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SPEAKER AND GAVEL

*Quarterly Journal of
DELTA SIGMA RHO-TAU KAPPA ALPHA*

speaker and gavel

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SPEAKER AND GAVEL

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DSR-TKA AS AN HONOR SOCIETY

James H. McBath

University of Southern California

Honor societies have had a place in American higher education ever since Phi Beta Kappa was organized as a literary and debating society in 1776. This first undergraduate society was open to all qualified students since there were no fields of specialization. All colleges then in existence were for the purpose of training men for "the service of the church and state." A half century later, with the expansion of education into new fields, Phi Beta Kappa elected to remain with the liberal arts and sciences. Disciplinary or specialized honor societies then were formed as were learned societies in the parent disciplines. The 1880s saw establishment of Tau Beta Pi in engineering and Sigma Xi in scientific research. Most of our present honor societies were formed in the early years of the 20th century. Delta Sigma Rho (founded in 1906) and Tau Kappa Alpha (organized in 1908) were part of this new movement in higher education to recognize achievement.

DSR-TKA is a long-time member of the Association of College Honor Societies. TKA was admitted in 1937; DSR became a member in 1955. ACHS is a coordinating and consulting agency for national and international honor societies. The association cooperatively develops standards and definitions, considers substantive and administrative practices, and distributes information interpreting the honor society movement. Formed in 1925 by leaders of six long-established honor societies in colleges and universities, its growth at first was slow; only six additional societies were admitted during the 20 years following its founding. Some of these were approved only after extended debate.

The founding societies were Phi Beta Kappa, Tau Beta Pi (engineering), Sigma Xi (science), Phi Kappa Phi, Alpha Omega Alpha (medicine), and Order of the Coif (law). The minutes of an organizing meeting in late 1925 show that a Delta Sigma Rho representative was present, although DSR wasn't admitted to membership until much later. The most significant factor inhibiting membership was lack of agreement by the charter members on what constituted an honor society. The founders were certain that they "belonged," but who else would qualify? The issue finally was resolved at the annual meeting in Indianapolis, February 19-20, 1939, when the Council agreed on its definition of an honor society:

An Honor Society shall be defined as an organization in a college or university of recognized standing which . . . receives into its membership those who achieve high scholarship and who fulfill such additional requirements of distinction in leadership or in some broad field of culture as the organization may establish. (Moore)

The Council then identified two classes of campus societies that would be considered acceptable: scholarship honor societies, whose memberships include only individuals in the highest 20% of scholarship, and leadership honor societies, whose eligibility is based on leadership and rank in the highest 35% of scholarship.

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The period of greatest growth in ACHS came during the 1950s and 1960s when prominent societies in specialized academic areas, such as mathematics, sociology, philosophy, and business administration, were encouraged to apply for admission (White). Membership in ACHS always has been as selective as is membership in an honor society itself. Only a half dozen societies have been admitted in the last decade. The organization now includes the honor societies of virtually every discipline in its membership. Some groups, like Morter Board and Phi Kappa Phi, represent all academic fields, while others, like Psi Chi (psychology), Kappa Tau Alpha (journalism), and Phi Sigma Alpha (political science) represent specific fields. All of them share a requirement that scholarship and academic achievement are prime conditions of membership. In this standard, the honor societies differ from the scores of recognition societies that do not have a requirement of academic accomplishment.

Membership in ACHS has several ongoing benefits to student members and to DSR-TKA itself. First, affiliation with ACHS links forensics with the educational mainstream of university life. The academic community is familiar with the "honor society" concept and tends to regard honor society status as a stamp of substantive quality. Most educational leaders themselves belong to general or disciplinary honor societies; some of them are national officers of honor societies. Moreover, honor society affiliation is professionally advantageous because it certifies the goals and character of one's educational activity. Dossiers, vitae, biographical directories, employment documents, all record honor society membership. Employment interview forms for major corporations typically request this information. Since 1963 the US Civil Service Commission has permitted honor society members to enter Federal service at the GS-7 level (instead of GS-5) with a correspondingly higher salary. Honor society membership is viewed widely as a validation of educational achievement.

I mentioned earlier that ACHS also serves a consultative function. The national headquarters can identify societies with experience in membership records, financial planning, publications, member services, ideas for financial support, organization development, and the like. Honor societies share common problems and have developed a variety of strategies for coping with them. While most of the discussion at National Council meetings centers on the promotion of excellence in undergraduate education, topics dealing with local chapter maintenance also are discussed. These points were raised at recent meetings:

1. Societies should review their dues structures periodically. Dues of the ACHS member societies range from \$5.00 to \$30.50. About 75% of the societies have dues that are \$15.00 or above. The most frequently reported induction fee was \$20.00.
2. Some of the older societies augment their income through bequests and charitable gifts from alumni. Tau Beta Pi, for example, distributes a small brochure that describes tax-deductible gift opportunities.
3. Several societies use an award for chapter-of-the-year and/or sponsor-of-the-year to motivate chapters. A prime national project for Phi Alpha Theta (history) is its annual "Best Chapter" award. Part of the reward is

notification by the society's national president to the institution's president.

4. A number of societies make a practice of announcing election of officers and annual conferences in the *Chronicle of Higher Education*. CHE will print this information in its "Gazette" section.
5. Some societies encourage local chapters to send letters of congratulation to the parents and high school principals of initiates.
6. Societies are looking for ways to recognize sponsors. Some of them schedule a social event for chapter sponsors at the convention of their national professional association. One society distributes a pocket appointment book embossed with the sponsor's name.
7. A number of societies have developed guidelines or criteria for "chapters in good standing." They feel that an outline of affirmative standards is more effective than a set of negatively stated requirements.
8. Some societies follow the practice of sending a letter to the institution's president reviewing progress of the honor society on the campus. They find that their most effective "last resort" action on problem chapters is a letter to the dean or academic vice-president with a copy to the sponsor.
9. ACHS societies should be sure that their names appear in the printed commencement program and in bulletins of the institution.

Today the Association of College Honor Societies consists of 57 academic and leadership societies which have more than 9,000 collegiate chapters and 4 million members. The member societies, said Donald B. Hoffman (1979) in his presidential address, "are dedicated to the principles of recognition of academic excellence, to the support of learning in all its phases, and to the defense of and the improvement of an educational system that has proved to be far in advance of any previously developed system of education designed for all the people." The great national honor societies take vigorous interest in their ACHS affiliation and exploit its prestige on their campuses. They believe that university leaders know about, and most of them belong to, honor societies and that to them ACHS membership symbolizes academic quality. Affiliation with ACHS does not guarantee endorsement of forensics by the collegiate community, but it does identify DSR-TKA with a respected scholarly company and makes a clear statement about our purposes and standards.

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THE PERCEIVED BENEFITS OF POLICY DEBATE TRAINING IN VARIOUS PROFESSIONS

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In the simplest of terms, this essay addresses the question: Why encourage students to debate? One answer to this question lies in the motives of forensic coaches, as educators, to instill in their students the communication skills needed for success in a variety of future careers. Anecdotal evidence for the success of such educational efforts include Lee Iacocca's oft-quoted reminiscence of his ninth grade experiences:

... I joined the debating team, which was sponsored by Mr. Virgil Parks, our Latin teacher. That's where I developed my speaking skills and learned to think on my feet.

At first I was scared to death. I had butterflies in my stomach—and to this day I still get a little nervous before giving a speech. But the experience of being on the debating team was crucial. You can have brilliant ideas, but if you can't get them across, your brains won't get you anywhere. (16)

Freeley (18–26) believes that there are numerous other benefits to be obtained from participating in educational debate. These benefits include skills in political participation, leadership, argumentation, critical thinking, the integration or synthesis of knowledge, research, speech composition and delivery, evidence use, reasoning, listening, and persuasion. In addition, he claims that debate helps one develop social maturity, open-mindedness, ethics, and a knowledge of current social issues. These often repeated justifications for training students in debate are widely accepted as valid. However, are such claims truly justified?

The Research Question

The most obvious group of people qualified to answer this question is former debaters. Who else would know if debate lives up to its claims? This essay represents an attempt to measure the perceptions of former debaters, regarding the value and utility of their training in policy debate, in a systematic and deliberate manner. It is hoped that such a study will produce a more complete and more representative portrait of former debaters' perceptions of the usefulness of their debate experience.

Methodology

In order to help answer this question, a questionnaire was designed and sent to former policy debaters who were employed in the professions of law, management, ministry, and teaching. The sample was drawn from the

Table 1. The Benefits of Intercollegiate Debate Training

Debate Benefits	Lawyers		Managers		Ministers		Teachers	
	avg.	s.d.	avg.	s.d.	avg.	s.d.	avg.	s.d.
Political	4.52	(0.5)	4.46	(0.8)	4.33	(0.7)	4.21	(0.9)
Leadership	4.09	(0.6)	4.38	(0.6)	4.35	(0.6)	4.37	(0.7)
Argumentation	4.83	(0.4)	4.81	(0.4)	4.65	(0.5)	4.95	(0.2)
Critical Thought	4.74	(0.4)	4.65	(0.6)	4.68	(0.5)	4.89	(0.3)
Synthesis	4.57	(0.5)	4.65	(0.5)	4.42	(0.8)	4.79	(0.4)
Research	4.35	(0.6)	4.54	(0.6)	4.61	(0.6)	4.68	(0.5)
Speech Writing	4.35	(0.6)	4.62	(0.6)	4.48	(0.6)	4.79	(0.4)
Social Maturity	3.96	(0.9)	3.96	(0.9)	3.71	(1)	3.89	(0.7)
Speech Delivery	4.48	(0.7)	4.62	(0.6)	4.48	(0.6)	4.47	(0.7)
Open-mindedness	4.09	(0.7)	4.31	(0.6)	4.23	(0.6)	4.37	(0.6)
Use of Evidence	4.39	(0.5)	4.54	(0.6)	4.55	(0.6)	4.84	(0.4)
Reasoning	4.57	(0.5)	4.62	(0.6)	4.65	(0.5)	4.84	(0.4)
Listening	4.48	(0.5)	4.46	(0.6)	4.23	(0.8)	4.68	(0.5)
Persuasion	4.43	(0.5)	4.50	(0.6)	4.32	(0.5)	4.47	(0.5)
Ethics	3.39	(1)	3.52	(0.9)	3.68	(0.7)	3.26	(0.7)
Current Issues	4.00	(0.9)	4.23	(0.8)	4.42	(0.6)	4.53	(0.5)

debate alumni list of six different universities representing the midwest and the south. Both large public and small private universities were included in the sample. Ninety-nine former debaters responded to the survey. The respondents possessed an average of 2.8 years of experience in intercollegiate policy debate and 23.2 years of experience in their chosen profession.

The respondents were asked a series of Likert-type questions designed to determine the effectiveness of debate in teaching the skills mentioned by Freeley. The questionnaire also included open-ended questions designed to explore ways in which intercollegiate debate's ability to prepare one for these professions could be improved.

Results

The results obtained from the questionnaire tend to support the claim that debate is beneficial in the development of skills needed by the professions. When former debaters were asked if debate helped them develop professional skills, they responded overwhelmingly in the positive. Of the sixteen benefits, which Freeley claims for debate, fourteen received an average rating of over 4.2 on a five-point scale. The results are presented in Table 1, with a score of 5 indicating strong agreement that debate helped in the development of that skill and a score of 1 indicating strong disagreement.

In addition, when the respondents were asked if they would recommend debate to students preparing for careers in their professions, eighty-six percent said they would and only five percent indicated that they would not (see Table 2).

Discussion

In general, it seems that training in intercollegiate debate provides students with a positive experience which helps them to develop skills which will be

Table 2. Percentage of Professionals Who Would Recommend Debate

Profession	Recommend		Not Recommend		No Answer	
	No.	(%)	No.	(%)	No.	(%)
Lawyers	17	(74)	3	(13)	3	(13)
Managers	22	(85)	2	(8)	2	(8)
Ministers	30	(97)	0	(0)	1	(3)
Teachers	16	(84)	0	(0)	3	(16)
Total	85	(86)	5	(5)	9	(9)

needed in their professions. Several respondents, in response to the open-ended questions, reported that debate was the most valuable educational experience they received. One minister wrote, "The most useful training I received in college for the ministry came from my experiences in debate. Period." A lawyer wrote, "Personally, debate was the single most useful experience I had in 19 years of education." Another respondent indicated, "The lessons learned and the experience gained have been more valuable to me than any other aspect of my formal education." However, did the responses to the questionnaire provide any hints about ways to improve the educational benefits of the debate experience? The survey indicates two primary areas in which intercollegiate debate training could be improved: social skills and ethics.

The areas of social skills and ethics received the lowest ratings in all four of the professions that were part of this survey (see Table 1). In examining the answers to the open-ended questions, the weakness in both of these areas could be traced to an overemphasis on winning. A frequent comment was that competing in policy debate took inordinate amounts of time in preparation and travel—leaving little time for other activities (both social and educational). Additionally, a few commented that the emphasis on winning in intercollegiate debate created pressures to "misuse" evidence.

In conclusion, this survey overwhelmingly supports the idea that participation in intercollegiate policy debate provides significant benefits for those entering the professions of law, management, ministry, and teaching. The results also remind the forensic community that we need to make sure that we do not overemphasize winning to the point of interfering with the educational benefits of participating in debate.

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EXPERTS' PERCEPTIONS OF ARGUMENT STRENGTH AS A FUNCTION OF TYPE OF WARRANT AND TOPIC

Robert H. Gass
Judith A. Sanders
Richard L. Wiseman

Stephen Toulmin (1990) commented, "Books are like children. They travel about and make all sorts of friends you never expected." While Toulmin did not anticipate the impact when he wrote *The Uses of Argument* (1958), the Toulmin model can be regarded as an influential approach to understanding argumentation. While recent argumentation research has shifted away from a message-centered focus involving the study of what has been termed argument, to a person-centered focus, or what has been termed argument₂ (Cox & Willard, 1982; O'Keefe, 1977), we believe a renewed interest in traditional approaches to the study of argumentation is justified on at least two grounds. First, a number of worthwhile avenues for examining traditional argument practices, particularly *the manner and means* by which persons evaluate the strength of arguments, have not been fully explored. Second, the recent groundswell of interest in critical thinking in the promotion of critical thinking skills provides additional justification for focusing renewed attention on traditional approaches to the study of argumentation.

Nature of the Research Question

The present investigation was designed to explore the way in which experts of argument evaluate the overall strength or potency of three commonly recognized types of warrants. According to Toulmin's typology, the "warrant" embodies the active reasoning in an argument and thereby serves to authorize the inferential leap from the grounds to the claim. "Its function," Brockriede and Ehninger wrote, "is to carry the accepted data to the doubted or disbelieved proposition which constitutes the claim, thereby certifying the claim as true or acceptable" (1960, p. 45). Brockriede and Ehninger (1960) further categorized warrants into three basic types; *substantive* (warrants based on traditional, "logical" reasoning, e.g., example, sign, analogy, cause-to-effect, generalization, etc.); *authoritative* (warrants based on ethos or source credibility); and *motivational* (warrants based on pathos or emotion). Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik (1978) further amended Brockriede and Ehninger's warrant

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typology by stressing that warrants could be based on shared beliefs, values, or attitudes held by the recipients of an argument as well.

Review of Literature

There has been a paucity of research on the way in which persons assess arguments based on traditional forms of reasoning, or what Ehninger and Brockriede called "substantive" warrants. This lack of research interest is evident in Petty and Cacioppo's (1986) comment that "one of the least researched and least understood questions in the psychology of persuasion is: What makes an argument persuasive?" (p. 31). Benoit (1987) has similarly lamented "while considerable attention has been focused on message factors such as evidence and language variables . . . the impact of message arguments has only begun to receive the attention it merits" (p. 182).

Few research studies have used the Toulmin model to examine the way receivers evaluate argument strength. Of those that have been conducted, none has investigated the importance of the *type of warrant* employed on receivers' estimates of overall warrant strength or potency. Reinard (1984), for example, compared the effectiveness of arguments based on the "first triad" of the Toulmin model (claim, grounds, warrant) with those also containing elements from the "second triad" of the model (backing, qualifier, and rebuttal). He found that the effectiveness of arguments based on the extended model depended on the degree to which the topic was viewed as ego-involving and on the particular combinations of elements of the second triad included. Unfortunately, no information was reported as to the types of warrants employed in each of the message units. Furthermore, although two topics were utilized, Reinard failed to note whether the types of warrants employed were held constant across both topics. The possibility of warrant-induced interaction effects cannot therefore be ruled out.

Petty and Cacioppo have conducted several investigations on "argument quality" (Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981; Petty & Cacioppo, 1984; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Their approach, which involves generating several sets of arguments which are then designated as "strong" or "weak," has examined overall perceptions of argument quality. No effort was made to control for warrant type, however, so it is not possible to discern whether warrants of a given type elicited consistently higher message quality ratings from subjects than warrants of another type.

Benoit (1987) examined the effects of three factors—argumentation, expertise, and attractiveness—on subjects' cognitive responses to messages. He found "strong" arguments produced significantly more favorable thoughts and greater attitude change than "weak" arguments. This study might have bearing on the question of whether receivers' estimates of warrant strength are related to warrant type, inasmuch as the "strong" arguments used appear to have been based on *generalizations* whereas the "weak" arguments appear to have been based on *examples*. However, since warrant type (generalization versus example) was not manipulated across argument strength (strong versus weak), the inference cannot be reliably drawn that "generalizations" constitute a superior form of warrant in comparison to "examples." It may only be the case that *strong* generalizations are superior to *weak* examples.

The above studies, while few in number, unfortunately exhaust the available empirical literature which has a direct bearing on how receivers assess the strength or quality of traditional, substantive warrants. Regrettably, no investigations to date have sought to examine specifically what influence, if any, warrant type may have on receivers'—in particular, expert receivers'—overall estimates of warrant strength or potency. Since it appears reasonable that the type of warrant employed could influence perceptions of warrant strength, efforts to examine this area of argumentation would appear justified.

The present investigation was undertaken with the goal of partially remedying this gap in the literature. Specifically, experts of argument were asked to evaluate the strength of three types of traditional, substantive warrants (analogy, example, cause-to-effect) on three different topics (a pro-attitudinal topic—abolition of capital punishment; a counter-attitudinal topic—legalization of abortion; and an attitude neutral topic—a hypothetical construction project); resulting in a 3×3 design. The three types of warrants employed were selected because they represent relatively clear-cut, widely-recognized, prototypical warrant types. The three topics employed were chosen so as to represent respectively; an issue toward which the general public and college students were unfavorably disposed, an issue toward which the general public and college students were favorably disposed, and an issue on which the general public and college students had no known predisposition.

Method

Panel of Expert Judges

A total of 13 professors with doctorates in speech communication participated as our panel of expert judges. All had taught argumentation for a minimum of five years. Further, all were or are directors of nationally recognized debate programs and active scholars in the field of argumentation. The reasons for these criteria for selection of expert judges are threefold: (a) the judges should be expert scholars/teachers in the area, (b) the judges should have witnessed a wide range of argument types and potencies, and (c) the judges should be practiced at assessing the strength of arguments. Since there were three forms of the questionnaire (one for each topic), the 13 judges were randomly assigned one of the forms of the questionnaire, i.e., four judges completed one of two forms of the questionnaire and five judges completed the third form of the questionnaire. The numbers of expert raters assigned to the tasks of assessing the reliability of intersubjective judgments are consistent with the recommendations of psychometricians (e.g., Nunnally, 1967).

Questionnaires

One of the first tasks involved in the design of the questionnaire was a decision regarding the topics to be utilized for the three warrant types (e.g., analogy, example, cause-to-effect). A decision was made to use two topics which were controversial, timely, and of national significance. The two topics

Table 1. Sample Arguments

-
-
- | |
|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The easy availability of abortions is desirable in order to prevent a population explosion. Restrictions on the availability of abortions could cause a dramatic increase in population which, in turn, could worsen overcrowding, pollution, and resource scarcity. 2. Capital punishment should be abolished because a human life is too precious to waste. To execute a murderer without making every effort at rehabilitation is analogous to junking an automobile merely because it has a flat tire. 3. Contractor II would be a bad choice because he's quick to fly off the handle. For example, did you see how mad he got when the secretary asked him if he was wearing a hairpiece? |
|--|
-

chosen were “anti-capital punishment” and “pro-elective abortion.” The sides advocated were selected on the basis of recent public opinion surveys indicating the general public opposes the former topic and favors the latter. A third, hypothetical topic was chosen to serve as a “baseline” for comparison with the first two, more emotionally-laden topics. It was felt the third topic should be amoral in orientation, non-national in scope, and generally attitude-neutral. We arrived at the topic of choosing a contractor to construct a university building at a hypothetical campus.

The next step in the questionnaire's construction was the creation of arguments for each of the three topics representing each of the three warrant types. Criteria employed in the generation of the arguments were four-fold: (a) the arguments should be believable or plausible, e.g., not completely absurd; (b) the arguments should be fairly commonplace, e.g., representative of “real-world” arguments on these topics; (c) the arguments should vary in their perceived strength, e.g., there should be strong, moderate, and weak arguments for each of the three warrant types; (d) the arguments should be of approximately equal length.

Using the above criteria, we constructed 33 arguments each for the anti-capital punishment and pro-elective abortion topics (11 arguments per warrant type per topic), and 36 arguments for the hypothetical building contractor topic (12 arguments per warrant type). Exemplary arguments appear in Table 1. (A complete copy of the arguments is available on request to the senior author.) These three sets of arguments were randomly distributed in each of the three forms of the questionnaires. The expert judges were asked to supply two ratings for each argument: (a) their classification of the *type of warrant* employed, and (b) their evaluation of the *strength of the warrant* on a 1–9 scale, where 1 = extremely weak . . . 9 = extremely strong.

Results

A manipulation check was performed to determine if the three warrant types (analogy, example, cause-to-effect) were perceived as intended. A very high level of agreement among the expert judges was found for all three warrant types. On 28 of the 33 anti-capital punishment arguments, all four experts agreed as to the classification of the warrant types. On 33 of the 36 hypothetical building contractor arguments, all five experts were in agreement as to the warrant types. Finally, on 32 of the 36 pro-elective abortion

arguments, all four experts concurred in their classifications of the types of warrants employed.

Having confirmed that all three warrant types were consistently perceived as intended, the first step in the analysis of the data was to ascertain whether the variability in expert agreement as to warrant type or warrant strength was confounded by either the topic or warrant type. Analyses of variance for experts' agreement on warrant type revealed no topic ($F = 2.0$, $df = 2/90$, n.s.) or warrant ($F = 1.3$, $df = 2/90$, n.s.) effects. Also, analyses of variance on experts' agreement on warrant strength (i.e., the standard deviations for perceived warrant strength) revealed no topic ($F = 2.2$, $df = 2/90$, n.s.) or warrant type ($F = 1.5$, $df = 2/90$, n.s.) effects. Thus, we can conclude that there were no systematic biases in judges' agreement on warrant type or on their agreement on warrant strength due to the topic or warrant conditions.

Analyses of variance were also computed to determine if there were warrant or topic effects on the *perceived levels of strength* for the various warrants in the 102 arguments. We found significant main effects for both warrant type ($F = 12.0$, $df = 2/430$, $p < .001$) and topic ($F = 6.4$, $df = 2/430$, $p < .002$). In regards to the differences in the perceived level of warrant strength for the three warrant types, warrants based on examples (mean = 4.74) and cause-to-effect (mean = 4.73) were perceived as significantly stronger than warrants based on analogy (mean = 3.64). In regards to topic differences, anti-capital punishment arguments were perceived to be strongest (mean = 4.93), followed by arguments on the hypothetical building contractor topic (mean = 4.29), and the pro-elective abortion topic (mean = 4.00). Lastly, we found a significant interaction effect between topic and warrant type for judges' estimates of warrant strength ($F = 4.2$, $df = 4/430$, $p < .003$). An analysis of the cell means in the 3×3 table breakdown for topic and warrant type revealed that examples were perceived strongest in relation to the anti-capital punishment topic (mean = 5.61), cause-to-effect arguments were rated highest in relation to the pro-elective abortion topic (mean = 5.02), while analogies were perceived to be weakest in relation to the pro-elective abortion topic (mean = 2.79).

Discussion

One reassuring finding generated by this investigation was the discovery that experts of argumentation can agree on the classification of prototypical warrant types, at least for the three types of warrants included in this study. The results of the manipulation check confirmed that the experts who comprised the judges in the study were able to consistently classify the three warrant types (analogy, example, cause-to-effect) as intended. It must be remembered, however, that all of the arguments included in the study were constructed with a view toward making them as clear-cut and unambiguous as possible. "Real world" warrants are typically more ambiguous and often overlap. For example, less idealized warrants might embody characteristics which could be simultaneously perceived as substantive, authoritative, and motivational (a Surgeon General's warning about the hazards of smoking, for instance). Thus, it is likely that experts might have exhibited considerably less agreement had they been asked to classify warrants which were borrowed wholesale from real world arguments. An interesting avenue for fu-

Table 2. Comparison of Strong Arguments

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| 1. | <i>Analogy:</i> Abortion must be legally available to women in this country, because what cannot be obtained legally, some women will seek to obtain illegally. Just as efforts to control marijuana, gambling and prostitution have led to black markets in those goods and services, efforts to restrict abortions would undoubtedly lead to black market abortions. |
| 2. | <i>Example:</i> Abortions must be readily obtainable in cases involving rape or incest, or the victim would remain a victim for life. For example, a Los Angeles woman was raped by several gang members and, had she not been able to obtain an abortion, would have been forced to bear and raise the child of her assailants. |
| 3. | <i>Causal:</i> Abortion is necessary because it represents the most humane course of action in cases where birth defects are present that would cause an infant to suffer extreme pain with little or no chance of survival. To require that all fetuses be carried to term would force some infants to lead brief lives of unrelenting agony, while subjecting their parents to needless psychological torment. |
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ture investigation would be to explore the extent to which experts agree on warrants drawn from real-life public policy disputes.

A second, more important finding stemming from this investigation was the main effect produced for warrant type. Warrants based on analogies were rated as significantly weaker than warrants based on either examples or cause-to-effect reasoning across all three topics. For example while the arguments in Table 2 were all perceived to be strong, the analogy was perceived to be considerably less strong than the example or causal argument. This finding suggests that, at least for experts of argumentation, arguments based on analogies are viewed as providing weaker authorization for the movement from data to claim than arguments relying on examples or cause-to-effect-reasoning. Obviously, it would appear worthwhile to replicate this study using other varieties of substantive warrants (e.g., sign reasoning, generalization, etc.) to see how analogies fared in relation to other warrant types.

The finding that experts consistently rated warrants based on analogy as weaker than warrants based on example or cause-to-effect reasoning is not necessarily a reason to hold analogies in low esteem, however. Lest these results be misinterpreted as providing carte blanche for “analogy bashing,” it must be remembered that the present investigation did not examine the overall *persuasiveness* of warrant types, only perceived warrant strength or potency, and only according to experts of argument. It is entirely possible that analogies are persuasive in ways that are not perceived by experts as strictly rational. For example, analogies may be more vivid, more visualizable, more easily remembered, etc. It is also possible that analogies would receive higher ratings from laypersons than from experts. Experts of argument, such as those utilized in the present study, may be more predisposed than laypersons to view analogies as inherently fallacious. The results of this investigation *do* suggest that analogies function as a weaker form of warrant, but only within the confines of the present study.

The finding of a main effect for topic type probably doesn’t warrant further scrutiny. In all likelihood, the fact that experts consistently rated arguments for two of the topics (anti-capital punishment and the hypothetical construction project) higher than arguments for the third topic (pro-elective

abortion) probably reflects the private attitudes of the experts toward those particular issues. Stated simply, experts' attitudes toward these topics may not mirror those of the general public.

Lastly, the finding of an interaction effect for warrant type and perceived warrant strength holds important implications for furthering the understanding of argumentation theory and practice. It appears that experts do not evaluate warrant strength in isolation, but rather as a function of the type of warrant employed and the particular topic in question. That is, a warrant type which is perceived as strong on one topic may not be perceived as strong on another topic. Based on the results obtained here, advocates would be advised to consider the suitability of a particular warrant type *vis a vis* the particular topic in question, and vice versa.

While shedding new light on the question of how experts of argument evaluate traditional, substantive warrants, the present investigation clearly raises as many questions as it answers. Among the questions raised is how laypersons would evaluate the same warrant types on the same or similar topics. Another question raised is how other types of warrants (including authoritative and motivational warrants) would fare in comparison to the types utilized in the present investigation. Finally, the question of how warrants are actually evaluated deserves further empirical scrutiny. Specifically, future research needs to be aimed at uncovering the dimensions involved in the process of warrant evaluation. What conscious or unconscious criteria do receivers employ in evaluating the strength, or quality, or overall effectiveness of warrants? With the present study serving as an initial step in this direction, we hope to begin to ask and answer more of the above questions in future investigations.

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RONALD REAGAN AND THE STRATEGY OF METAPHOR: THE MAKING OF AN AMERICA STANDING TALL

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Many have sought to explain the appeal of the Reagan presidency. Hypotheses ranging from a "tough leader look" to the "power of the storytelling form," pepper our everyday conversations and scholarly journals. Reagan's metaphors, however, have been largely unexplored. Thus the purpose of this essay is to demonstrate how Reagan's metaphors dialectically motivate Americans to join in the transformation of an America made small by economic woe at home and Iran abroad into an America standing tall.

Of all our contemporary presidents, perhaps no one captured the hearts of the American people better than Ronald Reagan. Even in spite of some rather serious "misspeaks," a bit of diplomatic lying, some gun-running in Nicaragua, a policy of disinformation in Libya, and chaos in Reykjavik, Reagan's popularity remained unprecedentedly high (Goodman 8; Sidey 16). History, does, of course, have a way of debunking heroic leaders and shattering heroic dreams, yet our history textbooks may well remember Reagan as that Great Communicator who pulled the economy out of recession, who put the nation back to work, who increased the stature of the United States in the eyes of the world, and who, unlike his immediate predecessors, forged an identification with a vast majority of the American people.

Throughout the past few years, many have sought to understand Reagan's appeal. Hypotheses ranging from a "tough leader look" (Schneider 212) and a "familiarity of images" (Hart 224) to the "power of the storytelling form" (Fisher 121), the "myth of the western hero" (Rushing 25-26), and the influence of "astrological speculation" (*Time* 5) now pepper our everyday conversations and scholarly journals.

With the exception of a few isolated references to his "plain," "New Deal" and "World War II" type tropes, however, Reagan's metaphors have been largely unexplored. That oversight seems a costly one, for not only is Reagan's rhetoric replete with rich metaphors, but metaphor, as a process which unites and resolves contradictory experiences and situations, has much light to shed on the motivating character of language.¹ To ignore metaphor is to

¹ This conceptualization of metaphor as a dialectic process which unites and resolves contradictions emerges from the work of Kenneth Burke and Lawrence Grossberg. As a result of this work, I define metaphor as a linguistic act which functions to constitute, express, exploit, act upon, and overcome the contradictions and paradoxes created in a world of humanity's own making." See in particular Kenneth Burke, *Attitudes Toward History* (Berkeley: U of Cal. P, 1950); "Linguistic Approach to Problems

ignore a substantial portion of Reagan's rhetoric and to preempt a very potent understanding of human communicative behavior.

The purpose of this essay is to explore the richness of Reagan's rhetoric from a metaphoric perspective. Focusing specifically on the one address which presaged the major themes of his administration (the first inaugural), the essay outlines the tenor of Reagan's strategy, and then reveals the way in which his metaphors enact that strategy to shape experience into action.

The Presidential Strategy

On the day following Reagan's election to office, the *New York Times* headline read, "Reagan Buoyed by National Swing to Right." Yet a poll conducted and published by that same newspaper that same day indicated that there had been almost no change in the self-described ideology of voters between 1976 and 1980 (Schneider 213). Thus while Reagan may have personified a "rightist" philosophy, conservatism was not the main reason for his election. As political scientist William Schneider acknowledged, the voters were not voting for the essential merits of a conservative program, but for a *change*. "It is as if, having got (sic) nowhere for the past four years with Jimmy Carter at the wheel, the voters turned to Ronald Reagan and said, 'O.K.—you drive'" (221).

Exactly where Reagan was taking us was relatively clear; his "mandate" after all, was to restore the economy, curb inflation, increase the nation's military security and the nation's stature. Exactly how he was going to accomplish this mandate was not quite as clear—or at least to the nation's economists, politicians, and other trend-watchers looking for the rousing of a "silent majority" or for the building blocks of a "great society," the precise steps Reagan would take in changing the course of the country seemed elusive.

A close look at the inaugural, however, reveals the succinctness of a strategy designed to "create" a plausible and palatable image of America and Americanism. In particular, it appears that the uniqueness and significance of Reagan's strategy lies in the way in which his metaphors combine the myth of American materialism with the myth of American moralism.

According to Walter Fisher in "Reaffirmation and Subversion of the American Dream," the American Dream is comprised of two different myths—the myth of materialism and the myth of moralism. Materialism argues that if people work hard they will reap the rewards of power, stature and wealth,

of Education," *Modern Philosophies and Education, The Fifty-Fourth Year Book of the National Society for the Study of Education*, ed. N. B. Henry (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1955), 259–303; "Rhetoric—Old and New," *The Journal of General Education* 5 (1951): 202–04; *Permanence and Change* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965); and Lawrence Grossberg, "Marxist Dialectics and Rhetorical Criticism," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 65 (1979): 235–49.

For additional work which points toward this interpretation of metaphor, see George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1980); Max Black, *Models and Metaphor* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1962); Janet Martin Soskice, *Metaphor and Religious Language* (Oxford: Clarendon P, 1985); I. A. Richards, *Philosophy of Rhetoric* (New York: Oxford UP, 1965); and William R. Burch, Jr., *Daydreams and Nightmares: A Sociological Essay on the American Environment* (New York: Harper, 1971).

while moralism promotes our more altruistic and utilitarian values like "tolerance, charity, compassion, and true regard for the dignity and worth of each and every individual" (216). Thus materialism caters to the American *individual* and moralism to the *American* character.

Though these two myths are at odds with one another, in Reagan's rhetoric each become dependent upon the other for fulfillment. In the true spirit of metaphoric transfer, Reagan's metaphors create the superiority of the *individual* American by creating the superiority of the *American* character. Because we are "Americans" (all knowing, worthy, trustful), the Reagan metaphors suggest, we are therefore entitled to our many individual successes; because we have so many individual successes, we are worthy to be called "Americans."

Some 160 metaphors clustering around such themes as rebirth, fiscal responsibility, destruction, oppression, and discovery give form to Reagan's strategy of materialistic-moralistic transformation. More important, however, than the many individual metaphors and themes in the address is the way in which they tap into, exploit, and draw upon social, historical, and physical resources of the American experience. Like the metaphors in so many of Reagan's speeches, the inaugural metaphors juxtapose individuality with institutionality, grandeur with commonality, and heroic action with unheroic inaction, and in doing so, motivate the American people to join in the transformation from an America oppressed to an America triumphant.

Cluster One: Oppression Angles Upward

In "Order and Disorder in Anti-Abortion Rhetoric," Randall Lake argues that a common, recurrent pattern in many fields of thought is the descent-ascent pattern. That pattern works through spatial, qualitative, and attitudinal images which first present the human condition as moving downward, and then reverse the trend by projecting the image upward (425-43). While Lake's concern is with the way in which this pattern is exploited in the anti-abortion rhetoric, there is no doubt that it plays a major role in Reagan's overall strategy of transformation.

A quick glance through the inaugural reveals metaphors like GOVERNMENT RIDING ON OUR BACKS (2), the TERROR OF RUNAWAY LIVING COSTS (2), the PILING OF DEFICIT ON TOP OF DEFICIT (1), a WORST SUSTAINED INFLATION which PENALIZES, CRUSHES, DISTORTS, and THREATENS TO SHATTER (1), and AN ECONOMIC AFFLICTION OF GREAT PROPORTIONS (1)—all of which orient through a down-up vertical pattern. Centered around a fundamental contradiction between individuality and institutionality, and playing off of values like UP IS GOOD and DOWN IS OPPRESSIVE, LIMITS ARE NECESSARY and LIMITS ARE STRETCHED, the metaphors first create the illusion of distressed individuals being driven downward, and then mirror in that illusion a projected thrust upward to power, stature, and wealth.

Consider, for instance, a metaphor like GOVERNMENT RIDING ON OUR BACKS. A trite image by any standard, it is nonetheless powerful in exposing the contradiction between individuality and institutionality, and in motivating one to adopt both a personal and public philosophy of "enough." Quite literally the metaphor argues that government—something which we as

individuals created—now impedes our movement upward by standing both “in” the way and “on” the way. The federal government has placed us in a situation where we are unable to do what we want.

Beyond mere literal interpretation, the power of the metaphor to motivate one to act against the government takes its shape from the experiences of physical and historical oppression which it activates. Physically, the metaphor individuates the burden of being weighted down and the frustration of being kept down. Who has not experienced the childhood phenomenon of being “sat upon” by a sibling or playmate; who has not struggled to get up after stumbling under the pressure of a heavy package; who has not pitied the old woman bent over by the force of time? Rooted in our evolution from Neanderthal to fully upright human beings, and in our love for waterbeds and chiropractors, standing upright has become a most valued and natural stance. The downward motion of government established in the metaphor serves, then, to heighten a move upward; by dialectic implication, the metaphor entertains the possibility of a situation in which government is not burdensome, is not taxing, is not oppressive, and a situation in which the individual is not burdened, is not taxed, is not oppressed.

The physical push downward is not the only experience which angles the individual upward; the upward thrust is complemented as well by a historical posture of OFF OUR BACKS. As the freedom of individual action pushes against the oppressive nature of a socially created institution, we are remade into the flower children struggling to do our own thing, into the teenagers too long hassled by parents, into the workers overburdened by the unrealistic demands of those higher up. We are transformed, in other words, into the individuals who will no longer tolerate the self-degradation of being pushed around; we are reborn the “heroes” who are capable of fighting for our own beliefs and self-worth. The metaphor motivates the American people to say “enough” and moves us toward a new interpretation of our government.

Although weaker, PILING DEFICIT ON TOP OF DEFICIT reveals the same down-up pattern in motion. First, it plays upon our experiences of money STACKING UP and money GOING DOWN. For most of us, being “well-off” is symbolized by a stack of dollars; the fewer dollars in our possession—or the shorter the stack—the less wealth we have. In this case, what is PILING UP is not the green bills but the due bills. Thus the metaphor creates an unusual image in which the upward movement, the STACKING, produces a downward spiral, the DEFICIT. The result is a sense of being physically stretched, like the tortured heretics of the inquisition, as the gap between the top of the pile and the bottom of the financial hole widens. Notice, too, that it is individuality which suffers at the hands of institutionality. We are stretched not because of *our* inability to come to terms with our financial situation, but because Uncle Sam seems so unable to come to terms with his. It is the government, after all, which is piling deficit on top of deficit; it is the government which is forcing us to scramble likewise. The sense of “pressure” generated by the metaphor functions, once again, to motivate upward; not only must we “rise above” the debts that are keeping us down, but we must also overcome a government which prevents our moving upward and forward.

The physical distress these metaphors create is complete: the images push us down, pull us up, stretch us beyond recognition. Both their richness and their power is revealed in the way in which they climax in a reinterpretation of material conditions: exit the individual pursuing stature and wealth; enter the government threatening to MORTGAGE OUR FUTURE.

This physical abuse cluster is not, by itself, enough to transform America into a triumphant nation. Its emotion is resentment rather than dedication, desperation rather than faith; it is depressing rather than lofty. Material prosperity is a valued individual experience in Reagan's America. The transformation in motivation is found in the materialistic-moralistic dialectic in the American experience.

Cluster Two: Grandeur Amidst Oppression

Fisher notes in his essay on the American Dream that a materialistic philosophy is subject to subversion by those who experience its hollowness. Yet he also notes, perhaps ironically, that presidential candidates usually choose between either the myth of materialism or the myth of moralism to motivate support (160-61). Nixon, for instance, personified materialism while downgrading moralism; McGovern argued strongly for moralism while debunking materialism.

As suggested above, however, Reagan's rhetoric appeals not only to the materialistic freedom to *do* what one wants, but, paradoxically, to the moralistic freedom to *be* what one wants (Fisher 162). Cluster Two reveals this to be the case as well. While the first grouping of metaphors created the image of the individual—materialism—struggling upward, the second one creates the image of "the Great American Nation"—moralism. Metaphors like INAUGURATION AS MIRACLE (1), WATCHING WORLD (1), WILL AND MORAL COURAGE ARE WEAPONS (3), LAST AND GREATEST BASTION OF FREEDOM (3), and MONUMENTAL HEROES (3) help to fill out this notion of American grandeur.

Consider, for instance, the way in which the metaphors in the inaugural's introduction work within the images of ORDINARY and SPECIAL to differentiate America from every other nation. The full passage reads:

To a few of us here today, this is a SOLEMN and most MOMENTOUS OCCASION. And yet, IN THE HISTORY OF OUR NATION, it is a COMMON-PLACE OCCURRENCE. The ORDERLY TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY as CALLED FOR in the CONSTITUTION takes place as it has for almost two centuries, and few of us STOP TO THINK how UNIQUE we really are. IN THE EYES OF MANY in the world, THIS every four year CEREMONY we accept as NORMAL is nothing less than a MIRACLE. (1)

All of the metaphors here contribute to the grandeur of the American experience, but the motivating power of the passage stems primarily from the ORDERLY TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY, CALLED FOR IN THE CONSTITUTION, and IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD. Drawing upon the American penchant for life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, these three metaphors turn Washington, the city of governance, into the "Shining City on the Hill."

It is clear that Reagan's remarks are focused on the uniqueness of the American political experience. The ORDERLY TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY,

for instance, highlights the American passing of power and the systematic manner in which it is accomplished. The image is of the fine tuning, timing, and smoothness characteristic of triumphant Olympians passing the baton from one runner to the next. Now AUTHORITY is not a baton; literally nothing is physically exchanged when a new president takes office. A "smoothness" is highlighted nonetheless, dialectically implying a "non smoothness" that is characteristic of authority-passing in other nations. A COMMONPLACE occurrence momentarily engages and contradicts the notion that it is MOMENTOUS and SERIOUS, and yet it is its commonality which forges its uniqueness. America is special because of the consistency with which democracy continuously unfolds.

CALLED FOR IN THE CONSTITUTION deepens the image of a unique and special America. A reference to the constitution forges the historic sense of uniqueness founded in the constitutional experience. Though the constitution specifies the functions and duties of the American government, its name evokes a whole complex of unified experiences: the birth of the nation, the revolution, the founding fathers, and the holy writ. The metaphor recreates the determination of a young country wanting to "begin right," the dedication of a group of colonists willing to exchange their "Englishman" label for an American one, and the pride of a nation founded on democracy and freedom for all.

IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD solidifies the uplifting image of American grandeur as it personifies a sociality which affirms our view of ourselves. Not only do Americans think themselves "better" than other nations, but they assume that other nations concur with that assumption. Rooted again in the constitutional experience is the understanding that the American push toward freedom and democracy is an enviable position. Historian James Oliver Robertson notes, for instance, that the colonists saw the American Revolution as a struggle to preserve freedom *and* to expand the base for freedom in the world. "Freedom hath been hunted round the globe," Thomas Paine stated in *Common Sense*. "Asia and Africa have long expelled her—Europe regards her like a stranger and England hath given her warning to depart. O! receive the fugitive and prepare in time an asylum for mankind" (qtd. in Robertson 70–71). IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD then imbues the inaugural and America with a sense of worth and fosters a twinge of envy: America the nation is transformed into the proverbial candy store while the other nations appropriately assume their roles as the drooling kids standing outside, peering in. Thus the transfer of authority must be a MIRACLE because it occurs with commonplace accuracy only in America. Working back and forth between commonality and grandeur, the American character is fixed as god-like, superior, supreme, and enviable.

This same sort of contextualizing takes place near the end of the inaugural address as Reagan reminds us that:

Above all, we must realize no WEAPON in the ARSENALS OF THE WORLD is so formidable as the WILL AND MORAL COURAGE of FREE men and women. It is A WEAPON our adversaries in today's world do not have. It is a WEAPON that we as Americans do have. Let that be understood by those who PRACTICE TERRORISM and PREY UPON their neighbors. (3)

Here again is the re-making of something ordinary into something grand.

These metaphors take things thought to be common to many humans, like WILL and COURAGE and WEAPONS, and transform them into uniquely American properties. Our will and courage are not mundane ideals but our ultimate defenses against terror. Such metaphors tap into those deeply rooted and powerful myths which project America as the only protector of freedom. As Robertson notes, "the vision of Crusader, of Fortress, of Champion, of the freedom and democracy and happiness (the unique qualities) of the New World, is still the controlling vision" (27).

The moralistic thrust of this cluster of metaphors affirms both the notion that America has the power to be what she wants to be, and the belief that she is *already* what she ought to be. In contrast to the last cluster, these metaphors lift up and renew. Their emotion is predicated on dedication rather than resentment, determinism rather than oppression, faith rather than desperation. When these metaphors of grandeur are juxtaposed with the oppressed metaphors of the first cluster, an overall paradox between oppression and grandeur, materialism and moralism is energized. It is inconceivable that a great nation could be peopled by oppressed individuals. Thus we are great, Reagan admits, but simultaneously we are not great; the upward thrust toward greatness is marred by the downward push toward oppression. Without the freedom to *do* what we wish, the freedom to *be* what we want is virtually worthless. Thus a third cluster of metaphors designed specifically to encompass the oppression-grandeur paradox completes Reagan's unfolding strategy.

Cluster Three: Heroism Re-makes Oppression

Perhaps the most unique and inviting characteristic of metaphor is the way in which it brings together and resolves contradictory experiences. Thus, in Reagan's inaugural address, oppression and grandeur not only "meet" but easily interact and comfortably live side by side. They do so because a third cluster of metaphors creates an image of American heroism, and a hero, after all, is one who actively struggles against oppression to serve an openly social and virtuous end (grandeur).

From the pioneers to the Founding Fathers to the entrepreneurs, America has always valued the struggles of the hero. Always the loner, always the individual, the hero puts the needs of society above personal ambition and greed. Reagan taps into the experiences of the American hero when he literally calls Americans HEROES and when he re-individuates the triumphant emotionalism of hero Martin Treptow near the end of his speech: "America must win this war. Therefore I will work, I will save, I will sacrifice, I will endure, I will fight cheerfully and do my utmost as if the issue of the whole struggle depended on me alone" (4). In personifying this heroism, Reagan attempts to forge an American heroic identification. The power of such a metaphoric personification emerges from the way in which it "works out" the conflict between oppression and grandeur, namely that oppression is a necessary prerequisite for grandeur.

Reagan's metaphors also turn such a heroic image into a particularly American and particularly contemporary image: the contemporary American hero is not the frontiersman or backwoodsman, but the employee (Robertson 131). Reagan's heroes are not charting new courses, but quite simply are

working and being productive. Heroes, he tells us, are people who RAISE OUR FOOD, PATROL OUR STREETS, MAN OUR MINES, TEACH OUR CHILDREN, KEEP OUR HOMES, and HEAL US When we are sick (1–2). Heroes GO IN AND OUT OF FACTORY GATES, PRODUCE FOOD, AND SUPPORT GOVERNMENT, CHURCH, CHARITY, ART, AND EDUCATION (2). Thus the motivating energy of heroism emerges from the individuation of the logic of productive individuality, the historical experience which argues that the individual is the engine of progress and wealth. Again Robertson captures this emotion when he states:

In American belief, the individual has always been the primary economic unit of the society. Columbus discovered America, frontiersmen and pioneers led the way across the continent, the sturdy American yeoman tilled the soil and created the wealth, entrepreneurs started the businesses and made them thrive, and behind these rugged individuals had come civilization, government, and organized, cultivated society based on the wealth they discovered, created, and manufactured. The frontiers, the settlements, the businesses and industries, the cities and towns had all been made and made to grow by the industrious, productive economic activity of single individuals. (131)

Metaphors like REAWAKENING THIS INDUSTRIAL GIANT (3), UNLEASHING HUMAN INGENUITY (2), and INFUSED WITH THE CAPACITY (4) all tread upon what Dallek calls the age of consumerism (3), and each reaffirms the image of American greatness by hinting at a young America free from rules and free to develop her own society. Such metaphors individuate the excitement, energy, and advantage of a time gone by; forces like urbanization, modernization, and industrialization (and the activity they produced) come clearly into focus. Into the oppression of the present Reagan brings the grandeur of the past and surrounds us with the new thoughts, ways, and inventions which peppered the American horizon then, and motivates us to discover our ability to reenact that time again.

In this final cluster of metaphors, the contradiction introduced between individual oppression and national greatness is united and resolved. As individual oppression continually pushes against the reality of national greatness, America and the American people are transformed into a nation that is great because of the heroic struggle against oppression. We are allowed to claim moral greatness by merely enacting the materialistic greatness that is so much a part of the individual American character. Note, however, that in order to be a part of Reagan's America we must not only discover and live the contraction between oppression and grandeur, but we must actively embrace both the grandeur and the oppression. To choose to continue our oppression is to cut ourselves off both from our moralistic and materialistic rights. We cannot be an American unless we recognize our grandeur; we cannot realize that grandeur unless we actively embrace our oppression.

The Strategy of Metaphor: Transforming the American Psyche

Reagan's vision of America is powerful and compelling. The images are common and easy to visualize as Hart noted (212–37), and together, as Fisher would suggest, weave a palatable story of American life ("Rhetorical Fiction" 119–26). Ultimately, however, the power of those images comes from the way in which they tap into, exploit, and draw upon the many social, historical,

and physical experiences of the American experience. Indeed, so thoroughly do Reagan's metaphors invoke *the* American experience that it is difficult to not accept Reagan's images at some level. Reagan renewed the American spirit, and Reagan biographer Lou Cannon is absolutely correct when he states that "Reagan had a vision of what America had been and what it should be again, and he tried to translate this vision into reality. The government of California was not the same after Reagan left it, and the government of the United States will not be either" (416).

Metaphors, however, are not neutral. They have, in Hastings' words, "assumptions at their roots" which lead to particular kinds of action (184). Lakoff and Johnson go further, capitalizing on metaphor's ability to highlight and hide, construe and constrain. "In allowing us to focus on one aspect of a concept," they state, "a metaphorical concept can keep us from focusing on other aspects of the concept that are inconsistent with that metaphor" (10). Edelman, too, underscores this notion when he suggests that "each metaphor intensifies selected perceptions and ignores others, thereby helping one to concentrate upon desired consequences of favored public policies and helping one to ignore their unwanted, unthinkable, or irrelevant premises and aftermaths" (67). Reagan's metaphors are no different; while on the surface they appear to offer "something for everyone," be it materialism or moralism, in reality they are skewed heavily in favor of the "haves" and heavily against the "have nots."

First, while one becomes a hero in Reagan's America by struggling and by rising up, materially rising is a hierarchical move. In reality, a hero is one who rises up only by rising up over something or someone. For such grandeur to triumph, there must be oppression. For us to feel superior about our stability as a nation, there must be those we see as inferior for their difficulties. Indeed, as Dallek notes, there is an unintended contradiction to Reagan's posture of self-reliance, "for a man who puts independence high on his list of virtues, it is ironic that he is so preoccupied with performing rescue missions and so in need of people who require saving" (17). Thus in spite of the vision to move forward together, to rise up and stand tall as a nation, the metaphors make it impossible for everyone to participate: some people must enact the role of the downtrodden.

And the problem, of course, is that those who find themselves in the downtrodden role have no place in Reagan's America. Reagan's metaphors transform the materialistic-moralistic myths in such a way that one becomes impossible without the other. Those who welcome oppression, who battle the odds to hold jobs, to save money, and to accumulate possessions become the epitome of American heroes. Witness the couple featured on the cover of *Parade* magazine: "Their average annual income is less than \$30,000, but super savers Jim and Amy Dacyczyn have been able to buy a farm house and two cars, and they say their four children lack for nothing" (4).

Those, however, who have lost the battle, who have lost their jobs, their savings, and their possessions are denied both heroic status and American status as well. Seldom do we hear about the working mother who had to go on welfare to support her children, or the mid-level manager now living with his family on the street, or the factory worker displaced from her job. Indeed, in Reagan's America these people simply do not exist. As Reagan

told supporters during the 1984 presidential campaign, "If I listened to him [Dukakis] long enough, I'd think that we were in an economic downturn and that people are homeless and going without food and medical attention and that we need to do something about unemployment" (*Newsweek* 10).

Unfortunately, Reagan's vision of America has stayed even as he has departed. As a result, we still cannot see, as Robert Reich points out, that "the poorest fifth [of American families] now have less than 5 percent of the nation's income, while the richest fifth have more than 40 percent" (42). We perhaps sense, but still do not grasp, Ralph Whitehead's observation that the contrast between Upscale America and Downscale America "is sharper than ever" (53). We may suspect something is amiss as "yuppie haunts" like "the health club, the gourmet takeout shop, the pricy boutique, and the atrium" begin to replace "the union hall, the lodge, the beauty parlor, and the mill" (Whitehead 53), but we have yet to act. And we will not, of course, until the metaphoric underpinnings of Reagan's brand of materialistic-moralistic transformation loosens its hold on contemporary America.

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THE DEGRADATION RITUAL OF JESSE JACKSON: ASSESSING THE DAMAGE OF "HYMIE" AND "HYMIETOWN"

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When Jesse Jackson embraced Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in 1979, Jackson said he was only following tradition. After all, it is common for men in the Middle East to hug one another. This simple gesture, nevertheless, provoked outrage among Jewish Americans, so Jackson publicly explained that the hug did not mean he was embracing Arafat's politics. However, that explanation did not make peace with Jewish Americans. Further actions, such as hugging Syrian President Hafez Assad, continued to cloud Jackson's relationship with American Jews (Atkinson 4). Groups, such as "Jews Against Jackson," began to "hound" the black Southern Baptist preacher demanding responses from him concerning his stance on Jewish issues. Jackson's relationship with American Jews was damaged, and he was continually "dogged by questions about his relations with Arabs" ("O'Neill," *The Washington Post*).

Jackson never had a good relationship with Jewish Americans, but his troubles with them did not reach its peak until five years later during his quest for the 1984 Democratic Party Presidential nomination. *The Washington Post* [henceforth, *The Post*] reported that Jackson had made ethnic slurs against American Jews. A journalist from *The Post* reported that Jackson "has referred to Jews as 'Hymie' and to New York [City] as 'Hymietown'" (Atkinson A1). These verbal slips, or gaffes, were widely publicized by the media, and Jackson had the task of mending his damaged character not only to American Jews but to all Americans. After all, his Rainbow Coalition prided itself on civil rights issues.

Gaffes, especially those made during political campaigns, can create quite a public stir, and the media usually has the role of publicizing such embarrassing flaws in a politician's performance. Gold (1978) says that the media has a "self-appointed role of exposing the 'real' person beneath the candidate" (306). Jackson's ethnic gaffes generated much media coverage despite the fact that the original story buried Jackson's slurs in paragraph thirty-five (Atkinson A1).

The rhetorical strategies following a political gaffe are interesting to examine because they may take a variety of forms, and the office-seeker "must protect his reputation by countering damaging charges" (Gold 307). Bennett (1981) says that the "degradation rituals" that follow a political gaffe "contribute both to the definition of the electoral process and to the information needs of voters who must make decisions within that process" (310). He claims there are specific stages that can be identified when analyzing political gaffes and their aftermath.

This essay argues that Jackson—a leader of civil rights and anti-discrimination—failed to properly assess the magnitude of his verbal slips against Jews. That failure resulted in damaged credibility and loss of character for

Jackson. An analysis of this sort may yield insights into how Presidential candidates must deal with gaffes, and the inquiry may also provide insightful information regarding how the American public reacts to apologies from gaffe-committing political figures. A central question for this paper then becomes, "How did Jackson's rhetorical reactions to the media's coverage of his gaffes about Jews affect his campaign for the Presidency?" In order to address this question, it is necessary to, first, examine Jackson's gaffes and the immediate aftermath of the accusation to place in context his apologetic situation. Second, this paper contains a brief review of the most pertinent literature on apologia paying particular attention to Bennett's method since it succinctly integrates many of the studies in apologetic income and political gaffes. Next, an analysis of Jackson's situation will be conducted in order to identify the candidate's rhetorical responses. Finally, the analysis will conclude with assessments of the short and long-term effectiveness of Jackson's rhetorical strategies and the rhetorical implications of this analysis.

Jackson's Gaffes

The biggest question after *The Post* ran the story that revealed Jackson's slurs was, "Did he actually make such comments?" *The Post* reporter who wrote the story could not remember specific sentences that Jackson used, but he could recall that the Presidential hopeful "said something like, 'All Hymie wants to talk about is Israel'" and used the words "Hymie" and "Hymietown" in other references (Friendly B14). Since the gaffes were not widely reported (*The Post* was the only paper to print the remarks), it was not known if Jackson did indeed make the derogatory statements. Jackson's comments were supposedly made in late January of 1984; the article did not reveal the slurs until the middle of February 1984. Why was there a delay? The reporter who disclosed the information, Milton Coleman, said that he felt the remarks were made in private and "off the record" since Jackson had asked the reporters to "talk black" during a casual luncheon at a cafeteria at Washington National Airport in January of 1984. "Talk black," according to Coleman, was a "formulation" that Jackson used when he wanted to speak candidly to reporters (Friendly, 1984). It was during that candid conversation with a few reporters that Jackson repeatedly used the word "Hymie" and "Hymietown." A transcript of the actual conversation is not available. Coleman then found out that Jackson used such words with other reporters, so he assumed that the comments were now public knowledge. Another *Post* reporter, Rich Atkinson, had been working on a story about Jackson and his relations with American Jews. Coleman gave Atkinson his information and Atkinson put it deep in his story. Other papers and media then ran follow-up articles.

Jackson met with officials at *The Post* to discuss the validity of the reports. After all, a second reporter who had been with Coleman and Jackson in the cafeteria on January 25 had "no recollection of Jackson using the terms" ("Post Reaffirms" A13). The Democratic Presidential candidate left *Post* headquarters without asking for a retraction and without threatening a lawsuit.

Despite the questions regarding the manner in which the news was gathered, it is important to note that Jackson had to "fix" his image—especially since his past was tainted (at least in Jewish eyes because of his ties with Arafat and other Middle Eastern anti-Israeli nations). The apologies that Jack-

son gave in response to his gaffes are the central artifacts of this analysis. His various public comments and apologies, especially speeches in New Hampshire and at the 1984 Democratic convention in San Francisco, will serve as the rhetorical subject of this analysis. But before Jackson's responses to the reports are examined, it is necessary to review some of the most pertinent literature on apologetic discourse and related studies.

Apologetic Discourse and Degradation Rituals

There are a number of articles and studies on apologetic discourse in communication, and of those articles, many focus on political—especially Presidential—apologia. Rosenfield's (1976) study of Richard Nixon's remarks before Nixon left the White House and after the Watergate Scandal is an example of such Presidential apologetic discourse. Nixon, instead of admitting at least some degree of guilt, portrayed "himself as a romantic prince who remained steadfast in the face of personal adversity" (19). In essence, Nixon portrayed himself as victim and failed to admit guilt. This portrayal failed to create an image of a tragic leader who should be pitied. Rather, his answer to the public came off as a "fairy tale told by an undignified sulk" (19).

Gold (1978) says that political apologia has taken on greater importance due to the media—a fact that Nixon definitely knew. A candidate's ethics are very important in a political campaign; personal character and integrity are "spotlighted" by the media in order to find the person behind the candidate. Gold's examination of the 1976 Presidential candidates and their various apologetic scenarios during the race reveals that the media's extreme focus on a candidate's credibility "has elevated the ritual of self-defense to a highly important one" (315). The failure of a candidate to successfully defend his or herself against a major or minor mistake takes on "great symbolic importance" (316).

Political apologia is an important aspect of campaign discourse, and rhetorical scholars have done extensive work in analyzing candidates' strategies. However, Hoover (1989) notes that despite the extensive work in political apologia, scholars have neglected to consider "the speaker's personal values as perhaps the key factor that shapes or 'constrains' his or her apology" (236). When a candidate does commit a mistake that seems to require an apology, the best chance for success, according to Hoover, would be to possess an audience's same values. One particular mistake in political communication that may go against an audience's or audience faction's value(s) is the gaffe.


Bennett has taken an interest in studying gaffes in the political arena. He says that political gaffes require much energy and effort from the transgressor to repair his/her political image. Barbar (1978) refers to the gaffe as a "stress test" in a campaign. If a candidate can control and correct the gaffe, he or she can pass the test. These verbal blunders may seem like simple slips of the tongue that are given attention only by a "simple-minded public and a sensationalistic press" (Bennett 311). On the contrary, Bennett says, "Gaffes and the degradation sequences they can initiate may well constitute the last predictable form of democratic accountability in our electoral process" (312). In addition, gaffes made by political leaders and the manner in which they repair their image help answer questions about leadership qualities the public looks for in leaders.

Bennett, drawing from Garfinkel's (1956) work on degradation ceremonies, identifies three defining characteristics of political degradation rituals. First, others must regard the gaffe as an improper behavior and against certain norms. Second, the offender is left to repair his or her image. And finally, the transgressor must choose a rhetorical gambit that satisfies the audience. Bennett says that spectators, or the audience, can make two judgements after a gaffe is made: one, it is not very important; and two, it is important and must be put in some kind of "normative category" to judge the importance of the violation. If it is considered important, the candidate has the responsibility of repairing his/her image and must choose a response. This response may not always be the best choice. Different gaffes require particular responses and political figures may not choose the optimal strategy. A rhetorical gambit, or apology, must do three things: one, it must indicate recognition of the gist of the problem; two, it must demonstrate an understanding of the correct behavior; and third, it must illustrate a sincere ability to display correct behavior.

Four well-known apologies in Bennett's degradation model each attempts to "save face and to minimize suspicion that the offense entailed flagrant disregard for the normative order" (316). Bennett draws heavily from both Abelson's (1959) and Ware and Linkugel's (1973) works in resolution and apologia, respectively. The four symbolic operations are: one, denial, or a refuting of facts or intention; two, bolstering, or reminding the audience of good character; three, differentiation, or re-defining the situation; and four, transcendence, asking forgiveness, showing a willingness to improve or re-dedicate him or herself, and illustrating a larger purpose or lesson of the gaffe. These operations may be used individually or in combination for a rhetorical strategy.

Bennett's model goes beyond just a simple apologetic analysis. The method provides focus for an analysis of a specific type of mistake and the rhetorical strategies that follow a gaffe. In addition, this method offers a logical way to evaluate the appropriate strategy taken by a transgressor. Bennett says that there is "some sort of logic at work in degradation sequences" (319).

Optimal Response Strategies Associated with
Different Formulations of Gaffes



A gaffe may be regarded in two basic ways: one, clarity of categorization (ambiguous or unambiguous); and two, magnitude of alleged offenses (a minor or major offense). For example, if an ambiguous gaffe was made by a politician and it was regarded by the public as a minor offense, then it would be illogical and perhaps damaging for that politician to offer a detailed and expansive apology for such remarks. On the other hand, if a politician makes a very explicit and unambiguous gaffe that is regarded by the public as a major offense, then it would be illogical and perhaps politically disastrous if the politician denied such accusations and refused to give an apology. This way of evaluation may reveal much about Jackson's choices and lend support to the strength of Bennett's model.

Application

Jackson received quite a response from the media and public. Editorials across the nation called for an apology from Jackson. For example, *The Post* ("Mr. Jackson's," 1984) demanded that Jackson give Americans an explanation and an apology. *The Post* stated:

There are certain words—we don't have to spell them out—that are impermissible in political discourse. . . . A politician or public figure who is caught using them, in public or private, can claim that he does so innocently; but such claims will be met with skepticism . . . Mr. Jackson owes the Americans whose votes he seeks an explanation and an apology (A18).

The rest of the editorial argued that Jackson's comments offended not just one group but all of America. What made the political gaffe so important and even somewhat ironic was that Jackson's Rainbow Coalition continually stressed its vision of an American melting pot of all races (Strasser, Monroe, Cooper, and King, 1984). The ethnic controversy damaged Jackson's credibility as the leader of the coalition.

Jewish leaders also had harsh words for Jackson. Nathan Perlmutter of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith said that Jackson reiterated his past views towards the Jewish people. Perlmutter said:

Jesse Jackson's image in the Jewish community is conditioned by more than his views on the Middle East . . . he blamed Jewish domination of the media for some of the news coverage he has gotten . . . I have no question that Jews, like most groups who have a commonality of interest, will be listening closely to what he says (Joyce A10).

Indeed, Jackson's comments were regarded negatively by Jewish leaders as well as the media. His violation was out of the normative order—especially since his Rainbow Coalition prided itself as a "hodge podge" of cultures and races. Jackson's gaffes undermined his fundamental political message of a true American melting pot. As Perlmutter stated, Jackson's slurs offended not only the Jewish community but America as a whole. A public figure who promotes civil rights and an un-racist America but also makes ethnic slurs is bound to be cast in the spotlight of attention. It was up to Jackson to repair his image and restore his credibility.

The second and third degradation ritual characteristics seem to blend closely together. The transgressor is left alone to repair the damage, and then he or she must select a rhetorical gambit. Jackson was the only one

who could correct his problem and salvage his credibility. Reporters and Jewish groups put Jackson on the defensive by asking him for an explanation (Strasser et al., 1984). Since Jackson was viewed as a political preacher of discussion and reconciliation, he had to continue this tradition lest he risk further damage to his credibility. As *The Post* asked in an editorial condemning Jackson's choice of words shortly after Atkinson's story, "What does Mr. Jackson have to say?" ("Mr. Jackson's" A18).

Jackson had to select a rhetorical gambit in order to address public outcry over his gaffes. His first and most obvious strategy was denial. In fact, Jackson repeatedly said for about two weeks that he had "no recollection" of saying the words "Hymie" or "Hymietown" ("Belatedly" 27; Friendly B14). During a CBS News program, *Face the Nation*, Jackson answered questions concerning his gaffes. He replied, "It simply is not true, and I think that the accuser [*The Post* reporter] ought to come forth" (Joyce A10). After the program, Jackson repeated the denial to reporters. "It's not my standard operating procedure to refer to Jewish people like that. It's a lingo; I don't engage in it. I don't even realize it, frankly. I really don't" (A10). The reason Jackson said he did not realize the significance and impact of the slurs was because he had heard the word "Hymie" in reference to Jews in Greenville, S.C. He said, "It was not even derogatory at that time" (A10). During that same questioning period, Jackson also tried to re-define the situation (differentiation) in an attempt to shift attention from his gaffes to the treatment he received from the media and Jewish community. He said, "It's almost as if there's an attempt to hound us on this question" (A10). Later, Jackson said that all of the negative attention he had received was simply a ploy to sabotage his campaign. He stated that this was just one of many incidents created to disrupt his campaign.

These responses by Jackson did not seem to address his problem. He failed to demonstrate an understanding of the correct behavior by denying the accusations and then attempting to re-define the situation without ever acknowledging the seriousness of the gaffes. As *TIME Magazine* stated, "It was more of a test of morality than politics. For more than a week, the Rev. Jackson flunked" ("Belatedly" 27). Jackson's formal apology to the public came on February 26, 1984 in Manchester, New Hampshire at the Temple Adath Yushurun around 9:00 a.m. just two days before the New Hampshire primary. Over two-hundred worshipers and almost as many reporters showed up to hear Jackson's message. Jackson was late for his speech, and it was later found out that he was "in the rabbi's office with aides, for once writing down what he was about to say" (McGory A2). Jackson finally admitted his guilt during his speech and questioning session. But before he explained his remarks, he had to answer why an apology took so long and, most importantly, why he earlier chose to deny the newspaper reports. "I was not sinful because I chose not to lie," Jackson said. "I chose to protect my integrity" (Sawyer A6). He then went on to say that he hesitated to answer with a definite answer because he was afraid of the impact on his image and credibility. Jackson tried to justify his denial by saying that he did not actually make a formal denial at all. His earlier comments simply explained that he had "no recollection" of using those words and that it was not his "standard operating procedure" to make such slurs. He refused to come right out and

say that he never used those terms in front of reporters in the cafeteria. In addition, he said his heritage and up-bringing taught him that those words were acceptable to an extent, and he did not see great harm in them. Jackson stated, "In private conversations sometimes I let my guard down and became Southern" (Dickenson and Sawyer, 1984, p. A1). He left himself loopholes; a loss of memory and his cultural influence. A loophole, or lack of definitive and concrete answer, may be a politician's face-saving device. As Burke (1945) notes, "What handier linguistic resource could a rhetorician want than an ambiguity whereby he can say 'the state of affairs is substantially such-and-such,' is and/or is not such-and-such" (p. 52). Jackson left himself enough room to maneuver himself out of any situation, but now his time had come to offer a more definite statement. He stated, "A strong moral leader must be tough enough to fight, compassionate enough to cry, human enough to admit it" (Sawyer, 1984, p. A6).

Jackson's ultimate strategy in his speech was transcendence, but before this is shown to be his fundamental rhetorical gambit it is necessary to address his other gambits in his same speech. First, Jackson briefly tried to bolster his image by way of his Rainbow Coalition roots. He said that his candidacy was "to ensure a continuing dialogue and relationship between Blacks and Jews . . . as brothers and sisters" (Dickenson and Sawyer, 1984, p. A2). He also said, "There is nothing in my personal attitude or my public career, behavior or record that lends itself to that interpretation. The record is the exact opposite" (p. A2). Jackson probably wanted to stress his fundamental political platform of ethnic integration and equality found in his Rainbow Coalition. Why he did not not over-stress his past record was most likely due to his negative past. After all, as already discussed earlier in this paper, Jackson did not have superior relations with the Jewish community in the past.

Second, Jackson again tried to stress a re-definition of his situation as he did during and right after his television interview on *Face the Nation*. "I was shocked and astonished that this ethnic characterization was overheard by a reporter," Jackson said in his speech. "I am dismayed that a subject so small has become so large that it threatens relationships long in the making . . ." (Dickenson and Sayer, 1984, p. A1). In essence, Jackson tried to illustrate that his slips were minor—at least in his eyes—and the media blew them all out of proportion. According to Bennett's logic system of strategies, re-defining a gaffe infers a recognition of a major offense. The Presidential candidate still held that his gaffes were minor. Jackson then emphasized the "pain, anxiety and hostility" he had undergone since his embrace with Arafat in 1979 (McGory, 1984). He also asked Jews to acknowledge that he had been a victim since that time. Jackson briefly presented himself as a victim, one who had been transgressed against by both the media and Jews, rather than as the transgressor. He then moved on to admit his guilt and ask forgiveness.

The most apparent gambit chosen by Jackson was transcendence. He opened his remarks by citing from the Bible. Jackson told of how Jacob wrestled with an angel in a "struggle between his inner and outer self" (McGory, 1984, p. A2). This story was symbolic of Jackson's own struggle of whether or not to publicly address an issue that was irrelevant and small to

him. McGory, a reporter covering Jackson on that day, said, "It was not immediately apparent who would win in Jackson's case" (p. A2). In essence, he said he went through his own inner battle, trying to decide what to do when the situation ballooned. In regard to his gaffes, Jackson bluntly stated his guilt: "It was not in a spirit of messages of measures, but an off-color remark having no bearing on religion or politics. However innocent and unintended, it was insensitive and wrong" ("Belatedly," 1984, p. 27). Jackson said that everyone has sinned and all come "short of the glory of God" (Sawyer, 1984, p. A6). Recognition of the problem was given by the Presidential hopeful. In addition, he admitted that he was, at least in part, to blame. He stated, "In part I am to blame, and for that I am deeply distressed" (Dickenson and Sawyer, 1984, p. A1). Jackson, although admitting guilt, still seemed to say that others (namely the media) had to share responsibility for the impact of his verbal slips.

Nevertheless, Jackson was the one who had to ask forgiveness and show a willingness to improve in order to salvage his credibility. He asked the Jewish community to join his Rainbow Coalition and "renew our bonds of friendship and redeem. Human to err, divine to forgive" (Dickenson and Sawyer, 1984, p. A2). He said that he stood before the crowd "bloody, but unbowed" and added, "I remain the candidate determined to heal the wounds" (Joyce, 1984, March 5, p. B6). During a questioning period after his statements, Jackson promised that he would not use such derogatory terms again; he illustrated a willingness to improve. Jackson also added a comment, perhaps premature, that presumed a "cleansing" had taken place. "I feel good tonight," Jackson said. "Suffering brings redemption" (Dickenson and Sawyer, p. A2). Although he felt cleansed, the public, especially the Jewish community, had the role of judge and jury. Jackson relied heavily on the Bible for his "higher lesson." He seemed to suggest that he was the type of leader who could now help mend Jewish-Black relations. His verbal slips allowed him to "see the light" of the strained relationship and begin to act upon it. In addition, Jackson stressed that humans are not perfect and everyone makes mistakes—a point he made later in his speech at the 1984 Democratic convention. He stressed that if humans want to achieve godliness they should learn to forgive others' mistakes. His suffering and agony during his ordeal finally diminished by going through a symbolic "saving at the altar."

Jackson's remarks drew mixed reviews. Jewish leaders admired and thanked Jackson for his apology; however, some said that it just was not quite enough. Rabbi Alexander Schindler, president of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, said, "This matter is now behind us" (Sawyer, 1984, p. 6). Others were not quite so forgiving. Howard Friedman, president of the American Jewish Committee, said he was encouraged by Jackson's apology, but he added, "We call upon him now to re-examine other statements he had made in the past about Jews . . . showing [an] understanding that those statements, too, have caused anguish not only in the Jewish community but the general community" (Sawyer, 1984, p. 6). It seems as if Jackson did repair some of his damage, and he was, at least at that moment, forgiven of his slurs. However, as *TIME* stated, "By that time, Jackson's moral crusade on behalf of the nation's have-nots had lost a good deal of its luster" ("Belatedly," 1984, p. 27). In addition, Jackson finished fourth in the New Hampshire

primary with only five percent of the vote. However, the effects of Jackson's gaffes grew after the New Hampshire primary. During a meeting with Jewish leaders in Farmington, Massachusetts on March 4, Jackson was under a mild attack concerning his ties with the PLO and his gaffes. Jackson responded by saying that "we must move away from a war of quotations" and establish better person-to-person communication (Peterson, 1984, p. A6).

Jackson again addressed his gaffes during his speech at the Democratic national convention in San Francisco on July 17. He alluded to the trouble caused by his derogatory remarks about Jews. "If I have caused anyone discomfort, created pain or revised someone's fears, that was not my truest self," Jackson said. "Charge it to my head, not to my heart" (Pear, 1984, p. A18). He then went on to add that he was "not a perfect servant," but he was a "public servant doing [his] best against the odds" (Raines, 1984, p. A1). Jackson again showed his willingness to improve as a leader and supporter of all communities. Later in his speech, Jackson again apologized and stressed the theme of party unity. In fact, his apology was much more apparent than his speech in New Hampshire; it was up front and blatant. He said, "If there were occasions when my grape turned into a raisin and my joy bell lost its resonance, please forgive me" (Blair, 1984, p. A1). "We are bound by shared blood and shared sacrifices" (p. A1).

Jackson's newest responses drew another batch of mixed reviews. Henry Sinegman, national director of the American Jewish Congress, said that he and other top Jewish officials were satisfied to some extent, but added, "It takes more than one speech to wash all that away" (Blair, 1984, p. A1). Howard Friedman said that Jackson's apology was a "welcome shift." Rabbi Henry Michelman, executive vice-president of the Synagogue Council of America, said, "I appreciated Reverend Jackson's confessional and found it heartening. However, we will watch to see if he truly emerges as a responsible leader dedicated to pluralism" (p. A1). Jackson's apology had been taken with a fair amount of skepticism.

Conclusion

Now that it has been shown that Jackson's gaffes were indeed significant enough to demand formal public apologies, it is necessary to draw some implications from the analysis. However, a note of caution must be made. Although this essay argues that Jackson's gaffes were significant, the slurs and apologies were only one aspect of a large and complex campaign. Jackson's gaffes might have been forgiven by a portion of his audience, but he surely could not have pleased everyone as all political figures have difficulty pleasing a diverse and pluralistic American society. Nevertheless, Jackson's degradation ritual is significant, and implications of this analysis can be made. A major issue at hand is to judge the quality of the candidate's responses. Jackson's biggest failure in his statements was in not picking the correct, or at least the most logical, way of apologizing.

Jackson's foremost apologetic strategies were denial and transcendence. In choosing denial, Jackson probably made two fundamental assumptions. Since Jackson stated he could not remember what he said in the cafeteria on January 25, and the reporter could not remember exactly what Jackson had said since their conversation was casual and had occurred almost a month

before the story ran, Jackson probably assumed that his comments were very vague and ambiguous. After all, the story that revealed his gaffes contained only brief comments in paragraph 37—a point Jackson himself made very clear (Dickenson and Sawyer, p. A1). The words were not stated verbatim since the reporter could not remember exactly what Jackson had said. Nevertheless, the gaffes that he made were seen as unambiguous terms with unambiguous meanings. Jackson should not have placed himself as judge and jury by proclaiming that the words were ambiguous. In addition, Jackson said his cultural upbringing did not find such terms as “Hymie” offensive; the gaffe was minor in his eyes. The public viewed them otherwise. In choosing transcendence, Jackson admitted guilt and asked forgiveness. This apologetic strategy came after he had concentrated on different apologetic choices, namely denial. Furthermore, Jackson’s willingness to change was not very concrete at the onset of his final major apology; he simply said that he himself felt cleansed without taking into consideration the public’s perception of his apology.

Jackson failed in these apologies for three reasons: one, he did not recognize the magnitude of the gaffe; two, he did not show an understanding of the correct behavior; and three, he did not demonstrate an ability to improve. Those failures were disastrous for him. The magnitude of the alleged gaffes quickly mushroomed from a few brief remarks in paragraph 37 in *The Post*’s story to front-page national news. This was probably due in large part to Jackson’s past history of poor Jewish relations. Also, as Bennett points out, popular individuals are held accountable for even the slightest deviation from their created roles. A Presidential contender must not deviate far from his/her role since his/her character and integrity are embedded in that role. The media, as Gold states, prefers to expose the “‘real’ person beneath the candidate” (p. 306). Gold continues, “Candidates are subjected to continual questioning about possible inconsistencies in their statements or incongruities in their past behaviors” (p. 307). Jackson should have anticipated the mushroom effect in the media; he should not have underestimated the power of print. Although his exact comments in the cafeteria on January 25, 1984, were never recorded and the reporter gave his “common knowledge” information to a second reporter who mentioned it in *The Post* article, Jackson should have reasoned that despite the second-hand reporting and ambiguous descriptions, the media and public would give the story much attention.

What all of the above analysis points out is that Jackson should have assumed that the alleged offense would be major, and the simple slurs, “Hymie” and “Hymietown,” would not be considered ambiguous or unmeaningful by the public. Simply knowing that Jackson might have referred to Jews in a derogatory sense was enough to create public arousal. Jackson’s values and beliefs were made into a mockery by his gaffes, and this failure to realize the impact of a few words may be interpreted as his failure as a politician who cannot respond and adapt to a pluralistic and diverse populous. His character was definitely damaged. He seemed to portray throughout his apologies that he was self-centered and undecisive. Jackson was self-centered in the sense that he never really understood or seemed to care about his audience’s perceptions and interpretations of the event. He kept

referring to his past culture (the South) and how words such as "Hymie" are not offensive there. Jackson did not seem to illustrate that he knew the impact of the gaffes, and he did not want to once he learned of the public's negative reactions. Undecisiveness was illustrated by Jackson in the sense that he jumped from strategy to strategy—some that came in conflict with one another. His apologetic journey from denial (which denies guilt) to transcendence (which admits guilt) came across as haphazard attempts. Good decision-making skills are desirable leadership qualities that Jackson did not portray.

Another lesson that Jackson learned the hard way was that the American public does not forget easily or quickly, and the public takes a while to forgive completely. For example, in 1984, New York Mayor Ed Koch said that he "would not endorse or support the Rev. Jesse Jackson if Mr. Jackson became the Democratic Presidential nominee" ("Koch," 1984, p. A5). During the 1988 Democratic nomination race, Jackson campaigned a great deal in New York City for the Jewish vote; Koch reiterated similar comments about Jackson (Lentz and Locin, 1988, p. A6). In addition, Jewish groups protested Jackson's candidacy. A Jewish group at one of Jackson's stops in New York carried signs that said, "I'm a Hymie" and "Hymietown" (p. A6).

Jackson was forced to apologize yet again for his 1984 comments during his 1988 campaign. He finally met with Mayor Koch to generate dialogue and issue apologies ("Jackson seeks peace," 1988, p. A4). Jackson met with Jewish leaders during his race in order to take "a step toward healing the wounds" between him and American Jews (p. A4). As columnist Jon Margolis (1988) writes, "Jackson has long since recanted or apologized for his more outrageous statements . . ." (p. A17).

Jackson's gaffes illustrate just how much attention is given to these verbal blunders by the media and public. As Bennett tells us, these actions that are "'out of character' provide important information on which to base and reformulate assessments of character" (p. 319). Jackson's handling of his apology was not as effective as it could have been; his violation damaged his credibility, and his apology was an amalgam of various strategies. Bennett tells us, "A clear violation cannot be repaired. It can only be forgiven" (p. 318). Jackson's violation was a bit ambiguous at the onset; however, it did not stay that way for long. Even though exact transcripts of his conversation on January 25, 1984 will never be available, the ambiguity of the terms "Hymie" and "Hymietown" is very low—at least in the public eye. The words carry very strong negative connotations. Jackson should have, according to Bennett's model, chosen his final strategy, transcendence, first. (That would have been, of course, the wrong strategy if he had not actually committed the gaffes. But then he would have had the responsibility of proving his innocence, and that might have been very difficult.) It seems as if Jackson's comment that the public should charge his gaffes to his "head" rather than his "heart" was somewhat damaging to his leadership image; the leader of a nation, as it could be argued, must have a "good head" as well as a "good heart" in the public eye.

This analysis identifies the gaffes made by Jesse Jackson in his 1984 pursuit of the Democratic Presidential nomination. Bennett's model for political gaffes readily applies to Jackson's situation. The implications of this analysis

suggest that Jackson's apologies were not very effective due to his mishandling of strategic choice and lack of insight into the severity of his gaffes. In addition, it is argued throughout this essay that political gaffes do indeed draw a great deal of attention to a political candidate. The transgressor must illustrate the ability to effectively improve his or her credibility and character in order to demonstrate effective leadership qualities. As Bennett states, "To the extent that actors can minimize the gap between normative expectations and audience perceptions of their actions, actors are likely to be regarded as suitable and competent" (p. 320). The power of a few words can indeed create for a candidate, such as Jackson, a "stress test." And those words may continue to haunt a political candidate for a very long time if publicly-acceptable apologies are not given.

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YOU'RE NO JACK KENNEDY: BENTSEN VS. QUAYLE

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Debates have become a pervasive part of campaigning for major offices.¹ Political debates normally consist of a panel of journalists who ask the candidates questions. The candidates normally have a specific amount of time in which to respond.² Therefore, goalsetting and strategy selection are two complicated and important elements for the participants of the political debate. Advisors help map out strategies for the candidates, and try to prepare the participants with appropriate responses in defense of character, policy, or past behavior.³ The Vice-Presidential Debate between Senator Lloyd Bentsen and Senator Dan Quayle, makes for an especially interesting case study involving the integration of apologia strategies, and compliance-gaining tactics, in an effort to gain listener compliance for the Vice-Presidential candidates, their parties, and their Presidential running mates.

Office-seekers are often subjected to constant questioning regarding such things as inconsistencies in their statements, voting records, and past behaviors.⁴ If the press discovers an inconsistency, flaw, or fault (let alone evidence of sexual misconduct), in a candidates' background, the media can repeat and transmit this information all over the country. Thus, even a frivolous accusation can be potentially damaging for an office-seeker.⁵

Faced with such political melodrama, the candidates must protect their reputation by defending against charges damaging to their character. Any attack casting suspicion upon one's moral character may hinder the office-seeker's ability to achieve goals and function as a public leader.⁶ Ellen Gold has argued:

¹ For example see: Myles Martel, *Political Campaign Debates: Images, Strategies, and Tactics* (New York: Longman Press, 1983). See also: The entire issue of *Speaker and Gavel* 24 (1986), with articles by J. Jeffrey Auer, Dayle Hardy-Short, Brant Short, Mary M. Gill, and Stephen Mills, which is one of many publications treating the subject of political campaign debates.

² This form of political debate, the "press conference" or "panel" format, has been widely criticized in both scholarly and popular publications. In addition to the sources cited above in note 1, see: William F. Buckley, Jr., "Presidential 'Debates' are just Superficial Exchange," *Greensboro News and Record*, September 19, 1988, p. A11. John Alexander, "Forget Issues, Bring Tissues," *Greensboro News and Record*, September 25, 1988, pp. E1, E8; George F. Will, "Over-Programmed Quayle Spouted a Lot of Nothing," *Greensboro News and Record*, October 9, 1988, p. E5; Meyer Rangel, "Surely Lincoln-Douglass Roll in Their Graves," *New York Times*, October 21, 1988, p. E5.

³ Myles Martel, *Political Campaign Debates*: p. 57.

⁴ Ellen Reid Gold, "Political Apologia: The Ritual of Self-Defense," *Communication Monographs* 45 (1978): 306.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 308.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 308.

Since contemporary practice so emphasizes the aspirant's personal qualities, his 'moral nature, motives and reputation,' and since the media are best able to stir up conflict and interest by exploring such personal attributes, apologetic strategies serve in an important fashion to keep a candidacy viable.⁷

Strategies, situational factors, overlapping functions, and the interrelation of elements obviously play an important role in the effectiveness of any particular rhetorical act regardless of its classification. The following discussion will examine the strategies and elements involved in two specific types of rhetorical acts: apologia and compliance-gaining. The discussion will include: (1) a review and discussion of major works and strategies involved in the genre of apologia, (2) a review and discussion of the major works and strategies of compliance-gaining discourse, and (3) an assessment of the 1988 Vice-Presidential Debate⁸ applying elements of apologia and compliance-gaining.

Apologia

Ware and Linkugel, in their well known article "They Spoke in Defense of Themselves," argued that "apologetical discourses constitute a distinct form of public address, a family of speeches with sufficient elements in common so as to warrant legitimate generic status."⁹ Subsequently, Noreen Kruse defined apologia as:

... public discourse produced whenever a prominent person attempts to repair his character if it has been directly or indirectly damaged by overt charges, or rumors and allegations which negatively value his behavior and/or his judgment.¹⁰

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 316.

⁸ The debate was broadcast on October 1988, and was carried by all major networks. The authors relied on videotapes of the debate and on the publication. "Quayle and Bentsen, Running Mates Under Fire," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 46 (October 8, 1988): 2832-42. (This is the transcript of the entire Vice-Presidential Debate provided by the Associated Press.)

⁹ B. L. Ware and Will A. Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense of Themselves: On the Generic Criticism of Apologia," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 59 (1973): 275.

¹⁰ Noreen W. Kruse, "Motivational Factors in Non-Denial Apologia," *Central States Speech Journal* 28 (1977): 13. She has also described the genre of apologia as "... a grouping of speeches based on situations and circumstances surrounding a speech defending one's character, and mending of one's ethos." "The Scope of Apologetic Discourse: Establishing Generic Parameters," *Southern Speech Communication Journal* 46 (1981): 279. For further evaluations and discussions of apologia, see: B. L. Ware, and Wil A. Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense of Themselves: On the Generic Criticism of Apologia"; B. L. Jackson Harrell, B. L. Ware, and Wil A. Linkugel, "Failure of Apology in American Politics: Nixon on Watergate," *Communication Monographs* 42 (1975): 245-61; Edwin Black, *Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method* (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1978); Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, *Form and Genre* (Falls Church, Virginia: Speech Communication Association, 1976); Bernard Brock and Robert Scott, *A Twentieth-Century Criticism* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1980); Robert L. King, "Transforming Scandal into Tragedy: A Rhetoric of Political Apology," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 71 (1985): 289-301; Sonja K. Foss, *Rhetorical Criticism Exploration and Practice* (Prospect Heights, Illinois: Waveland Press, 1989) 111-21. For an account of generic criticism in general and Apologia in specific, the reader is referred to Foss (1989).

Authors Harrell, Ware, and Linkugel contended that if this rhetor is a political figure, then s/he has a responsibility to maintain his/her persona along personal, ideological, and structural lines.¹¹ Ellen Gold further argued:

... the candidate's attempt to defend his policy soon becomes an effort to defend his actions and his character, justify his motives and intent—in short, an apologia.¹²

Harrell, Ware, and Linkugel defined political apologia as:

... that form of discourse in which a rhetor presents a personal defense of his worth, one distinctly different from a defense of programs and policies, apologia serves the unique role in our political system of being the rhetorical instrument best suited to the maintenance of rhetorical personae against charges that an individual is personally unsuited to wear the public mask and, hence, not fit for public trust and office.¹³

The varying strategies, situations, and circumstances surrounding apologia's help make each one unique. However, regardless of the extent of their individuality, all apologia's rely upon the use of four strategies: denial, bolstering, differentiation, and transcendence.¹⁴ These strategies may be used separately, simultaneously, or they may overlap one another.

The discourse of denial consists of the "... simple disavowal by the speaker of any participation in, relationship to, or positive sentiment toward whatever it is that repels the audience."¹⁵ Gold has contended that, in political campaigns, denials may take a variety of forms:

One may deny the facts, setting forth a different version ... If the facts seem indisputable, one may deny 'intention,' arguing that the statement or action has been misunderstood or misinterpreted.¹⁶

Authors' Harrell, Ware, and Linkugel (1975) discussed apologia as a strategic verbal defense in which the "rhetor fashions to extricate himself from the situation" (p. 246). The argument is basically grounded in "perceived honesty, largely a moral perception of the rhetor drawn by the public" (p. 260). Noreen Kruse (1981) specified that "discourses can only be defined as apologia if the rhetor's actions have led to public criticism of their characters or if the rhetors believe their behaviors have caused people to consider them immoral or unethical" (p. 280). However, Ware and Linkugel (1973) suggested that questioning a man's moral nature and worth as a human being is qualitatively different from challenging his policies. Therefore, an attack on a person's character, moral nature, and reputation requires a direct response (p. 274). Usually this direct response is in the form of a public address involving elements such as self defense, apology, and an emphasis on the positive aspects of this person's character. Foss (1989) indicated that all rhetorical genres including apologies, are constellations containing three elements labeled situational requirements, substantive and stylistic characteristics, and organizing principles (pp. 111–112).

¹¹ Jackson Harrell, B. L. Ware, and Wil A. Linkugel, "Failure of Apology in American Politics," p. 261.

¹² Ellen Gold, "Political Apologia," p. 307.

¹³ Jackson Harrell, B. L. Ware, and Wil A. Linkugel, "Failure of Apology in American Politics," p. 251.

¹⁴ B. L. Ware, and Wil A. Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense of Themselves," pp. 276–82.

¹⁵ Robert P. Abelson, *Theories of Cognitive Consistency* (Chicago, Illinois: Rand McNally, 1969) 344–45.

¹⁶ Ellen Gold, "Political Apologia," p. 308.

Bolstering as a component of apologia is applied when a "speaker attempts to identify himself with something viewed favorably by the audience."¹⁷ The candidate may bolster and strengthen his or her case by using symbolic strategies such as being photographed with persons whose reputations lend credibility to the office-seeker's defense, or using well-respected members of the community to testify about the candidate's past behavior.¹⁸

Differentiation "... subsumes those strategies which serve the purpose of separating some fact, sentiment, object or relationship from some larger context within which the audience presently views that attribute."¹⁹ In political campaigns, "... the candidate may try not only to redefine the larger context for the audience, but to separate himself symbolically from the accusation by attacking the source."²⁰

The final strategy of apologia is transcendence, which is the obverse of differentiation, and is transformative in the sense that strategies which "... involve a change in cognitive identification and in meaning factor together as transcendence."²¹

As apologia involves a rhetor's attempt to respond to a derogatory charge, thus resulting in a more favorable view of the speaker's character, elements of manipulation and compliance-gaining appear in most political/apology speeches. Therefore, an examination of the characteristics, strategies, and situational appropriateness of the rhetorical acts of compliance-gaining is in order.

Compliance-Gaining

In addition to defending one's reputation, a candidate also attempts to gain audience compliance, (compliance through votes, campaign donations, or both), and therefore may apply several strategies of compliance-gaining as rhetorical tools. Compliance-gaining can be described as symbolic behavior aimed towards shaping or regulating the behavior and/or opinion of others. Compliance-gaining has also been described as "... strategic verbal choice-making" which plays a key role in communication."²² There are a variety of situations in which a candidate seeks compliance from the listeners. This compliance-gaining act may take the form of a request, or "favor-asking," but, regardless of how the act is presented, the structure is self-serving.²³ Compliance-gaining behavior centers upon an attempt on the part

¹⁷ Ware and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense of Themselves: On Generic Criticism of Apologia," p. 277.

¹⁸ Gold, "Political Apologia," p. 308.

¹⁹ Ware and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense of Themselves," p. 278.

²⁰ Gold, "Political Apologia," p. 308.

²¹ Ware and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense of Themselves," p. 280. Psychologically speaking, transcendence moves the audience away from the particular and most likely negative charge at hand.

²² Ruth Anne Clark and Jesse G. Delia, "Topoi and Rhetorical Competence," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 65 (1979): 195.

²³ Karen Tracy, Robert T. Craig, Martin Smith, and Frances Spisak, "The Discourse of Requests: Assessment of a Compliance-Gaining Approach," *Human Communication Research* 10 (1984): 513-38.

of the communication source to effect a preconceived response from the target or receiver of the persuasive effort.²⁴

Gerald Marwell and David Schmitt developed sixteen compliance-gaining strategies. The compliance-gaining strategies most relevant to the political spectrum extend beyond the dyadic encounter, and are geared more toward the group or large audience. These strategies are based upon sanction (promise, ingratiation, esteem, aversive stimulation, and guilt), and need (altruism, and explanation).²⁵ To better understand these particular compliance-gaining strategies, each one will be examined separately.

Promise consists of a situation in which the:

Actor's proffered goods, sentiments, or services are promised to the target in exchange for compliance. This may include a bribe or trade-off, log-rolling, or finding a 'middle of the road' solution.²⁶

Ingratiation is a strategy of sanction in which the:

Actor's proffered goods, sentiments, or services precede the request for compliance. They range from subtle verbal or non-verbal positive reinforcement to more blatant formulas of 'apple-polishing' or 'brown-nosing.'²⁷

Esteem constitutes a case in which the:

Target's compliance will result in automatic increase of self-worth. Actor's appeal promises this increase in areas of target's power, success, status, moral/ethical standing, attention and affection of others, competence, ability to handle a failure and uncertainty will, and/or attempts to aspire.²⁸

²⁴ Gerald R. Miller and Mark Steinberg, *Between People* (Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1975).

²⁵ Gerald Marwell and David R. Schmitt, "Dimensions of Compliance-Gaining Behavior: An Empirical Analysis," *Sociometry* 39 (1967): 350-64. For further discussion on compliance-gaining strategies see: Franklin J. Boster, and James B. Stiff, "Compliance-Gaining Message Selection Behavior," *Human Communication Research* 10 (4) (1984): 539-56; Michael J. Cody, and Margaret L. McLaughlin, "Perceptions of Compliance-Gaining Situations: A Dimensional Approach," *Communication Monographs*, 47 (1980): 132-48; Michael J. Cody, William J. Jordan, and Mary Lou Woelfel, "Dimensions of Compliance-Gaining Situations," *Human Communication Research* 9 (1983): 99-113; Mark A. deTurk, "A Transactional Analysis of Compliance-Gaining Behavior: Effects of Noncompliance, Relational Contexts, and Actor's Gender," *Human Communication Research* 12 (1985): 54-78; James P. Dillard and Michael Burgoon, "Situational Influences on the Selection of Compliance-Gaining Messages: Two Tests of the Predictive Utility of The Cody-McLaughlin Typology," *Communication Monographs* 52 (1985): 289-304; Marwell and Schmitt, "Dimensions of Compliance-Gaining"; Schenck-Hamlin et al., "A Model of Properties of Compliance-Gaining Strategies"; Clark and Delia, "Topoi and Rhetorical Competence"; Karen Tracy, Robert T. Craig, Martin Smith, and Frances Spisak, "The Discourse of Requests: Assessment of a Compliance-Gaining Approach," *Human Communication Research* 10 (1984): 513-38; William J. Schenck-Hamlin, G. N. Georgacarakos, and Richard L. Wiseman, "A Formal Account of Interpersonal Compliance-Gaining," *Communication Quarterly* 30 (1982): 173-80; M. Lee Williams and Nancy K. Untermyer, "Compliance-Gaining Strategies and Communicator Role: An Analysis of Strategy Choices and Persuasive Efficacy," *Communication Research Reports* 5 (1988): 10-18.

²⁶ William J. Schenck-Hamlin, Richard L. Wiseman, and G. N. Georgacarakos, "A Model of Properties of Compliance-Gaining Strategies," *Communication Quarterly* 30 (1982): 93.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

With aversive stimulation, both verbal and non-verbal tactics can be applied:

Actor continuously punishes target, making cessation contingent on compliance: pouting, sulking, crying, acting angry, whining, the 'silent treatment,' and ridicule would all be examples of aversive stimulation.²⁹

The final sanction strategy, guilt, consists of a situation in which the:

Target's failure to comply will result in automatic decreases of self-worth. Areas of inadequacy might include professional ineptness, social irresponsibility, or ethical/moral transgressions.³⁰

There are also strategies based on need. Altruism is a need strategy in which:

Actor requests the target to engage in behavior designed to benefit the actor rather than the target. Presentation of some personal need and asking for help is typical. Intensity of the appeal may be manipulated by making the target feel unselfish, generous, self-sacrificing, heroic, or helpful. 'It would help me if you would do this,' and 'do a favor for me,' exemplify the direct approach of the altruistic strategy.³¹

The other need strategy, explanation, suggests that:

One of the several reasons are typically advanced for believing or doing something. A reason may include the following: (1) credibility, 'I know from experience.' The reason for complying is because of trustworthiness, integrity, exemplary action, or expertise; (2) inference from empirical evidence, 'Everything points to the logic of this step.' The reason for complying is based on the following evidence.³²

The literature treating apologia and compliance-gaining indicates that the effectiveness of each strategy varies depending on individual and situational differences. The media can make political candidates prime targets for a variety of attacks on virtually every aspect of their public or private lives. If the press discovers potentially damaging information, they can pursue the candidate with relentless energy. To combat persistent scrutiny by the press, candidates, and their advisors, implement particular rhetorical tactics. If political figures are attacked, especially in a debate setting, apologia strategies may be selected as a rhetorical tool to help defend the candidate's reputation. With apologia, the sense of preserving one's character appears to be a primary motive, however, most political/apologetic rhetoric goes beyond self-preservation and into audience compliance. If this is the case, then the office-seekers may select strategies with the intent to persuade or gain compliance. In this situation, the strategies of compliance-gaining may be effective. In fact, political candidates may target compliance as the primary goal using a mixture of strategies such as denial, transcendence, explanation, and acknowledgement of error, fault, or even guilt, (*mea culpa*) as a method of self-preservation. Is it possible, that in certain situations of public discourse, strategies of apologia and compliance-gaining overlap and are mutually in-

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 95.

clusive? This question can be answered, at least partially, by evaluating The 1988 Vice-Presidential Debate between Democratic Senator Lloyd Bentsen, and his Republican counterpart Senator Dan Quayle. Such an assessment should help to better understand any interrelationships between political apologia and compliance-gaining discourses.

The 1988 Vice-Presidential Debate

The two candidates met on October 5, 1988, in Omaha, Nebraska, for the third nationally televised Vice-Presidential debate in history,³³ and their only scheduled joint appearance. The debate panel consisted of: moderator Judy Woodruff, of the *"McNeil/Lehrer News Hour"* and *"Frontline"*; Jon Margolis, of the *Chicago Tribune*; Tom Brokaw, of *NBC News*; and Brit Hume, of *ABC News*. Judy Woodruff began the debate stressing the importance of Vice-Presidential candidates stating that "... based on history since WW II, there is a 50-50 chance that one of the two men here tonight will become President of the United States." On that serious note, she directed the first question to Senator Quayle:

WOODRUFF: Senator, you have been criticized, as we all know, for your decision to stay out of the Vietnam War, for your poor academic record. But more troubling to some are some of the comments that have been made by people in your own party. . . . Why do you think that you have not made a more substantial impression on some of these people who have been able to observe you up close?

QUAYLE: The question goes to whether I am qualified to be Vice President and, in the case of a tragedy, whether I'm qualified to be President. Qualifications for the office of Vice President or President are not age alone. . . . I have more experience than others that have sought the office of Vice President. Now let's look at qualifications and let's look at the three biggest issues. . . . I have more experience than does the governor of Massachusetts. . . .

Quayle applied indirect denial in responding to Woodruff's accusations of avoiding the war, poor grades, and he did so by transcending the question from why he has not made an impression on his own party, to, "the question goes to whether I'm qualified to be Vice President." He transcended the question even further by discussing another issue; "Now let's look at qualifications and the three biggest issues." Quayle differentiated himself from war evader and poor student, to the candidate in control of the issues. Quayle bolstered himself and tried to build his esteem by claiming that he had "more experience" than Governor Dukakis. Quayle used the strategy of altruism ("trust me, I know from experience").

Judy Woodruff delivered her next question to Senator Bentsen:

WOODRUFF: Senator Bentsen . . . You disagree with him [Dukakis] on some major issues. If you had to step in to the Presidency, who's agenda would you pursue? Yours or his?

BENTSEN: Well, I am delighted to respond to that question, because we agree on so many things, and the vast majority of the issues. . . . Governor

³³ The other two were Dole versus Mondale in 1976, and Bush versus Ferraro in 1984.

Dukakis has been able to cut the [Massachusetts] deficit ten budgets in a row. . . . That is a major sense of achievement, and I admire that. . . . Dukakis and I agree that we ought to have a trade policy for this country, that we've seen this administration more than double the national debt. . . . I worked to pass a trade bill through the Senate. . . . We stand tough for America. . . . We're going to open markets. . . . We'll show leadership in that respect. . . . That's the sort of thing that Michael Dukakis and I will do. . . .

Bentsen immediately ingratiated Woodruff and transcended the audience away from the questioner's immediate accusation with his opening sentence. He demonstrated an effective use of indirect denial by not admitting that Dukakis and Bentsen disagreed on major policies, and instead, the Senator discussed all of the issues that they agreed upon. Bentsen differentiated himself from working against Dukakis's policies, and presented an image of Dukakis/Bentsen as a team fighting for a better America. He also ingratiated and bolstered Dukakis by using statements of admiration and achievement, while at the same time, building personal esteem by discussing his work on passing a trade bill. Strategically, Senator Bentsen indirectly transcended guilt to the current Reagan/Bush administration with his accusations about the current national debt. This statement separated and differentiated not only the candidates, but the administrations as well. Bentsen closed with a promise that the Dukakis/Bentsen ticket would show leadership.

Jon Margolis asked a question concerning environmental issues directed to Senator Quayle:

MARGOLIS: Senator, since coming to the Senate, you have voted against environmental protection legislation about two-thirds of the time. These include votes against pesticide controls, the toxic-waste Superfund, the health and safety protection from nuclear wastes. Senator, do you consider yourself an environmentalist? And, if you do, how do you reconcile that with your voting record?

QUAYLE: I have a very strong record on the environment in the United States Senate, [audience laughter]. . . . I have a record where I voted against my President on the override of the Clean Water Act. I have voted for . . . and I support this administration in its environmental effort. . . . I take my children hiking, and fishing, walking in the woods, in the wilderness. Believe me, we have a commitment to preserving the environment. . . . Let me tell you about his [Dukakis's] environmental policy—the Boston Harbor which is the dirtiest waterway in America. Who has the environmental interests? George Bush and I do.

Quayle immediately bolstered and ingratiated himself by stating that he has a strong voting record, while indirectly denying any accusations contrary to a strong environmental record. He transcended the audience away from Quayle the anti-environmentalist, to Quayle, the environmental father who shares nature's wonders with his children—also an effort to build his self-esteem as the concerned Senator and father. With differentiation, the Senator's "believe me, we have a commitment to preserving the environment," allowed the listeners to infer that the Bush/Quayle team are environmentalists, while at the same time, shifting guilt and blame over to Dukakis's poor environmental administration, specifically, the Boston Harbor.

Britt Hume asked Senator Bentsen a question concerning the \$10,000 Breakfast Club:

HUME: Senator, I want to take you back to the celebrated "Breakfast Club." You said it was a mistake and you called the whole idea off. The question I have is, if the *Washington Post* had not broken that story and other media picked up on it, . . . would you still be having those breakfasts to this day?

BENTSEN: [Laughs] Well, I must say Britt, I don't make many mistakes, but that one was a real doozie. And I agree with that. And as you know, I immediately disbanded it. . . . So I would push very hard to see that we reformed the entire situation. I'd work for that end and that's what my friend from Indiana has opposed repeatedly, vote after vote.

Bentsen demonstrated concession and aversive stimulation by laughing, then followed with an admission of guilt concerning the "Breakfast Club." The Senator made a verbal promise to work hard on disbanning the "entire situation," which helped build back his esteem. He then transcended the blame and guilt of this issue over to Dan Quayle.

Several times during the debate, Senator Quayle was asked what he would do if he became President.³⁴ Quayle cited his experience, but always seemed to transcend his response in directions other than a direct answer to this particular question. Tom Brokaw asked Dan Quayle to respond to this important question, and the response led to the most memorable portion of this debate.

BROKAW: Senator Quayle, I don't mean to beat this drum until it has no more sound left in it, but to follow up on Britt Hume's question, when you said that it was a hypothetical situation, it is sir, after all, the reason that we're here tonight, because you are running not just for Vice President. And, if you cite the experience that you had in Congress, surely you must have some plan in mind about what you would do if it fell to you to become President of the United States as it has so many Vice Presidents just in the last 25 years or so.

QUAYLE: Let me try to answer the question one more time. I think this is the fourth time that I have had this question. [Brokaw: Third time]. Three times that I have had this question and I'll try to answer it again for you as clearly as I can because the question you're asking is: what kind of qualifications does Dan Quayle have to be President, and what would I do in this kind of a situation. . . . I would make sure that the people in the cabinet and the people and advisers to the President are called in and I'll talk to them, and I'll work with them. And I will know them on a first hand basis. . . . I will have day-to-day activities with all the people in government. . . . I will be prepared not only because of my service in the Congress, but because of my ability to communicate and to lead. It is not just age, it's accomplishments, it's experience. . . . I have as much experience in the Congress as Jack Kennedy did when he sought the Presidency. I will be prepared to deal with the people in the Bush administration. . . .

The mere fact that this was the "third" attempt to answer this question demonstrated the consistent usage of denial and transcendence tactics. Quayle denied not having answered this question previously. As a strategy to avoid answering the question at hand, he attempted to transcend the audience away from "what would Dan Quayle do as President," to, "what kind of

³⁴ Depending on one's count and one's perceptions, Senator Quayle was queried on this point three or four times.

qualifications does Dan Quayle have." He explained what he would do, and again bolstered the same qualifications that he gave in the beginning of the debate. The Senator transcended even further and tried to bolster his image with extreme esteem, by insinuating that he had as much experience to seek this position as did Jack Kennedy. Senator Bentsen short circuited Quayle's effort to deny and transcend when he replied:

BENTSEN: Senator, I served with Jack Kennedy, I knew Jack Kennedy. Jack Kennedy was a friend of mine. Senator, you're no Jack Kennedy. . . .

Reacting to Bentsen's report, Quayle *appeared* stunned. In point of fact, Quayle was stunned. In mid-January, he admitted, on national television, that he had been "taken aback" by the exchange.³⁵ To appear to have been leveled by Bentsen's rebuff, at the time it was delivered, was one thing; although Quayle's reaction certainly did *not* indicate that he had the experience, or ability, of the unflappable J.F.K. However, subsequently to publicly admit that Bentsen (Kennedy's friend), had so roughly, and effectively, rebutted him was yet another. Two months after the election, Quayle's handlers were evidently still unable to impart to him the not so subtleties of effective political communication.

During the debate itself, Quayle's only response to Bentsen's reply came after a lengthy pause. He lamely asserted:

QUAYLE: That was really uncalled for Senator.

Whereupon, Bentsen blasted him again saying:

BENTSEN: You're the one that was making the comparison, Senator, and I'm one who knew him well. . . . I did not think the comparison was well taken.

Thus, Bentsen effectively differentiated Dan Quayle, the young inexperienced Senator, from Jack Kennedy, "the legend." By indicating that Jack Kennedy was his friend, Bentsen bolstered his connection with Kennedy thereby transcending guilt to Quayle as Bentsen inferred that Senator Quayle was only trying to build his own esteem by "riding the coattails" of a well known Democratic President. Quayle demonstrated aversive stimulation with his remark, "that was really uncalled for . . ." delivered in a hostile tone of voice. (Admitting guilt for the "other guy" was a reoccurring theme used by both Senators in this debate.) Furthermore, Bentsen's retort reaffirmed Quayle's political inexperience and argued, forcefully, that he was not ready for the give and take of the National Political arena.

Conclusions

Prior to the debate, J. Danforth Quayle had been the subject of large amounts of negative media attention. In order to try to cope with this, his campaign had consistently utilized apologia.³⁶ After the debate, the National

³⁵ Interview by Charlie Gibson with Dan and Marilyn Quayle broadcast on ABC's *Good Morning America*, January 18, 1989.

³⁶ Loraye Hughes and Dean Fadely, "When Apologia Fails: J. Danforth Quayle and the Idea of the Absent." A paper accepted for presentation at the 1990 Convention of The Southern States Communication Association, Birmingham, Alabama, USA. April 5-8, 1990.

Republican Party changed their strategy. In order to effect damage control, they adopted another approach. At the height of the fall football season, the party leaders followed the time honored football dictum: When all else fails . . . punt.³⁷

Quayle's handlers began to try to quarantine him from aggressive reporters. "When they yelled questions at him as he got off planes, he borrowed a page from President Reagan shrugging that he could not hear the questions over the noise of the engines."³⁸ His handlers began sending him to small towns, state fairs, and "audiences guaranteed to react favorably."³⁹ In the last weeks, when he should have been at the peak of his campaign, supporting Bush, attacking Dukakis, speaking to millions on television (like Senator Bentsen was doing), Quayle was speaking to high school students (non-voters). His role was clearly that of a "phantom."⁴⁰ He complained outside a Columbus, Ohio, high school, "I wish I knew what my schedule was going to be. Put me on the air. I've been trying to create news for the last three weeks."⁴¹

The Bush-Quayle ticket was represented on the national level by Bush, by Bush's wife, Barbara, and two of their children, Jeb and Dorothy. To lessen the drag of Quayle on the ticket Bush's aides "employed a simple strategy: act as if Quayle did not exist."⁴² "The Democrats want to make Quayle the major issue, but they can't find him. . . . He's under house arrest," stated conservative political consultant Richard Viguerie.⁴³ Jeff Fishel, a government professor at The American University observed, "The Republicans' motives are obvious: 'Out of sight, out of mind' . . ."⁴⁴ Quayle made no more major speeches. His name was dropped off Republican bumper stickers. Thus, Quayle became the first Vice-Presidential candidate to be removed from the ticket without being removed from the ticket. He simply disappeared.⁴⁵

The Vice-Presidential Debate itself as a forum for airing the policies and behaviors of each candidate. Elements of compliance-gaining and apologia were interrelated and overlapped throughout the debate. Both candidates maneuvered these strategies and avoided directly addressing the majority of of the questions asked of them. Several findings emerge from assessing

³⁷ Quayle's performance was so inept that even a writer as conservative as George Will lamented that it proved the veracity ". . . of the maxim '*Ne Puerto Gladium*' (never give a child a sword)." Will went on to predict that Quayle would drop so far out of sight that, even if Bush were to be elected, he would ". . . not be trusted to handle even the more serious foreign funerals." See: Will, "Over-programmed Quayle Spouted a Lot of Nothing," p. E5.

³⁸ Staff Reporters, *New York Times*, August 26, 1988, D16; also, Maureen Dowd, *New York Times*, August 25, 1988.

³⁹ Maureen Dowd, "Quayle Struggles to Put Confident Face on Drive," *New York Times*, August 27, 1988.

⁴⁰ Richard L. Berke, "Quayle Role as Phantom of Campaign," *New York Times*, November 6, 1988.

⁴¹ Staff Reporters, "Campaign Trail-Quayle's Lament: Where to Now?" *New York Times*, November 2, 1988, A22.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Hughes and Fadely, "When Apologia Fails."

the 1988 Vice-Presidential Debate: (1) Both candidates demonstrated a conscious intent to persuade, manage conflict, manipulate responses, and gain compliance. (2) Senators Lloyd Bentsen and Dan Quayle applied strategies of compliance-gaining and apologia as manipulative rhetorical tools. (3) The rhetorical discourse in this debate also demonstrated the use of a sub-genre of apologia, specifically compliance-gaining apologia, as opposed to apologies of confession, denial or regret. And (4) finally, when apologia fails but the damage must be contained, if not repaired, other approaches must be found. In 1988, the Republicans finally tried to minimize their problem by concealing him. Out of sight, out of mind does work—at least some of the time.

CORPORATE CENTERED APOLOGIA: IACOCCA IN DEFENSE OF CHRYSLER

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The modern organization exists within a complex and frequently hostile environment including regulatory agencies, consumers, competitors and unions (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). An organization's success depends in part on its ability to manage relations with this environment by communicating about its goals, activities and procedures. In some instances, organizations are forced to offer public explanations, justifications or apologies for their actions (Garrett, Bradford, Meyers, and Becker, 1989). One example of such corporate centered apology is Lee Iacocca's Press Conference concerning the closing of the Kenosha, Wisconsin Assembly Plant. This analysis explores the rhetorical genre of apologia as it has been developed in the study of single speakers and applies it to the corporate centered discourse of Iacocca's February 1988 Kenosha, Wisconsin speech. In so doing, this essay focuses on the ways an individual, acting as a corporate rhetor or spokesperson, seeks to defend the image and salvage the reputation of the organization he or she represents.

Apologia

Apologia, as traditionally defined, occurs when an individual rhetor speaks in self defense seeking to justify actions or salvage a damaged reputation. Ware and Linkugel (1973) introduced a method for the criticism of apologia which included four elements—denial, bolstering, differentiation and transcendence and a set of postures combining these factors resulting in absolution, vindication, explanation and justification. Krause (1981) attempted to clarify the generic boundaries of apologia. She argued that only discourse occurring within a situation or rhetorical context requiring a response from the speaker could be considered apologia. Moreover, apologetic messages must also answer charges, respond to attacks and include character defenses. This involves "denying, excusing, or justifying their condemned behaviors to demonstrate that they should not be held morally responsible for the alleged acts" (Krause 283).

A variety of case studies have analyzed particular instances of apologetic discourse. These approaches usually center on individuals such as political speakers responding to accusations of wrong doing. Kruse (1981) noted, for example, that discourse cannot be considered apologetic "unless it is produced by an individual . . ." (280). Similarly, Ware and Linkugel note that apology follows the "questioning of a man's moral nature, motives and reputation . . ." (274) and limit their analysis to responses following attacks upon the character of individuals such as Edward Kennedy's "Chappaquiddick" speech. Garrett, Bradford, Meyers, and Becker (1989) however, examined accounts provided by managers when their organization was accused of unethical business practices. These managerial accounts, they argue, are

offered to "protect their organization's public image" (507). While apologia as a rhetorical genre is limited by present definitions to single speaker situations it may be expanded and applied to rhetoric which is corporate rather than individually centered. Organizations face the same questioning of moral nature, motives and reputation as individuals. The Challenger Shuttle disaster, for example, resulted in harsh attacks concerning NASA's motives and moral character (Seeger, 1986). It is likely, therefore, that following such attacks, organizations will produce discourse which is characteristically apologetic. While this form of discourse will have much in common with apologia offered by single speakers, it must be understood in part as corporate responses, with corporate sources, corporate purposes and corporate audiences.

Corporate Rhetor

A number of authors, have suggested that the group or organization frequently communicates with one voice. Cheney (1989) argues that the rhetorical tradition has failed to adequately come to terms with this corporate and organizational nature of contemporary rhetoric. The traditional bias and almost singular focus in rhetorical criticism is on the individual speaker. This view is inconsistent, however, with a contemporary society which emphasizes mass messages prepared by a variety of cooperating agents and directed to large, diverse and frequently conflicting audiences. Such is the case with public relations departments, advertising agencies, and public affairs units. This inconsistency requires a new approach to rhetorical criticism recognizing multiple agents involved in message preparation, utilization of a designated spokesperson/channel and large and diverse groups which make up the audience. While single speakers face multiple audiences, the modern corporation is unique in the degree of audience diversity and nature of their interests. Corporate audiences are diverse with each special interest group having the capacity to block specific organizational goals. Moreover, the specific interests of these corporate audiences, such as regulatory agencies and stockholder, are sometimes mutually exclusive. The corporation, and those representing it through public messages, frequently balance and play off interests of various audiences where a single speaker, such as a politician, might target messages to appeal to as large an audience as possible (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).

The first characteristic of corporate rhetoric is that the goals, activities, and procedures employed by the organization are expressed through "corporate persons" serving as spokespersons. These may be designated communication professionals, such as public relations staff or press secretaries, or the formal leaders of the organization. The use of "corporate persons" as designated spokespersons, Cheney argues, allows the organization to "de-center" its actions and messages from individuals. Decentering obscures matters of authorship, attribution and responsibility. As such, it is a useful rhetorical strategy for corporate apologia allowing diffusion of responsibility throughout the organization. Even in instances where the individual speaker and the corporation are closely associated, such as Iacocca and Chrysler, the "corporate message" may be presented as more or less distinct from the

speaker. A second although related characteristic of corporate messages concerns the confusing grammar often employed. Synecdoche and third person voice, for example, supports this strategic decentering and diffusion of responsibility. Who is responsible for an action undertaken by the Chrysler Corporation?

The third characteristic of corporate rhetoric suggested by Cheney (1989) is its use of images. In a society dominated by mass media and diversity among audiences, organizations increasingly favor general images in their messages. As Cheney notes that "By condensing, coloring, and pictorializing content for modern mass media, communication for corporations (sic) displace or suppress details and connections that would be required for careful reasoned analysis of whatever subject is considered" (12). These general image based messages have two additional attributes. First, they are less likely to offend some segment of the audience than are more specific detailed messages. General image based messages focused on such global values as "family" are unlikely to offend even unintended receivers. Second, image based messages are unlikely to create specific expectations among audience members. If the organization, for example, were to advertise specific product attributes, consumers might expect those attributes.

The corporate message, then, has characteristics which may distinguish it from messages produced by individuals. Because the bias of traditional rhetorical criticism is toward individual speakers, however, these characteristics have not been emphasized in rhetorical analysis including in the analysis of apologia. Organizations, by virtue of their hierarchical and divisionalized nature, have difficulty identifying specific individuals who are responsible for outcomes (Thompson, 1987). This creates the opportunity to deny or diffuse responsibility in ways which may be unique to corporate centered discourse. Apologia which is generated by and concerns a corporation's reputation, then, may use some strategies more effectively while the effectiveness of others might be reduced. In particular transcendence and non-denial may function differently in apologia which is corporate rather than individually centered. Garrett, Bradford, Meyers and Becker (1989) for example, found that "justifications" represented 72.1% of the managerial accounts following accusations of unethical organizational acts. "Justifications" included minimizing or denying a predicament while admitting tacitly or explicitly some responsibility. Similar strategies may be evident in the efforts by corporate leaders seeking to defend the image and salvage the reputation of the organizations they represent.

Iacocca

In 1978 Chrysler's Board of Directors appointed Lee Iacocca its new C.E.O. Iacocca only months earlier had been fired by Ford Motor Company after an impressive thirty-two year career. The *Wall Street Journal* characterized Iacocca as "one of the industry's best-known and most successful executives" who "appears to possess just the talents that Chrysler needs: He seems to have a canny sense of the public's taste in cars, of how to inspire dealers and marketing men to sell them" (Reich and Donahue 46). Iacocca immediately used his persuasive skills in generating public support for \$1.2 billion

in federal aid for Chrysler. In 1979, Chrysler's constituencies and the entire nation chose between two fates: bankruptcy or federal bailout. Iacocca was central in generating public and Congressional support for the bailout. In a house hearing before the Banking Committee's Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization, Iacocca stressed that bankruptcy for the automaker was not an option. After intense lobbying, legislation to rescue Chrysler finally passed both houses of Congress and in early 1980, President Carter signed the Chrysler Loan Guarantee Act, while Douglas Frasher, President of the UAW and Iacocca looked on.

Chrysler made an unprecedented recovery and by the summer of 1983 had repaid all \$1.2 billion in federal loans. When announcing the repayment during a ceremony at Washington's National Press Club, Iacocca declared, "It shows that the system can work if everyone pulls together . . . we cooperated, we fought for each other; we sacrificed equally. In a way, maybe it was social democracy at its best" (Reich and Donahue 254). Dionisopolulos (1988) noted that Iacocca was depicted in the press as a hero who had completed a "Herculean Task" by saving Chrysler (230). Moreover, the salvation of Chrysler was depicted as primarily beneficial to others including workers who held the 300,000 jobs associated with the Company and the communities in which they lived (Reich and Donahue 232-34). Following the bailout, Chrysler assured the U.A.W. that it could close no more plants; rather, it was moving to re-open plants and expand production. Chrysler acquired American Motors Corporation in 1987, and moved two of its major car lines to the former AMC plant in Kenosha, Wisconsin. This move proved overly optimistic and in January of 1987, Chrysler announced it would close the Kenosha plant.

Iacocca and the Kenosha Closing

The January 27, 1987 announcement that Chrysler would close its Kenosha, Wisconsin Stamping and Assembly facility followed a \$200 million investment in remodeling facilities in the 98 year old plant. Although all plant closings are traumatic, Chrysler's announcement was met with unusually severe hostility by both the press and the public for a number of reasons. First, the announcement of the closing came abruptly with little warning. Second, Chrysler initially was unprepared to offer any concessions to workers or the community. Third, the move was seen as inconsistent with the idea of cooperative social democracy Iacocca had advocated during the Chrysler bailout. Finally, a number of plant closings had prompted legislative efforts to regulate this activity (Millsbaugh, 1990).

Chrysler's announcement came as a shock to the citizens of Wisconsin. Although about 1,000 employees would continue to work in the engine and stamping operation, approximately 5,500 employees would lose jobs. Of the 5,500, only about 1,800 were eligible for retirement benefits. The remaining 3,700 workers faced an uncertain financial future (Keehn, 1988). Closing the Kenosha plant was expected to severely effect Kenosha and southeastern Wisconsin. The City and County would lose 3 percent of their tax base. Following the announcement, the Kenosha County Executive froze discretionary spending, halted capital projects, and mobilized resources for coping

with the prospect of a large dispossessed population (Georgevich, 1989). Local and State Government acted quickly. Governor Tommy Thompson asked the State Attorney General's Office to consider suing Chrysler for breach of contract. The State maintained that Chrysler had promised to operate the Kenosha facility for three to five years after the automaker received \$10 million in pollution waivers in 1987 (White, 1988). Additionally, City and County governments had given Chrysler more than \$900,000.00 in assistance for physical improvements at the plant.

Kenosha workers responded angrily and actively to Chrysler's announcement. They directed protests to Iacocca personally, wearing shirts depicting Iacocca with a long Pinocchio nose and buttons proclaiming "Lee Lied." U.A.W. Local 72 rented a billboard on a prominent Detroit freeway which demanded "Lee Iacocca, Keep your word to Kenosha!" (Sorge 1E). The local union also joined more than 100 people, including four Democratic presidential candidates, in signing a newspaper advertisement urging Chrysler to keep Kenosha open.

These strong reactions to the Chrysler announcement occurred in part because Chrysler had created expectations that it would keep the plant open and then failed to meet these expectations. Moreover, the issue was particularly potent for three additional reasons. First, Chrysler had implied a commitment to keep former AMC employees on the payroll. Second, the U.A.W. had supported the Chrysler bailout and accepted significant "give backs" to help the company survive. Third, a string of plant closings had prompted federal legislation to regulate this activity. Iacocca sought to salvage both Chrysler's image and repair his reputation through a series of press conferences and proposals. On February 16, 1988 Iacocca held a press conference in Milwaukee, Wisconsin to apologize for the hardship, respond to attacks against Chrysler, clarify questions about responsibility, and announce a plan to help workers and the community.

Iacocca's Non-Denial and Transcendence

Iacocca began the Kenosha Press conference by expressing Chrysler's concern with the way it was depicted in the press, to the people of Kenosha and to the company's various supporters and detractors. Harrell and Linkugel (1978) suggest that "Studies of apologia begin with a motivationally derived definition of that type of rhetoric; the speaker having come under fire, seeks to justify his personal worth" (269). Iacocca, acting on the motivations of the company he represents, sought to explain and justify the corporation's actions and re-establish its moral integrity. This analysis of Iacocca's apology uses Krause's (1977) elaboration of Ware and Linkugel's (1973) reformative concept of denial, in which the speaker seeks to deny the charges in an attempt to demonstrate that his or her depiction of reality is the most accurate. Krause extends this concept to include non-denial where the rhetor admits culpability but seeks to show that mitigating circumstances call for a reassessment of the situation and the person's moral character. Iacocca's use of apologia falls in this latter category as he attempted to show that Chrysler regretted the closing but was forced to take this action by circumstances

beyond its control. Additionally, this analysis links the reformative strategy of non-denial with Ware and Linkugel's (1977) transformative strategy of transcendence.

Transcendence occurs when a rhetor joins some fact, sentiment, object or relationship to a larger context within which the audience does not presently view the attribute. Transcendence is particularly useful in corporate rhetoric because the corporate body is dependent upon a number of factors such as interest rates, trade policies and governmental regulations which are beyond its immediate control. Joining the corporate actions to these larger conditions may allow the organization to deny culpability. In non-denial apologia, there are three sub-classes based on Maslow's hierarchy of needs: 1) survival responses, in which the rhetor feels some aspect of safety or security is threatened; 2) self-actualized responses, in which the rhetor attempts to maintain an image consistent with idiosyncratic values; and 3) social responses, in which the primary need is to restore or regain affection, status, prestige or esteem. These social responses are the most appropriate for this analysis because Iacocca was speaking as a representative of a corporation with diverse and conflicting social responsibilities. Sethi has noted that business, like all social institutions, depends on "society's acceptance of its role and activities if it is to survive and grow" (1987, 41). Corporate rhetors using justifications based on social response perceive the circumstances prompting their statements as threatening to the corporation's power, status, situational mastery and survival.

At the Milwaukee, Wisconsin press conference, Iacocca explicitly stated that his major concern was for Chrysler and the unfair way it was depicted as the villain for announcing the closing: "Let me say at the outset that I have seen Chrysler raked over the coals for two weeks now and I think some of it is unfair (1988, 1). Iacocca softened this observation, however, by adding that the animosity toward Chrysler was "unfair but understandable. In the heat following a plant closing, emotions naturally run pretty high . . ." (1988, 2). The charges against Chrysler were a direct result of the callous way in which it had abruptly announced the closing after it had expressed confidence in the plant's future only two years earlier. Iacocca noted that the question of Chrysler's reputation as a fair company did not rest on this fact: "Let me start by reminding you that we've said from the outset that we'd not only meet our normal obligations to our workers and the community, we'd go beyond them. And I intend to do just that . . ." (1988, 1-2). Iacocca stressed that Chrysler intended to uphold its "moral obligations" to the people of Kenosha. Following these efforts at setting a conciliatory tone, Iacocca offer a justification of the closing based on transcendence.

He attempted to rationalize the closing by stressing that despite Chrysler's initial faith that the plant could survive, mitigating circumstances made it impossible. He called the decision to close the plant a "crummy call" and then sought to transcend blame by noting that "time and the market place just caught up with an 85 year old plant" (1988, 2). This transcendent theme of diverting blame to the business climate at large continued throughout the speech. Iacocca downplayed the company's complicity in the closing, laying blame on society in an attempt to depict Chrysler as the victim rather than villain:

Most people don't see it yet, but we're really not the villains at Chrysler, we're victims . . . In fact, we're all victims, all of us in this country of years of unfair trade policies that have flooded our markets with foreign products, closed our factories, and put our people on the street. This is not a Chrysler problem or a Kenosha problem, this is an American problem. (1988, 2)

Supporting the theme of transcendence and the efforts to move to more abstract levels in assigning blame through use of the plural "we." Chrysler, as a body of interdependent individuals, is depicted as a victim of the same economic hardship as the displaced worker. Chrysler is a microcausm of these same broad social and economic conditions. This theme was successfully used in Iacocca's earlier efforts to generate support for the Chrysler's federal loan package.

Iacocca followed this observation with a long list of other plant closings as evidence that Kenosha was not an isolated incident, further demonstrating that Chrysler's response to the crisis in the American workplace was unavoidable. He painted a dim picture of future plant closings intensifying Chrysler's image as victim rather than villain by stating "There will be other cities and more plants and more jobs because the American auto industry has too much capacity and its being crowded out by the imports and new foreign factories . . ." (1988, 3). Iacocca ended this section of the speech with an effort to clarify his role in the decision by noting "I am just the messenger bringing the bad news. If you want to beat up on me, that's okay, but you better go to Washington if you want to fix it" (1988, 3). This self defense linked the strategies of non-denial and transcendence. Iacocca noted that he was willing to accept responsibility, but actual blame was diverted to the federal government.

Iacocca employed two other components of the social response of non-denial apologia in his attempt to demonstrate that the decision was beyond Chrysler's control. First, a social response justifies the means by virtue of the ends, especially if these ends are beneficial to the group as a whole. Chrysler, guilty of being "cockeyed optimists" a year earlier had moved its "oldest car lines" into the "oldest factory in the country" (1988, 3). Moving car lines to Kenosha extended the life of the plant, with projections that production would continue for three to five years. In so doing, however, Chrysler had created unrealistic expectations. Iacocca observed that "We had the quaint idea that keeping 5,500 people on the job was a good thing, even though everybody knew that the plant's days were numbered. But now I see, in retrospect that our life support was a mistake and the expectations we created have just added to the pain" (1988, 4).

The expectations Chrysler created made the Kenosha plant closing a unique case resulting in special obligations. Iacocca referred to the letters received from the people of Kenosha including one from the Superintendent of Schools, Dr. John Hosmanek. Hosmanek wrote that 1,905 families with a total of 2,358 children were going to suffer as a result of the closing and asked "Is there anything that we can do to be sure the kid's education doesn't suffer . . ." (1988, 5). Iacocca placed this letter in context with scores of others written by Kenosha workers concerned with paying bills and caring for their children. In light of these concerns, Iacocca presented the mea culpa: A Chrysler-Kenosha Trust to provide housing and educational assistance.

It (the Trust) will at least take some of the big worries off their shoulders while they get adjusted. The entire 1988 calendar year starting this past January 1st, we're going to contribute every dime of every single car and truck we sell in the entire state of Wisconsin to that trust . . . Based on last year's sales . . . that amounts to a little over 20 million dollars. (1988, 6)

In presenting Chrysler's concessions, Iacocca juxtapositioned the Trust against the community's concerns for its children's educations. This juxtaposition was effective because it helped divert attention from the way Chrysler was being represented as caring only about profit and not about the workers or community. By returning \$20 million in profit to Kenosha, Chrysler sought to purify its motives.

The second component of the social response Iacocca employed was identification in an attempt to show that Chrysler's goals were closely aligned with the people of Wisconsin. Although Chrysler was forced to close the Kenosha plant, it intended to remain a "responsible corporate citizen in Wisconsin" (1988, 7). Iacocca mentioned that the recent newspaper headlines suggested that Chrysler was pulling out of Wisconsin altogether. While 5,500 jobs would be lost, the Kenosha plant would still employ 1,000 workers in its engine plant as well as 3,600 workers in dealerships and 392 with suppliers. Iacocca extended his strategy of identification by inviting the State and City to contribute to the Chrysler-Kenosha Trust. Iacocca combined strategies of transcendence and identification by suggesting "Maybe if we can get together to help the Kenosha employees—that's the Company, that's us, the government and the community groups—we can turn off the rhetoric and start helping Kenosha look forward to its future (1988, 7). This strong appeal to unity was similar to the "equity of sacrifice" and "social democracy" appeals employed in earlier Iacocca speeches designed to garner federal aid. When Chrysler faced bankruptcy, Iacocca repeatedly emphasized the need of government, business and industry to work together. This emphasis on unified effort has become part of Chrysler's image.

The fact that Iacocca, serving as a corporate rhetor, distinguished the importance of the people of Kenosha to the company from the profit motives places his statement within the framework of a social response. The long-range goal of a corporation in our society, while ostensibly to make money, is to maintain a positive image. If Chrysler was depicted as the villain, greedy for money with no thought to the welfare of its employees, its image would suffer. Business, however, is sustained by profits. While closing a plant is a common response to a depleted demand and inefficient operations, Chrysler, through Iacocca, sought to present itself as equally interested in fulfilling its moral obligations to workers and the community. This effort to clarify motives is central to any apologetic discourse, but is essential to a business organization which must maintain profits while demonstrating that it serves larger social purposes.

After the threat of bankruptcy and its much publicized and controversial federal bailout, Chrysler had steadfastly pursued a distinct image personified by Iacocca. This image includes integrity, honesty, patriotism and a commitment to serving the American consumer. Much of its advertising seeks to identify this image by openly referring to the fact that Chrysler is number three among the "Big Three" automakers. It must work harder, therefore,

to maintain customers. Chrysler likely saw the greatest threat in the plant closing and subsequent criticism as a compromising of this distinct image. This threat, unless addressed, would damage Chrysler's reputation for fair treatment of workers and threaten the unique situational mastery it achieved as part of its well publicized turnaround. Iacocca's primary need as a corporate rhetor, therefore, was to align Chrysler's goals with that of the group. To achieve this, Iacocca offered a justification based in a larger social response.

Discussion

Iacocca's representation of Chrysler in the Kenosha closing raises a number of issues. The first concerns the decentering of the individual. As Cheney (1989) argues, corporate messages obscure matters of authorship and attribution. In this way, it is difficult if not impossible to discern who is responsible for the message. This decentering is inherent to corporations due to their hierarchical and divisionalized structure. While one person may be responsible for making the decision, another constructs the message and crafts the arguments and a third delivers the message. As Petress and King have argued, "In complex systems both overt and covert actions are initiated by multiple actors who possess unequal resources, limited information, and conflicting personal and public objectives" (1990, 19). Determining responsibility within such complex, decentering systems, is a matter of competing interpretations. This leaves room for the corporate rhetor to employ strategies of non-denial and transcendence in defending corporate actions. In this instance, Iacocca provided an interpretation of the Kenosha closing that accepted the fact of the closing but transcended responsibility. Modern corporations, due to complex interdependencies, also have the option of attributing cause to agents outside their control. Thus, the "Federal trade Policy" and "Japanese imports" are responsible for the Kenosha closing.

A second issue in this analysis concerns the importance of image to organizations. Modern organizations rely on public relations and mass media campaigns to inspire favorable images and bolster these images by elaborate myths and rituals. Organizations create these images to solidify their roles as distinct entities and create social acceptance. Employees, consumers, stockholders, and the financial community are encouraged to view corporations in light of these images. There are several consequences of this organizational image-making for corporate apologia. First, the tendency to decenter responsibility is increased when the corporation is presented only on the basis of an image. The public depiction of an organization through images makes identification of specific responsible agents even more difficult. Second, the organization's image is vulnerable to damage, particularly when its actions are seen as inconsistent with the image it has sought to create. The gap that exists between expectations for a corporation, created in part by its past communication, and its actual performance may threaten the organization's survival (Sethi). Third, organizations will seek to restore consistency between their actions and their image through communication.

In this instance, Chrysler's communication sought to restore consistency between its image as an underdog corporation concerned about workers

and its actions of closing Kenosha. Iacocca's personal image, built on his revitalization of Chrysler, was one of honesty, openness, and tenacity in overcoming the odds. This image, however, was entirely inconsistent with closing a major plant after leading the community and workers to believe that the plant would remain open. In seeking to restore consistency, Iacocca utilized the same image. Chrysler's history of overcoming the adversity of a near bankruptcy made the argument that market conditions were to blame for the closing more plausible. Further, the Chrysler-Kenosha trust was similar to the cooperation between government, community, and private corporation which had saved Chrysler. Both arguments were rooted in Chrysler's unique history.

It is important to note that, like social movements, corporate rhetoric must be understood within a larger social and rhetorical context. First, when examining organizational apologia, it is necessary to explore the unique factors which precipitated its use. Second, understanding the organization's history of communication is necessary to identify specific expectations which exist for that organization. Finally, a sense of the organization's image is critical because organizations carefully cultivate distinct images based on their particular industry, customer base, community, and workforce. Their communication, then, is constructed in a way which is consistent with these distinct images.

Conclusions

It is not clear that corporate centered apologia can be entirely differentiated from apologia which centers on an individual's reputation or character. Differences which exist may represent matters of degree rather than of kind. Efforts to sort out these differences might focus on unique arguments and appeals which organizations by virtue of their character use frequently and effectively. Non-denial and transcendence, through strategic decentering of individuals, for example, represent strategies that organizations might commonly employ. The effectiveness of these strategies depends on the degree to which it can be plausibly argued that causality is beyond the organization's control. Further, the image and reputation of an organization is unique, built through its interaction over time with a number of groups. Organizations use their images in defending and purifying their motives. Organizational and rhetorical critics interested in corporate centered apologia, then, should focus on arguments deriving from the organization's decentered character and its unique image in order to understand this form of discourse.

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A REVISED CONCEPTION OF ANALOGIC RHETORICAL CRITICISM

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Lawrence W. Rosenfield developed and applied the notion of analogic rhetorical criticism ("Anatomy," "Case Study," and "Wallace"). However, this method of rhetorical criticism did not emerge as a very common approach (see, e.g., Bradley; Chesebro and Hamshire; or, for a different approach, Kaufer). It is possible that the arguments advanced by Campbell, which provide ample reason to reject this notion as originally articulated, reflect underlying concerns on the part of rhetorical critics that may in part account for the failure of analogic rhetorical criticism to obtain widespread acceptance. In an attempt to revitalize the notion of analogic criticism, I advance a new understanding of analogic rhetorical criticism, grounding this revised conception of analogic criticism in John Stuart Mill's canon of difference. After discussing the analog's relationship to generic rhetorical criticism, this new conception of analog is illustrated with an application to mass media apologia by Edward Kennedy and Richard Nixon.

Mass media apologia are a significant discourse form today (see, e.g., studies by Gold; Kruse; and Ware and Linkugel). The advent of electronic media permits mass audiences to be apprised of alleged indiscretions of apologists, and it provides a broad forum for their rhetorical attempts to cleanse their reputations. Thus, this study has two purposes: to develop a revised conception of analogic rhetorical criticism, and to illustrate that conception with an analogic criticism of a significant form of mass media discourse—the apologia.

The Logic of the Analog Method

In "The Anatomy of Critical Discourse," Rosenfield first sketches the analog approach to rhetorical criticism: "The essential feature of . . . the analog modality, is that the norm employed is some actual discourse and not a theoretically derived prototype" (66). This approach "enables the critic to derive new categories and precepts from his investigation" (68). While a bit vague, this notion becomes clear in both of his applications, analogic criticism of George Wallace and Patrick Henry (1969) and of Richard Nixon and Harry Truman. In the second study the fact that the analog method analyzes two speeches in order to develop a generic description becomes quite clear. Rosenfield's purpose is to identify generic traits, for he writes that "There are four similarities in the two discourses which I take, at this time, to represent constants in the apologetic equation" (449). So, as initially conceived, the analogic method of rhetorical criticism derives inductive generalizations about the nature of a genre on the basis of an examination of two instances of the genre.

Karlyn Kohrs Campbell argues that this conception of the analog method relies on a sample that is inadequate for establishing a genre. "An inductive

approach to genre . . . requires surveying many rhetorical acts; generic claims drawn from the analogic comparison of two acts are generalizations drawn from too few cases" (120). This is a cogent criticism of analogic studies as currently conceived. Rather than abandon the analog method completely, I develop and illustrate an alternate conception of the analogic method.¹

Analogic rhetorical criticism as conceived here begins with two discourses which are alike in several essential regards (what is "essential" depends upon the argument being made by the critic in a particular study) and dissimilar in at least one important regard, and then establishes a relationship among variables based on both similarities and differences of the two discourses. Mill's classic work *A System of Logic* is undoubtedly the earliest discussion of the principle underlying this revision of the analog that is both thorough and clear (Bacon's discussion is earlier, but far less fully developed). One of the four methods of experimental inquiry, Mill's second canon, declares that:

If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs and an instance in which it does not occur have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the former, the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon. (215–16; italics omitted)

This fundamental principle is applicable to rhetorical criticism, since one of its legitimate ends is to ascertain the effects and attribute them to characteristics of the discourse. In other words, Mill's canon states that if two instances (discourses) differ in a particular phenomenon (experience different effects) and have every circumstance in common save one (the discourses are similar in essential regards), then that circumstance (rhetorical characteristic) in which they differ is probably the cause of the disparate effects. Of course, critics should exercise caution in drawing conclusions of this type. No two discourses could ever be identical in all aspects but one, and the cogency of this type of analogic claim is directly contingent upon the degree of similarity of the two speeches. Nevertheless, the potential contributions of such a conception of the analog method are significant for an understanding of how discourse functions to achieve its effects.

It is quite possible that the key difference between any two otherwise similar rhetorical acts may not be found in the discourse itself or even be under control of the rhetors. Differences in the audience, for example, may account for dissimilar results. Nor does this conception of analog deny the importance of situational factors—the compared discourses must be similar in important regards, and for some of the uses sketched here, situational

¹ This is not the first essay to suggest a different conception of "analogic criticism." There is no doubt that Ryan is correct in asserting that it is useful to examine *kategoria* and *apologia* as a speech set, but it is confusing to refer to such an undertaking as an "analog." The term "analog" derives from a Greek word that means resemblance (Measell). Hence it may not be appropriate to employ this term to refer to a juxtaposition of two different types of speeches. Nor is an analog in Rosenfield's terms simply an argument from analogy, which compares two instances of a phenomenon alike in essential regards and infers that something about one instance is true of the second (see, e.g., Benoit & France; Rieke & Sillars; or Ziegelmüller & Dause).

variables are the most significant. However, when it is employed appropriately and with due caution, this revised conception of the analogic method is a potentially powerful addition to the rhetorical critic's repertoire of tools for assessing the effects of persuasive discourse.

Furthermore, the reconceptualization of the analog developed here is not limited to speeches given in the same situation. Another type of study that capitalizes on the ability of the analogic method of criticism to employ both similarities and differences between discourses compares two speeches which used the same strategies in different circumstances to determine which circumstances are most conducive to that strategy. If two speakers in significantly different situations used the same rhetorical strategies and one was noticeably more effective, one possible explanation is that the strategy in question only works in limited circumstances. Or, a critic could examine two (or more) discourses by the same rhetor in different circumstances in order to isolate the peculiar rhetorical propensities of that rhetor. Here, discovery of rhetorical similarities in rhetorical artifacts produced by the same individual when confronting different rhetorical problems very likely points to features of that speaker's rhetorical style. Brockriede and Scott's study of two of Stokely Carmichael's speeches (given to quite different audiences) points in this direction. A third possibility is illustrated by Kaufer's use of the analog method to contrast Nixon and Kennedy's styles. Hence, the revised conception of the analog method developed here examines two speeches (although there is no inherent limitation on the number of speeches considered) with important similarities and differences. In it, both similarities and differences contribute substantially to conclusions about those discourses.

Analog and Generic Rhetorical Criticism

Analogic and generic rhetorical criticism have much in common (for discussions of the latter, see, e.g., Bormann; Campbell; Simons; Harrell and Linkugel). First, they both examine more than one speech (except for one type of genre study identified by Harrell and Linkugel, generic participation). Second, they both can be situationally-based; that is, they typically examine speeches given under similar circumstances. Third, they are perspective-free approaches, methods or procedures for criticism, not rhetorical theories. In other words, both analog criticism and generic criticism give advice to the critic about how to proceed, but do not specify what to look for (Brock and Scott). Some rhetorical theory (formal, like Aristotelian or Burkean; or informal, based on the critic's intuitive notions of rhetoric) *must* be employed in both approaches to inform the critic's choices about what rhetorical elements deserve attention.

These methods also have differences. First, as noted above, generic criticism is especially well-conceived for developing inductive generalizations about rhetorical discourse on the basis of analysis of a sample of instances of the genre under investigation. The urge toward development of descriptive generalizations about the nature of discourse as practiced in the world about us is commendable. As noted earlier, Campbell correctly points out that the analog cannot compete with generic criticism for this purpose. The

strength of an inductive generalization is directly related to the number of observations employed to develop it (as well as on the representativeness of those instances). While an analogic rhetorical criticism *could* use more than two speeches (for example, argument from analogy is virtually always based on two instances, but nothing inherently prevents the advocate from using more than two instances), to respond to Campbell's objection by adding more speeches erases the distinction between analog and generic criticism.

The strength of analogic criticism, as reconceptualized here, lies in the fact that it can treat differences as well as similarities. The analogic method, as suggested earlier, can compare successful with unsuccessful discourses in an attempt to discern the reasons for differential success. The generic method, by its very logic, lumps together all discourses of a certain type (or subtype)—the successful with the unsuccessful and the mediocre. The few exceptions to this generalization (see, e.g., Jamieson and Campbell), while developed independently, can be viewed as criticisms that incorporate Mill's canon of difference, as recommended here. Certainly nothing in the logic of the generic method directs critics to separate successful and unsuccessful discourses. Critics who discuss differences within a class are clearly going beyond the inductive nature of the generic approach. As mentioned earlier, nothing in this conception of the analog limits its logic to consideration of only two speeches. Further, although analogic criticism can profitably be situationally based, it is possible to use it to study discourses across situations, which the situational approaches to genre studies would not permit. As suggested earlier, it might be very interesting to compare speeches which are similar in some regards but which were given in different situations. While a non-situational conception of generic criticism could be developed, clearly the dominant approach to genre is situational. This rules out the two advantages of this conception of analogic criticism: contrasting successful and unsuccessful instances of a genre to discover the rhetorical elements responsible, and studying discourses across genre.

Thus, while the generic and analogic methods have much in common, they have differences, including their own strengths and weaknesses. Both can be powerful investigative tools when used for the right purposes, and both must be employed carefully in light of their peculiar limitations. This conception will now be illustrated through an application to discourses by Edward Kennedy and Richard Nixon.

A Kennedy-Nixon Analog

Kennedy's July 25, 1969, Chappaquiddick speech and Nixon's April 30, 1973, Watergate address possess several important similarities that invite the analogic approach to criticism. This analysis will explicate the similarities in the rhetor, the suspicions they faced, and the discourse they produced. Then the effectiveness of their rhetorical efforts will be contrasted. Finally, a key difference in their rhetorical defenses will be identified, and its relationship to the effectiveness of their discourse will be discussed.

The similarities in these two discourses begin with the nature of the rhetors themselves. Both Kennedy and Nixon held high public office at the time of

their speech: Mr. Kennedy was a Senator from Massachusetts, while Mr. Nixon was the President of the United States. Accordingly, their actions—even those not directly related to the performance of their official duties—were subject to public scrutiny.

Second, both speakers were the target of suspicion regarding their actions, for alleged involvement in illegal and immoral behavior. On July 18, 1969, Senator Kennedy was driving a car which went off a bridge, resulting in the death of Mary Jo Kopechne, a passenger in that automobile. In addition to the suspicions aroused over his potential responsibility for the fatal accident, his lack of candor created controversy, for he failed to report the accident to police for several hours. The *Washington Post* reports that on the day before his speech a "bitter whispering campaign" about this incident "has already begun" ("The Latest Kennedy Tragedy" A18). In his speech, Kennedy acknowledges the "innuendo and whispers" of late and wonders if his "standing among the people of my state has been . . . impaired" (Kennedy 10).² President Nixon was under suspicion for alleged involvement in the Watergate break-in and subsequent cover-up. Gallup opinion polls prior to this speech reveal that 30% of the public believed in early April that Watergate was a very serious matter ("Latest U.S. Views" 3). Nixon himself recognized that "the inevitable result of these charges has been to raise serious questions about the integrity of the White House itself" (Nixon 450).³

Third, these two rhetors faced remarkably similar rhetorical problems. Both were charged with immoral conduct: responsibility for a fatal accident; responsibility for the Watergate break-in. Both were also charged with a lack of candor: failure to report the accident in a timely fashion; complicity in the Watergate cover-up. Both speakers recognized this and the potential undesirable consequences on their ability to perform their public duties. It is not surprising to discover that both of these public figures decided to employ similar forums for their rhetorical responses to their problems: nationally televised apologetic addresses. Analysis of their respective discourses will reveal additional important similarities.

A key to understanding these discourses can be found in Kenneth Burke's notions of mortification and victimage. He suggests the following formula: "if guilt, then need for redemption" (450). Two avenues are available for purgation of guilt: "mortification," or acceptance of guilt and symbolic suicide, and "victimage," or scapegoating, shifting of the blame (450). Each process serves to eliminate guilt by symbolically killing it. While Burke discusses the existence of these two options, there is scant advice available concerning the relative merits of these two approaches. This analysis reveals several salient similarities in Kennedy's and Nixon's speeches.

These rhetors suffered from guilt, whether deserved or not, arising out of the suspicion they faced. Furthermore, both accept responsibility for their actions, apparently engaging in mortification. Kennedy declares that "I do not seek to escape responsibility for my actions by placing blame either in

² Since his entire text is printed on this page, no other footnotes will be employed for quotations from Kennedy's speech.

³ Further quotations from this text will be followed by parenthetical notions of the page number from this source.

the physical, emotional trauma brought on by the accident or anyone else. I regard as indefensible the fact that I did not report the accident to the police immediately." Later, he reports that "I felt morally obligated to plead guilty to the charge of leaving the scene of an accident." Nixon also accepts responsibility for his actions, apparently adopting a stance of mortification:

For the fact that alleged improper actions took place within the White House or within my campaign organization, the easiest course would be for me to blame those who I delegated the responsibility to run the campaign. But that would be a cowardly thing to do. I will not place the blame on subordinates, on people whose zeal exceeded their judgment and who may have done wrong in a cause they deeply believed to be right. In any organization the man at the top must bear the responsibility. That responsibility, therefore, belongs here in this office. I accept it. (451)

Both speakers explicitly accept responsibility for their actions, apparently engaging in mortification. Further reinforcing this impression, they both take pains to explicitly reject the possibility that they might shift the blame elsewhere, or engage in victimage. Interestingly, both speakers describe the wrongful event in language that demonstrates that other factors are in fact responsible. Each of the two charges (the wrongful action and the subsequent lack of candor) will be considered separately.

Kennedy relates the fact that "the car that I was driving on an unlit road went off a narrow bridge which had no guard rails and was built on a left angle to the road." Based on this description, it is the scene that should be considered the cause of the accident, not Kennedy. Nixon offers this discussion of the campaign, which included the break-in:

In both domestic and foreign policy, 1972 was a year of crucially important decisions, of intense negotiations, of vital new directions, particularly working toward the goal . . . of bringing peace to America, peace to the world. And that is why I decided as the 1972 campaign approached, that the Presidency should come first and politics second. Therefore I sought to delegate campaign operations, to remove the day-to-day decisions from the President's office and from the White House. (451)

If this account of events is accepted by the audience, he could not be held accountable for the break-in that occurred as part of that campaign. Both rhetors employ victimage or scapegoating by describing the situations they faced in such a way to shift the blame for the wrongful action elsewhere. Kennedy's discourse shifts the blame for the accident to the scene, while Nixon's speech shifts the blame for the break-in to his campaign staff.

The similarities in their discourses do not end here, however. Both made repeated efforts to deal with the problem. Kennedy describes his "repeated efforts to save Mary Jo." Nixon recounts his efforts to investigate the break-in:

I immediately ordered an investigation . . . I repeatedly asked those conducting the investigation whether there was any reason to believe that members of my administration were in any way involved. . . . I personally assumed responsibility for co-ordinating intensive new inquiries into the matter and I personally ordered those conducting the investigation to get all the facts and report them directly to me . . . I again ordered that all persons in the Government or at the reelection committee should cooperate fully. I was determined that we should get to the bottom of this matter. (450)

Of course, no one who is trying to cover up an incident would order so many investigations into it. He "received repeated reassurances" that no members of his administration were involved. Thus, both rhetors provided accounts of their repeated attempts to correct the problem.

Unfortunately, neither effort was successful. The result of Kennedy's valiant attempts to save Miss Kopechne was a state of "utter exhaustion." He reports that "I was overcome . . . by a jumble of emotions, grief, fear, doubt, exhaustion, panic, confusion, and shock." His physicians diagnosed him as having "suffered a cerebral concussion as well as shock." It is no wonder that he failed to promptly report this accident to the police. Nixon announced the resignation of three of his top aides: Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean, implying that they were responsible for the cover-up. Hence, both speakers shifted blame for their alleged lack of candor. Kennedy's failure to promptly report the accident was due to shock and exhaustion, not a character flaw. The cover-up was done by Nixon's subordinates, not Nixon.

Despite these striking and important similarities in the situations faced by these rhetors and in their rhetorical responses, these discourses met with markedly different results. It would be unrealistic to expect that an incident such as the Kopechne tragedy would have no negative impact on Kennedy's image, no matter what he did in the speech. Still, he managed to strikingly minimize his losses. Kennedy's speech was successful in securing the support of the people of Massachusetts. In that state, "Teddy's overall slippage in the polls was only 9 points, from 87 percent in March to a still mighty impressive 78 in August" ("The Disinvited" 38). National polls reveal similar results: 85% favorable before the Kopechne tragedy and 74% after it ("Troubled Times" 21). Kennedy's speech managed to maintain his image (or at least to restore it) for about three-fourths of the general public and even more in his home state.⁴

Nixon also faced a difficult rhetorical challenge, and could not be expected to dispel all of the suspicions and charges with a single speech. However, he was not nearly as successful as Kennedy in this rhetorical efforts to maintain his image. A Gallup poll conducted two days after his speech reports that less than one-third of the general public believed that he had "told the whole truth in his speech" and about half believed he was involved in the Watergate affair ("Public Reaction to Watergate" 9).

The task of identifying the cause of a successful or unsuccessful discourse

⁴ Butler asserts that Kennedy's speech "scored strong negative responses" (285-86), basing her conclusion on the verbal reactions of political commentators and the same polls I rely upon. She fails to report the figures I employ (78% still favorable in Massachusetts; 74% nationwide). She reports that "approval of Kennedy fell, soon after his speech, from 83 percent to 68 percent" (286). She fails to reveal that this figure represents only Independents ("The Disinvited," 38). Next, she reports that "the percentage of persons extremely favorable to Kennedy declined from 49% before the accident to 34% following Kennedy's reporting of the accident" (286). It seems unreasonably selective to omit all other favorable responses, which bring the total of all favorable responses to 74%, as I report. Finally, she also indicates that "the college-educated rejected Kennedy's televised explanation by 49% to 30% (286). The article from which she takes this (also selective) figure actually concludes that "In terms of the overall respect in which Kennedy is held, the poll indicated no radical shift as a result of Chappaquiddick" (Public reaction: Charitable, 17).

is an extremely difficult one.⁵ Causes for human behavior are seldom simple. However, the relatively large number of important similarities between these two rhetorical efforts allows us to narrow the possible causes, and, hopefully, identify the rhetorical element that best accounts for or contributes most to the divergent results.

Burke tells us how important it is to obtain redemption after experiencing guilt such as this. The key difference between these two rhetorical efforts at purification in these discourses lies in how they seek redemption. After appearing to engage in mortification, both rhetors describe the situation facing them in ways that function to shift the blame to another element in that situation. However, Kennedy shifted the blame to the scene, while Nixon shifted the blame to his subordinates. Kennedy shifted the blame for both the accident (the road conditions) and the failure to report it (his concussion and exhaustion from repeated attempts to save Mary Jo) to elements that he had no control over. Nixon, on the other hand, blamed both problems on his hand-picked subordinates: the break-in is blamed on campaign staff and the cover-up on his top aides. This is a key difference in their apologetic discourses.

Kennedy could not be held accountable for the conditions of the road. Even the trauma that was portrayed as the reason for his lack of candor was ultimately caused by the concussion he suffered in the accident. However, Nixon had personally selected his subordinates. Nixon's attempt to shift the blame may absolve him of direct responsibility, but auditors are forced to accept the conclusion that the President's top level advisors sanction illegal break-ins and lie directly and repeatedly to the President himself. Since he chose them to serve as his key aides (and to run his re-election campaign) he is responsible for their actions. While it is beyond the scope of this essay to examine the entire Watergate affair, the ineffectuality of this approach can also be seen in the fact that continued reliance on this strategy would eventually use up all reasonable scapegoats—leaving Nixon himself as the target of guilt. It is not surprising that Kennedy's use of the strategy of victimage was more successful than Nixon's.⁶

⁵ While this is not the place to discuss my conception of causality in rhetoric it is important to note that I do not ascribe to a view that rhetoric "causes" persuasive effects in the sense of necessary and sufficient conditions or deterministic causality. Mill, primarily concerned with physical science, may have conceived of causes in this fashion. However, my purpose here is to apply the logic of his approach to the social realm, and I recognize that the audience is an active participant in the rhetorical process, deciding what to attend to, interpreting and construing messages, and making choices about reactions to those messages. In my view, discourse influences persuasive effects by calling the audience's attention to certain ideas, motivating them to think about those ideas, providing materials to ponder, linking ideas together in arguments, etc. This view is not a limitation of the revised conception of analog, but a recognition that people are not mechanisms lacking choice and volition. Furthermore, it does not mean that audience reactions are totally unpredictable, only that they cannot be predicted with certainty.

⁶ Each speech was more complex than described here, which is why each piece has been the subject of study before (see, e.g., Benoit; Ling). I do not argue that this analysis is exhaustive; in fact, it seems likely that no speech can be fully explicated from any single perspective. This essay is designed to illustrate the analog method with what may be the most important factor contributing to the success of Kennedy's speech and the failure of Nixon's speech; and to suggest that this factor is most easily identified through this method.

Again, it must be acknowledged that these situations are very complex. For example, Nixon had significant attacks coming from various quarters, including the President's counsel, John Dean. Also, the time frame was different: Kennedy's speech was a part of a brief episode, while the Watergate incident developed over a period of time (the apologetic discourse analyzed here, however, is the first of three Watergate speeches, and occurs fairly early in the Watergate affair). Without denying the importance of these other factors, the point here is that the difference in target for their attempted victimage is the rhetorical element in these speeches that contributed most to their success or failure. This contrast between Kennedy's and Nixon's speeches reveals that there are differences in how a rhetor shifts the blame. Nixon attempted to shift the blame to Dean, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman. As Watergate continued to drag on, he ran out of plausible scapegoats, leaving the guilt to rest on his own shoulders. In short, Nixon's choice of target for victimage seems doomed to failure *regardless* of the other factors that also operated in this situation.

In his insightful criticism of Kennedy's speech, Ling concludes that while "Judging the response of an audience is . . . precarious," the "methodology employed here suggested . . . [that] Kennedy's presentation portrayed him . . . as a victim of the scene" (86). The implication is that his success is due to scapegoating of scenic elements. However, this analysis does not permit Ling to ascertain what would have occurred if Kennedy had not done so. Similarly, my analysis of Nixon's Watergate rhetoric included consideration of the speech of April 30, 1973.

Even if his audience had accepted his description of reality and the shift of blame to his subordinates, his image still would have suffered. Americans would have been forced to conclude he was a poor judge of character since he appointed as key officials men who would lie and ignore direct orders. (Benoit 203)

In other words, while Nixon did attempt victimage, he did not succeed in shifting all of the blame (direct and indirect) from himself. However, this analysis does not permit me to establish what would have been the case if Nixon had not blamed his subordinates. Of course, no one can know what would have happened if *Kennedy* had not blamed the scene, or if *Nixon* had not blamed his subordinates. But, if the speeches are sufficiently similar, that is unnecessary. The critic can point to the more successful discourse and explain, "Here the speaker did X, and the speech was fairly successful," and then point to the less favorably received address and observe "Here the speaker did not do X, and the speech was less effective." To the extent the speeches are similar in essential regards, the critic can discover useful insights from careful analysis of similarities and differences in rhetorical artifacts.

Conclusion

The conception of the analog approach developed here can be a powerful tool in the service of critics who are investigating the effects of discourse. The analog can also be used to examine other similarities and differences besides the ones illustrated here. For example, analysis of discourses uttered in diverse situations by the same rhetor can be used to detect idiosyncratic differences in that person's discourse. Of course, this method possesses

important limitations. Its usefulness depends entirely on the extent of similarity between the speeches (two or more) analyzed. However, when circumstances do warrant its use, it can be a powerful method.

This essay also argues that this revised conception of the analog method should be considered a "meta-critical" approach (Brock & Scott). That is, like movement criticism and generic criticism, it must be coupled with a theory of rhetoric or another method of rhetorical criticism. The analog method guides the critic in selecting discourse for analysis, but does not indicate which rhetorical elements deserve the critic's attention. This need not necessarily be a formal theory of rhetoric or rhetorical criticism, for critics may have intuitive notions about which aspects of the discourse are most interesting to scrutinize.

The application advanced here uses Burke's notion of guilt and purification to focus the analysis of these two species. As Burke suggests, shifting the blame, or victimage, can be an effective strategy for purging guilt. However, rhetors must be careful to shift the blame to elements in the rhetorical situation that they are not responsible for. Scenic elements (or, in other circumstances, one's opponents) seem likely candidates for scapegoating. Note that this criticism makes a modest contribution to fleshing out Burke's theory; specifically, that the rhetor engaging in victimage should shift the blame to an element for which the rhetor is not responsible. Doing so cannot assure success; although failing to do so may make failure very likely.

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