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SPEAKER AND GAVEL

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SECULAR HERETIC AS VICTIM: BURKEIAN EXAMINATION OF THE SECURITY CLEARANCE HEARING OF J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER

Elizabeth A. Roberts
Ohio Northern University

On the twelfth day of April, 1954, at 10 a.m. in Building T-3, Room 2022 of the Atomic Energy Commission in Washington, D.C., Dr. Gordon Gray, Chairman of the Personnel Security Board, formally read the following charge:

As a result of additional investigation as to your character, association, and loyalty, and review of your personnel security file in the light of requirements of the Atomic Energy Act and the requirements of Executive Order 10450 there has developed considerable question whether your continued employment on Atomic Energy Commission work will endanger the common defense and security and whether such continued employment is clearly consistent with the interests of national security.¹

Thus began a hearing of four weeks duration which examined the views, associations, actions, and suspected disloyalty—literally, the life—of J. Robert Oppenheimer: professor of physics; director of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton; former director of the Atomic Weapons Laboratories at Los Alamos, New Mexico; former chairman of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission; and advisor on atomic matters to the State Department, the Defense Department and individual service departments of the government of the United States.

The charges brought against Oppenheimer and the means by which his security clearance was removed provide an interesting study in rhetoric. Furthermore, the theories of critic Kenneth Burke offer a means of exploring the language of Oppenheimer's hearing and show why and how the government condemned one of the best theoretical physicists of his generation. The present climate of concern regarding nuclear arms, government intervention, and first amendment rights makes an examination of this case particularly appropriate.

In his participation in formulating nuclear policy, Oppenheimer's perspectives and his often abrasive personality conflicted with the views of government officials who were enveloped by fear of Soviet nuclear superiority and who vehemently urged maximum speed development of American military strength, especially nuclear. This confrontation became keenly focused in 1949, following the Soviet Union's detonation of its first atomic device which had been produced far earlier than most U.S. scientists had

¹ United States Atomic Energy Commission, *In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer, Transcript of Hearing before Personnel Security Board and Texts of Principal Documents and Letters* (1954; rpt. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971). (Hereafter referred to as Transcript.)

expected. The United States, thus, needed to determine how aggressively to pursue development of the immensely powerful hydrogen bomb. Oppenheimer and the General Advisory Committee of the AEC desired to delay any major progress on the H-bomb until a final attempt was made to agree on a mutual forswearing of the "super-bomb" with the Soviet Union. The Committee's attempts were stifled when President Harry Truman decided otherwise.

Even though Oppenheimer's consultant role with the government had diminished significantly by 1953, he was, nevertheless, in a position to influence national security policy by virtue of the prestige which surrounded him. He had an almost unique knowledge of nuclear weapons, the effects of those weapons, and of a nuclear arms race. He also possessed a highly rational nature, an extreme distrust of secrecy, a suspicion of inherited assumptions, and an almost unbounded faith in the virtues of an open society (Wilson xx). Replete with these characteristics, Oppenheimer struggled to understand the impact of nuclear science upon the national security needs of the United States. That struggle led him to speak openly about the facts of the nuclear arms race; that struggle led him to criticize official military strategy. Oppenheimer opted for a radical revision of the way men thought about national security and international relations in the nuclear age, and publicly debating the secret issues was part of that altered view. Oppenheimer looked ahead and saw futility in the arcane calculus of the "strategic nuclear balance." He understood the semantic force of the traditional doctrine to "stay ahead."

However, in the 1950s, Oppenheimer was considered to be a critic, a heretic, a prophet whose thoughts led a government of powerful and purposeful men to question his motivations. The result of that questioning was a challenge to the veracity and character of J. Robert Oppenheimer—a security clearance hearing. An analysis of that hearing as a rhetorical event presents the possibility of clarifying the means used to discredit and, thereby, to suppress the thoughts and views of J. Robert Oppenheimer.

Although much has been written about the events surrounding the hearing, the language—the rhetorical aspect—is the record of *how* the government conducted its challenge and is best viewed in the light of rhetorical critic/theorist Kenneth Burke. Any one of Burke's statements about the definition, function, and scope of rhetoric applies to the proceedings. Rhetoric is concerned with conscious or unconscious strategies for outwitting one another; it is "the region . . . of insult and injury, . . . malice and lie . . ." (Burke, *Permanence and Change* 274). Certainly the participants used words "to form attitudes or induce actions" (Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives* 41), for or against Oppenheimer. Rhetoric exists in every meaning, verbal or non-verbal, and in every meaning there is persuasion. In addition, Burke's "administrative rhetoric" typifies the whole conduct of the hearing from the rhetoric of the words to a rhetoric of action that spoke much louder than words (Holland 54–55).

Within several of the pivotal terms in Burkeian rhetorical theory, a method exists for achieving a more discerning view than any currently proffered regarding the nature of the Oppenheimer affair and the means by which the AEC reached its verdict. Pivotal Burkeian terms which figure significantly

in an analysis of the hearing include "Identification," "Hierarchy/Order," "Guilt," and "Victimage."

"Identification," cited by Burke as "one's material and mental ways of placing oneself as a person in groups and movements; one's way of sharing vicariously in the role of leader or spokesman; formation and change of allegiance," (Burke, *Philosophy* 227) figured prominently in analyzing relationships of witnesses, attorneys, and judges. It is ironic, given testimony in which twice as many statements indicated identification with Oppenheimer's beliefs (in socialist causes, security matters, development of the hydrogen bomb, loyalty to the U.S.) that the judges ruled counter to the preponderance of testimony. Rhetorical analysis indicated that factors other than the weight of evidence affected the decision of the judges.

An excerpt from the testimony of Colonel John Lansdale, Jr., the security officer for the Manhattan District at Los Alamos, represents an incidence of presence of Identification.

[from cross-examination, Day 5, regarding character, loyalty, and associations of an individual]

LANSDALE: . . . What I intended to convey was the appraisal or evaluation of associations in the forties must be viewed in the light of the atmosphere existing then and not in the light of the atmosphere existing at the present time. . . . [Y]ou can hardly put your finger on a scientist or a university professor or people who tend to get into civic affairs, you can hardly find one anywhere who is now in his fifties or so that has not been on at least one list of an association which was later determined to be subversive or to have leanings that way. . . . I have never, strongly as I have felt and acted with reference to Communism, never adopted the assumption, once a Communist sympathizer, always a Communist sympathizer. . . . (Transcript 279)

Representative testimony from Ambassador George F. Kennan also reveals the presence of Identification in the language of defense witnesses.

[from redirect examination, Day 7, regarding character, associations, and loyalty of individuals]

KENNAN: I have often said it is the people who come to their views through the questioning of other things who have the highest and finest type of understanding in the interests of the Government. At any rate, it seems to me that the exceptional people are often apt not to fit into an act or a series of loyalty regulations. . . . I have always felt that the United States Government has to realize that it has a real problem here, particularly with the people who have the greater capacities. There is need here for considerable flexibility, and as I say at the outset, I think for looking at the man as a whole and viewing his entire personality and not judging portions of it. (Transcript 368-69)

Each time a witness expressed positive Identification about Oppenheimer's views, especially regarding his loyalty, Chairman Gordon Gray seemed obligated to justify the role of the Personnel Security Board and the Atomic Energy Act. In addition, government counsel Robb and Gray focused on past and present elements of Identification. For example, in examining Katherine Oppenheimer, Gray discredited her testimony because views she held in 1940 differed from those she held in 1954. This strategy frequently appeared in the language of government counsel and the Board.

The many facets of the term "Identification" allowed for a variety of ways in which to view the language and action of the hearing. Identification

revealed loyalties and enmities in relationships, and it exposed strategies through which goals of counsel, both government and defense and members of the Board may have been sought.

Burke's terms of "Hierarchy/Order," "Guilt," and "Victimage" seemed to supply focal points for further observations. "Hierarchy" refers to the patterns in the socio-political structure that bind people together. Relationships established by authority bind people to work within their hierarchical structure. That structure is bureaucratized, or given a definite organization, thus providing "Order" within society. Numerous hierarchies may be embedded in one another and an individual may at times find a conflict between or among them, e.g., the conscientious objector who finds conflict between the dictates of the government and the dictates of the church. Violation of "Hierarchy/Order" occurs through withdrawal, rebellion, or violence, and language may be the means for rejecting the "hierarchy."

Rejection of "Hierarchy/Order" appears in the following excerpt from Oppenheimer's testimony.

[from direct examination, Day 1, regarding security procedures at Los Alamos]

OPPENHEIMER: Our names were not known and our drivers [sic] licenses were all made out under fictitious or artificial names. The laboratory was guarded within the post and the post was guarded. We went to precautions which did not do the trick, but which looked formidable at the time. I had partly the job of devising these idiotic things and partly the job of making them welcome. (Transcript 29)

A further example of support of Oppenheimer and rejection of Hierarchy in the guise of the Hearing was found in an exchange between Colonel John Lansdale, Jr., and Roger Robb, counsel for the government.

[from cross-examination, Day 5, regarding Oppenheimer's loyalty]

LANSDALE: . . . I am extremely disturbed by the current hysteria of the time of which this [the Hearing] seems to be a manifestation.

ROBB: You think this inquiry is a manifestation of hysteria?

LANSDALE: I think—

ROBB: Yes or no?

LANSDALE: I won't answer that question "Yes" or "No." If you are tending to be that way—if you will let me continue, I will be glad to answer your question. (Transcript 269–70)

Analysis of the "Hierarchy/Order" terms further reveals that those who oppose the principles of "order" may be considered "misguided sinners," or "villains who must be overcome" by the social order principles, or "heretics who must be captured and put to death because only in their death is society purged of threats to the principles of order" (Duncan 97).

Disobeying the hierarchical principles leads to "Guilt," and awareness that the carefully structured "identifications" within the particular Hierarchy have been threatened or damaged. The following excerpt illustrates languages in which there was attribution of Guilt toward Oppenheimer and denial of Guilt on his part.

[from cross-examination, Day 5, regarding Oppenheimer's opposition to the hydrogen bomb]

ROBB: . . . [Y]ou were instrumental in persuading other outstanding scientists not to work on the bomb. . . .

OPPENHEIMER: I think I would be glad to deny it. I would like to know what outstanding scientists I might have persuaded not to work on the bomb.

GRAY: . . . Did you attempt to persuade anyone not to work on the hydrogen bomb?

OPPENHEIMER: No.

ROBB: . . . Would you agree that you are or were the most experienced, most powerful, and most effective member of the opposition to the hydrogen bomb?

OPPENHEIMER: Well, I would say I was not the most powerful, I was not the most experienced, and I was not the most influential. . . . (Transcript 232)

In contrast, attribution of Guilt, both by Oppenheimer and Robb, appears throughout a segment of Oppenheimer's testimony on Day Three.

[from cross-examination, Day 3, regarding a 1943 security interview about what came to be known as the Chevalier incident]

OPPENHEIMER: . . . I think I said little more than that Eltenton was somebody to worry about. . . . Then I was asked why did I say this. Then I invented a cock-and-bull story. . . .

ROBB: Now let us go back to your interview with Colonel Pash. Did you tell Pash the truth about this thing?

OPPENHEIMER: No.

ROBB: You lied to him?

OPPENHEIMER: Yes. . . .

ROBB: So that we may be clear, did you discuss with or disclose to Pash the identity of Chevalier?

OPPENHEIMER: No.

ROBB: Let us refer, then for the time being, to Chevalier as X. . . . Did you tell Pash that X had approached three persons on the project? . . . Didn't you say X had approached three people?

OPPENHEIMER: Probably.

ROBB: Why did you do that, Doctor?

OPPENHEIMER: Because I was an idiot.

ROBB: Is that your only explanation, Doctor?

OPPENHEIMER: I was reluctant to mention Chevalier.

ROBB: Yes.

OPPENHEIMER: No doubt somewhat reluctant to mention myself. . . .

ROBB: And didn't you know, Doctor, that by refusing to give the name of X you were impeding the investigation?

OPPENHEIMER: I must have known that. . . .

ROBB: And yet you wouldn't tell them?

OPPENHEIMER: That is true. (Transcript 137-38)

Of the 320 incidences of denial of Guilt regarding Oppenheimer's views and actions, the following excerpt from the testimony of Dr. Vannevar Bush represents those of the defense witnesses.

[from examination by Chairman Gray, Day 10, regarding development of the hydrogen bomb]

BUSH: I feel that this board has made a mistake and that it is a serious one. I feel that the letter of General Nichols which I read, this bill of particulars, is quite capable of being interpreted as placing a man on trial because he held opinions, which is quite contrary to the American system, which is a terrible thing. And as I move about I find that discussed today very energetically, that here is a man who is being pilloried because he had strong opinions, and had the temerity to express them. If this country ever gets to the point where we come that near to the Russian system, we are certainly

not in any condition to attempt to lead the free world toward the benefits of democracy. (Transcript 565)

That "Guilt" must be expiated, Burke says, in such a way that there is no threat to the power of the Hierarchy. When the disobedience or opposition is viewed as an evil in itself, then a public "Victim" must be found. The "suffering and death" of the victim can be witnessed by the community as a purgation of weakness in which the display of power may move the community to a greater acceptance of "Hierarchy" and "Order" (Duncan 97–98). Burke notes that a few strategies may make the "Victim" worthy or more culpable. The "Victim" may be made worthy "legalistically" by making him an offender against legal or moral justice, thus deserving of punishment, or the "Victim" may be made worthy "fatalistically" by emphasizing personal flaws and punishable pride (Burke, *Philosophy* 39–40). The selection of the victim also has a curative role for those in power who have a need to blame their troubles on others.

The following excerpts from the Transcript illustrate two incidences of Victimage.

[from cross-examination, Day 5, regarding development of the hydrogen bomb]

ROBB: Did you express that view in 1945?

OPPENHEIMER: I wrote a report. You see, I don't know to what this document refers. Is this the Interim Committee report? If you will tell me where this is alleged to have been written, I will confirm it. . . . How can I confirm it without knowing whether this is testimony before the Joint Congressional Committee, or an interview with Colonel Lansdale or a report I made. (Transcript 227)

[from examination by Chairman Gray, Day 5, regarding statements about a communication on the thermonuclear issue]

OPPENHEIMER: I would like to make a general protest. I am told that I have said certain things. I don't recall it. I am asked if I said these what would that be. This is an extremely difficult form for me to face a question. I don't know what I said. It is of record. I had it in my vault for many years. (Transcript 241)

Another excerpt from the testimony of Dr. Edward Teller of Berkeley also reflects a type of Victimage.

[from direct examination, Day 13, regarding Oppenheimer's government work]

TELLER: . . . after the war Dr. Oppenheimer served on committees rather than actually participating in the work. I am afraid this might not be a correct evaluation of the work of committees in general, but within the AEC, I should say that committees could go fishing without affecting the work of those who are actively engaged in the work.

In particular, however, the general recommendations that I know have come from Oppenheimer were more frequently a hindrance than a help, and therefore, . . . I think that further work of Dr. Oppenheimer on committees would not be helpful. (Transcript 721)

An interchange between Garrison and Robb also reveals incidences of Victimage in their language regarding Oppenheimer's access to information being read into the proceeding.

[from cross-examination, Day 3, of Oppenheimer regarding a security interview]

GARRISON: Mr. Chairman, . . . I wonder, however, if it would not be within the proprieties of this kind of proceeding when counsel reads from a transcript for us to be furnished with a copy of the transcript as he reads from it. This, of course, is orthodox in a court of law. I don't pretend that this is a court of law, but I do make the request because I don't know what else is in the transcript, and if parts of it are read from, it would seem to me that it would be proper for us to see what parts are not read from and to look at it as a whole. . . .

ROBB: I don't know, sir; this is presently marked "Secret" so I could not make it available to Mr. Garrison at this time.

GARRISON: But it is being read into the record.

ROBB: That is right. (Transcript 147-48)

This issue remained a prominent aspect of Victimage throughout the Hearing. The following excerpt again illustrates that type of occurrence.

[from cross-examination, Day 4, of Oppenheimer regarding a security interview]

GARRISON: Mr. Chairman, what troubles me about this whole method of examination is that counsel is reading from a transcript bits and parts without the full course of the conversation which took place to a witness whose memory at best, as anyone of ours would be, is very, very hazy upon all these things, and picking here a sentence and there a sentence out of context, and then holding him to answer. I do think that this is a method of questioning that seems to me to be very unfair. (Transcript 210)

Coding and analyzing the language of the nineteen days of the Oppenheimer Hearing clearly indicates that Oppenheimer was a "Victim." The conclusions of the Personnel Security Board were not based solely on the evidence offered by defense and government witnesses and attorneys. What appeared was a sense that the verdict was almost foreordained—that no matter the weight of the testimony, the Board and the AEC would have reached the same conclusions.

In Burkeian terms, Oppenheimer had been selected as "Victim." He posed a symbolic threat to the Hierarchical structure with his stance against nuclear weapon stockpiling and his desire for openness with allies and enemies alike in sharing scientific secrets. His marked influence in the scientific community also made him a prime target.

By resurrecting security clearance issues from the 1940's and re-examining them, and by challenging Oppenheimer's lack of enthusiasm for work on the hydrogen bomb, the government confronted his violation of "Hierarchy/Order." The old security issues and socialist inclinations became, in Burke's terms, "sinister, secret adherence to an organized enemy alien power," and the hydrogen bomb issue became "temperamental deviation from the prevailing orthodoxy (Burke, *Rhetoric of Religion* 195). Therefore, as a "misguided sinner" and "secular variant of the heretic," Oppenheimer became a most visible villain because of his preeminent role in scientific and government circles. When he chose to answer the initial allegations in a security clearance hearing, the way was paved for the purgation of his weakness and the mastery of "Hierarchy" and "Order" in the community.

Thus, Oppenheimer was made a worthy "Victim" of sacrifice by means of the security clearance hearing. In Burkeian terms, he was made worthy "legalistically" because he was viewed as one who had offended legal and moral justice through his thermonuclear reservations. He was made worthy

"fatalistically" because he was seen as someone who had thought himself above the law when he withheld information from security officers in the 1940s. With Oppenheimer as "Victim," the verdict of the Personnel Security Board and the subsequent recommendations by General Manager Nichols and the Atomic Energy Commission carried out Burke's "Cult of the Kill" (Burke, *Rhetoric of Religion* 5). That "killing" involved not only the decision to remove his security clearance, but also the attempt to discredit and impugn the character of J. Robert Oppenheimer. The language of the security clearance hearing was the instrument by which that was accomplished. The pivotal terms of Kenneth Burke provide the means of effectively analyzing the language.

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CRISIS MESSAGES: WALL STREET AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AFTER BLACK MONDAY

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October 19, 1987 was the largest one day loss in the history of the New York Stock exchange. The Dow Jones industrial averaged plunged over 500 points or 23 percent (Pennar, Berger, & Farrell). Cumulative losses for the day are estimated as high as \$500 billion (Bartlett). Almost 604.3 million shares, double the previous record volume, changed hands (Cowan). Shock and concern spread throughout the nation and the world as observers began drawing parallels with the crash of 1929. Throughout the crisis officials from the financial community sought to communicate explanations and solutions while calming the population. This essay analyzes the messages sent by federal and private members of the financial community on October 19, 1987 and the following week. Several theories of crisis management along with Burke's concept of purification and the concept of organizational legitimacy are applied to these messages. Specifically, the crisis messages of the financial community are discussed and evaluated within the framework of Burke's concept of purification through victimage and mortification.

Crisis

Gouran states that a crisis differs from other events requiring decision-making because of the "... unexpectedness and sense of urgency that their threatening qualities create for a speedy resolution" (174). Similarly, Fink sees crisis as any situation which runs the risk of: 1) escalating in intensity, 2) falling under close media or governmental scrutiny, 3) interfering with the normal operations of business, 4) jeopardizing the positive image presently enjoyed by a company or its officers, and 5) damaging a company's bottom line in any way (15-16). Fundamentally, then, a crisis is a threat to an organization's legitimacy. Pfeffer and Salancik note that legitimacy is a form of social support and "can be achieved only if one is able to argue convincingly that what the organization is doing is just or worthy" (195). Legitimacy represents a congruence between organizational activities, products, procedures and larger social norms. A crisis in legitimacy occurs "when either discourse becomes an inadequate justification of and/or major institutional responses do not fulfill legitimate expectations" (Turkel). Moreover, when crisis erupts, the parties involved are forced to cope with what Billings, Milburn, and Schaalman term response uncertainty. In short, a crisis situation

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requires the communication of explanations and justifications to alleviate threats to legitimacy. The reasoning behind the response, however, is usually clouded by uncertainty.

One approach to studying crisis involves a three phase model of pre-crisis, crisis, and post crisis for analysis. The pre-crisis stage is a time of warning where the first signs of an impending crisis occur. These signs are frequently subtle and may not be perceived as warnings. In the crisis phase, the crisis erupts resulting in immediate damage. The focus in the crisis phase, then, is on limiting damage and preventing escalation. During this phase, decision-maker attention is first called to the crisis by virtue of a trigger event. Finally, during post crisis a dialogue is constituted about cause, blame, and the factors necessary to insure against reoccurrence. The adequacy of this response often determines long term damage. Billings, Milburn, and Schaalman discuss three types of crisis responses: 1) inaction, 2) routine solutions, and 3) original solutions (304). Inaction involves no response. Routine solutions involve reliance upon precedence or pre-crisis planning. Original solutions are created specifically for a particular crisis situation.

An additional concept important to this study concerns the communication act of blaming and scapegoating. Seeger concluded from a study of the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster that moving beyond a crisis frequently requires "processes to publicly demonstrate and dramatize the organization's efforts to deal with the crisis. This may include identifying the likely cause(s) of the crisis, assigning guilt, and identifying steps to insure that similar situations do not re-occur" ("Investigating Commissions" 1). Kenneth Burke described this assignment of guilt as part of the act of purification. He claims that society finds order through hierarchy. An organization occupies a specific position in a social hierarchy which is associated with the organization's legitimacy (*Philosophy of Literary Form*). To maintain position and legitimacy, organizations meet the demands of the established order in part by complying with general social norms. A crisis is an extreme disturbance in the status quo, disrupting operations and threatening survival. Thus, hierarchical position and legitimacy are threatened. This general inability or unwillingness to meet the expectations of society results in guilt according to Burke's dramatic framework. Burke states that cancelling or purifying guilt is accomplished through two strategies: 1) victimage or scapegoating and 2) mortification (*The Rhetoric of Religion*). In victimage, an appropriate victim is selected and saddled with the guilt. Pfeffer and Salancik note that such scapegoating is commonly employed by organizations when problems cannot be readily resolved (239). Burke argues that in mortification, one absolves guilt through an inner struggle. Burke describes mortification as "the exercising of oneself in 'virtue'; it is a systematic way of saying no to Disorder or obediently saying yes to Order" (*The Rhetoric of Religion* 190). This process of embracing social order is rooted both in the fundamental concept of organization and of its assessment of legitimacy. As Burke states, "The mortified must, with one aspect of himself, be saying no to another aspect . . ." (*The Rhetoric of Religion* 190). This inner struggle most often translates into some tangible change of internal operations. As Pfeffer and Salancik note, however, major internal changes in organizational operations are costly and are avoided whenever possible. In short, then, an organization may absolve

itself of guilt and re-establish legitimacy by assigning blame to key individuals, by accepting blame and altering its internal structure and behavior, or both.

Black Monday as Crisis

The market crash of October 19, 1987 meets Fink's criteria for crisis. First, an extreme risk of escalation in intensity existed as stockholders panicked and sold their holdings. A sense of urgency and a belief that inaction would lead to devastating consequences served to accelerate the crisis. Observers admitted that there was no way of knowing just how low the market would fall. Several traders commented that "It was like trying to catch a falling knife" (Dentzer, Thomas, Wang, Friday, & Brian 51). Declining stock prices were magnified by reports of dramatic declines in the London, Hong Kong, and Tokyo exchanges (Cowan). Second, the stock market collapse topped the media's agenda for nearly two weeks. Network news began with reports from major stock exchanges, interviewed members of the financial community and the Reagan Administration. Third, the uncertainty generated by the falling market disrupted normal operations. Wall Street was forced to suspend all trading for short periods and certain computerized trading indefinitely. Fourth, the crash threatened the images of the Wall Street firms and the Reagan Administration. Both groups are charged with the responsibility of assuring such drastic disruptions in the status quo of the markets do not occur. Both had benefited significantly from the sustained growth of the "Bull" market. As such, they were the most appropriate sources for explanations and justifications. Finally, the stock market drop seriously damaged the profitability of Wall Street firms with many counting their losses in millions of dollars.

Most directly, however, as stocks declined the financial markets lost legitimacy. Long established investment opportunities and expectations of sustained economic growth were suddenly gone. Markets which were the leading edge of Reaganomics were pointing toward recession. Millions of individual investors had lost significant portions of their wealth. As one financial observer noted "Behind the crash lies a loss of confidence in economic and political leadership" ("Extraordinary Butcher" 76). In short, then, the financial disaster of October 19, 1987 may be classified as a crisis not only for Wall Street firms, but for the Reagan Administration and for millions of individual investors.

Crisis Stages of Black Monday

A variety of messages were communicated by the financial community and the Reagan Administrations during the chronic crisis stage. A pre-crisis stage, however, manifested itself prior to Black Monday. Warnings of crisis were well publicized in the pre-crisis stage. Pennar, Berger, and Farrell, for example, suggest that the market was "... waffling for two months and sending some pretty strong signals for a couple of weeks" (44). In January of 1987, Marshall Loeb, Editor of *Fortune* observed that "The market has shot up so rapidly that I can absolutely guarantee that it will fall—fall quite possibly by

10 percent, 20 percent or perhaps more" (371). The Reagan Administration and the financial community either did not perceive, chose not to or were unable to act upon the warnings of impending crisis.

The rapid decline of October 19 caught many by surprise. Two events triggered the crisis. First, the Commerce Department's report for the August trade deficit showed only slight improvement (Egan, Shapiro, Monroe, Black, & Weiner). Second, treasury secretary James Bakker was quoted as publicly criticizing West German policy and threatening a lower dollar ("Extraordinary Butchery"). These events created uncertainty in economic indicators and lack of credibility in the Reagan Administration. During the crisis stage, a complete crash was averted primarily by those safety mechanisms installed in the market following the crash of 1919. Two additional regulatory actions were taken during this stage. First, the New York Stock Exchange placed sharp limits on program trading which was thought to have accentuated the crisis. Brokerage firms were barred from automatically executing trades through the high-speed computer-to-computer links between brokerage houses and the exchange floor (Sanger). Second, the New York Stock Exchange closed two hours early on October 23, 1987 to allow the brokerage firms an opportunity to catch up on the vast paper accumulated during the week (De Maria).

Many observers expected President Reagan to halt trading in an effort to reduce the impact during the crisis phase. Reagan, however, chose to release a general statement on October 19, 1987 indicating that the economists with whom he had consulted, confirmed his view that "... the underlying economy remains sound" (Fitzwater). Reagan also cited several economic statistics, including employment, manufacturing output, and the trade deficit, as evidence of a sound economy. However, his "steady as she goes" approach was eerily similar to President Hoover's October 1929 comments about declining stocks (Apple). With the exception of the two subtle measures taken by the New York Stock Exchange, then, the financial industry and Reagan Administration both depended upon what Billings et al. term routine solutions during the crisis stage.

Beyond the regulatory actions by Wall Street and statements by Reagan, two additional factors helped halt the stock fall. First, on October 20, Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, announced that the Fed would reverse its established policy of tight credit and instead make liquidity available. This change was dramatic given the Fed's long established policy of tight money to limit inflation. Second, many firms, seeing bargains in their own stock and looking for ways to defend their share prices, started extensive buy back programs ("Extraordinary Butchery" 76). These actions represented original solutions and helped bring stability back to the market.

The post crisis stage began as soon as the market stabilized. The steady but marginal improvement in the Dow Jones industrial average during the two days immediately following the crash provided an opportunity for reflection, identification of causes, assigning blame, and announcing changes. This dialogue of justification and explanation following the crisis was played out in the national media and involved officials from the Reagan Administration, the national and international financial industry, business leaders, and stockholders.

Purification

The post crisis stage is characterized by a search for explanations and justifications to reduce uncertainty, move past the crisis and repair damaged legitimacy. It is during this stage that guilt may be prominently assigned to those who are deemed responsible or who might make appropriate scapegoats. The post crisis phase is also where acts of mortification involving corrective changes in operations are likely to be announced. According to Burke, acts of blaming produce feelings of having been cleansed or purified. Moreover, victimage through scapegoating or mortification through changes in internal operations, result in a disassociation with illegitimate activities. Both the Reagan Administration and the financial community communicated public messages of victimage and mortification during the early post crisis stage of Black Monday which helped create a perception of purification.

The financial industry had expressed strong concern about the twin budget and trade deficits prior to Black Monday and strongly reiterated that concern in its aftermath. In an act of victimage, blame for the economic turmoil was placed on the rising deficits produced by the inactivity of Congress and the Reagan Administration. Salomon Brothers' chief economist Henry Kaufman, for example, summarized this concern with, "The twin deficits are coming home to roost" (Egan et al.). Similarly, Richard Heckler, Chairman of E. I. du Pont, noted that "We all have a pretty good idea that the underlying reason was nervousness about deficits—budget and trade— and associated concerns about interest rates and inflation. [sic] The political leadership needs to get its act together and bring the books into some semblance of balance" (2). John M. Makin of the American Enterprise Institute of Public Policy Research further criticized the Reagan Administration for its inactivity regarding the budget and trade deficits by noting that "This is not the sort of thing that can be cleared up with a couple of press conferences" (McNamee & Magnusson 47). The financial community clearly identified the twin deficits as the primary causes of the crash and attributed them to the Federal Government's fiscal policies. Moreover, they sought specific and tangible corrective actions. This criticism of the Reagan Administration by some of its staunchest supporters was a powerful inducement for change.

In the wake of Black Monday, however, the financial industry also turned to self-analysis. This self-analysis resulted in specific acts of mortification. Beginning in 1982, Wall Street had seen unprecedented growth of a Bull market. This widespread and sustained growth, however, was not always backed by underlying economic strength. Sarah Bartlett in *Business Week* summarized this tendency:

For too long prosperity was built on the notion that there was no tomorrow. Wall Street firms grew ferociously, hiring bright young MBAs who based their search for fame and fortune on program trading, futures, and options. And when some speculators got caught cheating, Wall Street seemed to shrug it off after a brief bout of worry. Investors, seeking even higher returns, bought paper backed by paper backed by paper. Fueled by such financial exuberance, companies went on an uninhibited takeover romp, and consumers immersed themselves in debt. (42)

Some members of the brokerage business argued that this rapid growth had fundamentally changed the personality of Wall Street. Powell and Friday

quoted one high-level executive at a top firm as saying that Black Monday proved "... that we weren't immune from a fundamental truth: anything that seems too good to be true, is" (56). Martin L. Leibowitz, Salomon Brothers' top analyst, indicated that the brokerage industry is in need of major changes in noting that, "This is volatility of a nature we've not seen before. ... All our equations will have to be reworked" (Bianco 47). Perrin Long of Lippert Analytical Services offered an optimistic response to the Black Monday turmoil. He noted that, "This could be the beginning of the long-awaited retrenchment on Wall Street" (Bock 33). These statements by prominent leaders of the financial community helped set the stage for mortification. Through a recognition of the need for change and its inevitability, the painful and costly process of mortification, however, was facilitated.

In addition to indicating its willingness to reform, the financial community communicated a powerful message by thinning its ranks. Following Black Monday, hundreds of young, well-paid brokers were released from major brokerage firms (Bock). Surprisingly, many of these newly released brokers approached the situation in a matter-of-fact style. Powell et al. state that, "As the stock market's plunge accelerated, Wall Street's finest weren't lining up by office windows to jump, à la 1929; they were lining up by Xerox machines running off copies of their resumes" (55). These actions suggest that the Wall Street community realized and accepted the fact that a change in philosophy was inevitable.

President Reagan also struck an accepting tone through his admission that the budget deficit had played a major role in bringing about Black Monday. He did not, however, accept blame for the deficit. Instead, Reagan established Congress as the victim. At no point during the days surrounding Black Monday was Reagan as pointed in his attack on Congress as during his October 22, 1987 news conference. Many of the questions concerned his announcement that he would meet with members of Congress in an effort to reduce the trade and budget deficits. When asked if it took a crisis to get the President to meet with Congress, Reagan argued that if Congress had passed his budget the deficit "would have been \$207 billion less than it turned out to be" (A8). When asked directly if the White House should share equally in the blame for the deficit, Reagan refused to move from his argument that Congress was to blame. He said:

Well, just a minute. The President of the United States cannot spend a nickel. Only Congress can authorize the spending of money, and for six years now I have repeatedly asked Congress for less money and they have turned around, given more to spend and done it in such a way that I can't veto it when they put it all together instead of appropriations in continuing resolution. (A8)

On another level, however, the President performed an act of mortification by initiating a meeting with Congress. Throughout 1987 Reagan had insisted that he would not bargain with Congress when it came to matters of the budget. Yet, during his October 22, 1987 news conference Reagan announced that he would be meeting with the leaders of Congress as soon as possible. This decision meant the President had, as McNamee and Magnusson state, "... yielded the critical inch of ground that he's held all year ..." (47).

This was a notable shift for Reagan. His initial response to the stock market

crash was to deny its significance. In an official White House statement on October 19, 1987 Reagan was quoted as saying that “. . . our view is that the underlying economy remains sound” (D32). Reagan went on to support this claim with specific examples regarding the expansion of the economy and the low inflation rate. This process is consistent with Burke’s view of victimage and mortification. Burke states that victimage is homicidal in that it involves the assignment of guilt to an external agent. Conversely, mortification is suicidal in that to be mortified one must absolve guilt through internal change (*The Rhetoric of Religion* 190). In fact, the President even indicated in his October 22 news conference that he would listen to a discussion of tax increase. This is something he had not been willing to do at any other point during his presidency. When asked about the meeting during his press conference, the President said:

[Sic] my program had \$22 billion of additional revenues in it. I have said additional revenue. There are other things you can do that are not deterrent to the economy such as taxes can be, but what I’ve said was, all right, I’ll listen to them and what they have in mind, in answer to this problem, but I expect them to listen to what I have in mind, and the bulk of these \$22 billion have nothing to do with taxes. (A8)

Reagan’s compromise was called a “special effort” by White House spokespersons and represented a significant shift toward self mortification (Quint D1). By offering to meet Congress, Reagan shifted from a strategy firmly committed to throughout his presidency which had been the cornerstone of the Reaganomics program through a novel response to the crisis. Fundamentally, then, Reagan was simultaneously accepting and denying responsibility for Black Monday.

Impact of Purification Messages

The messages of victimage communicated by the Reagan Administration and the financial community were not new. Reagan had blamed Congress for the budget deficit since his first year in office. Similarly, members of the financial community had criticized the growing federal and trade deficits and the Administration’s unwillingness to deal with them. These remarks were routine and rekindled consistent and familiar criticisms but did little to restore confidence in the economy. The magnitude of the criticism, however, served as an impetus for subsequent mortification.

The messages of mortification communicated by Reagan and Wall Street were more effective in alleviating the crisis and renewing legitimacy than those of victimage. Reagan was praised by Wall Street following his October 22, 1987 news conference. Industry observers indicated that his willingness to negotiate with Congress was a step in the right direction. Richard Leshner, President of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, said of Reagan’s address, “It was a cool, calm approach and just what was warranted. Things aren’t going to hell, even though they’ve been exciting” (Berg D12). A *Business Week* Harris Poll conducted on October 23–25, 1987 indicated that the American public was gaining confidence, but was concerned about the future of the economy. Seventy-seven percent of those stockholders surveyed indicated they had at least some confidence in the people who run Wall Street. Four-

teen percent said they had a great deal of confidence and 63 percent said they had some (Berger & Dunkin).

Conclusions

Both the Reagan Administration and Wall Street communicated messages of victimage and mortification when the stock market failed to follow expectations for legitimate operation. The messages of victimage were routine, while the messages of mortification were more original responses to the specific situation. Wall Street's most effective messages, however, came in the post crisis stage and concerned mortification. The budget and trade deficits were targeted as causes of Black Monday. Wall Street used this explanation to blame Congress and the Reagan Administration for the economic downfall. Blaming Congress and the Administration in itself, however, was not sufficient. Wall Street had grown rapidly in the five years of prosperity from 1982–1987. With this growth came a reputation of greed, deceit and insensitivity. Stories of insider trading, ruthless takeovers, and unrestrained greed were common and severely compromised legitimacy. Had Wall Street executives addressed Black Monday simply by placing all blame on the twin deficits, it is doubtful they would have garnered much public support. Wall Street's negative reputation required more than victimage. Rather, mortification and substantive reform were required to rebuild public confidence. Moreover, reliance on strategies of victimage alone may damage legitimacy further if the blame is perceived by the public as inappropriate. By treating the crash as an opportunity for reform, the brokerage industry was able to regain some legitimacy.

For the Reagan Administration, Black Monday was a unique situation requiring an original response manifest in a form of self mortification. By opening his budget to compromise, Reagan abandoned a long-held policy of refusing to negotiate on budget matters. However, Reagan was careful to temper his message of compromise with a very powerful message of victimage. Reagan had consistently blamed Congress for the entire budget deficit problem. This routine message enabled him to maintain his image of leadership while simultaneously compromising. Had Reagan not offered a message of mortification along with victimage, however, it is likely that he would not have regained Wall Street's confidence. It has frequently been suggested that negative events such as crises do not stick to Reagan's image. In these instances avoiding association with the "causes" of Black Monday involve skillfully juxtapositioning of victimage and mortification strategies.

The present study also suggests that victimage may be the first choice in managing crisis conditions and may involve routine responses. Burke suggests that when individuals feel guilt there is an immediate and compelling temptation to respond with victimage (*The Rhetoric of Religion* 191). Moreover, victimage is a less costly and faster strategy than mortification. Reagan and Wall Street initially provided explanations and justifications through strategies of victimage adopted well before Black Monday. Similarly, organizations who handle crisis by blaming the economy or firing a few prominent figures are typically adhering to routine responses to crisis. The present analysis, however, suggests that specific conditions may make victimage a

less successful purification strategy. In this instance, for example, blaming Congress was a routine response which had lost all novel appeal. Further, using Congress as a victim seemed self serving in light of the Reagan Administration's refusal to address the twin deficits. Finally, the crisis appeared to be associated more directly with a system of decision making which tended to create adversarial relationships than with any individual or group. Similar conditions in other crises may also reduce the effectiveness of victimage strategies.

In this instance, however, the unsuccessful efforts at victimage set the stage for subsequent mortification by providing support for changes. Mortification requires review and realignment of internal structures, procedures and philosophy with generally accepted norms of conduct. Moreover, mortification strategies are most costly and substantive. Messages of mortification, then, tend to be more productive in managing perceptions of crisis and renewing legitimacy by providing original solutions to crisis. Consequently, the more costly mortification strategies are likely employed after victimage has been attempted.

Messages of victimage are frequently appropriate means for salvaging the legitimacy of an organization. A message of mortification, however, can enhance a perception of preventive, long-term change and renewed social legitimacy. Such change suggests that the organization has responded to critics, taken control of its own destiny and can avert a similar crisis in the future. Simply assigning blame to individuals or outside parties may communicate unwillingness or inability to avoid future crises.

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THE CIMETER: CASE STUDY IN THE TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT

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The use and abuse of alcohol has been an issue of significant social concern since colonial times. An increased awareness of this issue occurred during the 1800s, especially in the two extremes, the large urban industrial cities and the small, developing frontier towns. The state of Missouri played a major role in the frontier development and in supplying goods and services to these towns. St. Louis, Missouri, became the "Gateway to the West," and so Missouri generally and St. Louis particularly played a key role in the temperance drama in other cities, towns, and wide spots on the trail. Accordingly, this study examines a temperance newspaper (*The Cimeter*) published in St. Louis by Bruce G. W. Hughes in 1884–1885 in order to discover and evaluate the rhetorical strategies used in the struggle against acceptance of the consumption of alcohol. This topic is a timely one, because today sentiment against drinking (especially when combined with driving) is higher than in recent years. Charles Stewart's approach to the rhetorical study of movements (Stewart, Smith, and Denton) will be employed for this analysis. A brief overview of temperance in the United States through the 1800s provides the backdrop for this study.

The Background of the Temperance Controversy

Emergence of the Alcohol Problem

The early American settlers found their "promised land" full of hardships and freezing cold winters, so the colonists and settlers justifiably consumed considerable alcohol. The early morning shot of whiskey became a pre-breakfast tradition, relieving chills, fever, and symptoms of malaria. The eye openers of whiskey, rye, brandy, and rum became an institution for hygienic purposes. In the 1880s New York's breakfast tables were often garnished with brandy, cider, or sangaree (Furnas 17). People were impressed with the potency of alcohol; some proclaimed it to be good for everything that ailed humankind. One advocate for alcohol wrote that

It sloweth age . . . it strengtheneth youth; it helpeth digestion; it cutteth flegme; it abandoneth melancholie; it relisheth the heart; it lighteneth the mind; it quickeneth the spirits; it strengtheneth the hydropsie; it healeth the strangurie; it pounceth the stone; it expelleth the gravel; it puffeth away ventositie; it keepeth and preserveth the head from whirling, the eyes from dazzling, the tongue from lisping, the throat from rattling; it keepeth the reason from stiffening; keepeth the hands from shivering, the sinews from shrinking, the veins from crumbling, the bones from aching, and the morrow from soaking. (Furnas 18)

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Given these beliefs, it is not surprising to discover that most people viewed suppliers of drink as public heroes. Taverns of New England were social institutions, places for the meeting of the minds, councils and social groups. Tavern owners usually held high position in their community and often were deacons in the church. In early America the only drinkers who received social penalties were the flagrant disorderly drunks; those who were considered to be "dangerous nuisances" were officially listed as "common drunks."

However, since tavern keepers wanted to maintain their popularity and make a profit on the drinks they served, they would often give the benefit of the doubt to the customers who might be "common drunks." In the early 1800s the list of town drunks was sometimes so long that it resembled the roster of eligible voters in the town (Furnas 24–25). Inevitably, the responsibility and character of liquor establishments began to decline.

As the American frontier expanded, brewers and distillers expanded their market and supplied frontier life with their products. New towns had their saloons, providing a variety of alcoholic goods and services, run by frontier entrepreneurs concerned with profit. Alcohol and prostitution became common features of the frontier saloons. As a result, families experienced abuse, economic loss, and sometimes death. Hence, as drinking increased, so did the problems associated with it.

The Emergence of the Temperance Movement

The gradual recognition of this drinking problem gave rise to the temperance movement. Temperance advocates often expressed their views in lecture halls or wherever people would gather in cities or towns. These lecturers would travel throughout the country, attempting to leave a lasting impression on their audiences. They provided a clearly antithetical account to the praise of alcohol quoted above:

Spirits . . . impair the memory, debilitate the understanding, and pervert the moral faculties. . . produce not only falsehood, but fraud, theft, uncleanness, and murder. . . How deep the anguish which rends the bosom of the drunkard's wife . . . the shame and aversion which she excited in her husband! Is he the father of children? See their averted looks . . . their blushing looks at each other! Is he a magistrate? . . . What humiliating fears of corruption in the administration of the laws . . . in the countenance of all who see him! . . . As to economics: behold drunkard's houses stripped gradually of their furniture . . . to pay tavern debts . . . houses with shattered windows . . . barns with leaky roofs, gardens over-run with weeds . . . fields with broken fences . . . children filthy and half clad, without manners, principles, or morals . . . addiction to spirits, soundly enough, amounts to slow suicide. (Furnas 11)

The United States appeared to many to be a society with major alcohol problems. In the 1840s through 1850s temperance reformers slowed their efforts, but following the Civil War, saloons multiplied and the problem resurfaced (Bordin xiv).

In nineteenth-century America, alcohol was considered by numerous observers to be a social evil. Many citizens were heavy users of alcohol, which was deemed more important than food itself. Alcohol was usually cheaper than milk and safer to drink than water. Alcohol supposedly supplied a sustaining energy for the hard-working laborer while supplying warmth for

cold winter days. Drink was perceived in the favorable terms used by earlier Americans—as medicine, anesthetic, and analgesic. In short, it simply functioned as an integral part of the American way of life (Bordin 5–6).

The strength of the temperance movement emerged through church-related networks. Fundamental temperance ideology was couched in Biblical warnings against intemperance and supported with New Testament commands for temperance. Joseph Gusfield argues that native American Protestants of the nineteenth century respected temperance ideals. In other words, they praised self-control, industriousness and made renunciation of impulse a necessity for life. Sobriety was a virtue for white, middle-class Protestants. Gusfield suggests that curtailment of alcohol sales was a simple way of solving the problems presented by a poor urban immigrant whose culture clashed with American Protestantism (Gusfield 4–6). Gusfield's view may be correct; unfortunately, his perspective is incomplete in that he ignores the realities of the liquor problem in the United States. Specifically, he fails to consider the rhetoric of temperance, a justification for a rhetorical study of the temperance movement.

Within the Protestant churches, three distinct forms of social Christianity were visible in the temperance movement. The first was conservative social Christianity. This view accepted the principles of individualistic reform; that is, reform on a voluntary basis. The conservative was by no means an advocate of institutional change. Second, radical Christianity used religious doctrine as a foundation for an attack on the existing social and economic order. This ideology wanted to create a new social system, and resulted in Christian socialism. Third, the progressive social Christianity held a position between the conservative and radical perspectives. The basic desire of the progressive was for institutions to operate in a moral manner (May). All three forms of Christianity were types of assimilative reform. As Christians, they were basically concerned with the plight of the urban poor and the conditions produced by the factory systems of industry. Through reforming the drinker, the middle class professional and businessman coped with urban problems in a way that affirmed cultural dominance. They perceived the drinker as poor, alien, or downtrodden. He could lift himself up to meet the expectations of the reformers, finding middle class respectability and income. When assimilative reform failed to bring overall results, the coercive reform was adapted. Coercive reform was the legislation of laws with accompanying enforcement as the means to affirm social dominance. Prohibition was the battle cry for the coercive reformist (Gusfield 7).

The temperance movement was a mixed bag of ideology for doing battle against the evils of alcohol. Variety in the movement existed because of the different church affiliations, doctrines, philosophies, or epistemological roots. The very fact that three different perspectives on Christianity existed—conservative, radical, and progressive—demonstrates the diversity of the movement. Despite this diversity, they shared a common goal: to rid society of the evils of alcoholic substance. The goal would be realized in two ways: the first would prohibit production of alcohol, and the second would ban the sale of alcohol. The accomplishment of these two goals would improve family life, raise economic productivity, lower crime, add years to many lives, and bestow the virtue of sobriety on our nation.

In order to accomplish the intended goal, the temperance movement adopted three distinct forms. First, a group of lecturers traveled about the country from town to town as evangelists for the temperance cause. They were powerful speakers, many of whom were clergy, professors of science or persons of public speaking ability. They attempted to persuade people to sign a pledge card for the cause of temperance. Second, organizations developed for everyone to join, providing opportunity for personal involvement. There were organizations for men, women, young men, young women, and children. Some of the organizations were the International Order of Good Templars, Good Templars, Christian Temperance Union, Women's Christian Temperance Union, and Junior Templars. Elaborate structures built cellular networks that extended from neighborhoods, to towns, to countries, to states, and ultimately, to national offices. This movement provided a unique support system for members and offered fellowship in a fraternal sense. Third, weekly newspapers devoted to the temperance cause were founded in several states as key organs of communication. The role of these papers was to inform the readership, recruit sympathizers to join the cause, and sustain the existing membership.

The function of temperance newspapers was similar to that of the Populist newspapers (Goodwin 164, 206–07). They became the voice of the movement. Like the Populist papers, the temperance papers usually suffered from inadequate finances. Despite the fact that most of their readers could not afford to pay the annual subscription cost, the paper was usually sent because the publishers believed they were fighting a moral battle. Accordingly, these papers were frequently money losing enterprises, with a short life.

This study examines *The Cimeter*, a weekly temperance newspaper published in St. Louis in 1884–1885. This newspaper was selected because it typifies temperance papers in the midwest, and it gained a respectable circulation. The publisher was the Reverend G. W. Hughey, who was the Pastor of Trinity Methodist Episcopal Church in St. Louis from 1879 to 1881 (Scharf 1687). Reverend Hughey was involved in temperance work in various capacities. He often traveled throughout Missouri on speaking engagements, wrote several books on temperance, and contributed support and leadership to the different organizations of temperance (Hughey). As suggested earlier, this analysis is designed to reveal the rhetorical strategies employed by this newspaper in the fight against alcohol use.

The Functional Approach to Movements

Scholars hold that rhetorical patterns occur in various configurations of public discourse. While emphasis has often been placed on explication of events, people, and strategies (Griffin; Smith), many believe that persuasion is the basic agency for social movements. Persuasion is used when functions or events confront the established norm or the status quo. It is through this dialectic confrontation that change often evolves (Andrews 196–98, 207–08; Wilkinson 91; Stewart, Smith, and Denton 73).

Charles Stewart has proposed five basic elements as a functional scheme for analyzing the rhetoric of social movements:

- 1) *Transforming perceptions of history.*
Social movements must alter the way audiences perceive the past, present, or future. For each movement there is a target audience. The social movement may find it necessary to revise their version of history over a period of time.
- 2) *Transforming perceptions of society.*
Social movements must alter the perceptions of the opposition. Attempts are made to strip opponents of their legitimacy. The self perceptions of the movement must enable the supporters to believe in their self-worth and ability to bring about change.
- 3) *Prescribing courses of action.*
Social movements must explain what needs to be done and who needs to do it. A list of demands and solutions that will alleviate the existing conditions must be explained or defended to the target audience if the program of change is to occur.
- 4) *Mobilizing the action.*
The social movement must unite and organize discontents, arousing them to action. Attempts to gain sympathy from opinion leaders is a must. The action may be a strike, boycott, or simply gaining the attention or sympathy of the public but action must occur.
- 5) *Sustaining the movement.*
A social movement may last for a prolonged period of time or at least until the 'goal' is accomplished. In that period of time it may be necessary to explain setbacks, justify why the movement goals have changed, or why new leadership is needed. Activities such as fund raising, membership drives, or acquisition of property or material may divert attention away from needed functions. The membership's commitment must be reinforced while providing satisfaction or membership gratification. These activities will often limit the movement's ability to perform essential actions needed for change. (summarizing Stewart 298-405)

Stewart's method is used because it provides a functional scheme for analyzing the rhetoric of social movements while capturing its essence. How the movement presents its perception of history and society indicates where the movement has been, where it intends to go, and the shared vision of the participants. How a movement explains change or justifies new goals is critical in retaining existing members. This process may be one of the most critical operations to occur in the life of a movement. By examining *The Cimeter* with this method, a clearer picture of how this paper functioned as a tool of the temperance movement and of the role persuasion played in it should emerge. Incidentally, it illustrates the utility of Stewart's approach to movements.

The Rhetoric of *The Cimeter*

The Cimeter was an integral part of the temperance movement. In general, references to *The Cimeter* may be understood as reflections of the temperance movement. Each of the five areas Stewart identifies will be analyzed in turn to illustrate the role discourse played in this important historical movement.

Transforming Perceptions of History

The Cimeter was successful in transforming perceptions of history by altering how people viewed the past, present, and future into Biblical terms. Particular segments of scripture which obviously pertained to drink were

interpreted in a manner which reinforced the temperance position. A regular feature in *The Cimeter* was "Biblical Doctrines of Temperance." The evidence cited was totally based on Biblical text and examples. The heart of the temperance matter was generated from the New Testament verse written by the historical figure Apostle Paul, "Be ye temperant in all things." The "Biblical Doctrine of Temperance" always defined and clarified the temperance position, i.e., "the moderation of that which is beneficial, and total abstinence from that which is harmful" (*The Cimeter*, 3 Jan. 1884, 2). Scriptures cited were chosen because they supported the ideas of temperance or abstinence. Needless to say, a significant amount of Biblical history (i.e., people drinking) had to be revised or simply ignored because it did not endorse abstinence. It is not surprising that such Biblical accounts as Jesus turning the water into wine, the use of wine in the Lord's supper, or Paul's advice to Timothy to take a little wine for his stomach's sake, were absent, ignored or rationalized to fit the temperance ideals. Such selective interpretation of the scriptures seems designed to shape perceptions of the past in line with the goals of the temperance movement, in an attempt to confer both Biblical and historical legitimacy on the movement.

The editor clearly states the present and future perception of *The Cimeter*:

The Cimeter will be nonsectarian, a nondenominational paper, but in a broad sense Christian. The battle against liquor power can be fought on a line of conscience and moral obligation. It is the intent of this paper to enlighten for judgment, to appeal to the conscience of right or wrong of the great question. (3 Jan. 1884, 2)

The Cimeter was identified historically (past, present, future) with Christianity or Christ-likeness. If *The Cimeter* is Christian or Christ like, moral and right, then the opposition (liquor power) is clearly perceived as devilish, immoral and wrong. The conflict between temperance and liquor power is described as a "battle . . . fought on the issue of conscience and moral obligation." Since *The Cimeter* is assumed to be morally right on the issue of temperance, the audience will sense in their conscience this rightness and will be morally obligated (future) to align in agreement with this paper (which represents the temperance cause). The intent (present/future) of the paper is to "enlighten" those who have not had the opportunity to see the light on the issue (3 Jan. 1884, 2). Clearly, the past, present, and future as seen by *The Cimeter* was that of "good" fighting against "evil."

Notice how this strategy utilizes appeals that are firmly rooted in the audience's beliefs and values. Readers of *The Cimeter* were generally religious. Hence, the *Bible* and ("Biblical Doctrine") were highly esteemed sources lending credibility to the proposed transformation of audience perceptions of history. This was reinforced by the strategies employed to accomplish the second function identified by Stewart.

Transforming Perceptions of Society

As a result of *The Cimeter's* perception of "good" fighting against "evil," efforts were made to strip liquor power of its legitimacy. This was accomplished by citing tragic examples of human suffering directly related to consumption of alcohol. A byline from the *St. Louis Globe Democrat* pre-

sented this event: "Ithaca, New York. John Kilstron drank lager beer at Pat Sheey's saloon this morning and died two hours later. Fred Hoffman drank beer at the same place this afternoon and is in a comatose condition without hope of recovery" (10 Jan. 1884, 6). Another example was entitled, "What Whiskey Will Do?" A man in a New York county awakens in jail. He asks, "is this a jail?" The reply, "yes." The man queries, "what am I here for?" The reply, "for murder." He inquired, "does my wife know?" The answer, "yes, she knows." Someone shouted out "why it was your wife you murdered?" The reader is asked to remember that "the constable who carried him to the jail sold the liquor that caused his drunkenness; the justice who issued the warrant was the one who signed his license; the sheriff who hanged him also sold liquor and kept a tin-pan alley" (31 Jan. 1884, 2). Another example calls for patriotism in the crusade against our nation's greatest crime.

Nine of our ten murders are direct products of the distillery. There never was a greater need for sturdy patriotism for heroic deeds than in this crusade against the direct cause of murder, against not only the besetting sin of the age, but our greatest national crime. (17 Apr. 1884, 5)

A direct correlation was asserted between liquor and crime. The warden of the prison in Jefferson City was asked, "what effect would the closing up of saloons in the state have on the population of the penitentiary?" The warden replied, "it would reduce it ninety percent." He further suggested that out of the 1,400 inmates, 1,050 came to the penitentiary as a result of saloons (31 Jan. 1884, 5).

The Cimeter reflected the temperance movement in citing alcohol for all social ills. Great effort was taken in reporting the association of alcohol with death, crime, and corporate policies of business. A letter from the superintendent of Wisconsin Central Railroad states that, "no man is fit to be entrusted with the responsibilities of a railroad employee who uses any form of intoxicating liquors" (10 Jan. 1884, 5). According to *The Cimeter*, it appears that poor workmanship, crime, murder, and social deviance are directly related to, if not caused by alcohol.

An apparent self-righteous perception of self worth by the temperance movement can be found as the moral condition of the great cities of Chicago, New York, Boston, and San Francisco is discussed.

Their aggregate wickedness is so enormous that one wonders at that divine long suffering which saves them from the fate of Sodom. But is not their marvelous preservation attributable, at least in part, to the presence of the many righteous souls which they contain? Our cities have thousands whose prayers are incessant, whose influence is the salt that preserves. How important, therefore, to the life of cities, is the presence and power of the church. (10 Jan. 1884, 6)

Temperance followers condemned the wickedness of the cities, while sharing a Biblical vision of their role in society as the salt that preserves. In reality they are stating that their presence is the only thing holding back an impending doom or judgment similar to Sodom's. They see their role as important and significant. As one WCTU (Women's Christian Temperance Union) officer wrote, "we are the King's Soldier's absolutely and persistently moving under the King's order" (20 Mar. 1884, 4). The followers of temperance believed in their self-worth and their ability to bring about change. Note

how sharply these depictions of the evils of drink (if accepted) completely reshape the perceptions of the role of alcohol in society (as a normal, healthy, accepted part of life) prevalent before the temperance movement.

Perceptions of society held by the members of *The Cimeter's* audience were shaped through the use of concrete examples of the victims of alcohol abuse, which tend to be easily apprehended. Also, drunkenness is a problem that manifests itself in each individual drinker (as opposed to, for example, a flood or hurricane, where many are hurt simultaneously). Hence, the use of specific examples is an appropriate means for displaying the nature of the problem. Crime in general and murder in particular are directly linked to use of evil spirits. Here as well we find religious allusion ("King's Soldiers") employed. These factors combine to shape their view of contemporary society, so as to highlight the severity and extent of the problems caused by consumption of alcohol. Now, a solution was needed.

Prescribing Courses of Action

Clear prescribed courses of action could be found in *The Cimeter*. The basic course of action suggested by the editor was "to legalize prohibition and the sale of alcohol" (3 Jan. 1884, 2). Again the editor provided a course of action that might have been viewed as a solution; "we shall, however, support only good temperance men for office, regardless of the party to which they belong . . . to compel all political parties to join in the war against liquor power" (3 Jan. 1884, 2). It was plausible to see a mobilizing or uniting for an effort to gain sympathy from the political parties. After all, what political party would want to be against Christ, Christians, righteousness, morality and good? A subtle threat was issued to all parties who would not comply in fighting against liquor power.

As the paper grew in circulation—4,000 by June 1884 (19 Jun. 1884, 4)—so did references to the Prohibitionist Party (25 Dec. 1884, 4). The platform of the Prohibitionist Party was printed in *The Cimeter* (allegedly at the request of the readers) and a judgment made by the paper: "we believe that this National Platform embodies the true principles upon which to erect a grand party of genuine reform" (25 Dec. 1884, 4). Political expression increased over time in *The Cimeter*. When the Republican Party was silent over the liquor question in their platform of 1884, a stern rebuke was given by *The Cimeter* to the Republican Party (25 Dec. 1884, 5). The Republicans and the Democrats competed for the liquor vote, so good citizens should immediately withdraw from all connections with these parties (25 Dec. 1884, 3). Several distinct prescribed courses of action emerged from *The Cimeter*: (1) legalized prohibition, (2) support only temperance men for political office, (3) compel political parties to join the temperance cause, (4) endorsement of the Prohibitionist Party, and (5) open criticism of political parties.

This indicates how the temperance movement (as exemplified by *The Cimeter*) attempted to co-opt the competing political parties. This strategy is fairly obvious, for legislative means are often seen as a "quick-fix" for social reform. The government has the power to eliminate this problem (or so it might have seemed prior to the failed prohibition experiment), so this is an apt means for implementing a solution. Of course, withdrawal from the party

is a threat that, if carried out, vitiates this option. *The Cimeter* may have been better off counseling its readers to secure places in their party's hierarchy to ensure the acceptance of their reforms.

Mobilizing for Action

The editor of *The Cimeter* viewed the paper as a sounding board for generating unity for action.

The Cimeter will not be neutral, but independent. The paper will express convictions on great moral questions that enter into politics. We shall utter our convictions. We shall defend everything that is good and pure and oppose everything that is bad and impure. We shall occupy no equivocal ground on any great moral question, effecting public welfare. (3 Jan. 1884, 2)

The "we" in the above quotation could be understood to represent the newspaper; however, in the broadest sense, it could refer to the temperance movement on a whole. Editor Hughey wanted to provide a first class "Christian family paper" (3 Jan. 1884). Hughey really was calling for the uniting of "Christians" for the paper's sake and of course the temperance cause: "We appeal to the Christian temperant men and women of this country to sustain us in our work, and help us put just such a paper as proposed in every household" (3 Jan. 1884, 2). If "Christians" could be united for the cause of temperance, the political and governmental leaders would have to sympathize with the movement. This unifying of "Christians" for action represented the possibility of a strong political coalition.

Perhaps the most significant uniting, organizing, and arousal for action was within the different temperance groups, i.e., Good Templars, Christian Temperance Union, Women's Christian Temperance Union, Junior Templars, and Neighborhood lodges. These varied organizations gave opportunity for everyone to participate, from a small cellular structure to state and national organization. *The Cimeter* devoted a page for the purpose of listing the activities of St. Louis temperance organizations (3 Jan. 1884, 5). The printing of these activities would hopefully create the public image of action for the organizations and the temperance cause.

The Cimeter attempted to unite and organize "Christians" into the temperance cause. The possible emergence of a strong political coalition was the shared vision. Clearly, the publication of temperance organizations' activities gave a public image of action for the cause. These efforts contributed to the mobilization for action.

Sustaining the Movement

Another function of *The Cimeter* was sustaining the temperance movement. The membership had to remain committed to the cause. *The Cimeter* attempted to reinforce the membership's commitment while providing reasons for the membership to feel gratified in what they were doing for temperance. The mandate for *The Cimeter* was to keep temperance people sober, and several strategies were used to accomplish it. One such strategy was the publication of articles by a physician who presented medical findings on the effects of alcohol on the human body. The general theme of these articles was clear: consumption of alcohol is bad for the human body (4 Jan. 1884).

If one is already a temperance member, then articles of this nature would reinforce the temperance position.

A second strategy used stories about "Intemperance." These stories used largely emotional appeals to reinforce the need for a life of temperance. Examples of pathos are found in all the stories:

Friends of intemperance are the enemies of this country. Oh! Could those fathers and mothers look into the future and see their sons, once noble and true, now on the verge of the drunkard's grave.

Young men, did you ever stop to think how the word drunk sounded? Did you ever think what misery and woe you bring upon your friends, when you degrade your manhood by getting drunk?

The temptation of the social glass . . . two angels sit on his shoulder, one reminds him of mother and home while the other urges him to please his companions, besides, what's the harmlessness of one glass. . . . The first glass will start you down the road of ruin! How it crushes the heart of the poor wife . . . sitting at home, before dying embers . . . listening for husband's steps, alas, they were not. He lingers at the bar . . . starving family . . . children suffering from the cold. (3 Jan. 1884, 2-3)

A third strategy in *The Cimeter* focused on the youth membership. Stories dealt with truancy, dialogue for girls, while establishing or reinforcing an attitude against the dreaded demon rum (3 Jan. 1884, 4). Great efforts were taken to enlist and indoctrinate youth into the temperance movement. The emphasis on youth was a preventative means to an end. Keep the youth from the dreaded demon rum, and the movement will become strong. If youth can be committed to the cause, then the future outcome might produce the desired change.

The judicious use of emotional appeals has its place in committing the readers to the movement. The constant awareness of the movement and its activities clearly functioned to sustain the movement. Finally, the emphasis on youth is a good strategy for ensuring the longevity of the movement.

Conclusion

The Cimeter exemplifies an important instrument of communication for a unique social movement: the temperance newspaper. This newspaper attempted to transform perceptions of history by altering the past, present, and future into Biblical terms. The temperance movement, by transforming perceptions of society and history, established a coherent world view that functioned to reduce temperance (a social and personal subject) into a religious and moral issue. This reduction drives the specific strategies employed by the movement. For example, the use of strong emotion in describing conditions of alcoholics, their families, and their ruin was a definite effort to alter society's perception of the liquor business. It is also important to recall the self-perception of the temperance movement as a righteous movement. They were God's chosen for a moral cause.

Courses of action were constantly embedded in the pages of *The Cimeter*. The call for people to disassociate themselves with the Republicans or Democrats must be considered significant. This represents a complete turn around in the paper's policy. The original position of *The Cimeter* was that it would not be political, nor have anything to do with party politics. Apparently,

practical considerations forced a change in policy as the paper gave an open endorsement of the Prohibitionist Party.

Perhaps the most obvious function of *The Cimeter* was its effort to sustain members of the movement. Constant reminders of the cause were printed on the pages. The purpose of temperance and successes of temperance throughout the country were printed repeatedly to encourage readers to abstain and support the cause. *The Cimeter* became the voice for many of the temperance organizations in Missouri, and in this capacity it functioned to sustain them. The printing of special notices, calls for commitment for more involvement helped sustain these groups.

The issue of maintenance (keeping people sober) was a fundamental concern for *The Cimeter*. This temperance paper sought to explain the problems that might be considered setbacks, justify strategies and reinforce members of the cause. The paper attempted to provide reasons why temperance people should be sober, strongly committed, and experience a sense of satisfaction for their position.

This case study of *The Cimeter* as a part of the temperance movement also reveals the utility of Stewart's functional approach to the rhetoric of movements. Rhetoric is an instrumental tool, and movements are purposeful, not purposeless. This approach to movement criticism focuses the critic's attention on goals or ends a group should attempt (e.g., transforming perceptions, mobilizing for action) and aids the critic in uncovering and displaying a movement's strategic responses to these needs. Different movements may be forced to employ different strategies for achieving their functions. For example, *The Cimeter's* reliance on religious appeals could be out of place in other movements. While the "creation-science" movement (an oxymoron if ever there was one) could (and perhaps should) rely on religious appeals, it would be inappropriate for the opposing movement to do so. So, the utility of Stewart's approach is in focusing on the key functions or goals a movement attempts to accomplish, while the strategies for implementing those strategies should vary from movement.

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ASSESSMENT OF A RHETORICAL TRANSFORMATION: JUDGE MILES LORD'S COURTROOM STATEMENT TO A. H. ROBINS EXECUTIVES

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"You have taken the bottom line as your guiding beacon
and the low road as your route. This is corporate
irresponsibility at its meanest."
Judge Miles Lord¹

The preceding remark was uttered by Judge Miles Lord in his Federal District Courtroom on February 29, 1984. It was part of a statement addressed to three corporate officers of A. H. Robins Corporation: E. Claiborne Robins, Jr., president and chief executive officer; Carl Lundsford, head, research and development; William Forest, vice president and general counsel. These individuals were present to accept an agreement between Robins and a group of women who had brought suit against Robins. In filing the suit the women claimed that Robins' Dalkon Shield, an intrauterine device, had caused them unnecessary pain and physical injury. The purpose of the session was for the representatives of Robins and the plaintiffs to accept officially the settlement agreed upon by both parties. Thus, Lord's thirty minute statement that largely assailed Robins' defense of the Dalkon Shield was unexpected.

Until Miles Lord read his statement, Dalkon Shield litigation was generally framed in institutional language of the legal system. By employing novel metaphors, vivid symbols, and negative images, however, he framed Dalkon Shield litigation with language of cultural significance. He argued that Robins was more than a corporate actor involved in litigation and that Robins was a corporate predator threatening the safety of an unknowing public. With such framing, the product liability interpretation of the dispute became secondary to issues of good versus evil, rich versus poor, and greed versus decency. This transformation, although apparent throughout the statement, is best captured in his final comment to the Robins executives, "Please in the name of humanity lift your eye above the bottom line. You the men in charge, must surely have hearts and souls and consciences." Thus, Judge Lord became the rhetor to invest the Dalkon Shield dispute with cultural

¹ Excerpt from remarks made by Judge Miles Lord in his Federal District Courtroom, Minneapolis, Minnesota, February 24, 1984. All subsequent quotations and phrases found in the essay are taken from Lord's courtroom statement (extended passages are cited specifically). See Lord.

implications; he became Robins' denouncer and champion of society's values.²

By speaking in terms of American values, Lord transformed the Dalkon Shield case from a legal dispute into a moral imperative. In doing so, he addressed the particularly elusive topic of corporate moral responsibility to society as a whole. Since, according to Lord, legal sanctions against Robins had not increased responsibility, a moral denouncement justifiably occurred. Hence, Lord stepped out of his role as legal arbiter and condemned A. H. Robins for moral corruption. The purpose of this essay is to examine Lord's courtroom statement as a rhetorical transformation from legal judgment to moral condemnation. This examination from the individual to the cultural will demonstrate the significance of Lord's rhetorical transformation as it pertains not only to A. H. Robins, but to the whole of corporate America. The speech is worthy of study because it represents an uncommon if not desperate response to a common yet perplexing problem that demands attention: To what extent should corporations be morally responsible to society? Before examining how Lord applies this question to Robins, a brief background of the Dalkon Shield Affair is warranted.

Background of the Dalkon Shield

The Dalkon Shield was acquired by Robins from the Dalkon Shield Corporation in June 1970.³ Within two weeks after the acquisition several senior level officials of Robins discovered the product's reported pregnancy rate was too low and that the device's safety was questionable.⁴ Despite this knowledge, Robins marketed the product in January 1971. Moreover, when the introductory campaign commenced, A. H. Robins had not conducted clinical trials on this medical device to answer questions related to safety issues and higher than expected pregnancy rates (Tuttle 2504).

By mid-1972, physicians and users complained to Robins about unexpected pregnancies and medical complications linked to the Shield (Engelmayer and Wagman 64). These problems continued to plague the device, and it was subsequently removed from the American market in June 1974. Since initial litigation in 1972, Robins has elected to defend the product's safety and efficacy.

Rhetoric of Moral Corruption

When disputed facts find their way into some institutional framework, typically a legal or quasi-legal one, a sociolinguistic transformation occurs

² For a discussion of the challenges facing a rhetor seeking to transform an issue from one interpretive framework to another, see Klumpp and Lukehart.

³ The history of the acquisition, marketing and legal defense of the Dalkon Shield is chronicled in three books: Engelmayer and Wagman; Perry and Dawson; Mintz.

⁴ Remarks about the Dalkon Shield's safety and inaccurately reported pregnancy rate circulated in a Robins' inter-office memorandum on June 11, 1970. The memorandum was sent by William Bender, vice president, administrative staff, to executive-level officers of Robins, including: William Zimmer, president and chief executive officer; Charles Morton, vice-president and general manager; Roy Smith, director, product development. See Bender.

that is particular to the institution (Gronbeck). A medical device such as the Dalkon Shield, for example, whose safety and efficacy is questioned may ultimately become a "product liability" issue in the legal world. At this institutional level, one party typically seeks to frame such an issue in institutional terms favorable to his or her position while an opposing party seeks to frame this issue in terms favorable to his or her position. This is a formal process within an institutional framework and involves officialization of the issue. When an issue first begins to be interpreted and acquires institutional meanings and significations, then low level officialization occurs (Gronbeck 162-63).

If an issue is not resolved via court or out-of-court settlements, then the issue remains in the framework and is usually considered by a different set of actors possessing higher status. This process occurred in the Watergate Affair; as the burglary incident moved to higher levels in the judicial system, it was interpreted by attorneys possessing higher status and prominence than those prosecuting and defense attorneys who participated in the initial legal officialization of the dispute. In some cases the institutional framework of the legal system is insufficient to resolve an issue of corruption. In situations where the indicated party is perceived to have assaulted core values—a society's reason-for-being—then cultural as well as institutional sanctions are warranted. At the cultural level the populace becomes the offended party.

Such was the case with A. H. Robins, and two interesting features are worth noting since they affect the nature of the rhetoric of corporate corruption with respect to Lord's statement. First, Lord's indictment of corporate corruption on the part of A. H. Robins came after Robins agreed to an out of court settlement, leaving morality, not legality in question. Second, even though the lawsuit against Robins involved payment for product liability issues, Lord stressed the moral significance of the matter, signaling outrage over a lack of conscience. Lord noted that Robins could not be cleansed of this act simply by paying for damages, punitive or otherwise. The guilt, he argued from the bench of the federal courtroom, struck a much deeper chord regarding fundamental values of society. Thus, the context from which he spoke provided him with a ceremonious forum to underscore and magnify the fact that moral issues concerning core societal values were at stake.

In matters of corporate corruption, the sociolinguistic process is perhaps the most crucial aspect in determining guilt. As opposed to political corruption, where minor acts of lying and stealing may become heinous crimes against society in certain cases, corporations resist such labels since "corporations" do not steal. People steal (Friedman 126-31). In embracing this interpretation, representatives of A. H. Robins denied personal responsibility and, therefore, resisted the sociolinguistic process in their attempts to de-officialize the apparent corruption. Lord labels this position as a lack of conscience while speaking to Robins' representatives:

It is not enough to say, 'I did not know.' 'It was not me.' 'Look elsewhere.' Time and again each of you has used this kind of argument in refusing to acknowledge your responsibility and in pretending to the world that the chief officers and the directors of your gigantic multinational corporation have not responsibility for the company's acts and omissions. (72)

To Lord the "accumulation of corporate wrongs" is a manifestation of "individual sin," and as such, he argues that the representatives of Robins are responsible for selling a hazardous product to the public. To right these wrongs, an admission of guilt would be a necessary first step. However, as Lord notes, Robins refused to do so. "In the face of overwhelming evidence," he states, "Robins denies its guilt and continues its monstrous mischief." Furthermore, he points out that in light of several thousand claims settled against Robins over the Dalkon Shield, the corporation offers no indication of changing its "morality." On the contrary, profits continue to mount, he notes, suggesting that Robins has not significantly suffered "any penalty whatsoever from these litigations." In other words, legal sanctions have not changed corrupt behavior.

The moral conflict involved in the issue before Judge Lord not only stems from assigning individual guilt to the actions of a corporation, but also from the corporation's commitment to the profit motive at the expense of public safety. According to Lord, while the Dalkon Shield had damaged its corporate credibility to some degree, Robins' success as a whole had not suffered. Therefore, Robins has not atoned for its acts of corporate corruption. To support this claim, Lord points to the irresponsible behavior of Robins' officials:

The company has not suffered, nor have you men personally. You are collectively being enriched by millions of dollars each year. There is as yet no evidence that your company has suffered whatsoever from these litigations. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary. (75)

To complete the sociolinguistic process, Lord uses such terms as "instruments of death" and "deadly depth charge" to describe the Dalkon Shield, creating symbolic meaning on three paradigmatic levels: facticity; institutionalization; and cultural significance (Gronbeck 158–59). On the level of facticity, these symbols directly correspond with sense experience (Gronbeck 158). From this primary level, Lord categorizes—names—the data accumulated on the Dalkon Shield with terms like "death" and "deadly" whereby the Shield becomes associated with or transformed into something that "kills" and threatens society's ability to procreate.

At the institutional level, Lord abandons the language of the judiciary and adopts the language of religion to add specialized meaning to the act. Corporate wrongs, he notes, are manifestations of individual sin. He sets the moral tone of his statement by admitting that he engaged in "no small amount of prayer" while contemplating the matter, and at one point he appealed to the Robins officials by stating: "Confession is good for the soul, gentlemen." "Face up to your misdeeds and rectify this evil situation." Hence, he affirms, by negating Robins' corrupt legal tactics, widely held beliefs associated with the proper functioning of a society. In essence, Lord contends that Robins has displayed a fundamental disregard for society's basic need to survive and reproduce.

With respect to Judge Lord's emphasis on religious references, the significance of Lord's rhetorical transformation bears a striking resemblance to the biblical story of David and Goliath. While Lord played the role of David, physically smaller and seemingly less powerful than his adversary, the cor-

porate Goliath, he nevertheless propelled a morally charged message that stunned his huge opponent. The outcome was not entirely the same as in the ancient story, but the symbolism coincides. When faced with a powerful giant that threatens public safety with selfish motives, truth and moral conviction must come forth to protect the innocent. As in the case of David, the incident revealed Lord's ultimate faith in the high road of morality, above which no corporation rules. And while he did not bring Robins completely down, public response to his statement was supportive.⁵ A member of the House of Representatives responded by inserting the statement into the *Congressional Record*, noting it was an eloquent call for corporations to meet their "moral as well as bottom line business obligations" (E3256-58). The unusual courtroom remarks precipitated an increase in Dalkon Shield litigation as well (Walsh 1). The remarks also prompted Roger Tuttle, the first in-house attorney to handle Dalkon litigation, to confess that he had burned damaging documents after Robins lost its first major lawsuit in 1974 (Schwadel 3). Finally, the statement and its influence on increased litigation contributed to Robins' decision to declare bankruptcy in 1985.⁶

Conclusion

When Lord completed his remarks to the Robins officials, he acknowledged that he had become a partisan advocate for the plaintiffs. While he would later defend his statement as appropriate under the rubric of an independent judiciary, he was aware that Robins would challenge the appropriateness of his courtroom statement. In retrospect, Miles Lord became a committed rhetor against Robins' legal defense of the Shield. As a result of his direct experience with its legal strategies and tactics in defense of the intrauterine device, he became concerned that this particular corporate defender, possessing a strong balance sheet, had an unfair advantage against its opponents in the legal arena.

Lord's concern was reasonable and extends to other corporate actors. The ability of many financially successful corporations to retard litigation, to delay the judicial process in extended product liability suits, is well documented (Moskiwitz and Ivey). This factor coupled with the fact that few, if any, operative institutional/ceremonial places exist outside the legal arena for corporate wrongs to be examined and purged from society, raises concern as well. The scarcity of such "places" means that unlike political corruption, where ceremonial frameworks are more available, corporate corruption is likely to be considered primarily in the legal arena. Thus, the ability for this society to purge itself of corrupt corporate predators, such as Robins, in a "full blown degradation ceremony at the cultural level" may be remote.

The result of this situation may well produce a legal arena whereby confrontations are unequal because corporate financial resources subvert the legal process. This "advantage" can reduce the effectiveness of the legal adversaries who are unable to match the financial resources of their cor-

⁵ See, for example, "Damage Control," and "Depth Charge."

⁶ For a discussion of how filing bankruptcy is used as a legal strategy to defend corporations in all types of litigation, including product liability, see Moskiwitz and Ivey.

porate counterparts. If this situation is widespread, then the implications for the legal system (and therefore justice) are not good. If this was the scenario Miles Lord witnessed as a presiding judge in the Dalkon Shield litigation before his court, and there is evidence to suggest such a scenario existed, then his decision to ignore norms of judicial restraint and to become the rhetor denouncing Robins' anti-social actions becomes understandable, and—at the cultural level—warranted.

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RESOLVING PARADIGMATIC DISPUTES AS A PRE-DEBATE ISSUE: A MODEST PROPOSAL

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Certainly the controversy over the appropriate paradigm for adjudicating both policy and non-policy debate rounds has been extensive in recent years. After all, paradigms are the lens through which critics view “reality” in the debate round (Rowland, 1982, p. 133) and, as such, exert substantial influence over both the debate process and individual debate outcome. The recognition that knowledge of critics’ paradigm is of paramount importance in the audience analysis process has been instrumental in the rise of published “Judge’s Philosophy” packets, as well as the frequency of formal and informal oral interaction between participants and critics before rounds begin.

At the same time, it is clear that increasing numbers of debate critics are willing to employ the debate round as a forum for resolving theoretic disputes, including paradigms (Cross and Matlon, 1978; Dempsey and Hartmann, 1986). A recent survey of CEDA critics (Gaske, Kugler, and Theobald, 1985) discovered that the *tabula rasa* paradigm was easily the most popular critical lens. Consequently, rounds that pivot on issues such as whether the resolution is a statement of probable truth, whether an example of the resolution is sufficient grounds for affirming the proposition, or whether examining policy implications is the appropriate method of evaluating a value judgment, are becoming increasingly frequent.

To be sure, those are important matters that require resolution but whether the debate round is an appropriate forum for resolving them is uncertain. Moreover, we question the wisdom of resolving paradigmatic disputes at the same time as other issues are decided, at the close of the debate. Rather, we will argue that the paradigm for evaluating a particular debate round should be decided *before* the round begins. Doing so, we believe, will result in fairer, more substantive, and more productive debate. To build our case, we will examine: 1) the role of paradigms in academic debate; 2) The problems with resolving paradigm disputes during rounds; 3) An alternative approach; and 4) An analysis of the possible criticisms.

The Role of Paradigms in Academic Debate

For the majority of critics, paradigmatic argumentation is acceptable. Freeley (1981) studied paradigms and concluded that 72% of judges feel para-

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digms are arguable in competitive debate. Similarly, Cross and Matlon (1978) found that "... judges have shown a willingness to accept many new theoretical arguments in debate if the theory is cogently defended by the team presenting it" (p. 123). While some judges have inflexible paradigms, most judges can be persuaded to analyze the debate from a number of different models (Ulrich, 1982; Patterson and Zarefsky, 1983). Problems occur, however when confusion exists about what paradigm to use.

Paradigms influence the decision of the debate itself. A judge's decisions are often contingent on the paradigm he/she accepts in the round. After all, changing "lenses" through which to view arguments necessarily causes us to "see" differently. The important role of paradigms in influencing decisions is also manifested in the real world. Scientists decide upon the relevance of information based on the paradigm that is in operation. What "counts" as meaningful data in one framework may not in another (Rowland, 1982).

Debaters are often dismayed because judges' decisions appear to be inconsistent. One of the reasons for that perceived inconsistency is the absence of consensus on the various paradigms. Freeley (1981) argued that consensus among the judge and debaters may anticipate what standards will be applied in judging their effort. The lack of any clear paradigm in the round guarantees ambiguous and inconsistent evaluation of a debate (Rowland, 1981).

In sum, debate paradigms shape the issues and decisions in a debate round. Rowland (1982) argued:

Debate paradigms are important because they provide rules to which debaters adapt in their quest for ballots. As long as debates prefer winning to losing, those rules will play a major role in shaping debate practices. (p. 448)

The impact of paradigms on the issues and decisions in debate rounds is great. The problem with the current means of resolving paradigmatic disputes is that they are decided at the same time as other issues. A debater may advocate a number of positions that will be rejected because of the model that the judge accepts. This problem could be largely avoided if paradigms were decided before the debate begins.

Problems

One problem with arguing paradigmatic issues during a round is ambiguity. Rowland (1982) noted that:

The function of a debate paradigm is to provide appropriate standards for evaluating debates. If those standards are unclear or inconsistent, then neither the judge nor the debaters involved will be certain of their applicability. The resulting uncertainty will make the paradigm less successful in shaping debate toward good argument. Unclear or inconsistent paradigms produce argument that mirrors the paradigm itself—unclear and inconsistent argument. (p. 138)

This notion of paradigms mirroring arguments is not limited to unclear and inconsistent standards, however. A clear, internally consistent paradigm will also reflect arguments on substantive issues. We would define substantive issues as being those arguments that are inherent to the resolution, e.g., establishing significance, inherency and solvency. While paradigmatic argumentation would be defined as theoretical argument.

The problem is that if competing paradigms are defended by the two debate teams throughout the round, it is unclear what precepts the judge will be adhering to in casting his or her vote. Thus, if the paradigmatic issue is unresolved, what arguments are acceptable will be ambiguous. Indeed, a judge may be persuaded to accept certain aspects of a given paradigm and not others, making the issue much more unclear.

A second problem with arguing paradigms during a round is that it decreases substantive clash. Rowland (1982) noted that: "All paradigms define the world. They define the questions which may be asked and those that are not worthy of consideration" (p. 138). Yet, if competing paradigms are being argued throughout the round, then each team's substantive arguments for or against the resolution should correspond to their own paradigms. In other words, the questions that are "worthy of consideration" will be different for each team. Rowland further contended that "a good paradigm should provide a more accurate reflection of the issues being debated than its competitors provide" (p. 138). Yet, when competing paradigms are defended in the round, there are two reflections of the issues being debated, one corresponding to each team's arguments.

Ulrich (1982) noted that "A paradigm can either be imposed upon an individual debate by an external agent—or the paradigm can evolve from an individual debate" (p. 145). To these choices we would like to add a third: The paradigm can, and *should*, evolve *before* each individual debate. We adhere to the notion, as many do, that "the (debate) community should be open to a variety of competing paradigms instead of imposing one paradigm on all members of a field" (Ulrich, 1982, p. 145). However, there is a better way to determine what paradigm is most appropriate for a given round than having the debaters argue the merits of competing paradigms *during* the round, or by having the critic merely impose one (often without the knowledge of the participants). By having all participants in a given round—debaters and judges alike—come to a consensus on what paradigm to view the debate round through *before* the resolution itself is debated, several problems with arguing paradigms during the round could be overcome.

A Proposed Solution

A solution is not easy to conceive, since many different factors influence the debate round. What we advocate is holding a paradigmatic discussion before the first affirmative. During this mini-debate the judge would make a decision on the paradigm to be used in the round. The format would be as follows:

Judge discussion of paradigms—	1–3 minutes
Affirmative discussion—	1 minute
Negative discussion—	1 minute
Affirmative rebuttal—	1 minute
Negative rebuttal—	1 minute
Judge's decision	

We propose that the judge discuss the paradigm(s) that he/she understands and/or will accept, followed by a one minute affirmative discussion advocating one of those paradigms. If the negative agrees with the affirmative's

paradigm then the debate can begin. If, however, the negative disagrees, then the negative is given one minute to support another paradigm. If the affirmative agrees, then the debate begins. If the affirmative and negative still do not agree, they are both given one minute per team to advocate their paradigms. At the end of this four minute mini-debate, if consensus still does not exist, the judge weighs the various arguments and makes a decision on the paradigm he/she will adhere to. After the judge's decision the debate proceeds, following a short break (1 min.) for each team to assess strategy (e.g., choice of affirmative case).

Debaters have a variety of arguments available when discussing paradigms. For example, the affirmative could argue for adoption of a particular paradigm. Following the affirmative position, the negative could suggest that the paradigm is internally inconsistent, promotes undesirable argumentation, is unfair to the negative, and/or does not adequately address the central question posed by the resolution. Additionally, the negative could offer an alternative paradigm. Indeed, the judge would not be required to participate in the debate. If the judge has a specific paradigm he/she advocates, the debaters would have to support the judge's paradigm.

By utilizing this format, the role of the critic is decided at the beginning of the round. Because paradigms influence the issues and decisions in competitive debate, it makes more sense to resolve paradigmatic disputes before the issues are discussed.

The proposed solution would alleviate the problem of issue selection in a similar way. Debaters currently advocate a number of positions that could be rejected depending on the paradigm. If the debater were to know the paradigm before the round, they could construct clearer strategies. The debaters would know what arguments to initiate in constructives and extend in the later speeches, reducing the haphazard selection of arguments.

Paradigm resolution at the beginning of the round would also increase the familiarity and fairness of debate. First, by knowing the judge's paradigm the debater would be able to construct positions that adhere to it. Second, the eventual decisions would not be as difficult for debaters to understand, since the "lens" through which the arguments were viewed would be made explicit.

By discussing the paradigm before other issues, substantive clash during the debate would be increased. Instead of spending an hour repeating the reasons for various paradigms, debaters could concentrate on the substantive issues of the resolution. Moreover, understanding the paradigm used, and how the paradigm influences the decision-making process, would increase clash and should enhance the depth of substantive discussion.

Finally, establishing a paradigm at the beginning of the round would make the role of the critic clearer. It is not appropriate to decide on a paradigm before the substantive issues surrounding the resolution are presented in the round. For example, a judge's decision between hypothesis-testing and policy-making would be less confusing if the critic only had to listen to the arguments for and against each paradigm. Absent such a *priori* determination, the judge may have a negative arguing qualitative policy implications that are not absolute. At the same time, the negative argues that the judge is a hypothesis-tester and the examples advanced increase the chance of committing a hasty generalization. During all of this, the affirmative is arguing

that such arguments undermine the goals of debate, so in an argument skills, or communication skills paradigm the judge would still vote affirmative. At the end of the round, the judge must weigh, or wade through, the paradigmatic arguments knowing that the decision on the paradigm will decide the debate. This situation could be largely alleviated if the paradigm were decided before the round began.

Criticisms

Obviously, objections exist to any proposed change. Some criticisms of our proposal are worthy of consideration. The first criticism may be that such a written judge's philosophy statements would cure the problem (Dempsey and Hartmann, 1986), that altering the debate format is unnecessary. While we agree that judges' philosophies are an excellent tool, the format would still be desirable. Logistically, judges' philosophies are difficult to assemble, collect, and distribute at all but the *major* tournaments (and sometimes even then). Judges' philosophies indicating a *tabula rasa* position merely tell the debaters of increased *options*, not probable outcomes. And, our experience has been that *verbal* engagement with critics is actually enjoyable, and enhances the debate experience.

One may suggest that the solution would reduce the use of lay judges in debate rounds. The proposal would require the judge to begin the debate with an understanding of at least one paradigm. The objection would be that some judges do not understand any paradigm, so the use of lay judges would complicate the debate.

This is interesting but ultimately the criticism is false. Lay judges could use the opportunity to tell of their debate experience, cuing the debaters that a long discussion of paradigms would not be beneficial. The debaters would then understand that the debate might be judged on speaking merits. Lay judges discussing their perspectives would accrue additional benefits to the debater: 1) Any additional knowledge of the judge is beneficial, 2) An elaborate strategy would be less likely to be used, making the lay judge's decision easier, and 3) The judge would likely have a better understanding of the debaters' arguments.

In any situation, the ultimate decision is still in the hands of the judge. If the paradigm is decided at the beginning or at the end of the round the judge will still have to make the decision (Ulrich, 1982). Independent of the judge's experience in debate, his/her attitudes, beliefs and values have a profound influence on the paradigmatic decisions.

The third criticism that could be raised is that debaters do not understand paradigmatic issues enough to discuss them adequately beforehand. Patterson and Zarefsky (1983) suggested that debaters must be aware of the differences among paradigms, enabling them to adjust their arguments within the paradigms. If debaters do not understand paradigms, the mini-debate could be a disaster. This objection loses sight of the real issue, and in fact, it justifies our approach. Ignorance is no reason to overlook paradigms. Familiarity with paradigms and their importance to both the debate specifically and the resolution generally should be increased.

The fourth criticism might be that our proposal would unnecessarily change the format, increasing the time needed for each debate round. However,

the extra time required for the debate would be offset by the better debating that would occur. To spend four–seven extra minutes to listen to a discussion of paradigms is a small price to pay. The alternative is often an hour and a half of confusion. Preparation time could also be reduced by 1 to 2 minutes per side without a harmful consequence. Finally, the mini-debate need not last 4–7 minutes. Both debate teams and the judge could agree on the paradigm at the outset of the debate.

A fifth criticism could be that our proposal would be infeasible during elimination rounds. With the inclusion of two additional judges, the chance of reaching a consensus, before the round, on a given paradigm would be reduced. This argument does pose some limitations to our proposal. However, paradigmatic discussion before the round begins, even in elimination rounds, would disseminate more paradigmatic information to the debaters. Even if there was disagreement over the paradigm to be used, the debaters could try to adapt their arguments to each paradigm. Also, if two judges were hypothesis-testers, and one was a communication skills critic, the debaters would have a better understanding of how the round would be decided. Finally, if the *tabula rasa* paradigm is the most significant decision-making model (Gaske, Kugler, and Theobald, 1985) then chances are that all three judges would be open to paradigmatic consideration.

An additional criticism that could be voiced is the overall reduction of paradigmatic discussion. Some debaters may have more paradigmatic issues to discuss than is possible in the four minutes allotted. This problem is not as significant as it might appear. Very few debaters spend more than four minutes making new arguments regarding paradigms. More often the same arguments are simply repeated and, given Zarefsky's (1984) earlier argument on the nature of paradigm dispute, are simply irrelevant.

Finally, some may argue that paradigm discussions are not any different than other issues. Why not discuss topicality before the round begins? At first glance this criticism has merit; however, paradigms are unique in that they influence the judge's perceptions of *all* issues presented. Different paradigms create different implications for topicality, counterplans, etc. Hence, the discussion of paradigms before the round begins is uniquely justified.

The objections raised in this section may not be the only criticisms to our proposal. However, we would argue that these objections are outweighed by the advantages offered by changing paradigmatic discussion. Moreover, even if there are logistical problems with our solution, the philosophical underpinnings would still be intact. We need to decide paradigmatic disputes before other substantive issues.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it must be noted that in no way do the authors see this proposal as a "cure-all" for the problem of paradigmatic evaluation in competitive debate. We primarily wish to point out that, since all substantive discussion in a debate is predicated on paradigmatic assumptions, it makes sense to establish the paradigm *before* such discussion. While we believe the proposed format to be an adequate solution to the problem, our primary concern is the legitimacy of the philosophical underpinnings of the format.

We have identified a number of the problems associated with discussing paradigms while debating other issues. Hopefully, this paper will spark an interest regarding the role of paradigms in competitive debate. The time has come for debaters and judges to reach some agreement on paradigmatic disputes.

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THE CROSS EXAMINATION DEBATE ASSOCIATION: A TIMELINE PROFILE, 1985-88

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The Cross Examination Debate Association has experienced significant growth since it was founded in July 1971. It has grown from a regional organization (Southwest Cross Examination Debate Association) (Wood and Midgley) "to the largest collegiate debate organization in the country" (Ulrich). The Executive Secretary of C.E.D.A. is charged with recording and reporting the results of tournaments and regional and national standings to member schools. These reports can function as raw data to analyze the direction of C.E.D.A. as a significant element in collegiate debate. The reports from the 1984-85 season to the 1987-88 season provide useful insights into the nature of C.E.D.A. (C.E.D.A. Executive Secretary Reports).

Specifically, the national sweepstakes point system, the trends in the frequency of tournaments, and a month by month analysis of C.E.D.A. competition are examined in this paper. Through this examination, questions concerning elitism in the top rankings and regional domination can be addressed. Obviously, this analysis is limited by the accuracy and completeness of the C.E.D.A. reports, and this investigation has neither challenged nor found any reason to doubt the accuracy of these reports. Selecting these four years was arbitrary and limited by the availability of complete sets of data. An important shift in the procedure for calculating sweepstakes points occurred in the second year of the study. Prior to the 1985-86 year, all eight preliminary rounds were used for point calculation, from 1985-86 to the present the number of preliminary rounds scored was reduced to six.

C.E.D.A. Sweepstakes—How Are They Calculated?

National sweepstakes points, though somewhat controversial, are "an essential aspect of the work of the Cross Examination Debate Associations" (C.E.D.A. Constitution 7). While the formula for awarding points is too long to quote in full, a summary of the process includes the following procedures:

1. One point is awarded for each round won in prelims.
 - a. Two teams per school may receive points.
 - b. Even if there are no wins, each team receives at least one point.
 - c. Wins in all six preliminary rounds count or in an eight round tournament the last six rounds count.
 - d. The tournament must be C.E.D.A. sanctioned.
2. One point is awarded for each ballot won in elims.
 - a. No more than three ballots per elim round count.
 - b. Even with large judging panels, any split in the ballots is treated as a 2-1 ballot.
3. Tie breaker points resolve ties in the national standings.
 - a. Tie breakers are calculated for the six tournaments at which a school earned the most points.

- b. Five tie breaker points are awarded for first place, three points for a second place, and one point for a third place.
- 4. Points awarded are limited to a school's six highest point winning tournaments.
 - a. Low totals (LT) are informational statistics noting the fewest points earned once a school has competed in more than six tournaments.
 - b. Lincoln/Douglas debate is calculated at half the points that would normally be awarded to team debate. (C.E.D.A. Constitution 7-8)

The national sweepstakes points are viewed quite differently by the schools involved in C.E.D.A. For some, the prestige factor is compelling, for others the point system is a harmless appendage that flairs up only occasionally, for others the point system is perceived as counter productive. Regardless of position, the point system has been in effect long enough to assess patterns that have emerged.

National Sweepstakes—Closed or Open?

Two factors examined in this study may shed some light on the questions of how many national sweepstakes points it takes to earn a top ranking in C.E.D.A. and which schools actually achieve national ranking.

Points Needed for Top C.E.D.A. Ranking


Clear patterns emerged from the 1984-85, 1985-86, 1986-87 and 1987-88 Executive Secretary reports. The highest points won by a school (i.e., the National Sweepstakes Champion) in each season revealed consistent level of points needed to obtain that distinction. In 1985, UCLA won the top honors with 180 national sweepstakes points. In 1986 and 1987, Southern Illinois University won the top honors with 156 points each year. In 1988, SIU challenged UCLA's high of 180 but fell two points short for a National Sweepstakes Championship total of 178. However, the shift in the C.E.D.A. rules after the 1984-85 season makes it more difficult for a team to achieve such high team totals since only six preliminary rounds count, not all eight.

One way to determine how good these sweepstakes totals are is to calculate the maximum possible points that could be earned in one year. If a school had six perfect tournaments (with each tournament breaking to octofinals), then 198 national sweepstakes points could be earned.¹ Breaking the 198 total is possible since some tournaments qualify for double or triple octos,² but clearly the range of 156 to 180 points for the National Sweepstakes Championship reflects six exceptional tournament performances.

The National Sweepstakes Championship winner has been a fairly closed shop for the four years studied. In fact, only six schools have won the National Sweepstakes Championship since 1972:

¹ If all six tournaments not only broke to octofinals but did so in two separate divisions, then the total points possible could increase from 198 to 216.

² C.E.D.A. policy governs the elimination rounds a tournament may submit for points based on total number of teams in a division. So while it is possible to institute quarter finals with eight teams, for C.E.D.A. points that division must have a minimum of fifteen teams.




California State University, Long Beach ('72, '75)
 University of Arizona ('73 and '74)
 Brigham Young University ('76, '78, '81)
 California State University, Northridge ('77, '79, '80)
 University of California, Los Angeles ('82, '83, '84, '85)
 Southern Illinois University ('86, '87, '88)

In the last seven years, the National Sweepstakes Championship has been won by either the University of California at Los Angeles or Southern Illinois University. In the seventeen year history of C.E.D.A., all six National Sweepstakes Championship winners have won that honor at least twice and typically three times.

If we extend the analysis to include the schools reaching the top ten C.E.D.A. national rankings, the predictability factor increases. To qualify for the top ten, a school will have earned 119 national sweepstakes points with at least twenty-four tie breaker points and a low point total no lower than thirteen. The total of 119 national sweepstakes points occurred in three of the four years studied. The only exception was 1988 when the total slipped to 118 (less than a one percent change).

When examining the top twenty-five or even the top fifty schools, the pattern continues. While not quite as stable as the top ten, the top twenty-five teams ranged from ninety-six points to one hundred points over the four years. The top fifty teams had a low of seventy-five and a high of seventy-nine points (top fifty data was not reported in 1985). Table I illustrates the number of national sweepstakes points needed to enter the top ranked schools in C.E.D.A. and reflects how stable those numbers have been over the four years studied.



Schools Qualifying for Top Rankings

A second factor, which schools actually make it to the top C.E.D.A. rankings, reveals that the answer to the question "Are the top rankings a closed or open field?" is yes and no. Table II illustrates the frequency of schools qualifying for the top ten and top twenty national rankings. Three schools earned top ten rankings all four years studied (University of California at Los Angeles, Southern Illinois University and Macalester College). Four schools earned top ten rankings in three of the four years studied (Central College, Southwest Missouri, Florida State, and Brigham Young University). Three schools earned top ten rankings for two of the four years (Cornell, Air Force and Miami of Florida). Thus, ten schools earned top ten rankings more than once in the four years studied.

Ten schools qualified once for the top ten rankings during the same four years including Weber State, University of Tennessee, Arizona State, Whitman College, University of Oregon, Carroll College, The College of William and Mary, Wheaton College, Kansas State and Marist College. Only three of the top ten rankings in the last four years were earned by schools who were not consistently in the top twenty.

The top twenty rankings yield roughly the same overall picture as the top ten. Five schools ranked in the top twenty in all four years, three schools ranked in the top twenty in three of the years and nine schools ranked in the top twenty in two of the four years studied. Twenty-four schools appeared in the top twenty rankings once during the four year period. So twenty schools made it to the top twenty more than once, and twenty-four made it only once. Thus, virtually the same ratio of new schools to schools qualifying more than once is found in both the top ten and the top twenty (a 1/1 ratio in the top ten, a 5/6 ratio for the top twenty which could be expressed as a 6/6 to a 5/6 set of ratios to emphasize the similarity).

These data are not self-evident and certainly not subject to a singular interpretation. Cautious interpretation would suggest that there are programs of C.E.D.A. debate that have achieved a level of national competitive competency and have maintained that competency over time. Further, the top national rankings have never been closed to "new" nationally competitive programs. While achieving a top ranking in C.E.D.A. is possible for schools traditionally outside the top rankings, the national sweepstakes points need to be competitive for these rankings seems highly predictable. The four years selected for study suggest a plateau in terms of the numbers of national sweepstakes points needed to be ranked in the top fifty schools in C.E.D.A. That plateau extends to the top twenty-five, top ten and even to the National Sweepstakes Championship schools.

Regional Bias: Myth or Reality?


C.E.D.A. began on the West coast and the leadership (the Executive Secretaries and Presidents) have been predominantly West coast based. The geography of both the origin and leadership have led to unproven and untested assumptions about "West coast domination" of C.E.D.A. Examining the available data on a regional basis reveals an apparent lack of regional bias in C.E.D.A.

Table III breaks down the top ten teams in C.E.D.A. sweepstakes standings by region for the years 1985 to 1988. The data is graphed first in terms of the number of schools from that region qualifying for a berth in the top ten national C.E.D.A. rankings. The second and darker column represents the "weighting factor" which is simply the number of times the same school from that region placed in the top ten. For example, in the Southwest region one school and one school only qualified for the top ten in the four years studied. However, that one school qualified four times (hence, the weighting factor of four). Whereas, in the Northwest region, three schools qualified for the top ten over the four years but each school qualified only once during the four years (thus, in this instance, the schools qualifying and the weighting factor are the same).

The data in Table III suggests that C.E.D.A. is not "West coast" dominated. In fact, no geographic region seems to dominate the national C.E.D.A. standings. The highest ranked region (Rocky Mountain) is only one to three schools ahead of all the other regions in terms of number of schools qualifying for the top ten. In terms of the weighting factor, the Rocky Mountain region is one to four units above the other regions. Simple measures of central tendency for the weighted factors across all regions reveal the balance among regions:

MEAN for all regions	= 4.9
MODE for all regions	= 4.0
MEDIAN for all regions	= 4.5
RANGE among regions: Low	= 3, High = 7


Even collapsing the Southwest, Northwest and Rocky Mountain regions into one "Western" unit does not support a geographic domination theory. Both the three Central regions and the two Eastern regions qualify a proportional




number of teams to the top ten when compared to the three Western regions. For the four years studied, C.E.D.A. seems free from geographic domination.

Month By Month Analysis of Tournament Sweepstakes Points


One measure of the health of an organization such as C.E.D.A. is the number of tournaments available to its members and the distribution of those tournaments during the competitive season. In any given year since 1984-85, close to 150 C.E.D.A. sanctioned tournaments were reported to the Executive Secretary. The tournaments reported totaled 141 in 1985, 154 in 1986, 147 in 1987 and 146 in 1988. This pattern suggests a robust stability in the number of tournaments being offered in C.E.D.A. competition on a yearly basis (see Table IV).





Another consideration is, are the tournaments spread evenly over the season or clustered in certain months? Table V breaks down the total number of tournaments by month for each of the four years. (The 1987-88 figures are included somewhat tentatively since dates for tournaments were omitted from most of the Executive Secretary's reports and they had to be cross referenced with the calendar.)

The data in Table V reveals that October, February, and March are the



most active months for C.E.D.A. competition (October averaged thirty-two tournaments, February averaged twenty-eight tournaments, and March averaged twenty-eight tournaments). November and January averaged twenty and nineteen tournaments respectively while December (traditionally the end of the semester for many schools) and April (the C.E.D.A. season officially closes early in April) have significantly lower averages.

The number of national sweepstakes points recorded by month follows a pattern similar to the frequency of tournaments reported. Such a correlation is expected and the only dramatic difference noted in Table VI is for the month of April. In April 1985, 584 sweepstakes points were recorded and this total jumped to 948 in the next year. This significant increase is explained by the addition of the first National C.E.D.A. Tournament. In April 1987, the number of tournaments remained fixed at two with 1,182 points reported. In 1988, the total number of points reported for April dropped slightly to 1,026.

The pattern and distribution of tournaments speaks directly to the health of C.E.D.A. competitive opportunities. With as many as seven or eight tournaments being offered nation-wide on any given weekend, schools participating in C.E.D.A. have both opportunity and choice.

Conclusion

Statistics and charts do not explain the nature of C.E.D.A. competition fully. They only begin to sketch out some of the patterns and raise some of the questions that need to be continually raised about not only C.E.D.A. but other forensic organizations as well. With several years of comparative statistics available, the accuracy with which the national sweepstakes reflects the goals of C.E.D.A. can be examined.

This research presents a basic analysis of issues important to many schools participating in the Cross Examination Debate Association as well as those interested in the integrity of debate as a co-curricular activity. While this research covers only the last four years, it lays the groundwork for extending the analysis to earlier years (1972-84) and continuing the analysis in the future on a year-to-year basis.

Future research in this area can also be expanded to include factors which may contribute to the C.E.D.A. national sweepstakes process. These factors could include: 1) what types of tournaments are attended by the top ranked schools, 2) what level of elimination rounds do the top ranked schools require before attending a tournament, 3) to what extent do novice debaters effect the national rankings and, 4) what is the impact of attendance at smaller regional tournaments versus larger national tournaments.

Based on the four years studied, the C.E.D.A. national sweepstakes is relatively stable and predictable. While many schools consistently earn high national rankings, newer programs often break into the high rank categories. Further, the national sweepstakes process seems free from any apparent geographical bias. This research also confirms the stable number of sanctioned tournaments held each year and their consistent distribution across the debate season. Hopefully, the information found in the research raises questions, prompts discussion and encourages additional research.

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