokens of identification for large and significant groups. Phrases such as "sacrifice," "dedication," "simplicity," "share," and "shared faith" reminded his religious audience of his ties with them. Words like "competency," "responsibility," "hard work," "mutual effort," and "efficiency" were aimed at the business community. And patriots could revel in phrases like "trust one another," "united nation," "common good" and "cooperation." These, it will be noted, were also aspects of Carter's personality and background that he stressed during the campaign—his religious faith, agribusiness experience and deep-felt patriotism.

There is a sense in which it is fair to say that Carter was still not speaking as President, i.e., as a politician, but as an outsider. This was even true of

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2 Ibid.
4 Wicker.

https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol19/iss3/1
the non-verbal appeals—the sweater of the average person replaced the three-piece suit. And his controlled smile reminded us that our resentment should be aimed at the oil companies, at the bureaucrats, at the government itself, but not at Jimmy Carter.

So there were components in the speech which made it a good campaign exercise. But was that the right speech to give at that point? Realities were already pressing the Carter Administration. His nominee for Director of the C.I.A., Theodore Sorensen, had been rejected* and his nomination of Paul Warnke as director of the State Department's Disarmament Agency was in trouble.\(^5\) Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns had come out against the Carter economic plan.\(^6\) Clearly, the unity he desired was not available. He opted, therefore, for a statement of objective rather than a push for policy. But the unity he sought to thereby build was doomed. Governmental decisions, with the possible exception of crisis decisions, are always divisive because each decision inevitably tramples on somebody's interests. Further, it may be that Carter wanted a perfect opportunity to unveil his energy program. The hard winter was demonstrating the need, but by April 20th, his target date for introducing the program, it was predictable that Congressional resolve would have melted with the winter snow.

I conclude that Carter, caught in the conflict between campaigning and governing, symbols and reality, opted for the wrong course.

But that was not the only contradiction in the speech. In fact, the remainder of this analysis will be devoted to uncovering those additional conflicts.

People\(^1\) vs. People\(^2\)

Carter ran for the presidency on a platform of making the government as good as the people. Christopher Johnstone has contended that "Carter's persuasive strategy seemed calculated to create a circumstance in which voters could reaffirm their faith in their country and in themselves by voting for him."\(^7\)

As President he seemed to continue to hold to that belief and that strategy, to think that a presidential suggestion that we all turn down our thermostats was going to be followed. The truth is that there was hardly anything in our response to the energy crisis that confirmed Carter's romantic view of us. He was engaging in good politics but his historic knowledge of how we respond to the call for sacrifice was highly inaccurate. James Reston noted, "The hard truth is that we are the most recklessly wasteful people in the world; that, by his own estimate, we are actually wasting more fuel than we import from other countries. Our record since the oil embargo of 1973 is neither good nor generous, but is a national disgrace."\(^8\)

In short, the Carter assessment of the people was wide of the mark. And so were his appeals, which were moderately emotional generalizations rath-

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* Wicker.
* Reston.
er than concrete solutions. While the President was asking us to transcend to a higher level of self-sacrifice via “voluntary participation,” most of us responded by shivering and agreeing that it was too cold at that height.

And while the drama between the rhetorical citizen and the real citizen was being played out, there were even some indications that Carter didn’t esteem us quite as highly as he claimed. Several times in the speech he suggested that government policy had to be made comprehensible to the people. It is at least arguable that Carter saw the government as an intelligent body which had to reduce its’ intellectual language and style to suit the needs of simple folk who need special help to comprehend government regulations. While at one level it seems pleasant to hear that the government is going to spend more time and effort making things easier for you, there is also a nagging suspicion that anyone who calls for such alterations may be looking down at you.

And, again, the non-verbal persuasion could reinforce that viewpoint. Here was Carter portraying himself as an ordinary citizen, playing President of the United States costumed in a cardigan sweater.

The contradictions became obtrusive. Who were we—the real us, the us he claimed or the us he implied? And who was he? A dressed up citizen or a dressed-down President?

To Sacrifice or Not

There were five references to sacrifice in the speech:

1. “Some of these efforts will also require dedication—perhaps even some sacrifice—from you.”
2. “if we all cooperate and make moderate sacrifices” we can make “our own lives more enjoyable and productive.”
3. “in order to solve our energy problems we need not sacrifice the quality of our lives.”
4. The economic program “does not ask one group of people to sacrifice solely for the benefit of another group.”
5. “We have lost faith in joint efforts and mutual sacrifices.”

Just listing the references together is enough to point up the contradictions. First he said that perhaps sacrifice would be necessary, then that it would be moderate, then that it wouldn’t affect the quality of our lives, that it wouldn’t fall unevenly upon any one group and, finally, that we have lost faith in sacrificing at all.

By the end there is no way an audience could know what was meant. No one knows how a sacrifice could help but affect the quality of life; no one knows how a sacrifice can be “moderate” and still be so widespread as to be evenly distributed throughout the population. No one knows the goals for which we were to sacrifice, the nature of the sacrifices to be proposed, or the hoped-for effects of the sacrificing. All we know is that Carter had sacrifice on his mind.

In both the campaign and this speech, Carter called for an open government. But his unwillingness to spell out the causes and effects of sacrifice was one indication that the openness was not to be complete. And there were others.

The idea of “open government” is that problems and their proposed solutions are openly debated and the final decision is made on the basis of the public argumentation. Yet in this speech Carter gave us a taste of his less-than-open approach. For one thing, he made it clear that the public debate approach was not the one to be followed when he said, “I will report to you from time to time about our government, both our problems and our achievements . . . .” Debate participants do not need periodic reports on problems and progress.

But perhaps it was in his style where the most telling evidence of his lack of openness was apparent. More specifically, the “proof” he set forth in this speech was more stylistic than openly argumentative. For instance, he tried to prove the existence of an energy problem through his adverbs. The “extremely” cold weather during the winter, he said, had “dangerously depleted” our supplies. No statistics on reserves were given, no arguments made on the basis of present and projected supplies. There was nothing for the audience to debate; we were left to accept or reject his analysis.

Likewise, he characterized his economic plan as “balanced.” What was balanced against what we were not told. Oh, we were informed that it “does not ignore inflation to solve unemployment—or vice versa.” But which portions of the plan were to address which problems and why those solutions were favored over others were materials for public debate which were omitted from the speech. Again, our role clearly was reduced to two alternatives—accept or reject.

To make those choices easier, a high level of antithesis ran through the speech: real v. artificial shortages, work v. welfare, essentials v. luxuries, strength v. weakness, high v. low, productivity v. stagnation, confused and wasteful v. competent and efficient. By limiting our information and structuring our choices into clearly dichotomous good v. evil options, Carter hoped to gain our acquiescence without the participation that a truly open government would require.

Another indication of the same orientation can be found in Carter’s employment of pronouns. Personal references (I, me, my and the “Royal we”) were used 127 times while plurals (we, our, us, “the citizens,” etc.) were employed only 71 times. In the all-important mood-setting first few paragraphs, eighteen of the first 155 words were personal references while only seven were plural references. Further, the roles identified by the pronouns were quite different. For Carter it was “I can,” “I will,” “I made,” “I intend,” “I want,” and “I plan.” the “you” roles were primarily information receiving: “to bring to you,” “to let you know,” “want you to know,” “as you probably know,” “report to you,” and “to tell you.” Thus, the format was clear: I will make the decisions and then I will let you know. True, this is a kind of openness, but it is not what is meant by an “open government.” It is not the Wilsonian “open covenants openly arrived at,” but rather “open deci-
sions arrived at behind closed doors." The resultant openness, of course, is a facade because no one ever knows if the announced decision and that arrived at in secrecy are identical—or even vaguely similar. Additionally, when there is no linkage between decision-making and policy justification, the justifications tend to be framed in terms of the values of the audience regardless of the reasons for the decisions.

It's An Emergency, Go Slow

The final contradiction which permeates the speech was between his descriptions of problems and his prognoses for solutions. The problems were introduced as emergencies but the solutions were hardly described as panaceas:

problem—"One of our most urgent projects is to develop a national energy policy."
solution—it "started before this winter and will take much longer to solve."

problem—"the worst economic slowdown of the last forty years."
solution—"It will produce steady, balanced, sustainable growth."

problem—"we must reform and reorganize the Federal Government."
solution—the system "will take a long time to change."

problem—the tax system is "a disgrace."
solution—"The economic program . . . will . . . be just a first step."

problem—the welfare system also needs a complete overhaul."
solution—We have "begun a review."

Finally, speaking generally about all of his proposals, he said "Many of them will take longer than I would like . . . ." How one reacts to all of these identifications of emergencies followed by slow and partial solutions depends somewhat on political orientation. A sympathizer might say that Carter was just being realistic about how long solutions take, while an opponent might contend that Carter was trying to demonstrate a commitment to promises on which he had no intention, or chance, of delivering.

A more rhetorical assessment would take as its point of departure Murray Edelman's claim that every government engages in a "cycle of anxiety and reassurance" to provide a "supportive following." "We are all familiar with the process in this country: first we are told that somebody (usually Russia) is a great danger; then we are assured that our government can cope with the situation. In this speech, then, Carter's problem was that he oversold the anxiety part of the formula by elevating problems into emergencies. Naturally, then, the world of political reality being as slow as it is, he could not promise to solve the emergencies immediately.

Assuming that he continued this rhetorical approach throughout his presidency, it may give us a clue to his declining fortunes. That is, any leader who oversells problems without overselling his solutions is bound to be perceived as incapable of coping with the problems.

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At any rate, in this speech Carter effectively built anxiety about problems but was unable to complete the cycle by giving assurance that he could solve them.

Conclusion

I conclude that Carter’s First Fireside Chat was rift with contradictions. Rather than lay out a program he chose to try to build his following and this “symbols v. reality” approach weakened his appeal as an energetic leader. Other contradictions, between his assessment of his countrymen and the reality, between whether to call for sacrifice or promise no lowering in the quality of our lives, between his call for an open government and his evident continuation of a closed decision-making system and between his posing problems as emergencies while failing to reassure us with his solutions, all conspired to make him look weak—perhaps weaker than he was, certainly weaker than he needed to appear.
RONALD REAGAN'S 1980 CAMPAIGN COMMUNICATION: A CASE STUDY IN POLITICAL MYTHOGRAPHY

Dirk C. Gibson

American presidential elections have been extensively studied by scholars in academic disciplines such as political science, sociology, journalism and speech communication. This diversity of professional orientation has resulted in a wide variety of theories purporting to explain public communication during electoral campaigns. Political rhetoric, for example, has been explained as offering uses and gratifications, setting the public agenda, providing the opportunity for transactions between candidates and voters, and diffusing information. ¹

Although these studies are valuable, alternate approaches to political rhetoric are needed. Edelman noted:

> to explain political behavior as a response to fairly stable individual wants, reasoning, attitudes and empirically based perceptions is therefore simplistic and misleading. Adequate explanation must focus on the complex element that intervenes between the environment and the behavior of human beings: creation and change in common meanings through symbolic apprehension in groups of people, of interests, pressures, threats and possibilities.²

In addition, Cassirer has observed that empirical and practical analyses contain philosophic assumptions, and may have mythic aspects.³ McDonald agreed, observing that "a satisfying explanation or elucidation requires more than data and once we are beyond data we find ourselves leaning on the metaphors and myths that stand between us and the unknown."⁴

This case study of President Ronald Reagan's campaign rhetoric in the 1980 general election will report his use of political myth. The data base for this research is Associated Press coverage of Reagan's public communication during the campaign. Two archetypal, traditional mythoi will be identified, the conspiratorial enemy and the hero/savior myths, and other case studies in political myth will be noted.

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³ "Theoretical, practical and aesthetic consciousness, the world of language and of morality, the basic forms of the community and the state—they are all originally tied up with mythico-religious conceptions," Ernst Cassirer, Language and Myth (Toronto: Dover Publications, 1946), p. 44.
⁴ Lee C. McDonald, "Myths, Politics and Political Science," Western Political Quarterly 22 (1969), 147.


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Myth and Politics

The study of political myth is not a recent phenomenon. Although many different perspectives on political myth have been advanced, there appear to be some common elements. Thus, in this essay, political myth is understood to refer to rhetorical structures or models which shape political perceptions.

Roelofs noted in 1967 that "the Americans have erected around the operative aspects of their political system a series of myths . . . therefore, just as they periodically break into violence, so also do they even more continually escape into the comforts of myth." The creation of pseudo events through political rhetoric, first described by Boorstin in 1961, allows us to "create events where there are none, to make heroes where none exist . . . to fabricate national purposes when we lack them." Why do Americans engage in political mythicization? McGee suggested that "political myths are purely rhetorical phenomena, ontological appeals constructed from artistic proofs and intended to redefine an uncomfortable and oppressive reality." Bennett also considered myth a significant part of American politics:

This body of myth is the basis of political consciousness in American society. . . . Myths condition the public to the powerful symbols used by politicians. Myths underwrite the status quo in times of stability and they chart the course in times of stress. In the day-to-day business of politics, myths set the terms for most public policy debate. When mythical themes and myth-related language are stripped away from policy discourse, very little of substance remains. Most political controversy centers around disagreement over which myth to apply to a particular problem.


Bennett, p. 168.
Four recent case studies of political myth are noteworthy. Hahn and Gonchar’s research into the issues vs. images dichotomy, Bormann’s 1977 discussion of Lincoln’s efforts at national unification after the Civil War, Solomon’s 1974 study of the STOP ERA movement and Bass and Cherwitz’s analysis of anti-imperialist movements in the United States and Great Britain all investigated some aspect of political myths. Bormann, Solomon, and Bass and Cherwitz found political myths to be highly effective rhetorical strategies in a diverse set of situations. However, none of these studies investigated political myth in the public communication behavior of candidates. Edelman concluded that “we choose our significant political symbols and stances in a world of metaphorical and mythic cues.”

Reagan’s Political Myths

What follows will document Reagan’s use of two political myths: conspiratorial enemy and hero/savior. These are two basic myths, as Edelman noted, “in place of a complicated empirical world, men hold to a relatively few, simple archetypal myths of which the conspiratorial enemy and the omnicompetent hero-savior are the central ones.”

The conspiratorial enemy assailed by Reagan during the 1980 presidential campaign was “Unnecessary Government Regulation.” One of the central Republican campaign points was that government has grown too large, in part through governmental regulations. Reagan told a senior citizen’s rally in Philadelphia on September 8 that governmental regulations were their nemesis and promised that “I will not tolerate, and will fight with all my strength, the inexcusable waste, fraud and abuse of government programs, many of which are aimed at older Americans.” Two days later, Reagan claimed that $195 billion could be saved over a five-year period, by the elimination of waste and “outright fraud.” The next day, Reagan argued that Carter policies had discouraged domestic energy production.

“Since 1977, his administration has ignored the problems overly strict compliance schedules (with environmental regulation) have caused the steel industry,” Reagan claimed in Green Bay, Wisconsin on October 3. Reagan championed women’s rights in Claremont, California, on October 14, where he argued that “there are hundreds of federal regulations that discriminate against women. I have been told that in those regulations at the Federal level, there are literally hundreds of instances of discrimination against women—I would eliminate those as quickly as I could.”

On October 19, in coal country at Pawnee, Illinois, Reagan complained that the government response to our energy shortages was “they follow up
with regulations" which further inhibit supply increases. Less than a week later, Reagan proposed "cuts in government spending and waste, simplified depreciation schedules for business and industry, a reduction in government red tape, and decontrol of the energy industries." These examples illustrate Reagan's use of a conspiracy myth. Big government has simply become obese, and a horde of bureaucrats are blamed for mismanagement and waste on a scale eclipsing that of the infamous Gang of Four in Peking.

A second mythic appeal was used, characterizing Reagan as a hero/savior. This myth asserted that the failings of the Carter administration would be alleviated by the competence of a Reagan administration. This myth was fostered by indicting Carter's record on public policy issues, coupled with portrayal of Reagan as defender of the people. The need for salvation by a hero/savior was demonstrated through delineation of Carter's shortcomings, followed by assurances of Reagan's potential political prowess.

Carter was assailed on many fronts, in general terms and on specific issues. A favorite Reagan charge concerned "the litany of broken promises and despair" represented by Carter policies. The economy was often used by Reagan to indict Carter for "an American tragedy, an assault on the hopes and dreams of millions of American families." In Buffalo, New York, on September 12, Reagan said that the city port "is an empty, idle place because of Carter's failures."

Reagan hammered at Carter's 'Misery Index' to show the problems of the status quo. In Miami, Reagan noted that "today, after three and a half years of Carter failures, that Misery Index has grown to 20.3%"; six days later in Los Angeles, Reagan blamed New York City's financial problems on "unsettled market conditions and continuing high inflation resulting from mismanagement of the economy by the Carter administration." The Carter administration's handling of the economy has been a disaster," Reagan asserted on October 24 in Greensville, South Carolina; the following day, in Washington, D.C., he said "that's not just a record of economic failure, but failure on a scale so vast, its dimensions so broad, with effects so devastating, that it is virtually without parallel in American history."

Reagan played the hero's role by contrasting Carter's economic failures with reassurances about the efficacy of his policies, which he documented by stating that "economists who have studied the program have given us their word." "I will restore the integrity of the Social Security system, and see to it that inflation does not rob you of your income from Social Security," Reagan stated on October 24.

Reagan defended his leadership abilities, claiming in visionary language that "the 1980's can be a decade of deliverance for Americans, deliverance..."
from high taxes, government excesses and military weakness.\(^{27}\) Reagan demonstrated his mythical heroic qualities by publicizing Carter’s weaknesses and claiming that he would save the day through more effective leadership. In addition to the economy, Reagan blamed Carter for the hostages' captivity, the Iran/Iraq war, and the disclosure of the existence of the Stealth bomber.\(^{28}\)

In conclusion, this essay has taken a first step in exploring electoral uses of political myth. As Graber has observed, there is value in conducting case studies of American public communication to discern norms of political rhetoric, in hopes of establishing standards of conduct and evaluation.\(^{29}\) Judging by Reagan’s comfortable margin of victory over his incumbent adversary, there is considerable merit in closer study of political myth in public communication.


Senator Robert C. Byrd (West Virginia, Minority Leader):

"The Congressional Record is a vital instrument of the legislative process without which our work would be nearly impossible. We rely on the Record to follow the progress of legislation, from a bill's introduction to its passage or defeat. When we are busy with committee meetings or other Senate business, we depend on the Record for a complete account of the floor discussion we might have missed. And when we have completed our work, the Record preserves the legislative histories to which the courts, long into the future, will refer in determining the Congressional intent behind the laws which we have written. The Congressional Record is a symbol of our democracy through which the people may fully observe the making of their laws and may hold their lawmakers accountable for their words and deeds." (Quote, Nov. 15, 1981, 511.)

Senator Barry Goldwater (Arizona, Republican):

"Although I have known, or at least thought I knew, that the Congressional Record could be checked by the Senators or their assistants for the purpose of correcting grammatical errors, punctuations and so forth, I never dreamed of the extreme to which this has gone and the way the Record is being abused. I learned, to my utter surprise and my complete disgust, that Senators are not only allowed to correct grammatical errors, and correct other such mistakes made during debate, but I was told that entire pages and, indeed, entire speeches were crossed out of the Record before the Record was completed and handed out the next morning. Now this is going too far. I was so shocked by this that I began to realize that the only way we are going to keep a permanent, accurate, dependable record of every word that is said on the floor of the Senate is if we allow television to record the actions of the Senate. Never before have I backed or supported a move to televise the Senate, but, I feel that in view of the abuses of the Congressional Record, and in the interests of keeping the American people accurately informed as to what we said and what we debated and decided, I must remove myself from the list of opponents to television. I will support the television move when it comes back to the floor." (Congressional Record, May 21, in New York Times, May 25, 1982, Y-18).
Is It the Congressional Record
Or the Congressional Second-Thoughts?

Francis X. Clines and Bernard Weinraub (New York Times reporters):

"Senator Arlen Specter was sitting in his office on Monday afternoon, listening to his 'squawk box' and the floor debate on the school prayer issue. Suddenly Mr. Specter, a Republican from Pennsylvania, heard Senator Ernest F. Hollings, Democrat of South Carolina, provoke an uproar by referring to Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum, who is Jewish, as 'the Senator from B'nai B'rith.'

"Mr. Hollings's remark came while he was arguing the case for a bill on voluntary prayer in public school, and Senator Metzenbaum and others were clamoring for recognition.

"As Senator Specter, who is Jewish, rushed out of his office to the Senate floor, Mr. Metzenbaum voiced his 'sadness and embarrassment' at the Hollings comment. Mr. Hollings responded with an apology, remarking, 'I said it in a moment of levity. I said it only in fun.'

"Reaching the floor, Senator Specter heatedly denounced Senator Hollings, calling his comments 'inappropriate and offensive.'

"Several hours later, Senator Specter received a phone call from the majority leader, Howard H. Baker Jr. Mr. Baker said the Hollings remarks were 'unfortunate' and 'not meant in the context that they came out,' according to an aide to Senator Baker. Accordingly, Mr. Baker asked Mr. Specter if he would agree, as Senator Metzenbaum had agreed, to have the entire contretemps deleted in the next day's Congressional Record, an unusual step.

"Senator Specter reluctantly concurred in removing the remarks, but only if the Congressional Record on Tuesday carried a note saying that an exchange had been deleted. Senator Baker agreed.

"The next day's Congressional Record carried, then, the following innocuous note:

"'Mr. Baker. Mr. President, earlier today there was a colloquy between the Senator from South Carolina and the Senator from Ohio, entered into a little later by the Senator from Pennsylvania.

"'After consultation with the parties involved, it appears that there is a desire to have that colloquy deleted from the official record.'" (New York Times, Nov. 19, 1981, Y-14.)
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