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SPEAKER AND GAVEL

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GENDER DIFFERENCES AND ARGUMENTATION: A POSITIONAL ACCOUNT OF THE RECEPTION OF GENETICS ARGUMENTS

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The past decade has seen a revival of the old patriarchal idea that the minds of men and women are fundamentally different. Cultural feminists led the way back into this dark forest by arguing that women had different paths of moral development from men (Gilligan, 1982) and different ways of "knowing" the world (Belenky et al., 1986). The work of these feminists, however, merely legitimated more recent studies focusing on the biological differences between men's and women's minds that have recently been conducted by traditional biological scientists (e.g. Gur et al., 1995) and that have since been widely popularized in the mass media (e.g. Begley, 1995; "Sex," 1995). This essay argues against the application of such modes of analysis to studies of gender and argumentation. Instead, it suggests that we should employ positional accounts of gender differences in argumentation.¹ It makes this argument in three steps. First, it briefly describes the two major flaws undergirding extant gender difference arguments. Second, it describes an alternative perspective based on the social and personal positioning of gendered humans, a perspective that emphasizes the search for gender diversity. Third, it presents an audience-reception study of genetics arguments designed to illustrate the positional model.

Flaws in the Gender Difference Argument

A variety of scholars have pointed out the many flaws in those analyses that have sought to demonstrate that the mental processes of men and women are fundamentally different from each other (see especially Tavris, 1992). For our purposes, these flaws can be reduced to two. First, these works emphasize the differences between men and women and ignore the range of differences among persons within each gender grouping. The particular way in which these studies dichotomize gender depends on whether the method employed is scientific or feminist.

Those studies asserting gender dichotomy on the basis of scientific meth-

¹ Various usages of the terms "sex" and "gender" are employed by those from different perspectives. Because cultural definitions are imposed upon biological factors to cut up biological territories in various ways, to regulate their meanings, to reshape biological components (through developmental training as well as surgery), as well as to create unique cultural aspects of sexual identities, we use the term gender as a superordinate term designating both cultural facets of sex-related identities as well as the culturally shaped biological substrate.

odologies reduce the range of scores for men and for women each to a separate "mean" and then report the differences between these two means as though this difference of mean was summative of a normative "male" and normative "female" type. This method should be treated with great skepticism because in any set of complex statistical measures, one should expect at least one out of 20 of the subquestions to show, by random chance, a difference in mean if measured to a significance level of $p < .05$ (a fairly standard significance level). Only strict replication could assure us that these fishing expeditions have produced something other than random variance. But, in general, these fishing expeditions are not replicated. The experiences of scholars in communication studies suggest that reliable and valid replication of gender dichotomy studies are highly difficult. Studies attempting to verify gender dichotomy with respect to communication patterns have shown more contradictory results than similar results (Pearson, Turner & Todd-Manillas, 1991; Rakow, 1986).

Even if, however, replication produced any cases of reliable evidence of gender difference in the means of "normal" male and female minds, such studies have little substantive meaning, given the fact that on the overwhelming number of features, there are no differences in means, and that within-group difference exceeds across-group difference. In other words, the fact that there are differences in the means of these two constructed population distributions tells us little, especially when overlap in the two distributions is as large as it is in all gender findings to date.

Those studies that assert gender dichotomy on the basis of feminist methodologies do not, of course, hold themselves accountable to such quantitative measures. Instead, they rely on the "experiences" and "interpretations" of the authors, their research participants, and their audiences to confirm their claims (Carter & Spitzack, 1989). Given that we are all already steeped in sexist stereotypes, it is not surprising that research participants and researchers produce sex-stereotypical comments and interpretations and that many people find these studies consonant with their experiences. In this case, therefore, feminist methodologies relying on prior experiences are subject to circular reasoning and therefore are highly suspect.

The second basic flaw in studies seeking to establish gender dichotomy is that they continue to believe that they can parse out some kind of fundamental biological component of differences in human behavior that is separate from cultural influences. This is obviously not possible when one studies adult human physiology. As we well know now, brains develop in response to external stimuli, so that differences in the brains of two sets of twenty year olds are as likely to be accounted for by their exposure to different stimuli and rewards as to be accounted for by gender genetics. Given that gender difference in social treatment begins as soon as a child is given a name, this socialization component cannot be parsed from the biological component after birth. Even if, on the other hand, we analyze differences in brains of newborns (an ethically problematic procedure, since the newborns cannot give informed consent), we have no idea whether measured differences in biological means (which still suffer from the problems described above) translate into any specific social differences. The turn to biology as a

proof of differences in the cognitive capacities or styles of men and women is, therefore, inherently insupportable.

Alternative Treatments of Gender

Gender deconstructivists and those who have studied the interactions of race, class, and gender have urged us to take a different approach to gender (Butler, 1990; Houston, 1992; Moi, 1985/1991; Stanback, 1989). Instead of emphasizing the differences between the groups "men" and "women", these scholars have suggested the need to explore the differences within genders, even blurring the lines between genders. They have argued that there are a variety of rich subtypes of gender, including but also transcending those related to sexual orientation. There are, as our common sense would aver, both nurturing, quiet "feminine" men and bossy, independent "masculine" women. Bem (1981), for example, has suggested that there are four genders: "masculine," "feminine," "neuter," and "androgynous." The gender deconstructivist approach urges us to explore these and other different groupings as valid types of human beings, rather than dismissing them as deviants who stray from the sex role stereotypes summed up in means of gendered behavior. In place of a model of gender dichotomy, it offers a model of gender diversity.

A few empirical studies have moved us in that direction (Houston, 1985). However, by and large, gender deconstructivists have not been empirically oriented. They are more concerned to endorse and encourage a range of gender differences than to test whether such groupings might exist or to categorize them through careful observational studies. To respond to this gap, the study here reported offers an empirical exploration of within-gender difference and examines the impact of those internal differences upon our understanding of across-gender differences in argumentation.

In order to pursue such an approach, however, we must account for where these subgroup differences might arise from. It may well be that there is a biological component to individual gender differences. However, it is also undoubtedly the case that biological features are ineluctably modified by social circumstances, so that these social circumstances become at least as potent, if not more potent, as predictors of human behavior than do initial, minor, biological differences. As they manifest themselves in particular individuals, social circumstances can be described as "positional variables."

Positional variables have to do with the roles and responsibilities that one believes that one must attend to in society. A variety of components construct one's position. Some of the factors relate to social class, some to ethnicity, religious training, familial structure, relative abilities, sexual orientation, and to individual idiosyncrasy (which may or may not be anything more than the specific interaction of these other features). In the construction and decoding of arguments, the positional factors that will influence one's interpretation of those arguments may fall into two classes: topic-invariant and topic-variant. Topic invariant factors are those which remain constant across subjects. They would presumably manifest themselves whether the argument at hand related to the best way to bake a chocolate cake, how to engineer a missile, or whether lying was ever a good thing. Topic invariant factors would arise from

basic training in argumentation style that carried across situations or from positional factors that were so fundamental that they impacted all topics. We do not know if there are any topic-invariant factors in the processing of argumentation. Studies designed to test that question would be quite elaborate.

Topic-variant factors are those which are related to the specific topic at hand. If one is positioned with certain responsibilities with respect to a given subject, one presumably would construct different arguments and decode arguments in different ways than persons who are otherwise positioned. With regards to genetics, for example, since women are positioned with greater responsibility for children in our society, we would expect that they might process arguments about genetics differently from men. More particularly, however, we would expect that women who expected to have heavy responsibilities with regard to children would be uniquely different from any other persons who did not have such positioning. The following study explores such processing differences. It concludes that those who are socially positioned as subject to greater responsibility with respect to an argument will be more sensitive to negative judgmental contents of those arguments than those who are not so positioned, and that this, not biological sex, accounts for perceived differences in processing of arguments. In the case of the processing of genetics arguments, this translates into an apparent gender difference in argument reception between men and women that can actually be attributed to a sub-group of women with expectations for relatively large families.

Study Design

We report here a *post hoc* analysis of the gender component of a study designed to test the impact of different forms of genetics arguments upon people's opinions of genetics. The study involved 137 students, 66 self-designated as female and 77 self-designated as male, in basic communication courses in a large southern research university. After answering basic demographic questions, students were assigned to read one of two forms of a "news report" about genetics. One version was drawn from discourse of the type "voluntary hereditarianism" (VH) common in American public discourse in the early 1970's. This discourse contained negative judgments of persons with genetic illness embedded in its word choices. It represented genetic illness as a "taint" upon a family and, while it left the choice not to reproduce open to the individual, it suggested that individuals with genetic illnesses should choose not to reproduce. The second version was drawn from the discourse of the type "medical genetics" (MG) common in American discourse in the early 1990s. This discourse did not contain such negative judgments of genetic illness. It medicalized genetic differences and emphasized the need to avoid discrimination against the ill.

After reading one of these passages, student participants were asked to answer four sets of questions. The first set were open-ended questions that asked for their general interpretation of the key metaphors of the two discourses—the "lottery" vs. "the blueprint." The second set were closed questions that asked them to rate their agreement or disagreement with a state-

ment about genetics on a 1 to 7 Likert-type scale (see Table 1). The third set of questions asked them to indicate which of a series of positions would most likely be held by the author of the article. The last set of questions asked them to make judgments about the general population's interpretations of the blueprint and lottery metaphors.

Our goals were to compare men and women to see if there were differences between these two groups, and then to further subdivide the groups to explore whether or not these differences were accounted for by particular positionings of the two genders. We found a rather stark and clear difference with regard to the number of children that women expected to have, a factor obviously significant with regard to genetics.

Results and Interpretations

On the majority of questions, there was no statistically significant difference between men and women in their response to their personal opinions with regards to genetics. However, with regards to two sets of questions there were significant differences in the means between men and women. The first set of questions were those that asked what expectations the respondent had with regard to their children. At the $p < .05$ level, men were significantly more likely to say that they wanted their children to be "perfect," "normal" and "like me" than were women (see Tables 1 & 2). Women were significantly more likely to say that they wanted their children to be "healthy." In addition to these differences with regards to preferences about children, there were significant differences between the means for men and women with regards to their opinions about social support for genetic discrimination. Women were significantly more likely to think that insurance companies should not discriminate against those with genetic disease and that the government should regulate genetics to prevent discrimination (see Table 2).

These differences in opinions seem to be related to clear patterns in differences of interpretation of the genetics argument. Men and women read the two versions of the genetics argument differently in patterns that seem to reflect these differences in underlying attitudes. While there were no differences in how men and women who received the "medical genetics" discourse interpreted it, there were clear differences in how men and women who received the "voluntary hereditarianism" discourse interpreted this more negatively judgmental argument. Women were significantly more likely to interpret the VH discourse as more negatively judgmental against humans with genetic disabilities. On question A3, which sought to tap audience interpretations of the stringency of standards implied about desirable qualities in children, men tended to see the VH article as similar to the medical genetics article in terms of the author's attitudes toward desired children (see Table 3). They tended to place the author of the VH passage in the more tolerant categories, holding mostly that the author of the article would have the opinion that "people should have only healthy children" or that "people should not try to determine what kind of children they will have." Women, on the other hand, thought that the attitudes of the author of the VH passage were less tolerant. Unlike the MG article, they thought that this author believed that "people should only have perfectly healthy children" or "healthy

Table 1. Questions Reported in This Study¹

I. Your opinions (1 = Agree, 7 = Disagree)

- M2. Persons with genetic disease come from tainted families.
- M5. If persons with genetic disease have children, it will decrease the overall fitness of the human species.
- M6. Efforts to limit population growth should include discouraging people with genetic diseases from reproducing.
- M8. Persons with genetic flaws should not have children.
- M9. Our genes determine our physical form, our mental characteristics, and our behavior and personality.
- M11. I would like my children to be perfect.
- M13. I would employ genetic technologies to increase the chances of having a healthy child.
- M14. Our genes influence our physical form, our mental characteristics, and our behavior and personality.
- M15. I would like my children to be healthy.
- M17. Insurance companies should not discriminate against those who have genetic flaws (Note: this question was recoded in the program to invert the direction).
- M19. The government should regulate genetics to prevent discrimination.
- M22. I would like my children to be normal.
- M23. Human beings should control their genetic legacy.
- M24. Each of us has some form of genetic flaw. The differences are only matters of degree.
- M25. I would employ genetic technologies to have a perfect child.
- M28. I would like my children to be like me.

II. Author's Opinions

- A3. The author of the article would most likely hold which of the following opinions?
 - A. People should only have perfect children.
 - B. People should only have perfectly healthy children.
 - C. People should only have healthy children.
 - D. People should only have normal children.
- A6. the author of the article would most likely hold which of the following opinions?
 - A. The government should regulate reproduction to reduce population and the genetic load on the human species.
 - B. Individuals should regulate their own reproduction to reduce population and the genetic load on the human species.
 - C. Individuals should make decisions about reproduction based on their own needs and desires.
 - D. The government should provide social support so that individuals can make free choices about their reproduction without facing economic discrimination.
- A7. Which of the following statements best captures the author's attitude toward those with genetic illnesses?
 - A. They come from bad families.
 - B. They are victims of a disease and should be treated the same as anyone else with an illness.
 - C. They are just like everyone else.

Only questions that yielded statistically significant results at the $p < .05$ level are reported.

Table 2. Male v. Female Attitudes on Genetics

| Question/Variable | Sex | Mean | SD | t | p |
|---------------------|--------|--------|-------|-------|------|
| Child preferences | | | | | |
| M11* | male | 3.5909 | 1.771 | -2.11 | .036 |
| | female | 4.2714 | 1.970 | | |
| M15 | male | 1.3636 | .572 | 2.80 | .006 |
| | female | 1.1304 | .380 | | |
| M22 | male | 1.9242 | 1.385 | -2.33 | .021 |
| | female | 2.4783 | 1.378 | | |
| M28 | male | 2.5252 | 1.395 | -2.06 | .041 |
| | female | 3.0000 | 1.351 | | |
| Anti-discrimination | | | | | |
| M17** | male | 5.1970 | 1.648 | -3.50 | .001 |
| | female | 6.0857 | 1.305 | | |
| M19 | male | 4.5781 | 1.631 | 2.81 | .006 |
| | female | 3.7826 | 1.635 | | |

* See Table 1 for list of questions referred to in this study. Only items with $p < .05$ are reported here.

** Item was recoded in reverse order.

children." They did not think that the author thought that "people should not try to determine what kind of children they will have" (see Table 3).

The same pattern of interpretation occurred with regard to question A6, which sought to estimate the audience's interpretation of the desirability of regulating reproductive practices by various agents. Women were far more likely than men to place the VH article on the more judgmental, less tolerant end of the scale. Women tended to see the VH article as advocating either government regulation of reproduction or at least individual regulation of their own reproduction for social ends, rather than seeing the article as supporting individual choice for personal desire or government support of individual choices (see Table 3).

The pattern also held for question 7, which sought to estimate author attitudes toward people with genetic diseases. The men did not seem to pick up on the strong judgmental taint of the voluntary hereditarianist discourse, with its references to tainted blood, secretism, and corruption. They were most likely to see the VH author as holding the position that genetic illnesses were diseases just like any others. Women, on the other hand, were significantly more likely to interpret the VH author as holding the position that those with genetic diseases "come from bad families." The substantiveness of these findings is reinforced by the fact that on other questions, those which related to less judgmental issues such as degree of determinism and locus of control, there were no statistically significant differences between men and women. Hence, the response seems particular to negative judgmentalness.

Two interpretations of these patterns of difference are available. The positional approach would hold that those who are positioned with initial values at odds to an argument are more likely to be sensitive to negative judgments embedded in an argument than are those whose initial values are more consonant with the argument. The other interpretation is that men and

Table 3. Male vs. Female Interpretations of Genetics Arguments

| “Voluntary Hereditarianism” | | | | | | | |
|---|--------|----|----|---|---|----------------|--------|
| | Answer | | | | | | |
| | a | b | c | d | e | C ² | p |
| A3 | | | | | | | |
| male | 1 | 4 | 11 | 6 | 8 | 10.67368 | .03049 |
| female | 2 | 13 | 17 | 1 | 4 | | |
| A6 | | | | | | | |
| male | 5 | 10 | 8 | 7 | | 10.17245 | .01716 |
| female | 11 | 20 | 3 | 2 | | | |
| A7 | | | | | | | |
| male | 7 | 18 | 5 | | | 8.14326 | .01705 |
| female | 21 | 14 | 2 | | | | |
| “Medical Genetics” | | | | | | | |
| No questions showed significant differences at the p < .05 level. | | | | | | | |

women are just different in the way they respond to arguments, women being more sensitive to negative judgmentalness in general. To assess these two models, we explored whether there were differences with regard to women who were themselves positioned differently. The number of children that women expect to have seemed to provide a topic-relevant positioning on the subject of genetics (Condit, 1995).

Findings with Regard to Children Expected

To determine the impact of the number of children participants expected to have on their interpretations of genetics arguments we divided men and women into "high-child" and "low-child" groups. The "high-child" group consisted of those who said that they expected to have three or more children. The "low-child" group consisted of those who said they expected to have zero, one, or two children. It was necessary to group the "3" children group with the "high-child" group in order to get sets large enough for the statistical test. This is conceptually justified by the fact that the two child family is normative in the United States (Gallup, 1991). The results of these analyses strongly support the positional model: the opinions of high-child and low-child women differed dramatically from each other and in their relationship to similarly positioned men's opinions; further, with regard to the interpretations of the judgmentalness of the VH discourse, only the high-child women showed a statistically significant set of differences from men.

First, with regard to the receiver's own values, the patterns of attitudes of high-child and low-child women were dramatically different. Low-child women were significantly more judgmental (M8, M24), more determinist (M9, M14), and more control oriented (M13, M23, M25) than were high-child women (see Table 4). Second, the patterns of differences between men and women were strikingly different when we compared high-child women to high-child men and low-child women to low-child men (see Tables 5 & 6). Whereas high-child women were more likely to be opposed to what has

Table 4. Women's Attitude Differences by Expected No. of Children

| Question/ Variable* | Condition | Mean | SD | t | p |
|------------------------|------------|--------|--------|-------|------|
| M8 | Low-child | 4.6000 | 1.516 | -2.27 | .026 |
| | High-child | 5.3929 | 1.257 | | |
| M9 | Low-child | 3.0500 | 1.339 | -3.13 | .003 |
| | High-child | 4.2143 | 1.729 | | |
| M13 | Low-child | 2.9750 | 1.656 | -2.80 | .007 |
| | High-child | 4.1071 | 1.618 | | |
| M14 | Low-child | 2.8462 | 2.8462 | -3.18 | .002 |
| | High-child | 4.0357 | 4.0357 | | |
| M23 | Low-child | 3.9500 | 3.9500 | -2.47 | .016 |
| | High-child | 4.7857 | 4.7857 | | |
| M24 | Low-child | 5.3500 | .975 | -2.09 | .040 |
| | High-child | 5.8214 | .819 | | |
| M25 | Low-child | 4.6500 | 1.545 | -2.18 | .033 |
| | High-child | 5.5357 | 1.795 | | |

* See Table 1 for list of questions. Only results $p < .05$ are reported here.

been called the "geneticization" ideology (Nelkin & Lindee, 1995) than were high-child men, low-child women were *more likely to be supportive* of a genetic ideology than were low-child men. High-child women were significantly less judgmental (M2, M17, M26), less determinist (M3), less control oriented (M5, M13, M23, M25), and more tolerant of diversity in their chil-

Table 5. Attitude Difference: High-child Men vs. High-child Women

| Question/ Variable* | Sex | Mean | SD | t | p |
|------------------------|--------|--------|-------|-------|------|
| M2 | male | 5.2308 | 1.451 | -2.22 | .031 |
| | female | 6.0174 | 1.331 | | |
| M5 | male | 4.3462 | 1.719 | -2.61 | .012 |
| | female | 5.4286 | 1.317 | | |
| M11 | male | 3.4615 | 1.749 | -2.44 | .018 |
| | female | 4.6786 | 1.906 | | |
| M13 | male | 2.6538 | 1.623 | -3.29 | .002 |
| | female | 4.1071 | 1.618 | | |
| M17 | male | 4.8846 | 1.966 | -2.77 | .008 |
| | female | .07146 | 1.086 | | |
| M22 | male | 1.5769 | .902 | -2.86 | .006 |
| | female | 2.3929 | 1.166 | | |
| M23 | male | 3.7308 | 1.687 | -2.55 | .014 |
| | female | 4.7857 | 1.343 | | |
| M24 | male | 5.1154 | 1.071 | -2.73 | .009 |
| | female | 5.8214 | .819 | | |
| M25 | male | 4.3462 | 1.810 | -2.42 | .019 |
| | female | 5.5357 | 1.795 | | |
| M28 | male | 2.1538 | 1.156 | -2.66 | .010 |
| | female | 3.0714 | 1.359 | | |

* See Table 1 for questions. Only results $p < .05$ are reported here.

Table 6. Attitude Difference: Low-child Men vs. Low-child Women

| Questions/ Variable* | Sex | Mean | SD | t | p |
|-------------------------|--------|---------|-------|------|------|
| M6 | male | 4.94714 | 1.469 | 2.12 | .037 |
| | female | 4.1500 | 1.819 | | |
| M9 | male | 4.0789 | 1.836 | 2.84 | .006 |
| | female | 3.0500 | 1.339 | | |
| M15 | male | 1.3421 | .534 | 2.42 | .018 |
| | female | 1.1026 | .307 | | |
| M19 | male | 4.5676 | 1.642 | 2.53 | .013 |
| | female | 3.6410 | 1.547 | | |

* See Table 1 for questions. Only results $p < .05$ are reported here.

dren (M11, M18, M22, M25, M28) than were high-child men, whereas low-child women were significantly *more* judgmental (M6), determinist (M9), and control oriented than were low-child men. The only statistically significant differences between low-child men and low-child women in preferences about their own children went in the *opposite* direction from the overall male-female means. Low-child women were less likely than men to say that they wanted their children to be healthy (whereas all women as a group had been more likely to say this). The only way in which low-child women seem to have been more opposed to geneticization than low-child men was that they were significantly more likely to believe that the government should prevent genetic discrimination (M19). If we compare low-child women to low-child men, therefore, we get a reversal of our characterization of men as a group and women as a group.

Analysis of attitudes by gender suggests, therefore, that differently positioned women have dramatically different attitudes toward genetics. Some groups of women have attitudes towards geneticization that are more consonant than those of similarly positioned men, whereas other groups of women have attitudes towards geneticization that are more opposed to genetics than are similarly positioned men. The stark reversal of patterns found here among subgroups suggests that for the most part, subgroup differences make interpretation of overall means of men and women quite misleading. This also appears to have a clear impact in accounting for the way in which different groups process arguments.

In short, there were no significant differences between low-child men and low-child women in their interpretations of the genetic discourse, whereas high-child men and women interpreted the discourse differently on both items A3 and A7 (see Table 7). Thus, the observed differences in sensitivity to negative judgments attributed above to gender are more specifically accounted for by women who intend to have many children. It is this group that picks up on the judgmental qualities of the voluntary hereditarianist discourse, more than simply "women in general." While all women are somewhat subject to the responsibilities of child bearing and rearing, women who expected to have large families are positioned to be the most subject to those responsibilities, and it is not surprising therefore that it is they who

Table 7. Interpretations of Genetic Arguments by Child Expectation and Gender

| High-Child Men vs. High-Child Women | | | | | | | | |
|--|--------|----|----|---|----|----------------|----------------|--------|
| | Answer | | | | | | | |
| A3 | a | b | c | d | e | C ² | p | |
| male | 1 | 2 | 7 | 5 | 10 | 10.29222 | .03578 | |
| female | 1 | 8 | 2 | 1 | 16 | | | |
| | Answer | | | | | | | |
| A7 | a | b | c | | | | C ² | p |
| male | 2 | 12 | 12 | | | | 6.24965 | .04394 |
| female | 10 | 8 | 10 | | | | | |
| Low-child Men v. Low-child Women | | | | | | | | |
| No significant differences at the p < .05 level. | | | | | | | | |

are most sensitive to argumentative contents that would increase their guilt or task load with regard to choosing their child's genetic configuration.

Conclusions

This study has been formative and exploratory only. We have sought to examine the extent to which within-gender differences in argument processing may be more important than between-gender differences, and to suggest that ignoring within-gender differences may actually lead to misinterpretations with regard to gender difference. In this case, a dichotomous gender approach that examined only the difference in means between men and women would have led to the faulty interpretation that women are less judgmental about genetics issues than men and more likely to process judgmental argumentative messages as negatively judgmental than are men. Instead, examination of sub-group differences indicates great diversity within women. It indicates that depending on their positioning with respect to expected child-raising responsibilities, women are either more control oriented and judgmental than similarly placed men (if they expect few children) or less control oriented and judgmental than similarly placed men (if they expect more children). Furthermore, it is the latter group who best account for the differences in interpretation of messages, so that it is one's vulnerability of position on an issue, rather than one's gender per se, that leads to the interpretation of a nonfavorable argumentative message as judgmental.

Due to the fact that this exploration is based on a single, *post hoc* examination, we would urge caution in the application or overgeneralization of these findings. This study should not be treated as a conclusive demonstration that within-gender differences always or usually outweigh across-gender differences. However, it does provide a clear example that calls into question the continuation of "business as usual" with regard to gender difference studies. There are good reasons to believe that a bipolar gender model is as likely to be misleading as informative—statistically significant results on bipolar gender hypotheses may mask gender diversity. Thus, those pursuing gender difference research are encouraged to test within-gender

differences as well as across-gender differences to insure that their research is not producing overly simplistic conclusions. While a model of gender diversity is not yet established as an alternative to gender dichotomy, it is certainly reasonable to suggest that it should be a hypothesis that we pursue rigorously.

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THE ARGUER'S IDENTITY: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE ON THE PRACTICE OF ARGUMENTATION THEORY

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Traditional argumentation and interdisciplinary feminisms have an important assumption in common. Argumentation is admired for its promotion of a practical art that has the potential to make a significant difference in the lived experience of human beings, particularly in the context of democratic participation. Likewise, the relationship between theory and practice is a central concern for many feminists, the synthesis being a necessary ingredient in the avowedly political feminist agenda. This connection resonates with a basic tenet of feminist thought; the personal is political.

Feminist intellectuals associate the "personal" with the "practical" and the "political" with the "theoretical" (Warren "The Truth" 103). Theory, from a feminist point of view, is expected to play a practical part in transforming oppressive social relations. Its object is to make a difference in the lives of real women and men rather than constructing theoretical abstractions that have little relevance to everyday experience.

However, unlike traditional argumentation theory and the liberalism upon which it relies, feminist scholars tend to pay more critical attention to the identity of the subject in the center of theories about human political life. Eisenstein, Jones, Sapiro and others have noted that theories about human political life typically involve a human subject whose identity is abstracted to stand for a kind of theoretical everyman. For example, many political theories rely upon an abstract conception of the "citizen" which is assumed to be gender neutral. Feminist intellectuals have engaged in productive critiques of this theoretical identity arguing that the abstracted subject often prevents the meaningful development of practical theory because it ignores the lived experience of women thereby excluding women's pragmatic concerns from traditional approaches to theory development. The result has been that women's issues arising from personal experiences have often been relegated to and devalued as private considerations not worthy of public deliberation (Elshtain; Okin; Pateman).

In this essay, I argue that future development of any theory of argument claiming to make a real emancipatory difference must be guided by close examination of the theoretical construction of the arguer's identity. My initial premise is a simple though important one. The identity of the competent arguer resides at the heart of any meaningful intersection between the theory and practice of argumentation. Based on this premise, I suggest that if argumentation theorists are to achieve the goal of making a practical difference to all human beings, we need to explore how our theoretical conceptions of the arguer's identity expand or limit access to the identity of a competent arguer for every individual. Thus, this essay constitutes an initial foray into the importance of the identity question in argumentation. It is designed to

stimulate dialogue about the impact of our theoretical assumptions on practical argument. Specifically, we can learn from women's experiences in intercollegiate debate as a microcosm of the practice of argument theory in order to formulate some basic propositions about the identity of a competent arguer that will be equally accessible to all human beings.

The Arguer's Identity:
The Nexus of Argumentation Theory and Practice

The major distinction between formal logic and informal reasoning or argumentation rests upon a conception of argument that emphasizes the humanness of the enterprise. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, and Toulmin, for example, point out that any real understanding of argument depends upon the inclusion of human perception and interaction in the process, things that formal logicians ignore. Other argumentation theories assume the truth of this proposition but tend to rely upon unexamined assumptions about the identity of the human arguer.

For example, many scholars justify the importance of their theories with claims about the role of argumentation in promoting individual and collective civic participation. They define their theories through descriptions of argument practices with which any (abstract) individual can supposedly identify (Crenshaw 129). Yet, by centralizing the study of argument itself, these theorists make arguments, rather than arguers, the principle objects of study. Such a focus may beg the identity question because the majority of the discursive practices that are studied are men's arguments (Spitzack & Carter; Campbell). Thus, the identity of the arguer has always played a central, albeit frequently unexamined, role in major theories of argumentation.

Brockriede was one of few scholars who sensed the importance of explicitly examining the identity question when he maintained that "the nature of the people who argue, in all their humanness, is itself an inherent variable in understanding [and] evaluating" argument (1). Privileging the importance of the identity of the arguer allowed him to transcend the limits of the formal logician who safely ignored human beings by focusing solely on the argument itself. Yet, Brockriede's attempt to engage the identity question had its own limitations. Burdened by the unopened baggage of sex and gender, his sexual metaphors for ethically classifying argumentative motives and interactions ignored the historically and materially located meaning of sex and gender in our society (Altman 486).¹

In contrast, feminist scholars consciously seek to unpack these meanings and investigate the subject's identity through a gender lens. Feminism has contributed to our understanding of the relationship between theory and practice by examining the identity of the subject who resides in the center of any given theory relating to humans and human experience. The fruits of this task have been many and varied contributing to a united commitment

¹ Brockriede classified arguers into three categories: rapist, seducer and lover. He suggested that the arguer as rapist was the least ethical, aiming for dominance of the co-arguer for unilateral gratification and so on. Brockriede seemed to ignore the implications of the fact that rape is a crime of violence most often perpetrated by men upon women.

to improving the situation of women as well as men (Jaggar & Rothenberg xii; Keohane, Rosaldo & Gelpi vii; Rosaldo 417).

Intercollegiate Debate and Women's Experiences as Arguers

For similar reasons, I hope to refocus the development of argumentation theory on the arguer's identity through an exploratory analysis of women's experiences in intercollegiate debate. Because traditional argument theory has relied upon an abstract conception of the arguer that does not account for women's experiences with the actual practice of argument, it often fails to achieve its goal of promoting the practical art of argument based upon egalitarian principles. I argue that further development of argumentation theory must account for women's experiences with sexism while explicitly theorizing the identity of a competent arguer. While argumentation scholars theorize that every individual can equally identify with the practice of argumentation, in practice, women's access to the identity of competent arguer is often restricted. To illustrate these propositions, I describe three aspects of women's experiences in intercollegiate debate and argue that these experiences constitute challenges to scholars seeking to formulate a theory of argument that supplies equal access to the identity of competent arguer.

Feminist standpoint theorists like Hartsock have argued that women's material experiences can provide a starting point for the reformulation of androcentric theory. Standpoint theory posits that individual and collective experience inform a variety of perspectives on society. These perspectives are historically and materially located in the real relations of humans with one another. Perspective is a central element of human identity and can be structured by the experience of oppression. As such, it can serve as a starting point for personal social and political transformation (Hartsock). To understand these perspectives and their impact upon the identity question, feminist standpoint theorists focus on women's material experiences in society.

Like standpoint theorists, this essay focuses on women's experiences for the purpose of challenging androcentric theories of argumentation. Unlike standpoint theorists, I do not limit this analysis to material relations alone. Instead, I examine discourses about women's roles as arguers in intercollegiate debate, women's encounters with certain sexist cultural constraints expressed through what is often said to them and about them in the debate world. Doing so recognizes that human symbol use impinges upon material reality by shaping, ordering and creating understandings of our world (McGee 3).

Intercollegiate debate is a real material as well as symbolic social order that is centrally characterized by its promotion of argument practice. Because of the unique nature of intercollegiate debate as a bounded forum for argument, scholars claim that the study of intercollegiate debate practice can tell us about argumentation theory (Goodnight; Rowland & Fritch; Rowland, Voth & Bossman). These authors suggest that intercollegiate debate supplies a model for testing spheres theory because it is a relatively pure forum focused within the public sphere. In a sense, these authors assume that debate is an application of argumentation theory, a real life example of spheres theory in practice.

Intercollegiate debate is also an appropriate forum for studying the identity question in argumentation theory for two reasons. First, many debaters and coaches spend so much of their time involved in the activity that they admit its influence on their conception of their own identity. Even those who spend less time in debate report that it has been a seminal influence in their lives (Colbert & Biggers). We often talk about the "debate forum" or the "debate culture." We perceive debate to be a "world" in which we move. Students who participate often identify themselves as "debaters" and academicians describe themselves as "debate coaches." As such, intercollegiate debate constitutes a significant aspect of students' and coaches' identities. I suspect that many of you personally understand what I mean by the distinction between merely participating in debate and actually being a debater or coach and perhaps even the difference between having participated in an argument and considering yourself an *arguer*. Our participation in debate influences how we conceive of ourselves. It structures our personal identity in part.

Second, the practice of intercollegiate debate is largely structured by the assumptions of traditional argumentation theory including the slippage in the supposedly gender-neutral construction of the arguer as anyone who can identify with the argument practices of the public sphere. The most common rationale for intercollegiate debate is that it develops critical thinking skills necessary for rational collective decision making (Colbert; Cross; Follert & Colbert; Freely; Gruner, Huseman & Luck; Hill; Howell; Jackson; Trank; Whalen). Critical thinking skills are considered a valuable asset for students because they facilitate professional preparation and participation in a democratic society (Colbert & Biggers; Ehninger & Brockriede). The prevalence of legal and policy-making analogies for explaining debate theory reflect the presumption of its location in the public sphere. Fundamentally, these skills enable our students to participate effectively in public argument.

Complaints about debate moving away from a public speaking model might seem to contradict my claim. However, as Rowland and Deatherage point out,

debate is now aimed at sharpening the research, critical thinking and organizational skills of students *so that they can become effective advocates before government commissions, courts, and other decision-making bodies* [italics added]. (247).

Even if we agree that debate is moving away from its public speaking orientation, it is still justified by the importance of argument as a public enterprise. The rationale for a debate practice that prepares advocates to argue before specialized decision-making bodies located in the public sphere means that the *raison d'être* of intercollegiate debate is still the promotion of argument as a public enterprise.

The assumption underlying this rationale is that every student can learn to identify equally with the argumentative practices of the public sphere. If we teach all of our students the effective practice of public argument, they will be equally able to move through and contribute to professional and civic life. Drawing upon classical liberal views, these justifications assume that we need only to prepare each individual student to be competent arguers and

they will have equal access to influence argumentative outcomes in the public sphere.

However, this rationale tends to ignore the gendered asymmetries that women experience as arguers. Various sexist experiences in debate hinder women's access to the identity of competent arguer in the public sphere. This parallels Fraser's feminist critique of the supposed gender-neutrality of spheres theory in general. She argues that women are no longer completely confined to the private sphere as some earlier feminist critiques suggested. Instead, the problem with spheres theory is that it fails to take into account the asymmetries that subject women to unwanted invasions of and a lesser ability to define and defend their privacy (597). Women often are devalued in the public sphere because they are women. Spheres theory does not advocate women's exclusion from public sphere participation, but it nonetheless fails to theorize women's experiences thereby ignoring argument practices that marginalize women.

To illustrate how these theoretical assumptions about the arguer's identity impact women in practice, I turn to a discussion of some of women's experiences in intercollegiate debate. For the purposes of this discussion, I draw heavily upon my own experience and my personal knowledge of other women's experiences who have crossed my path in sixteen years of association with high school, NDT and CEDA debate as well as some reliance upon studies reported by other researchers. I do not pretend that my depiction is completely representative of *all* women's experiences in intercollegiate debate, nor will I suggest that there is some kind of essential "female debate experience." Women's experiences are many and varied, and some women may not see themselves or their experiences herein. However, I do believe that my experience and the experience of other women that I describe here has not been uncommon. Just as Brockriede described a way to think about arguers based on his experience with argument, I am attempting to offer some thoughts about how experience should influence the ways in which we think of the arguer's identity.

It is important for women's own voices to be the ultimate determinant of their own experience, but even if I had conducted a survey of women in intercollegiate debate and reported the results of that survey through direct quotations, I would still be placed in the position of interpreting their experiences for them. Like Alcoff, I recognize the dangers of "speaking for" others. If I pretend to transcend my social location when making epistemic claims from a privileged position, the result may well be to perpetuate the experience of oppression. One part of the experience of oppression is to be (mis)represented by others who enjoy the power to speak and be heard. Another is to be drowned out by voices that are privileged.

However, a retreat from argument on my part would be an abdication of political responsibility and social interconnectedness in favor of political apathy. Worse still, the result may well be political inefficacy. As a way to balance these concerns, I ask that my analysis be read as an invitation to dialogue—an engagement in a discussion about women's experiences in intercollegiate debate as a starting point for the identity question in the creation of practical argumentation theory. Indeed, it could not be more, for I certainly cannot speak for all women given my privileged social location. What fol-

lows are some initial observations about some women's experiences in intercollegiate debate that impinge upon our conception of the identity of the competent arguer.

The Incompetence of Femininity

Debate, and argument more generally, are often understood through war metaphors.² Argument is frequently described as winning or losing a battle of words; argumentation is a "wordy war" that sublimates the more lethal pursuits of physical combat (Warren "Charlotte" 357). Combat metaphors also are pervasive in debate jargon. Debaters "hit" other teams at tournaments or declare their argumentative success on an issue announcing "we're killing them on this issue." Because warfare has historically been the province of men, understanding argumentation through war metaphors, tends to conflate the terms masculine and human (Warren "Charlotte" 357). For the major part of our history, the military forces have denied women membership and when women finally entered the military profession, their exclusion from combat prevented them from obtaining leadership positions and both reflected and buttressed a cultural presumption that war is men's domain.

In addition, tournament participants will often describe winning and losing in terms of sexual metaphors that describe harm done to debaters or their opponents who have lost a round. Baker argues that such metaphorical constructions place women in a passive role.

Names for males are the subjects of sentences with active constructions (that is, where the subjects are said to be doing the activity); and names for females require passive constructions (that is they are the recipients of the activity—whatever is being done to them). Thus, we would not say "Jane did it to Dick," although we would say "Dick did it to Jane." (57–58)

While sexual metaphors that describe harm done to an individual can be constructed so that women are the perpetrators of the harm, it is still true that the metaphor denigrates the female role. Suppose someone

wishes to express malevolence as forcefully as possible without actually committing an act of physical violence. . . . One of the strongest possible ways of telling someone that you wish to harm him is to tell him to assume the female sexual role relative to you. . . . Clearly, we conceive of the male sexual role as that of hurting the person in the female role. (61)

The use of sexual metaphors describing winning as a form of harm done to other debaters situates the understanding of the female role as passive and victimized.

By analyzing some of the common metaphors in the debate community, it is not my intention to advocate censorship. My claim is that the frequent use of combat and sexual metaphors may be a sign of a kind of cultural assumption that equates femininity with being weak, passive and less competent. One common negative result is that women frequently are subjected to a double standard about the acceptability of assertiveness.

Many women have described the thin line they walk when deciding ex-

² For a thorough and interesting discussion of the use of war metaphors in intercollegiate debate, see Knutson.

actly how assertive to be. If they are as assertive as male debaters, they often are judged to be overly aggressive and not feminine enough. If they choose to be less assertive, they often are perceived as lacking confidence and competence. These experiences are a sign that debate culture contains a presumption that equates incompetence with femininity, yet nonetheless insists that women be feminine. The presumption of the incompetence of femininity is reinforced by another kind of experience that interferes with women's equal access to the identity of competent arguer.

The "Great Woman Debater" Phenomenon

Many women I know can recount the following from personal experience: "Oh, (*insert female debater here*), you are one of the best women debaters I have ever seen! You are as good as (*insert female debater here*) was." A less complimentary version of the account is "Well, you're pretty good for a woman." A more ambiguous statement might be "Isn't it great that women like you are doing so well!" The interpretation of these comments depends heavily on an understanding of the context in which they are made. Some versions of these statements may be made and taken as a meaningful compliment or a celebration of women's accomplishments. Yet, in many instances, these remarks are revealing declarations of the devaluation of women's communication as a segregated whole. Several studies suggest that women's communication is often seen as less powerful or persuasive or interesting than men's communication (Penelope; Henley; Hamilton & Thorne; Thorne, Kramarae & Henley; Spender).

This premise applied to intercollegiate debate may not be immediately acceptable to those of us who can recall association with women in debate who are or were examples of excellence to all of us. In certain contexts, mention of these women and their achievements can be empowering, and it is not my purpose here to discount their distinction. Nonetheless, I believe it is essential to understand the dynamic of the "Great Woman Debater" phenomenon.

The "Great Woman Debater" is sister to what Spitzack and Carter have identified as the "Great Woman Speaker" category of rhetorical study. Research falling into the category of "Great Women Speakers" recognizes the influence of great women and attempts to demonstrate that women too can be powerful and contribute to society despite their historical exclusion from the public sphere. However, Spitzack and Carter, I think rightly, caution that the study of great women speakers may serve to perpetuate traditional and unfair standards for the judgment of greatness that will continue to exclude most women from communication research (405).

Their point and mine is not to demand a "genderblind" approach to the study of rhetoric and argumentation. Rather, the difficulty of the "Great Woman Debater" phenomenon lies in its exclusionary implication. It is analogous to describing women as "women attorneys" or "women professors," for such a description, while recognizing that women have entered these professions, still defines the profession as male-dominated by requiring the adjective "woman" to make its meaning clear. When one woman is elevated to the status of greatness in direct contrast to the majority of women, the

implication is that she is the exception and that most women do not have the capacity to achieve the status of competent arguer. This may appear to be confirmed when a debater looks around herself and finds a disproportionate number of white males winning speaker awards and advancing into elimination rounds (Stepp; Logue).

Moreover, she might wonder if the "compliment" is "backhanded" in that her greatness is somehow lessened or diminished in comparison to a male norm. Women who describe the "Great Woman Debater" experience often point out that they have never heard anyone say to a man "You are the best *male* debater I have heard in a long time!" Yet, perhaps the most troublesome outcome of the "Great Woman Debater" phenomenon is its potential to pit women against each other. When the standard of comparison is other women, it may arbitrarily increase the pressure to compete against them or, alternatively, promote a desire to avoid them thereby impeding empowering alliances with other women who may have similar concerns including the next experience I describe.

Your Personal Life is Now Public Domain

Many women who participate in intercollegiate debate find that the details of their personal lives, particularly their romantic interests, sexual life, and reproductive choices become the subject of public discussion and judgment. This can take many forms ranging from sexual harassment to generally demeaning community gossip. The existence of both gender and sexual harassment in intercollegiate debate has been well documented (Stepp, Simerly & Logue; Szwapa).

The following survey response cited in Szwapa's study is so vivid in its description of these experiences, I am compelled to include it here.

In rounds, I have been called babe, girl, honey, sweetie. I've been talked down to, called stupid and even touched. I've been winked at, have had judges tell disgusting jokes in front of me and my partner (who is also a woman) in rounds. Outside rounds I've been straight out propositioned to sleep with men, to go out with them, to have a drink with them, etc. In fact, I've been treated as a debate ornament. I sometimes feel the only reason debate lets women in is so men have something to gawk at, sleep with, etc. At other times, I seriously question why I could let these things happen to me and other women in debate and still be involved after everything I've witnessed. I don't know if these things qualify as harassment according to the proper definition. But what I do know is my experience. My experience tells me that women are marginalized and treated poorly in this activity. (44)

When women are demeaned in this fashion, it seems preposterous to suggest that women have equal access to the identity of competent arguer.

In many instances, judgments about women's competence as arguers is or has been tied directly to discussion of their personal lives. For example, women's accomplishments are frequently diminished by unfair gendered or sexualized pronouncements. If the judge is male, she won because he thought she was attractive. If the judge was female, she won because of the judge's feminist bias. In sixteen years, I myself have been variously accused of sexual liaisons with judges for ballots, with debaters for evidence, and with coaches for favors.

Coaches who are women have suggested that their reproductive choices influence judgments of their competence. Women who choose to have children, who perhaps previously enjoyed a reputation as a good judge or a good coach, find that once they have a child they are assumed to be less competent—as if their years of experience somehow evaporated at the onset of pregnancy or the moment of birth. These experiences suggest that individual women are often denied equal access to the identity of competent arguer.

Equal Access to the Identity of Competent Arguer

The previous discussion suggests that women's access to the identity of competent arguer is restricted by their experiences with sexism in the actual practice of argument in intercollegiate debate. If, as others have suggested, intercollegiate debate is a microcosm of public argument that constitutes a forum for testing argument theory, then women's experiences within that forum should suggest some avenues for the reformulation of a practical theory of argumentation. The barriers women face suggest some critical *topoi* or challenges for argumentation theorists.

First, theories of argument should avoid conceptualizing argumentation as a form of dominance. Argumentation as dominance feminizes losing thereby suggesting the incompetence and weakness of femininity. It subjects women to the double standard for assertiveness. When losing is equated with femininity, women are pushed toward a masculinized form of aggression but are punished when they do so for stepping outside the boundaries of femininity. The very conception of what it means to win an argument and to be a competent arguer can be gendered. Gendered dominance metaphors used to explain the operation of practical argument circumscribe a conception of women empowered to engage in competent argument. Argument scholars should avoid masculinizing the identity of competent arguer through gendered dominance metaphors.

Second, theories of argument should avoid constructing standards of competence derived solely from men's experience and arguments. Doing so results in the evaluation of women in comparison to a privileged male norm and defines competent arguers who are women as exceptions to that norm. The problem with the "Great Woman Debater" phenomenon lies not in its celebration of successful debaters; rather, it arises from the explicit or implicit assumption that successful women are the exception to the male norm. This assumption constitutes a gendered barrier to women's access to the identity of competent arguer. Standards for the judgment of argumentative excellence that have been derived from men's experiences perpetuate an unfair paragon of greatness from which the majority of women are excluded.

Third, and perhaps most important, argumentation scholars should theorize the arguer's identity in a way that offers equal authority to define the boundaries of spheres and in such a way that individual arguers are empowered to defend and define their role in the public sphere. "Your Personal Life is Now Public Domain" suggests that women are not denied access to the public sphere of intercollegiate debate *per se*. Rather, when they move in this sphere, they are subjected to intrusions into their personal lives by sexual

and gender harassment and sexualized condemnations of their competence as arguers. This confirms Fraser's analysis of spheres theory which departs from "the familiar orthodoxies of an earlier stage of feminist theory, which protested women's alleged confinement to the private sphere," instead pointing out asymmetries that subject women to unwanted, invasions of and lesser ability to define and defend their privacy (597). It further suggests that judgments about women's argumentative competence are tied to their lack of power to define the boundaries of public space. While women are not completely relegated to the private sphere as earlier feminist criticisms suggested, their access to the identity of competent public arguer is seriously hampered by this lack of power.

In this essay, I have suggested that the failure of traditional argumentation to focus on the identity of the competent arguer has prevented the meaningful development of a practical theory of argument, one which tells us how real life arguers can strive for equal participation in civic life. The examination of women's experiences in intercollegiate debate reveals how a theoretical rationale for argumentation that ignores the identity question and consequently the lived experience of women allows for the perpetuation of exclusionary argument practices. It is in a sense conservative in its inclination to preserve the current practice of argumentation instead of theorizing what possibilities inhere in an emancipatory theory of argument.

From the standpoint of women in debate as an example of argument in practice, equal access to the identity of competent arguer has been limited and the justifications for intercollegiate debate ignore these experiences by relying upon theories of argumentation that fail to explicitly examine the identity of the human arguer. The most common rationale (firmly based in argumentation theory) for intercollegiate debate merely posits the existence of a public sphere and the necessity of competent argument in that sphere. Yet, in practice, the competent arguer is often constructed and judged according to a male norm.

As an alternative, I suggest that we should pursue a theory of argumentation based upon a commitment to equal access to the identity of competent arguer for all women and men. As such, it would constitute an ethical conception of argumentation, an approach that offers standards for evaluating argument practices based upon how they ensure or deny equal access to the process of argument itself. It might also suggest practical strategies for empowerment through argument for those currently marginalized by exclusionary conceptions of competent argument. Addressing the identity question would also help to transcend a significant limitation of this essay, its sole focus on gender. More studies need to investigate how current argument practices evidence racist, heterosexist, and classist tendencies as well.

While the full development of such a theory is beyond the scope of this essay, the arguments here do provide some groundwork for future research in this area. Such research could be grounded in two approaches. First, future research could focus on how current argument practices interfere with access to the identity of competent arguer. Case studies of exclusionary argument practices could focus on how access to the identity of competent arguer is restricted based on categories of gender, race, class and sexual orientation. Second, argumentation scholarship would benefit from more specific case

studies of the practical arguments made by arguers who have historically faced barriers in the public sphere due to gender, race, class and sexual orientation. These studies might reveal how those at the margins have resisted restrictive judgments about their competence and used argument as their avenue for empowerment.

I am very hopeful about the potential for such a reformulation; despite these three negative constructions of women's competence, though in lesser numbers, intercollegiate debate still continues to attract women and supply them with many advantages. When the discussion turns to the question: why do or did you stay in the activity when faced with these barriers, women often respond with descriptions of their respect for other women and men in the activity, the solidarity they experienced with other women and men who are concerned about eliminating inequality, and the value of argument itself. The value of argument as a practical art integrally intertwined with our most precious democratic ideals resides in the intersection between theory and practice. To theorize argument practice and practice argument theory better, we need to more closely examine the arguer's identity.

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"JUST BETWEEN YOU AND ME": "FEMININE STYLE" AND "FEMININE COZE" IN CONNIE CHUNG'S INTERVIEW WITH THE PARENTS OF NEWT GINGRICH

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In recent years the emergence of feminist rhetorical theory has called into question the theoretical foundation of traditional rhetorical theory, exposing the limitations of what Rushing refers to as "the old rules of the patriarchy" (83). Feminist scholars continue to contribute concepts and constructs which enhance our understanding of rhetoric and gender. One such concept, "feminine style," represents a conglomerate of rhetorical strategies which were identified in early American women's discourse and which characterize the political rhetoric of contemporary female leaders (Campbell, "The Rhetoric"; Dow and Tonn). Campbell's observation of the rhetoric of women's liberation spawned the notion that the distinctive style of the discourse results from an attempt to raise consciousness (79-81). Dow and Tonn's analysis of Texas Governor Ann Richard's rhetoric extends the parameters of feminine style to include political empowerment. An analysis of Connie Chung's interview rhetoric will suggest that rhetorical strategies associated with feminine style may be used to affect disclosure.

Connie Chung's infamous interview with Bob and Kathleen Gingrich, parents of House Speaker Newt Gingrich, sparked a national debate about communication and ethics. Society publicly wrangled over such issues as the appropriateness of the epithet allegedly used to describe the First Lady, the journalistic ethics involved in attaining the revelation, and the nature and process of assigning meaning to words (Budiansky 20; Carlson 36; "Controversy" 16). And while the rhetorical implications far outweigh the political significance of the event, it should be noted that the story dominated the television and radio news media on the House Speaker's first day in office, and the incident has been linked to Chung's abrupt departure from the CBS *Evening News* (Carter "CBS Worries" A8).

A rhetorical analysis of Chung's Gingrich interview offers insight into the social issues surrounding the incident. Beyond this, a rhetorical approach will inform regarding the employment of feminine style to achieve the goal of interviewee disclosure. A strategy that we will call "feminine coze" is identified and described.

Rhetorical Dimensions of the Television Interview

Television interviews play an increasingly important role in the contemporary political landscape. From Senator Edward Kennedy's inability to artic-

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ulate the motivation for his presidential aspiration to Roger Mudd in 1979, to H. Ross Perot's *60 Minutes* comments, to Bill Clinton's saxophone wielding *Arsenio Hall* gig, the potential impact of the personal television interview is evident. Politicians and celebrities concerned with crafting favorable public images turn to the television interview because it allows for a more controllable situation than other formats and because it provides, or appears to provide, the public with what they want to see—an 'inside' glimpse. The television interview has become an important political tool in the image oriented campaigns of the nineties.

One glaring fact of contemporary mass communication is that public communication is becoming more private. Tannen claims "... our society is becoming more private than public in orientation, more gossip-like in public domains" (105). She contends that this shift in orientation results in "an increased interest in the private lives of public people" (105). Television programming suggests that Americans are obsessed with encountering "private" information from a public medium. A plethora of talk shows' "soft" news programs, news magazines and game shows have emerged which focus viewer attention on the intimate details of the lives of celebrities or even total strangers. The personal interview plays a significant role in many of these programs.

The fact that politicians use the personal interview rhetorically is hardly a revelation. However, a rhetorical aspect of the interview that tends to be overlooked is the appeal of the interviewer. The interplay between interviewer and interviewee represents an attempt to draw viewers. Rhetorical choices are made by television personnel and by the interviewer herself in an attempt to encourage participation in the program.

The television interviewer functions somewhere between the realm of the private and the public. Interviewers seek identification on two levels, with the interviewee and with the television audience. Typically, success in the public realm depends on the personal interaction. An interviewer who fails to permeate the celebrity's public personae or elicit a unique revelation may be found waning in the Nielsen ratings. This is particularly true in the case of the political interview. The typical prime-time viewing audience is not naturally drawn to political issues and people. The political interview must make headlines or provide unique insight in order to be a popular success in prime time.

The television interview is both an interpersonal, or small group interaction, and a mass communication event. The demands of one aspect of the rhetorical situation often affect the other. The incongruity of having a personal chat with a relative stranger in front of 30 million viewers creates a unique rhetorical situation.

"Just Between You and Me" Revisited

Connie Chung's interview with Bob and Kathleen Gingrich, which aired January 5, 1995, on CBS's *Eye to Eye with Connie Chung*, touched off a chain of events that many believe lead to her firing. *The New York Times* reported that Chung "had become the object of some of the most ferocious criticism . . . ever directed at any network anchor" as a result of the interview

(Carter, "CBS Worries" A8). House Speaker Gingrich angrily denounced Chung's tactics, claiming, "I think it is unprofessional and frankly pretty despicable to go to a mother . . . and say, 'whisper to me' and then share it with the country" (DeWitt A23). President Clinton himself acknowledged Chung's impropriety by quipping, "God knows what she could have gotten my mother to say" ("Clinton's Reply" A20).

Public perception of the interview reflects the manner in which the event was reported. The following passage from *Newsweek* typifies the negative slant of the coverage.

Last week Gingrich showed how he could use Big Media's worst tendencies to his advantage. In an interview in the CBS newsmagazine "Eye to Eye," Connie Chung coyly baited Newt's 68-year-old mother into saying what her son really thought of First Lady Hillary Clinton. "Why don't you just whisper it to me, just between you and me," Chung coaxed as the cameras rolled. "She's a bitch," whispered mother Gingrich. For Newt, the incident was a gift. He was able to be appropriately outraged, accusing Chung of "ripping off" his mother for rating. (Waldman 17)

The report leaves no doubt about who was at fault in the interview. Phrases like "coyly baited," "coaxed," and "appropriately outraged" suggest that Chung had overtly deceived Mrs. Gingrich. Despite CBS's claims that Mrs. Gingrich "knew exactly what she was doing" (Budiansky 20) and that her comment was "unsolicited" (DeWitt A23), and in the face of Chung's personal defense on the program itself that "Mrs. Gingrich was sitting before three cameras and television lights, with a microphone on. It was clear that what she said would be broadcast" (16), Chung was portrayed, almost unanimously, as the villainess. Why? The obvious answer is that Chung simply lied to Mrs. Gingrich when she claimed that the comment would be "just between you and me" and then broadcast the statement to the nation. However, an analysis of the context of the communication suggests that the phrase, "just between you and me," was quite obviously meant to include an audience consisting of more than "just you and me."

In order to understand the phrase that made headlines, it is necessary to examine an earlier segment of the interview. This early interaction is crucial in light of what follows:

Chung: Is he (Newt) a true Southerner?

Mr. Gingrich: No.

Mrs. Gingrich: No.

Mr. Gingrich: He was born in Harrisburg Hospital.

Chung: Pennsylvania.

Mr. Gingrich: Yeah, and he lived in Pennsylvania until '53.

Chung: So he's kind of a Yankee. Newt's a Yankee.

Mrs. Gingrich: (Whispers) I think so.

Chung: (Whispers) But we won't tell anybody.

Mrs. Gingrich: OK. It's better—because he has enough Democrats against him. (10)

While none of the reports of the incident mentioned this interaction, it is noteworthy because it establishes a communication precedent, a "shared reality," an inside joke which explains the newsworthy whisper that follows. Though the program is obviously edited, the logical sequencing of question-

ing suggests that this interaction preceded the comment about Hillary Rodham Clinton.

The Gingriches approach Chung's question about Newt's status as a "true Southerner" cautiously. There is a pause after the question, and the Gingriches establish eye contact and seem to reach nonverbal agreement before answering the question in the negative. Based on the mutual testimony Chung provides the conclusion, "Newt's a Yankee." Mrs. Gingrich's whispered reply of agreement is obviously meant as irony. She is speaking softly as if to say, "We don't want his Georgia constituents to hear this," realizing that the microphone, camera, and CBS would carry this message virtually everywhere. Chung recognizes the joke, leans forward toward Mrs. Gingrich and with a tone of mock seriousness whispers her humorous response, "But we won't tell anybody." Mr. Gingrich clearly understands the humorous incongruity and laughs audibly at the mock secrecy. What is not mentioned in the transcript but is perfectly clear on the CBS video tape is that the first three words of Mrs. Gingrich's next response, "Ok. It's better," were delivered in the same sarcastic stage whisper. The humorous nature of this episode is undeniable. After Mrs. Gingrich finishes her statement, she shakes with laughter. An inside joke regarding the public nature of this "private" conversation was obviously shared by Chung and Mrs. Gingrich. Certainly no one would argue credibly that Chung meant for the sentence, "But we won't tell anybody" to be taken literally. The meaning of the comment is established by the context.

The now infamous portion of the interview begins with Chung questioning Mr. Gingrich about his son's relationship with the President. After a few brief questions and responses Chung turns her attention to Mrs. Gingrich.

Chung: Mrs. Gingrich, what has—what has Newt told you about President Clinton?

Mrs. Gingrich: Nothing, and I can't tell you what he said about Hillary.

Chung: You can't?

Mrs. Gingrich: I can't.

Chung: Why don't you just whisper it to me, just between you and me?

Mrs. Gingrich: (Whispers) She's a bitch. About the only thing he ever said about her. I think they had some meeting, you know, and she takes over.

Chung: She does?

Mrs. Gingrich: Oh yeah. Yeah. But when Newtie's there, she can't. (14–15)

Mrs. Gingrich clearly turns the topic of the inquiry to Hillary Clinton. In fact, there is no pause or hesitation between the words "Nothing" and "and," as Mrs. Gingrich shifts the focus from President to Mrs. Clinton. It also should be noted that Mrs. Gingrich smiles, ever so slightly, as she mentions Hillary. Chung responds with a raised eyebrow look of surprise and an upwardly inflected, "You can't." After introducing the topic herself, Mrs. Gingrich infers that she cannot disclose any more regarding her son's opinion of Hillary. This set up the pivotal moment of the interview.

Chung leans forward, gestures toward her ear, and smiles slightly as she makes her "Just between you and me" plea. The comment is greeted by barely audible laughter from both Gingrich parents. The same shared reality that made Chung's earlier "But we won't tell anybody" comment an inside joke, elicits laughter from the Gingriches because they understand the in-

congruity of the "private public" statement. While Mrs. Gingrich whispers her son's strong opinion, she returns to full voice to explain the comment. In fact, her vocal tone is emphatic when she makes the statement, "she takes over." This is yet another indication that Mrs. Gingrich jokingly used the whisper. Furthermore, the conspicuous presence of at least three camera operators and other production crew members precludes a literal interpretation of the phrase. If she believed that the whisper was truly confidential, then it seems ridiculous to offer full-voice evidence in support of the harsh, whispered opinion.

The phrase, "Just between you and me," was not meant to be understood literally. An analysis of the statement in its context and the communicative behavior surrounding the comment support this claim. If Mrs. Gingrich was not cleverly deceived, as most of the media accounts plainly state or strongly suggest, then what did occur? Is it possible that Mrs. Gingrich joked with Chung, trusting that the journalist would "edit out" the potentially damaging revelation? This interpretation shifts the issue from deception to betrayal. The question that emerges from this scenario is, why did Mrs. Gingrich trust Chung to such a great degree? The answer may be explained by a rhetorical application of Campbell's concept of feminine style (*Man Cannot* 12-13).

Feminine Style and the Gingrich Interview

The rhetoric of Chung's Gingrich interview exhibits rhetorical strategies associated with feminine style. Dow and Tonn summarize Campbell's construct as follows:

In a rhetorical situation, these attributes produce discourse that displays a personal tone, uses personal experience, anecdotes and examples as evidence, exhibits inductive structure, emphasizes audience participation, and encourages identification between speaker and audience. (287).

These five interrelated strategies pervade the interview and represent an attempt to produce identification on two levels: between Chung and the Gingrichs, and between the interview agents themselves and the viewing audience.

The establishment of a personal tone was quite clearly a priority of the *Eye to Eye* production crew. The opening shot of the interview derives from inside the Gingrich home. It features Bob Gingrich smearing icing on a cake. He is interrupted by a knock on the door. When he opens the door, he finds Connie Chung had dropped by for a chat. When one considers that the camera had to be in position inside the home before the neighborly journalist came calling, one understands the contrived nature of the event, and the measures that were taken to portray a personal context. Mr. Gingrich presents Chung with his homemade "finger-licking good" cake and proclaims, "I knew you were coming so I baked a cake" (8). This comment is greeted by a friendly burst of laughter from Chung.

The establishment of a personal tone seems to be the order of the day. Mrs. Gingrich comments, "He sits right there and does his crossword puzzles. And I watch TV and drink my coffee and have my cigarettes. Ours is the same routine. You can count on it" (8). From this moment forward, much of

the dining-room table interview is viewed through the haze of Kathleen Gingrich's cigarette smoke, while Bob Gingrich leisurely sips his coffee.

The sharing of details contributes to the personal tone of this public conversation. Mrs. Gingrich reveals her personal nickname for the 51 year-old House Speaker, "Newtie" (8). The Gingriches disclose details about personal events ranging from Mrs. Gingrich's abusive first husband to Mr. Gingrich's refusal to attend Newt's first wedding. While the Gingriches, especially Mrs. Gingrich, freely share information about extremely personal topics, it should be noted that Chung initiates the discussion in personal areas. Throughout the interview she leads them to, and through, the disclosure of personal details.

The use of a personal tone enhances identification among the interview agents. Chung's personal reactions, especially her nonverbal responses, suggest empathy. Her constant eye contact, frequent nods and reassuring smile suggest agreement and identification. Perhaps her most obvious use of supportive reactions occurs when Mrs. Gingrich makes her famous "bitch" comment. Chung audible gasps "oh" as if to suggest shock or surprise. It is difficult to believe that a seasoned journalist of Chung's caliber is shocked by a harsh comment about the First Lady allegedly emanating from Newt Gingrich. Chung's nonverbal behavior changes drastically when she confronts the Gingriches with negative accusations about Newt (13-14). She completely avoids eye contact by referring to her notes—a nonverbal means of distancing herself from the negative information. Throughout the interview Chung strategically responds to the Gingriches in an attempt to foster identification.

An attempt to bolster audience involvement is evident at two levels. Chung's empathetic reactions and leading questions obviously involve her primary audience, the Gingriches. The disclosure of personal details, the presentation of a "homey," personal setting, and the emphasis of the controversial revelation all represent rhetorical choices focused on involving the viewing audience.

The use of personal experience, anecdotes, and examples as evidence should come as no surprise, since these are the basic elements of almost any interview. In the Gingrich interview these strategies form an implied inductive argument designed to enhance the newly-elected House Speaker's credibility. Mrs. Gingrich shares personal experiences about her first marriage and her son's first marriage. She relates an anecdote about her talkative son and his ability to "take me around the world" while washing and drying dishes together (11).

Mr. Gingrich relates personal experiences and anecdotes a bit more reluctantly. His most vivid use of these strategies occurs when he shares the story of his trip, with Newt, to Verdon. According to Mr. Gingrich the visit to this battlefield compelled Newt to become politically active, so that he "could see that this never happened again" (12). The Gingriches combine personal experience, anecdote, and example to reflect favorably on their son's character and political involvement.

Personal experiences, anecdotes, and examples are used as evidence to support unstated, but strongly implied inductive arguments. The Gingriches do not state plainly, "Newt Gingrich is a good person and a strong political

leader." Instead, they supply carefully selected experiences, anecdotes, and examples which lead an audience, bit by bit, to a favorable conclusion. An implied inductive argument, or the attempt to construct one, is present in nearly every interview where an individual seeks to enhance one's image.

However, interviewees must realize that interviewers may be constructing inductive arguments of their own, which may potentially contradict their purpose. Chung observes, in a voice-over toward the beginning of the interview, that Newt Gingrich's public image is full of "apparent contradiction" (10). The Gingrich interview segment of the program is structured around these contradictions—a "Southerner" who is really a Yankee, a man who publicly preaches family values but divorced his first wife while she was battling uterine cancer, a conservative Republican family man with a lesbian Democrat for a sister, a sophisticated House Speaker who called the First Lady a bitch. The conclusion to which the program appears to lead, bit by bit, example by example, is "Beware he's not what he claims to be"—a far cry from the Gingriches' message. The interview agents use the same examples as evidence to support vastly different inductive conclusions.

Feminine Coze as Rhetorical Strategy

Chung's use of rhetorical strategies associated with feminine style, contributed greatly to Mrs. Gingrich's whispered revelation. In sharing extremely personal details about an abusive first husband, her son's doomed marriage, her son's ambitions, her relationship with her son, etc., Mrs. Gingrich receives supportive, empathetic reactions from Chung. As Mrs. Gingrich argues that her son is a good person Chung appears to agree. Burke's notion that identification involves a joining of interest, real or perceived (20–21), offers the possibility that Mrs. Gingrich perceives Chung as identifying with her.

Tannen offers further insight into identification among female communicators. Tannen observes that "The noticing of details shows caring and creates involvement. Because women are concerned first and foremost with establishing intimacy, they value the telling of details" (115). Wood suggests that disclosure of details signals close friendship among female communicators (185–187). While Chung values the sharing of details for quite another reason, it is possible that Mrs. Gingrich felt as if a level of intimacy was being established with Chung. Tannen provides further evidence for this possibility. She notes that women are often drawn together in "trouble talk," or lament. "They bond in pain" (100). Perhaps Mrs. Gingrich felt this bond developing as she shared with Chung her personal account of abuse. The third-person nature of the interview may have also drawn the women together in Mrs. Gingrich's view. Tannen explains that, "Talking about someone who is not there is a way of establishing rapport with someone who is there. By agreeing about their evaluation of someone else, people reinforce their shared values and world views" (107).

Chung's feigned identification and personal style wrought an ill-advised trust in Mrs. Gingrich. Malcolm explains how this trust is formed in the arena of print journalism.

He (the reporter) is a kind of confidence man, preying on people's vanity, ignorance, or loneliness, gaining their trust and betraying them without re-

morse. On reading the article or book in question, (the source) has to face the fact that the journalist—who seemed so friendly and sympathetic, so keen to understand him fully, so remarkably attuned to his vision of things—never had the slightest intention of collaborating with him on his story but always intended to write a story of his own. The disparity between what seems to be the intention of the interview as it is taking place and what it actually turns out to have been in aid of always comes as a shock to the subject. (3–4)

While this description may represent an overstatement, there is little doubt that Mrs. Gingrich would agree with this assessment as it applies to her television interview.

The use of rhetorical strategies associated with feminine style lead to Mrs. Gingrich's disclosure. However, the very nature of the appeal contradicts the purpose of the feminist rhetoric from the consciousness raising small groups associated with the early feminist movement. Campbell explains that the goal of these groups was "to make the personal political" ("The Rhetoric" 79). Participants encountered this process through shared experience. By sharing personal accounts of individual problems, group members developed a common understanding of the trials and injustices associated with their position as women (Campbell, "The Rhetoric" 79). Personal disclosure was the agency used to achieve the purpose of raising social consciousness.

In the contemporary mass media interview, disclosure is the ultimate goal. There may, or may not be, a larger issue or argument to which the disclosure is related. Whereas, disclosure in the early feminist movement represents a means by which the disclosing individuals could be enhanced, disclosure in the mass media context is produced for audience consumption. The exposure of negative qualities in the disclosing agent may be the result, and at times even the goal, of the interview.

The journalistic manipulation of feminine style lacks the genuine nature of, what has heretofore been identified as feminist rhetoric. Rhetoric which resembles feminine style, but which has as its end, disclosure, might be more accurately described by the terms, feminine coze. The term, "coze," refers to a "a friendly talk, chat" (*World Book* 480). The modifier, "feminine" is retained because the rhetoric more typically resembles feminine rhetoric in form and context. The rhetoric shares stylistic similarities with feminine style, as has been previously demonstrated. Also, as Tannen points out, the sharing of personal context over public aspects of the situation also suggest a feminine perspective (Campbell, "Femininity and Feminism" 101; Campbell and Jerry 123). However, as is the case with feminine style (Campbell, *Man Cannot* 12), feminine coze is not a style exclusive to women. One might be just as likely to observe the strategy in the rhetoric of Geraldo Rivera or Larry King, as in the rhetoric of Barbara Walters or Connie Chung. Feminine coze is characterized by more than a resemblance to feminine style. In Chung's Gingrich interview, the following rhetorical strategies are evident: feigned familiarity, the appearance of empathy and agreement, identification through humor, probing questions, and agenda-setting. Feigned familiarity is used as a means to emphasize the personal nature of the conversation. Interviewees will often cooperate with this strategy so as not to appear cold or impersonal. In the Gingrich interview, the dining-room setting, appearance of a neighborly visit, "inside" joking, and a personal tone all contributed to an air of

familiarity. A person is much more likely to disclose personal information to a familiar friend than to a meddling stranger.

The appearance of empathy and agreement plays an important role in the encouragement of disclosure. Empathy implies a "feeling with" the interviewee, while agreement suggests a "thinking with" the sources. The most typical display of empathy or agreement is nodding one's head in response to speech. Chung exhibits empathetic behavior while Mrs. Gingrich relates the story of her abusive husband. She nods and shifts her eyebrows downward as if to suggest disapproval of the abusive behavior. The nod of agreement is useful to the interviewer because listeners are rarely held accountable for nonverbal behavior. An interviewer can appear to agree with a statement in order to motivate further disclosure. In fact, unless the nod blatantly serves the interviewer's purpose as it relates to the viewing audience, it is likely to end up on the editing room floor.

Identification through humor serves to alleviate tension and build rapport among interview participants. Human agents are drawn together by a similar perception of humor. Chung strategically uses humor as both a source and a receiver. She perpetuates the inside joke regarding the public nature of the interview with a whispered, "but we won't tell anybody." She responds to Mr. Gingrich's "I baked you a cake" comment with an uncharacteristic, hearty burst of laughter. Shared laughter may suggest a similarity of perspective and it may also serve to remove interviewee inhibitions.

Probing questions function quite obviously and directly in the attempt to affect disclosure. Questions like, "He was a bit abusive?" and "Why didn't you go to the wedding?" probe into personal realms and result in revelations that Chung would not have otherwise motivated.

A final characteristic of feminine coze is agenda-setting. Certainly any professional journalist is going to establish an agenda, or at least plan a list of questions for an interview. The interviewer concerned with disclosure will guide the questioning toward areas in which it is likely to occur. Tannen would suggest that inquiries regarding personal details, lament, or gossip will build rapport and enhance disclosure. Chung's questions about Mrs. Gingrich's spousal abuse, and her inquiry regarding Newt's relationship with the President, reflect a carefully planned agenda designed to achieve disclosure. The interviewer cannot tell the source what to say, but she can direct the conversation to selected topics.

Observations

Chung's use of feminine coze was effective in motivating disclosure in the Gingrich interview. The attempt to draw viewers, however, was only moderately successful. While the program was rated slightly higher than previous weeks programs, it managed only a ranking of 58th for the week. An estimated 9,231,600 homes, or 15% of the total television audience tuned in to the saga ("Ratings Week" II 8). *Eye to Eye* was canceled by CBS in May of 1995, shortly after Chung was "removed" from her co-anchor post (Kloer C7; Carter "CBS Removes" A16).

The theoretical similarities between rhetoric exhibiting feminine style and the rhetoric of the mass media interview are striking. The philosophical foun-

dation of feminist rhetoric points to obvious similarities between the rhetorical genres. Feminist rhetoric grew out of private, small-group meetings. It reflects the experiences of the women who crafted it. Most interviews are similarly founded in the personal experience of the interviewees. Both rhetorical situations are characterized by an attempt to make what is private and personal, public.

The difference between feminine style and feminine coze is an important one. Campbell compares the consciousness-raising strategies of the early feminists to Natanson's concept of genuine argument" (Campbell "The Rhetoric" 79; Natanson 15-6). The goal of early feminist rhetoric was to enhance the understanding of the disclosing agents. Conversely, feminine coze often seeks to affect disclosure solely for the interests of the observer. Unlike early feminist rhetoric, feminine coze is effects-driven, often voyeuristic in nature, and occasionally potentially damaging to the disclosing agent.

Ethical implications regarding the use of feminine coze abound. The communicative behaviors associated with feminine coze are ones generally related to effective listening skills and positive, friendly interaction. Ethical issues emerge as communicators employ these behaviors deceptively, in order to encourage disclosure. Disclosure, in and of itself, is not necessarily an ignoble goal. However, the deceptive motivation of disclosure serves to negatively affect the credibility of personal, public communication. Perhaps the worst ethical breach occurs when production staffs edit interviews to emphasize ideas obviously not intended by interviewees. As Malcolm suggests, this behavior is "morally indefensible" (3). Mass media audiences and rhetorical critics should be aware that rhetoric exhibiting the outward appearance of feminine style is not necessarily genuine in nature.

Critics may claim that the identification of feminine coze perpetuates an extremely negative feminine stereotype—the wile witch who will use whatever means necessary to get the goods. The description and application of feminine coze represents an attempt to analyze rhetorical actions. Rhetors should be aware that the use of the behavior may perpetuate the age-old, maleconstructed myth. Feminine coze is not limited to females, nor is it consistent with the purpose of feminist rhetoric. Perhaps the strategy developed as a means of addressing the duality that confronts women public speakers. In her study of early feminist rhetoric, Campbell mentions inappropriate rhetorical strategies advanced by women. She writes, "In still other cases, rhetors found womanly ways of persuasion that were self-contradictory, and hence ultimately damaging to their cause" (*Man Cannot* 12). Feminine coze may be one such rhetorical strategy.

Several gender-related issues surround the interview. Would a neighborly visit have been portrayed if Dan Rather had been conducting the interview? Would Mrs. Gingrich have revealed her son's opinion about the First Lady to Rather? Would Rather have held to such intense scrutiny? Rarely did negative feminine images (the witch, the bitch, and the helpless old lady) emerge from the interview. Further analysis of the interview may reveal answers to these intriguing questions of communication and gender.

Feminine coze may be useful in explaining the rhetorical impact of several mass media interviewers. The effectiveness of Barbara Walters, Oprah Winfrey, Geraldo Rivera, and a host of other celebrity interviewers might be

evaluated in light of feminine coze. Beyond this, feminine coze could also play an important role in such situations as medical doctor/patient interactions, psychoanalytical sessions, the corporate grapevine—virtually any situation in which disclosure is a goal. While the rhetorical dimension associated with a mass audience would be lost in these contexts, the rhetorical nature of disclosure-seeking interpersonal interactions is undeniable. Further refinement and application of feminine coze could offer valuable insight into a variety of rhetorical situations.

A rhetorical analysis of Connie Chung's interview with the parents of Newt Gingrich reveals much about contemporary journalistic ethics, feminist rhetorical theory and the rhetorical nature of the television interview. Chung's "Just between you and me" comment represents a rhetorical style more than a literal, overt lie. Her use of strategies, heretofore associated with feminine style, demonstrates that arguments reflecting these strategies are not necessarily genuine in nature. Chung's employment of feminine coze brings to light a potentially deceptive rhetorical strategy aimed at affecting disclosure. The identification of this strategy may prove useful in the description, analysis, and evaluation of a variety of rhetorical acts.

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FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, STRUCTURATION THEORY AND COMPLIANCE-GAINING: AN EXPLORATORY INTEGRATION

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What Anthony Giddens calls structuration (Giddens, 1984) directs attention to how social actors' behavioral regularities or patterns relate to social structure: social structure provides resources by which individuals carry out daily interactions, and in the process that very structure is reproduced. This structure is identifiable by members of a culture as having enough substance to influence action, though it is physically insubstantial (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). Structuration theory unites psychological and sociological realms of inquiry and has been used to examine relationships and roles (Secord, 1982) and conversation during legal proceedings (Molotch & Boden, 1985).

Structuration theory, because of its focus on resources employed in the production and reproduction of social life, provides both a rationale and a backdrop for the intersection of theories or perspectives that address intentionality and power in human interaction, especially those that involve the individual and the societal level. Two domains of inquiry seem to fit well together under the rubric of structuration theory. These are the quantitative studies of compliance-gaining and the critical perspectives of feminist theory.

Compliance-gaining, or interpersonal influence, is interpersonal persuasion in which a persuader attempts to achieve behavioral change from another person (Schenck-Hamlin, Wiseman, & Georgacarakos, 1982). Compliance-gaining research can be shown to intersect the individual and corporate (societal or organizational) spheres of action, though to date no studies have examined the societal implications of compliance-gaining (but see Harden, 1988). For example, individuals learn which persuasive resources are at their disposal and employ them, often with implications for further compliance-gaining attempts. Likewise, use of a particular persuasive tactic influences the relationship, altering the context of the next compliance-gaining attempt. In that sense, individual action has implications for higher levels of influence.

Feminist perspectives examine the production and reproduction of social life. They examine power and resources, in some sense giving structuration theory contextual embodiment. Feminist perspectives add gender to the interpersonal influence literature.

One could argue for structuration theory's direct application to the compliance-gaining literature without the mediation of feminist theory. Rules, resources, and modalities of structuration can be identified through an examination of compliance-gaining tactics and strategies resulting from various relational configurations (see, for example, Harden, 1988). However, feminist

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approaches highlight dimensions of compliance-gaining missing in other approaches. The last decade's plethora of scholarship on gender's influence on human meaning and behavior (e.g. Gilligan, 1982; Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule, 1986) suggests a focus on gender—especially in an area that has at its heart the notion of power.

One could also argue that feminist perspectives alone could critique the compliance-gaining literature or use it to justify or abandon several of its progeny. Structuration theory, however, provides a framework for compliance-gaining that fits individual action into larger social structures, which feminist perspectives find important. Structuration theory connects individual agency and social structure: what we do individually affects what happens corporately. It directs us to focus attention on how practices arise from resource allocation and use in a particular context and hence reproduce the context for continued practices. Therefore, structuration theory is useful to feminist theorizing.

The rest of this article explores ways of integrating these three bodies of research. First will be a presentation of basic elements of structuration theory. Next will follow a brief discussion of several strands of feminist theory. Finally, structuration theory and feminist theory will be applied to the compliance-gaining literature.

Structuration Theory

Giddens (1984) defines "structure" as rules and resources which are drawn upon by human beings in action and which are organized as properties of social systems (Giddens, 1984, p. 25). The "reproduced transformational relations" which take place as a consequence of carrying out everyday action and interaction, and which are organized as regular social practices, constitute "systems," while structuration itself is defined as a set of "conditions governing the continuity or transmutation of structures, and therefore the reproduction of social systems" (Giddens, 1984, p. 25). "Resources" are means of enablement by which actors exercise power. They may be tangible, such as money, or they may be symbolic, such as identification with a respected other person.

By the very action of drawing upon rules and resources and enacting behavior within their enablements and constraints, persons recreate, or even change through unintended consequences of action, those very structures which are later drawn upon in their recreated, or modified, form by those very social actors. In this manner, the individual is both the product and producer of social structure and thereby of society. Secord (1982) posits that contemporary forms of social structure derive from a mixture of intentional and unintentional action in the context of prevailing social conditions. (One example relevant to a feminist perspective is the shift away from the use of the generic "he" in academic writing during the past two decades.) Taking Secord's argument down a level of analysis to the interpersonal realm, the contemporary form of an interpersonal relationship derives from the same processes: intentional and unintentional action contribute to the reproduction of the relationship through the daily enactment of the relationship.

What Giddens calls the modalities of structuration—signification, domi-

nation, legitimation—are drawn upon in the reproduction of social systems. Signification refers to the communication of meaning; signification is represented in interaction by the act of communication, which is likely to draw on aspects of the situation to shape meaning. Legitimation has to do with the normative aspect of human action—that is, expected behaviors in a context or relationship in the form of rules and roles. Domination refers to generating command over objects, goods, or material phenomena. In any given situation, these elements are bound together in action and are separable only analytically (Giddens, 1984, p. 28).

Giddens suggests that an analysis of structuration of social systems entails studying the modes in which such systems are produced and reproduced in interaction: that is, we should look at people's everyday practices. As Connell (1987) suggests regarding ideology, which can be seen as an aspect of structural domination: "... Ideology has to be seen as things people do, and ... ideological practice has to be seen as occurring in, and responding to, definite contexts" (p. 244). For example, Molotch and Boden (1985) describe the Watergate hearings as an example of how conversations contain power relations deriving from differential skill in manipulation of the "architecture" of talk, suggesting that domination is accomplished through the selective use of talk procedures.

Feminist Theory

This section describes in broad strokes several feminist perspectives, with the goal of identifying domains of resources marked by each of the perspectives. There may be overlap between the perspectives; also, some perspectives may be more useful than others when examining compliance-gaining (e.g. see Buzzanell's (1994) application of selected feminist perspectives to organizational communication theorizing).

The liberal feminist perspective is the oldest articulation of feminist theory (Tong, 1989; Johnston, 1992). It derives from liberal political philosophy and is founded on the notion of equal rights for all human beings (see Jaggar, 1983). Liberal feminists have pinpointed unequal laws and role expectations as a key problem for women; these laws keep women from exercising autonomy and fulfilling the self (e.g. the traditional role as wife and mother has kept women in the private, rather than the public, sphere). Here, resources (or lack thereof) stem from societal constraints purposely constructed.

The Marxist feminist perspective suggests that it is not unequal laws, but the concept of class, that is the key to women's oppression: our social existence determines our consciousness (Tong, 1989). "[A] woman forms a conception of herself that she would not have if her role in the family and at the workplace did not keep her socially and economically subordinate to men" (p. 40). The essence of being human is to shape collectively who we are by transforming and manipulating the material world—that is, nature. This perspective defines a link between women's work status and women's self-image. From this perspective, resources (or lack thereof) stem from the action of class systems, not from purposely constructed laws. Moving within the constraints of this class and work system will gain or lose resources to be drawn upon for power.

Radical feminists suggest that it is men and their system of patriarchy that cause women's oppression. This oppression takes form primarily in men's attempts to control women's bodies (Tong, 1989). The roots of women's oppression are buried deep in patriarchy's sex/gender system with its prescriptions of sexual status, roles, and temperament (see Millett, 1970). Through conditioning and through the working of various institutions such as church, schools, and media, men secure the apparent consent of women they oppress.

Radical feminists would attempt to remake the world according to a feminist vision (Tong, 1989). For example, the masculine world is characterized by an orientation described as "power over" things and people, whereas a feminine orientation is characterized by the concept of "pleasure with" and "power to" (French, 1985). The feminine orientation, unlike the masculine orientation, is not founded on control of other people. A feminine perspective celebrates the ability of a group or an individual to affirm all others rather than to subjugate others. From this perspective, the very concept of resources and how they are used is contaminated by men, creators of these concepts. Resources from this perspective would derive from alternative sources yet to be imagined.

Psychoanalytic feminism suggests that the roots of women's oppression are internal, developed as part of the self since infancy (Tong, 1989). The root of the female role stems from attachment and individuation processes. For example, girls end up identifying with their mother rather than separating from her as boys do. So men, because of separateness from the mother, cannot relate deeply to others. Their condition leads them to work in the public sphere with its competition and efficiency. Girls' oneness with the mother leads to a capacity for relatedness and a nurturing role. Resources from this perspective are specific to one gender or another.

Gilligan's (1982) work on women's moral systems extends this line of thought (Tong, 1989). Men and women have different conceptions of morality. Men, because of the importance of separation and autonomy, focus on justice, fairness, rules, and rights. Women, because of the importance of family and friends, focus on people's wants, needs, interests, and aspirations. The typical woman, according to Gilligan, is prepared to forsake some of her rights if by doing so she will preserve important relationships. It follows that women have a consequentialist view of morality, considering the effect of one's action on all who will be touched by it, rather than using abstract principles to judge the morality of an action.

Socialist feminism can be seen to represent the confluence of Marxist, radical, and psychoanalytical streams of feminist thought (Tong, 1989). Socialist feminists see the systems of capitalism and patriarchy as contributing to women's oppression. The traditional family is seen as serving the interests of both these systems ideologically, biosocially, and economically. Some socialist feminists see patriarchy as a material entity; some see it as symbolic. Those who take a materialist standpoint (e.g. Hartmann, 1981) suggest that patriarchy is "a set of social relations between men which have a material base which, though hierarchical, establish or create interdependence and solidarity among men that enable them to dominate women" (Hartmann, 1981, p. 14). Men restrict women's access to important economic resources and disallow women control over reproduction through marriage, childrear-

ing, the state, and other institutions. This system probably works both symbolically and materially; resources available would take both forms.

Existentialist feminism derives from Sartre's existentialism (Tong, 1989). According to the existentialist perspective, the essence of being human is being free to make choices. Simone de Beauvoir (1974) extended the existential analysis to women's condition in relation to men. According to her (1974), men have a grasp upon the world that is more extended and powerful than women's (de Beauvoir, 1974). Men, therefore, produce new and different things. Women simply reproduce the status quo through producing other human beings. Since woman is not like man, she becomes "the Other" in relation to man and oppressed by him because of the male will to power. Beauvoir's analysis points to biology rather than class as the cause of oppression. Women's resources depend on their roles in relation to men; only the prostitute, or hetaira, has any real power (de Beauvoir, 1974).

Postmodern feminism centers primarily on the role of language in women's oppression (Tong, 1989; Nye, 1988). According to some postmodern feminist theorists, men have a pointed, singular way of writing whereas women have multiple voices (Cixous, 1981). Women have been marginalized, unable to think in truly feminine ways within the structure of patriarchal thought (Irigaray, 1985). Even the processes of categorization and labeling are patriarchal.

Nye (1988) examines the concept of women's language, citing several studies that show differences in how women use language (e.g. Thorne & Henley, 1975; Thorne, Henley, & Kramarae, 1983). Many of these differences, she suggests, are due to a lack of power, not to being female per se. In order to break free, women must assert themselves. But if they are trapped in male language, as some theorists suggest they are, their attempts are doomed. Therefore, many postmodern feminists draw on the work of Derrida and Lacan, advocating a decentering or unbalancing of traditional ways of thinking and knowing. Theorists like Mary Daly (1978) suggest, for example, that women should recover old meanings for words currently used in a derogatory sense (e.g. crone, hag, spinster) and thereby crack sexist language apart (Nye, 1988). Resources here come from a new creation, a new use, of old concepts—a shaping of what already exists into something new, and through its use giving it power.

Feminist Theory, Structuration Theory, and Compliance Gaining

Clearly, the many strands of feminist thought suggest different framings of resources available to women. What follows is a discussion of compliance-gaining literature from a structurational perspective, supplemented by possible lines of feminist analysis.

Compliance-gaining literature

Past theoretical approaches to interpersonal influence have been based on operant learning (de Turck, 1985), constructivism (Clark & Delia, 1979), social exchange (Marwell & Schmitt, 1967), and subjective expected utility models (Sillars, 1980). The most current attempt has been a goal-based approach (Dillard, Segrin, & Harden, 1989). No perspective has examined how

compliance-gaining strategies may derive from either the larger social structure or from the idiosyncratic elements of unique relationships, nor is there a theoretical framework accounting for the transformative action of the exercise of individual power in interpersonal relationships. No one has taken an explicitly feminist approach to this area, either, though differences in male and female sales strategies (Sprowl, 1987) and conflict behaviors (Gayle, Preiss, & Allen, 1994; Miller, 1992) have been reported.

The initial quantitative article on compliance-gaining strategies is the Marwell and Schmitt typology (1967); numerous typologies of strategies and/or underlying dimensions of strategies have emerged since (Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkinson, 1980; Falbo, 1977; Cody, McLaughlin, & Jordan, 1980; Rule, Bizanz, & Kohn, 1985). Individual differences in strategy choice and use lie in areas such as empathy (Hunter & Boster, 1987; Dillard, Hunter, Burgoon, Boster, & Stiff, 1985), communication apprehension (Lustig & King, 1980), and dogmatism (Roloff & Barnicott, 1979). Interpersonal power affects choice of influence strategy (Howard, Blumstein, & Schwartz, 1986), as well as whether the target is a friend or a stranger. This finding speaks directly to the concept of resources as well as to relationships. Power, for example, is clearly a resource, given the findings of the Howard, et. al. (1986) study.

Outcomes of interpersonal influence situations include attributions (Kipnis, Castell, Gergen, & Mauch, 1976; Kipnis, Schmidt, Price, & Stitt, 1981), satisfaction (Richmond, McCroskey, & Davis, 1986), and relational change potential (Shaw & Condelli, 1986). These findings suggest that the influence situation is reflexive and transformative, just as structuration theory would suggest. For example, Kipnis, et. al. (1976) report that powerholders who believed they caused the target's behavior devalued the target and acted to increase social distance from that target. This finding seems to support an existential feminist perspective of men's view of women as "the Other," especially if men can act upon women and thereby, even unintentionally, distance themselves from women.

Shaw and Condelli (1986) discovered that positive or negative outcomes to the target are expected to influence the persuader's future use of power and the persuader's attractiveness to the target, as well as the target's private acceptance of the persuader's demands. They highlight that the relationship between a powerholder and a target is affected by the valence of the target's expected outcomes. Additional research concerning actual compliance-gaining situations suggests that social actors who are aware of potential outcomes from the use of certain strategies alter their behavior accordingly, responding to perceived constraint (Dillard, Segrin, & Harden, 1989). For example, persuaders take into account not only their primary goal of persuasion (for example, to borrow money), but potential influence on secondary goals (such as the relationship between the parties, their own identity, and potential harm to themselves). These findings suggest not only that the process of compliance-gaining is structural in nature, but that persuaders with differential concerns for these secondary goals may behave differently. Women's concern with relational outcomes (Gilligan, 1982) and also with maintaining socially acceptable female identities (e.g. Belenky, et. al., 1986) may make available to them resources different than those of men, or lead them away

from considering stronger means of influence that may accomplish the primary goal but damage the relationship.

Utility of a feminist structural approach to compliance gaining

Understanding the compliance-gaining process from a feminist structural perspective requires a look at what structuration and compliance-gaining concepts look like in various feminist frameworks.

First, the conceptual domain needs explication and then a feminist reading. Compliance-gaining as structuration is the socially constituted (interactive) practice of domination (exercise of power, which is the ability to get things done) brought about by drawing upon the resources available in the situation by means of signification in order to bring about consequences which would not take place without the intervention of the agent. Compliance-gaining is an attempt to impose constraint on another's life. The system subject to transformation is primarily the interpersonal relationship at the level of the dyad, but secondarily the social system to which the dyad contributes.

Clearly, from some feminist perspectives, the very definition of the content domain would need to be redefined. From some radical feminist standpoints, the very idea of "gaining compliance" is misconceived, implying competition rather than cooperation, "power over" rather than "pleasure with" or "power to." From the existentialist point of view, compliance-gaining may be an important sphere of activity, since it involves impelling oneself onto another, acting on the world. The risks involved become treating "the Other" as an object to be annihilated rather than as another free self. Other feminist perspectives can be applied to the specific resources available for compliance, but no others address themselves so specifically to the nature of the action itself, with the possible exception of postmodern feminism, which will be addressed in the next point.

Consider once again that the essence of a compliance-gaining attempt is a process of domination through signification, or the creation of meaning in order to enable. Creation of meaning refers to the actor's casting the parameters of a context of interaction within which requests or strategies will carry force necessary for compliance. Strategy use is the process of manipulating an interpretive scheme or frame to guide or coerce the target's behavior; the referent of that scheme may be a resource derived from the modality of domination (a threat, when the persuader has power to carry it out or the target is dependent) or from the modality of legitimation (reference to social norms or morals as justification for the target's action). The feminist framework most applicable to this conceptualization would appear to be the postmodern, with its emphasis on language and meaning. Various postmodern approaches will take different positions on whether the use of language itself is inherently problematic for women or whether women's forms of language are actually quite powerful, despite surface appearances to the contrary (Tannen, 1994).

Modalities. The goal of this aspect of the analysis is to apply feminist frameworks to the resources of the modalities of domination, signification,

and legitimation as expressed in compliance-gaining situations. As examined above, the modalities themselves hold implications for a feminist analysis.

Explicitness versus indirectness is one dimension that has been a focus of the male-female differences in communication domain (Tannen, 1994). Compliance-gaining strategies vary in the explicitness of the modality drawn upon. For example, a direct request ("Do this") does not contain in the verbal form of the utterance a reference to a norm (legitimation) or other modality. The situation may provide a clue, however, as to which implied modality (e.g. domination, signification, or legitimation) constitutes the rhetorical force: picture a supervisor directing a subordinate. In this case, the resource apparently stems from legitimation, or the expectation that authority is invested in the superior (a liberal feminist position) or from domination (an ideology of power relations involving authority—a radical or Marxist feminist perspective).

The methods by which inference may be accomplished will involve attributions of intent to the persuader by the persuadee and will be determined in part by other elements of the interpersonal system, such as closeness of the pair and relationship history and the gender of the participants. For example, Krone, Allen, and Ludlum (1994) found that male managers are more likely to use reward and coercive influence strategies with subordinates than are female managers. It is expected that general domains or typologies for relationship histories may be developed which will serve as a variable in the analysis of effects and antecedents of compliance-gaining strategy usage, keeping analysis at a useful level of generality. In many cases, the modality of a tactic must be inferred from the situation or context (Pearce, 1995). In this sense, these attributes become direct or indirect means of legitimation, in that expectations for behavior in some contexts are normative, that is, probable or likely.

The target will draw, in similar manner, upon available resources in the three modalities in attempting to resist. The current focus of this paper is on the persuader, but the relationship as a system must not be ignored, since the interactive process which takes place during compliance-gaining and its consequences is the basis of the compliance-gaining situation as structuration, through which the system is reproduced. Modes of resistance as well as modes of influence carry significance for interactants' interpretations of the relationship.

Processes of structuration. Compliance-gaining attempts bring about consequences that vary in their import for the relationship. These results are conditions for the reproduction or transformation of the system that enabled their initial production. In the compliance-gaining situation, the first level of system reproduction or transformation is the dyad or the interpersonal relationship; the second level or order is the group, organization, or society of which the dyad is a part, and to which the dyad contributes through sustained activity. As noted in the review of compliance-gaining literature, effects of compliance-gaining strategy use and attempts may include altered cognitive attributions or altered affect. Of course, the current state of the relationship may be maintained instead of transformed, and transformation is not necessarily rapid. For example, on the primary, or interpersonal dyadic, level, elements of the compliance-gaining situation may contradict aspects of the

relational structure. A threat in the context of a "loving" relationship serves as a denial or alteration of the meaning of the relationship. The reaction of the target will feed back into the relationship and change the terms of interaction. The relationship may become distressed; repeated use of threats will tend to reproduce the pathological structure and may lead to the demise of the relationship (whether intended or unintended). A change in the interaction patterns through an infusion of new understanding in regards to healthy interpersonal behavior (i.e., nonuse of threats) may transform the pathological structure into a sound one.

Awareness of the practices of others is a legitimacy resource (discussed further below) that may be called upon by actors in their compliance-gaining attempts, with subsequent expected and/or unintended consequences of action in their relationships. For example, the norm of reciprocity may be accessed by use of a debt strategy ("I did X for you, so do Y for me"). An extension of this process is that habits acquired in one relationship may alter the structures of other relationships and may serve as cross-relational resources. That is, if something works in one relationship, it may be tried in another, but the results will be unpredictable. It is likely that fewer unintended consequences will result from the use of highly stereotyped compliance-gaining sequences which have been developed and solidified over time in the context of a relationship. Such practices may reach the status of quasi-institutions (Berger & Luckmann, 1967), which tend to be reproduced rather than altered over time.

Domains of resources. Three domains of resources are available to the actor and specifiable through signification in the areas of domination and legitimation in the compliance-gaining situation. Two of these resource domains are similar to Secord's (1982) sources of social power, which he suggests lie in the nature of dyadic interaction resources, that is, the personal and interpersonal levels; the third exists in the societal structure through the normative structure (or societal expectations for behavior). Considering the latter source: relationships have a type of social power due to expectations that society holds for different sorts of relationships. For example, in the normative area, a structural set of "rules and resources" developed (and dependent on) an interaction between the larger social definition of how the dyad's type of relationship usually is enacted (e.g., this is how a married couple ought to behave) constitutes resources on the social level (Argyle & Henderson, 1985). Reference to societal norms involves legitimacy which links the requestor to the force of society. However, relationships also have a type of power stemming from their uniqueness outside the constraints of the larger canopy of significance of which they are a part (Baxter, 1987). Finally, individuals have personal power that derives from their position or personal characteristics in relation to the other party.

The outcomes of the system impinge on the inputs in transformative ways (Kelley, Berscheid, Christensen, Harvey, Huston, Levinger, McClintock, Peplau, & Peterson, 1984 chapters 1 & 2) with implications for the development and growth of relationships. The examination of interpersonal influence will serve as a starting point and exemplar of the structuration perspective that could later develop into a more comprehensive treatment of interpersonal relationship development from a structuration approach. Employing a feminist per-

spective will allow a focus on how resource limitation as well as access can contribute to system production, reproduction, and perhaps change.

Compliance-gaining is an inherently social process. Much of the force of institutional legitimacy derives from the very embeddedness of these shared institutions in convention, recognized or enacted on the level of practical consciousness. An example of how the immediate setting may be drawn upon through language to create a situation normally defined differently (i.e. as that of strangers) is given by Maynard and Zimmerman (1984). Their investigation of the use of "setting talk" as a means of distancing or reduction of intimacy gives a clue as to how social reality may be constructed using the resources available in the current setting. Much of this may be not directly thought about or motivated, being part of the day-to-day routine of actors' lives, especially in the relationships of men and women. In some situations, power available from an individual's position in the relationship may deliver more force than social norms. Those relationships with an imbalance of power (Secord, 1982) will provide more resources for use by individuals who have more power in the relationship. Sex differences are a primary contributor on the societal, dyadic, and individual level to unequal distribution of resources in a relationship (Falbo & Peplau, 1980).

From each of the feminist perspectives discussed previously, women's resources derive from societal expectations (liberal and psychoanalytic feminist perspectives, particularly, suggest this framing). For example, in a typical relationship, women are expected to be more concerned with affiliation than with power. Phillip Smith (1985) addresses this issue insightfully. Smith suggests that women's and men's communication resources and tactics differ. He suggests that the feminine aspects of gender identity is concerned with the management of interpersonal resources related to affiliation; masculine aspects of gender identity are associated with control-related resources. That is, women are expected to be preoccupied with management of affiliation in interaction, but men are preoccupied with control. Therefore, women are expected to be more adept in general at interaction in affiliative contexts and men in situations requiring control. These expectations can be just as powerful a force as coercion (Wood, McMahan, & Stacks, 1984).

Smith reviews studies that show expectations for women's speech to be, for example, kind, correct, unimportant, friendly, gentle, and less characterized by curse words. In control-related settings, men are expected to be and perceived to be skillful, regardless of the verbal tactics they employ; unless women make explicit attempts to display control-related resources, they may not be perceived as skillful. That is, perceptions of women depend on their use of language. One common example has been women's greater use of tag questions (compared to men). However, Smith reviews research that contradicts this phenomenon. Differences in use appeared to be a function of the speech situation rather than of gender. This interpretation suggests that perhaps the resources available to women as women are actually more strongly derived from the setting or the situation, which is a more powerful determinant than gender. This suggests a shift in the availability of resources to women, perhaps due to the impact of the women's movement on actual social behavior (an example of structuration).

Resources on the dyadic level refer to how the structure of that relationship

has been used and interpreted idiosyncratically by the agents involved. Normative dyadic resources refer to tacit understanding of normal interactive processes holding for the two individuals which are made explicit in the form of the request (the norm of reciprocity is a good example). Different individuals draw upon the social resources and rules differently; these varied "action-interpretations" result in the uniqueness of relationships.

The importance of drawing upon idiosyncratic norms lies in the implication of the special quality of this particular relationship compared with "all the rest of them" which constitute the wider society. Part of the significance of a dyadic relationship, particularly an intimate one, may reside in its differentiated status from perceived relationships that "other people" have, or a unique relational culture (Baxter, 1987). Hence, requests that are based on the unique status of that particular relationship (e.g. the knowledge that no matter how others behave, this is what we do) may carry more force than a societal norm if the value of the relationship lies in its uniqueness, since complying with the request strengthens the unique nature of the relationship.

The existential feminist perspective speaks to resources available to women that derive from the particular nature of the relationship. Despite societal expectations, a particular woman in a particular relationship may have developed creative ways of empowering herself. Here, de Beauvoir's analysis of the hetaira, or professional prostitute, in ancient Greece is informative. A more recent example is a study of compliance-gaining between husbands and wives (Dillard & Fitzpatrick, 1985). In this study, wives gained compliance twice as frequently as their husbands. From a general feminist analysis, this is an unexpected finding if one relies simply on the conclusion of powerlessness of women on a societal level. On the individual level, however, it is evident that particular women in particular relationships do exercise power. There could be a confounding effect, however, within the socially legitimated marital relationship, such that women are expected to wield considerable power within that relationship. In such cases the power base is not really the idiosyncratic nature of the relationship, but rather its socially sanctioned form (marriage), which merely permits women in that relationship to exercise power.

Cixous (1981) argues that women are multivocal, whereas men tend to be direct, to the point, univocal. Another finding from the Dillard and Fitzpatrick (1985) study suggests such a postmodern feminist analysis: husbands were able to gain compliance most frequently through direct requests. Wives used a multiplicity of strategies, with no one being more successful than another. This finding supports the flexibility of women's voices. Perhaps in flexibility there is strength.

The third type of resource is simply individual force or strength, and is separate from the other two in that it is not explicitly social in nature. From a feminist standpoint, however, there is no individual power that is not in some way social—the personal is by definition social. However, there is a level at which individual creativity can be exerted; the postfeminists admit this when they suggest that women can "mime the mimes," or exaggerate the expectations men have for them (Irigaray, 1985; Moi, 1985) or, in Daly's terms, re-create old definitions for contemporary ones. In such a case, a woman may take delight in being called a crone, and actively identify herself

as such. If symbolic interactionists are taken seriously, it is through individual interpretation and projection of roles that will allow for, if not direct, others to respond in unique ways, allowing escape from social prescriptions.

On the physical level, size and strength may serve as implicit threats (although typically, women are not larger than men, there are some women who outrank their partners in this area). Use of an individually-based resource may be effective immediately, for the short term, but carries implications of independence from any social relationship. The person using an individual strategy stands alone and is distanced by the solitary resource applied. Use of such a strategy may serve to distance the person from social contact. An example of this type of strategy is aggressiveness or forcing, a type of conflict management that asserts self without regard for other. One should maintain caution when examining different types of power use for their individual or dyadic force. Expertise, for example, is a social resource, since to be an expert one must be assigned that status by others. Expertise is an invitational rather than a coercive strategy. Not all feminists would agree, however; for example, expertise in the scientific professions has been criticized for encouraging separation of the knower from the known (e.g. Belenky, et. al., 1986).

The examination of individual differences such as empathy (Hunter & Boster, 1987) focus usefully on the microscopic level of analysis, revealing how individuals may draw idiosyncratically upon societal or dyadic resources. The implication for a feminist analysis lies in the work of Gilligan (1982), who suggests that women are especially attuned to relational issues, and hence may be susceptible to emotional appeals—not because women are “emotional,” but because that mode of legitimating a request may speak to their relational concerns. This type of empirical investigation involves classifying utterances and their reference to the interpersonal or social domain.

Discussion of a well-known typology of power will supplement this treatment of modalities. French and Raven's (1959) bases of power include coercive, reward, legitimate, expert, and referent power. Coercive and reward refers to ability to influence a target's negative or positive outcomes. From the existential feminist perspective, this is the means by which men have controlled women. Due to their superior strength (Beauvoir, 1974), their action on the world and will to power translated into domination of women. Women do not possess as much coercive power as men do. Reward power may exist, however, for women who have personal resources desired by men (e.g. beauty, sex).

Strategies based on coercive and reward power comprise aspects of the modality of domination, since they relate to control over resources. These resources may be of any type, including access to valued outcomes or material goods. The ability to ensure positive or negative outcomes for the target by means of others are also resources. Specific examples include control over a person's job, control over sexual favors, or control over information, to cover a wide range of situations ranging from organizational to intimate. Both interpersonal and societal domains provide resources of this type.

Legitimate power exists when the target believes the persuader has the right to exercise influence over the target. Traditionally, women have wielded this power in the home. However, radical feminists suggest that this apparent

power is a sham; men continue to exercise control over the process and product of women's reproduction, and thereby maintain power over them legitimately.

Referent power, or Kelman's (1961) identification, refers to legitimate power on the interpersonal level. Referent power exists when a target likes the persuader and complies because of respect. A persuader may draw on referent power as a societal resource if positive evaluation by an individual with whom the target identifies is pictured as an outcome of the target's compliance. Expertise constitutes legitimacy on the societal level, to the extent that it is normative to listen to those who are knowledgeable. The successful use of expertise involves demonstrating superior knowledge such that the target is induced to comply.

In the Victorian era, women had referent power in the area of morals and expertise in the area of the home. In the professional arena, referent power and expertise are problematic. The best example is in the area of expectations of women managers or leaders. Women are expected to exercise the authority that a man does, but in feminine way, which, in a catch-22, is described as "powerless." Goldsmith (1980) points out that the rules of language are more narrowly defined for women than for men—men have greater freedom of expression than they need and women are restricted in the means to understand and criticize. Many stereotypes (e.g. raising the voice) are "unwomanly" (p. 182). Therefore, women are limited with regard to the form of expression of expertise.

Legitimate power is conceptually identical to the modality of legitimacy on the interpersonal level, but can be extended to include the societal level. A situation may be defined through clever signification in such a way as to infuse with legitimacy the request of the asker. In fact, much more force will be accorded that request backed by social legitimacy. Actors recognize this force; in fact, Schmitt (1964) reports that moral obligation was considered more likely to be used as a persuasive strategy in situations in which the target was not believed by the persuader to be morally obligated. In this manner, legitimacy may be created. Since social institutions have a longer history of enactment than a relationship, the force of the social system may be greater and applied more often. For example, the reciprocity norm may be invoked with success (Goranson & Berkowitz, 1961).

In the compliance-gaining situation, through the modality of an interpretive scheme in the communication interaction, either domination or legitimation is portrayed as the signified intention of the persuader. Legitimation may disguise the operation of facility (domination) such that it appears normative (this has been one of the major statements of feminist theory with regard to institutions such as the church, as well as the means by which women are coopted into compliance with male exercise of dominance). The enactment of this scheme will feed back into the system as an acceptable way of behaving, creating a greater probability of that specific type of action in a subsequent situation. It is in this way, according to the radical feminist perspective, that male hegemony continues.

Summary

The purpose of this paper was to sketch, in broad terms, suggestions for an integration of structuration theory, feminist perspectives, and compliance-

gaining findings. Each of the three perspectives offers heuristic insight to the others; the next paragraphs review some of the benefits of integration. Some of the suggestions were covered in the paper; others are a legacy for future scholarship.

Feminist theorizing accomplishes the following work for compliance gaining. It provides a way to rethink the domain from a specific critical perspective, and it may offer new ways of conceptualizing power and influence or fresh explanations for the findings: that is, it may offer alternative places to "look" amongst compliance-gaining phenomena for theoretically and practically interesting insights. For structuration theory, feminist theorizing provides the following benefits. It offers a specific framework/domain in which structuration can be shown to operate. Furthermore, especially when applied to a specific collection of empirical findings (such as compliance-gaining research), it provides concrete examples of structuration concepts, such as resources and modalities.

Structuration theory does the following work for compliance gaining research. It channels these findings' implications beyond the interpersonal area, providing a way to connect to larger societal issues. Structuration theory, like feminist theory, can reframe compliance-gaining theory and research in a heuristically provocative way, as demonstrated in the preceding discussion. For multiple feminist theories, structuration theory can provide a common language in which to structure both their criticisms and expectations for change. That is, the concepts of resources, rules, and modalities of structuration can be used to show how the action of oppression works (though these concepts must be cast in the language of each theory's assumptions). Therefore, structuration theory may allow for judgment among competing feminist theories (e.g. some may be shown to offer more insight than others from this perspective), though this task was not attempted in this essay.

Several strands of feminist theory, as demonstrated above, are amenable as a framework for the application of structuration principles to women's communication experience. Feminist perspectives, from liberal through radical and postmodern approaches, were shown here to focus on the resources available to women in interaction. Often, the resources available to women are different from those available to men. The cause of the difference in resources may be unequal laws (liberal feminism), capital-production relations (Marxist feminism), or even lack of access to a nonpatriarchal language (postmodern feminism) (Tong, 1989). Each of these approaches sheds different light on the precursors of structuration, that is, resources that women have access to and may draw upon in order to accomplish various goals in the social world. Certainly this type of analysis can extend beyond the compliance-gaining literature into other domains of interpersonal communication.

Compliance-gaining research does the following work for structuration theory. It can offer empirical tests of its findings as well as specific instances where structuration can be seen to operate. Compliance-gaining findings also offer insight to feminist perspectives. They allow exploration of a specific area of interpersonal interaction (on the individual level) from feminist perspectives and allow support for, critique of, and renovation of feminist tenets and future scholarly endeavors. In most feminist analysis, the "action" takes

place at a general societal level, rather than at the individual level (criticism has been leveled at some feminist theories for just that reason). Integrating strands of feminist theory with a structuration approach to social phenomena on the individual level (compliance-gaining research) will allow a bridging of these levels. In the process, such research will answer calls for a greater focus on women's communication (e.g. Wood, et. al., 1984).

The importance of the study of the interpersonal exercise of power and its interaction with dyadic and more comprehensive social structure from a feminist perspective lies in the nature of the activity of compliance-gaining: the exercise of domination and power. There is no more important aspect of the constitution of society than how relations of power are carried out on the levels of the individual and of the group, especially with regard to women and other less empowered groups. One need only think of the historical abuse of women and others with fewer societal and political resources resulting from pathological power processes to recall the importance of investigating power phenomena. The importance of maintaining a dualistic focus is that individual behavior does carry over to society through interaction. Even at a very early age these processes are begun. Cicourel (1981) reviews the importance of the role of language use to children's socialization, especially in the resolution of conflict and misunderstandings, including disputes during play (which include compliance-gaining involving peers), to the child's socialization. Therefore, continued feminist examination of compliance-gaining behavior as structuration is useful and necessary.

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COMMUNICATION, ADVOCACY, ARGUMENTATION AND FEMINISMS: TOWARD A DIALECTICAL PARTNERSHIP

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Amazon, anarcho, black, cultural, "do me," ecological, erotic, existentialist, liberal, libertarian, lesbian, Marxist, materialist, moderate, postmodern, post-structural, proactive, psychoanalytic, radical, separatist, socialist, third-world—by now it should be clearly understood that feminism is not univocal. Instead, feminism "is not one, but many, theories and perspectives" (Tong, 1989, p. 1). It can be thought of as an "umbrella concept" (Warren, 1993, p. 122) since "there is no single definition of 'feminism' or 'feminist'" (Bowen & Wyatt, 1993b, p. 2). Given the plurality of feminism, it is more accurate to speak of feminisms (Bowen & Wyatt, 1993b, p. 11; Hekman, 1990, p.2). Warhol & Herndyl (1991) concur:

We've used the plural form "feminisms," rather than "feminism," to acknowledge the diversity of motivation, method, and experience among feminist academics. From the outside "feminism" may appear monolithic, unified, or singularly definable. The more intimately one becomes acquainted with feminist criticism, however, the more one sees the multiplicity of approaches and assumptions inside the movement. (p. x)

Although feminism welcomes many viewpoints, distinctions among feminisms often reflect fundamental and sometimes incommensurable differences. Virginia Olessen (1994) explains that "there are many feminisms, hence many views, some conflicting" (p. 158). Lisa McLaughlin (1995) agrees that the "unified front suggested by 'feminist' and 'feminism' can be misleading" since these terms "disguise an unharmonious set of philosophies" (p. 148). Bowen & Wyatt (1993b) observe that "many times the items in the catalog of feminist thought seem to contradict one another" (p. 11). Thus, any temptation to conflate these feminisms should be steadfastly resisted. As Audre Lourde (1993) cautions: "It is a particular academic arrogance to assume any discussion of feminist theory without examining our many differences" (p. 10).

Despite enormous differences between individual feminists and among multiple forms of feminism, most feminists embrace one or more of several core assumptions. For example, feminist thought tends to coalesce around a few central goals. In this essay, I will contrast three distinct feminist projects.

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I label these feminism¹, feminism², and feminism³. The focus of **feminism¹** is biological sex (male/female); it opposes the domination of women by men and advocates equality (or superiority) for women. The focus of **feminism²** is sociological gender (feminine/masculine); it challenges the domination of masculine ideology and seeks the equality (or superiority) of traditionally “feminine” ideals. The focus of **feminism³** is domination per se; it rejects the ideology of domination and all its manifestations (sexism, genderism, racism, classism, ageism, heterosexism, ableism, etc.).

Before proceeding, three caveats seem appropriate. First, these categories are an attempt to describe ideology rather than people. It would be inappropriate to attempt to essentialize any individual feminist according to this typology. Nevertheless, arguments proceeding from feminist theory regularly adopt one or more of these premises. Second, these categories are not offered as exhaustive or discrete. There may be feminist approaches not represented here, and it certainly is possible for a feminist argument to subscribe to more than one of these assumptions. The third caveat is that these categories do not strictly correspond to what has been labeled first, second, and third “wave” feminism. While the parallels with first and second wave feminism are striking, it is fair to say that some authors have defined “third-wave” feminism quite differently than I conceptualize feminism³.

After further distinguishing these approaches to feminism, I will do three things. First, I will contrast two models of communication and examine various feminist approaches for their congruence with these models. Next, I will review feminist research in rhetorical theory and suggest connections to argumentation studies. Finally, I will distinguish various approaches to argumentation and examine implications of these perspectives for feminism. Following this exploration, I will draw some conclusions and suggest future directions for communication studies. I invite the reader to travel with me on this journey, and to see, as I see, important connections between argumentation theory and some approaches to feminism. I intend to suggest that a communication-argumentation-feminism partnership has much to offer all three foci of inquiry and important implications for pedagogy.

Feminisms

Feminism¹

Feminism¹ corresponds closely to what has been called “first-wave” feminism which was “by and large a liberal feminist reform movement.” Liberal feminists sought sexual equality within the existing social structure. Since it embraced existing societal values, “liberal feminism asked women to adopt a male orientation” as a precondition to equal treatment (Taylor and Richardson, 1993, p. 534–5). First-wave feminists “attempted to fit women uncritically into a masculine pattern of life and a masculine model of humanity

¹ This project opposes the domination of women by men and advocates equality (or superiority) for women.

² This project challenges the domination of masculine ideology and seeks cultural equality (or superiority) of traditionally “feminine” ideals.

³ This project opposes domination per se regardless of manifestation.

and culture" (Plumwood, 1993, p. 27). In short, first-wave (typically liberal) feminists were interested in "making women more like men" (Dervin 1987, p. 110). Rosemarie Tong (1989) explains that first-wave feminists felt that "to free themselves from oppression, women who are ready, willing, and able to develop masculine traits should be permitted and even required to do so" (p. 103). These feminists displayed "a tendency to accept male values as human values" (Tong, 1989, p. 31).

While first-wave feminism is most closely associated with liberal feminism, "the attempt to fit women into a masculine ideal of selfhood goes beyond liberal feminism" and is also found in some forms of socialist and Marxist-humanist feminism (Plumwood, 1993, p. 27). Additionally, although "radical" feminists are generally classified as "second-wave" feminists, some fit our definition of feminism¹. Early radical feminists felt that sexism had been rationalized on the basis of supposedly "essential" biological differences between the sexes. They attempted to obviate these "natural" differences by encouraging women to emulate traditionally "masculine" behavior.

In short, while liberal feminists typify feminism¹, one need not adopt the liberal label to subscribe to the central premises of feminism¹. Feminists¹ embrace the values of the dominant culture. They accept the man-made institutions of the existing order but seek a larger role for women within those institutions.

Feminism²

Some early radical feminists embraced masculinity, but others were highly critical of it. These later radical feminists joined with cultural feminists, and others, in a chorus of voices critiquing excessive valorization of the masculine. Val Plumwood (1993) explains that this feminine-identified feminism "has been a major rival to and critic of the feminism of uncritical equality." Feminism² is associated with "second-wave" feminism. If first-wave feminism "rejects the ideals of feminine character," then second-wave feminists reject masculine ideals (p. 30). Primarily associated with cultural feminists and radical feminists, the rejection of ideals thought of as masculine also gives rise to several themes in socialist feminism, ecological feminism, eco-feminism, and some feminist theories of nonviolence.

In feminism² the central goal for women "is not equal participation or absorption in such a male dominant culture but rather subversion, resistance and replacement" (p. 30). Second-wave feminism is sometimes equated with "cultural" feminism because, as Zimmerman (1994) explains, it calls for the creation of a "counterculture to replace the misogynist, hierarchical, domineering, violent, militaristic, death-denying culture of patriarchy" (p. 236). "Despite disagreements, most cultural feminists agree in promoting a culture that valorizes the relational, other-oriented, nurturing traits that traditionally have been the most highly developed in women" (p. 237). Like cultural feminists, many radical feminists oppose man-made society and instead support traditionally feminine values. Taylor & Richardson (1993) observe that "radical feminism is a transformation politics engaged in a fight against female disadvantage and the masculinization of culture" (p. 536).

Feminism³

Second-wave feminism's emphasis on women's difference from men had the unintended effect of implying the essential sameness of women, "but growing emphasis on 'difference,' especially when abetted by postmodern theory, began to fragment the very concept of women and introduced other "differences"—such as race, ethnicity, age, and sexual orientation" (Zimmerman, 1994, p. 283). One truly revolutionary implication of this feminist criticism is that it "undermined the old dualism of men-as-oppressors and women-as-oppressed. Women, too, can be the oppressors" (p. 238). Taylor & Richardson (1993) explain that the "recognition that the circumstances of women's oppression differ has given way to a new feminist paradigm that views race, class, gender, ethnicity, and sexuality, as interlocking systems of oppression" (p. 538).

The focus on an interlocking system of domination is essence of feminism³ as presented here. Concentrating on the root (domination) rather than the branches (i.e., sexism or genderism) empowered feminists with a transcendent understanding of the unity of oppression. Feminism³ rejects the reductionistic, additive, either- or analysis of oppression in favor of a holistic, synthesizing, both- and model. Collins (1991) explains: "Additive models of oppression are firmly rooted in the either/or dichotomous thinking of Eurocentric masculinist thought" (p. 225). Collins continues:

Embracing a both/and conceptual stance moves us from additive separate systems approaches to oppression and toward what I now see as the more fundamental issue of the social relations of domination. Race, class, and gender constitute axes of oppression that characterize black women's experience within a more generalized matrix of domination. Other groups may encounter other dimensions of the matrix, such as sexual orientation, religion, and age, but the overarching relationship is one of domination. . . . (p. 226)

What Collins (1991) has called the "matrix of domination;" Riane Eisler (1987) labels "the dominator model;" bell hooks refers to as the "politic" (1989) or "ideology" (1981) of domination; and Karen Warren (1993) describes as a "logic of domination." Opposition to the matrix/model/politic/ideology/logic of domination is more basic than opposing multiple distinct manifestations (sexism, genderism, heterosexism, racism, classism, ageism, ableism, nationalism, ethnocentrism, etc.). What feminist³ approaches have in common is an understanding that apparently distinct forms of oppression are rooted in a single system premised on *power-over* domination. Feminists³ acknowledge these connections and critique oppression at its source. Feminism³, then, subsumes the concerns of feminism^{1&2}.

Having distinguished three lines of feminist thought, we now proceed to examination of two models of communication and their implications for these diverse feminisms.

Communication Models and Feminist Theories

Communication Models

In this section I will distinguish two attitudes regarding human communication. The first, which I label **unilateral monologic**, is modeled on the

received view of human relations in Western culture. It is premised on an ultimately isolated, alienated, disconnected, separated, and narrowed sense of self in competition with others. The other model, which I will label **bilateral dialogic**, proceeds from the emerging view that understands reality as relational, connected, integrated, and holistic.

Philosopher Martin Buber's examination of two central human relationships, I-It and I-Thou, grounds the concept of communication as monologue and dialogue. The monologic stance regards the audience as less important than the rhetor. Johannesen (1983) elaborates:

The I-It relation, or monologic communication, is characterized by varying degrees of self-centeredness, deception, pretense, display, appearance, artifice, using, profit, unapproachableness, seduction, domination, exploitation, and manipulation. . . . A person employing monologue seeks to command, coerce, manipulate, conquer, dazzle, deceive, or exploit. (p. 52-3).

In communication as monologue, the rhetor's attitude toward the audience is superiority, perhaps even contempt. The monologic communicator seeks dominance. In exercising *power over* the audience, unilateral communication verges on force. Brockreide's (1972) metaphor of rhetorical rape is consistent with the assumptions of unilateral communication. It is not my intention to imply that many would explicitly defend this model in its nakedness. Nevertheless, it is quite possible that we live in a culture that disguises, rationalizes, and normalizes communication premised on individualistic "survival of the fittest" values.

Bilateral dialogue stands in sharp contrast to unilateral monologue. Johannesen (1983) concludes that authenticity, inclusion, confirmation, presentness, a spirit of mutual equality, and a supportive psychological climate typify "the major attitudinal dimensions which most scholars writing on dialog, under various labels, identify" (p. 49).

In the I-thou or dialogic relationship, the attitudes and behavior of each communication participant are characterized by such qualities as mutuality, open-heartedness, directness, honesty, spontaneity, frankness, lack of pretense, nonmanipulative intent, communion, intensity and love. . . . The essential movement in dialogue, according to Buber, is turning toward, outgoing to, and reaching for the other. And a basic element in dialogue is "seeing the other" or "experiencing the other side." A person also does not forego his or her own convictions and views, but strives to understand those of others and avoids imposing his or her own on others. (Johannesen, 1983, p. 47-8)

A dialogic relationship is bilateral, reciprocal, and respectful. The mutuality of the bilateral relationship is quite different from the power-over stance adopted by the rhetorical rapist. Johannesen (1983) explains:

A bilateral or power parity relationship is sought by the rhetorical lover who views the audience as persons rather than objects or victims. The attitudes of speaker toward audience characterizing the rhetorical lover are equality, respect, willingness to risk self-change, openness to new ideas and arguments, and a genuine desire to promote free choice in the audience. (p. 59-60).

The bilateral rhetor is open minded and hearted. Johannesen (1983) concludes that "bilaterality includes mutuality of personal and intellectual risk,

openness to the possibility of self-change, and openness to scrutiny by others" (p. 61). Finally, we should note that Johannesen observes that dialogue is premised on an "argumentative stance" (p. 59) while monologue is frequently equated with "persuasion and propaganda" (p. 52).

Feminist Theories

Since the monologic model rationalizes the rhetor's exercise of power over the audience and their ultimate domination, feminists³ should reject monologue in favor of dialogue which assumes a bilateral relationship between rhetor and audience. Ascertaining the reactions of feminists^{1&2} will require further elaboration. We would expect feminists² to embrace "women's ways" and to reject traditionally masculine behavior. We would anticipate the opposite from feminists¹. To predict these feminist's reactions requires a deeper understanding of traditionally feminine and masculine thought. This distinction (masculine/feminine) is not intended to biologically essentialize. While one would expect an empirical correlation between males and "masculine" behavior in a given culture, it does not follow that men are masculine (in the western sense) in all places or at all times. In fact, substantial evidence suggests enormous cross-cultural variability in gender roles.

A major project of feminism has been examination of the western masculinist philosophical-scientific worldview. A central aspect of this worldview is radical dualism. At least since Descartes, dichotomous thinking has been highly valued in Western thought. Many dualisms are manifest in Western culture, with perhaps the most central one being the egoic I/it. The power of this basic dichotomy was substantially strengthened by the Newtonian world view which is "rooted in the binary masculine psychology of discrete self versus dominated other" (Donovan, 1992, p. 180).

Feminists have opposed this separation. Summarizing the work of Iris Murdoch, Donovan concludes that "the I-it of Newtonian science must give way to a more comprehensive vision that accepts the 'thou-ness' of life" (p. 182). Donovan (1992) argues that this "new physics" offers a compelling vision of relational organization. "Under such conditions the old dualisms—either, I-it, subject-object—are no longer operative. What is needed is a holistic, contextual, both- and approach to reality" (Donovan, 1992, p. 183). She continues:

The new vision of the universe that is emerging is no longer of an Other that operates in predictable, mechanical fashion, but of a contextual network in which every discrete entity is defined relative to its environment and subject to positional relativity of the observer. Under this perspective black and white, I-it dualism is no longer possible. (p. 180)

Feminist scholars have observed that women are more predisposed to integrated thinking. Karen Foss (1989) summarizes some distinctions of "feminine" thought:

Women's reality is characterized by such features as a sense of interdependence and connection with others and with the world, a recognition of the inevitability and value of a subjective approach to knowledge; an acceptance of self-questioning and paradox that the world does not need to be "fixed" in place and fully resolved in order to have an understanding of it; a fusion

of the public and the private realms; an egalitarian use of power; and a focus on process rather than product. (p. 2)

A central distinction observed by feminists concerns attitudes about care (Tronto, 1989). Carol Gilligan's (1982) research on psychological development in women found that while men tend to assume an autonomous self, women are more likely to embrace an "ethic of care" characterized by a commitment to relationships. Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, and Tarule (1986) found that women are more likely to prefer relationships that are egalitarian, reciprocal and collaborative, rather than hierarchical, dominating, and competitive.

The foregoing discussion should allow us to draw some initial conclusions regarding feminism and communication. We can anticipate that those identifying with feminism² would embrace bilateral dialogue given its consistency with feminine consciousness as traditionally conceived. We would also expect them to oppose monologue given its congruence with traditional masculine rationality and philosophical assumptions. Finally, we would expect feminists¹ to embrace monologue for the same reasons. We now turn to an examination of scholarship that has explicitly addressed issues of feminism and communication.

Feminist Communication Scholarship and Rhetorical Theory

Feminist scholarship in communication⁴ is now "proving vital to the discipline and is beginning to receive official recognition" (Bowen & Wyatt, 1993a, p. viii). Celeste Condit (1993) reports that the majority of this work has been in the realm of interpersonal communication. She fears that feminists have chosen to "abandon the study of rhetoric" and warns that to do so is "to abandon an important arena of power" (p. 215). Given its relative isolation from feminist criticism, it is small wonder Edward Corbett (1990) contends that "rhetoric is one of the most patriarchal of all the academic disciplines" (p. 577).

While relatively little feminist rhetorical scholarship exists, much of what does retains the masculinist biases of feminism¹ (Campbell, 1988, 1989; Glenn, 1993). Campbell (1988), for example, argues that feminists should recover the speeches of women, include such speeches in our courses, and offer courses on women in history. For Campbell, feminism is centrally concerned with combating biological sexism. Her essay does not seem to acknowledge feminism beyond feminism¹. Cirkse and Cuklanz (1992) agree that the work of "reclaiming the history of women public speakers" is premised on "liberal feminist ideals" (p. 23).

The additive strategy ("add women and stir") is now widely criticized by feminist scholars. Jansen (1993), for example, notes that "the new feminist epistemologies assume that any strategy that simply adds women's contri-

⁴ Feminist approaches to the study of communication have been taken, for example, by Blair, Brown and Baxter (1994), Cirkse and Cuklanz (1992), Deming, (1989), Dervin (1987), Fine (1988), K. Foss (1989), Gregg (1987), Kramarae (1989), Lay (1991), McLaughlin (1995), Rakow (1986, 1989, 1992), Self (1988), Shields and Dervin (1993), Spitzack and Carter (1988), Treichler and Wartella (1986), and Wood (1988, 1992).

butions to existing equations will not produce the necessary corrective" (p. 145). The old structures of knowledge are patriarchal constructions which is why "these structures cannot support integration of feminist ideas within existing paradigms and definitions of the problematic of communication studies" (p. 139). Biesecker (1992) argues that retrieving women's texts is insufficient because "the standards according to which any speech is assessed are constructed on the basis of male attributes, capacities, and modes of activity" (p. 88).

Recently, rhetorical scholars have argued that feminist studies should move beyond the retrieval and situating of women's texts. Biesecker (1992) calls for a "more radical approach" which would "uncramp the orthodoxy of rhetorical theory" (p. 88). Balbus (1984), Condit, (1993), Green (1993), Griffin (1993), McPhail (1991) and Shepherd (1992) employ at least some feminist² theorizing. None of these scholars, however, seem to venture into the integrated critique of domination envisioned in feminism³.

An exception to the general tendency of rhetorical scholars to ignore feminism³ is the recent work of Sonja Foss and Cindy Griffin (1992, 1995). They report (1995) that a recognition of the "patriarchal bias that undergirds most theories of rhetoric is growing steadily" in the field of communication (p. 2). Specifically, they decry the "positive value" traditional rhetorical theories accord to "dominating others" (p. 2), which they contend constitutes a "rhetoric of patriarchy, reflecting its values of change, competition and domination" (p. 4). In their 1992 essay, Foss and Griffin develop a rhetorical theory from the writings of the feminist Starhawk. Starhawk's system contrasts two rhetorics: the rhetoric of inherent value and the rhetoric of domination. The rhetoric of inherent value (ROIV) favors interconnection and is rooted in a respect for all living things and the ecosystem on which they depend. This is contrasted with the rhetoric of domination (ROD)—"the current state of patriarchy, an unnatural state that oppresses and destroys"—which embraces hierarchy and manipulation (p. 335).

In "Beyond Persuasion: A Proposal for an Invitational Rhetoric" (1995), Foss & Griffin call for rhetoric which "offers an invitation to understanding to enter another's world to better understand an issue and the individual who holds a particular perspective on it" (p. 13). That the invitational approach is plainly bilateral and dialogic can be seen in their prescription that "in presenting a particular perspective, the invitational rhetor does not judge or denigrate others' perspectives but is open to" them (p. 5).

In an invitational approach, the rhetor's ideas are not privileged. Benhabib calls this "the principal of egalitarian reciprocity" and suggests that "each has the same symmetrical rights to various speech acts, to initiate new topics, to ask for reflections about the presuppositions of the conversation, etc." (in Foss & Griffin, 1995, p. 12). Like bilateral dialogue, invitational rhetoric is open, as "no subject matter is off limits, and all presuppositions can be challenged" (p. 12). An argument offered "represents an initial, tentative commitment to that perspective—one subject to revision as a result of the interaction" (p. 8). Participants adopt empathic attitudes in attempting to understand offered perspectives. Central in such a rhetoric are openness and mutual respect. In this regard, invitational rhetoric is also dialogic.

A critical dimension of the offering of a perspective, in whatever form it takes, is a willingness to yield. Not unlike Buber's (1965) notion of the 'I-Thou' relationship, the basic movement of a willingness to yield is a turning toward the other. (p. 7)

Foss & Griffin (1995) discuss several implications of a theory of invitational rhetoric but one seems especially relevant to the present investigation. In traditional theory, "rhetors tend to see their audiences as opponents and sometimes may be tempted to engage in questionable ethical practices to win their 'battles' with them" (p. 15). An invitational rhetorical theory "may contribute to the efforts of communication scholars who are working to develop models of cooperative, nonadversarial, and ethical communication" (p. 15). Foss & Griffin cite new scholarship in argumentation as exemplifying such efforts. They specifically discuss Josina Makau's work on cooperative argumentation and Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's argumentation scholarship which seeks to "create an open and free exchange and responsible participation in cooperative dialogic communication" (p. 15). Foss and Griffin clearly embrace bilateral dialogue as feminist and challenge argumentation scholars to extend the work begun in their proposal for an invitational rhetoric.

Foss and Griffin explicitly link an invitational rhetoric to feminist and argumentation theories. However, further research is required to understand how argumentation theory can extend the proposal for an invitational rhetoric, and how feminist theories (including invitational rhetoric) address concerns raised in the study of argumentation.

Advocacy, Argumentation, and Dialectic

Advocacy and Argumentation

One might expect feminists^{2&3} to oppose argumentation. The up/down, dominant/defeated, winner/loser aspects of "argument" (as frequently experienced), certainly present difficulties for those identifying with feminism³. These features, as well as the aggression and conflict associated with arguing, should be a concern for those committed to feminism². Nevertheless, these problems need not hinder feminists^{2&3} from embracing argumentation. Josina Makau (1990) explains:

There are at least two approaches to argumentation. Competitive argumentation focuses on winning something, from an audience's vote to a debate prize. Cooperative argumentation focuses on the shared goal of finding the best answer or making the best decision. (p. 48)

Certain "competitive" strategies have no purpose in argumentative contexts in which arguers cooperate in the critical testing of arguments. The competition of ideas need not become a competition of egos. Sharon Blinn (1992), holds that cooperative argumentation "rests on the mutual respect imparted to all participants in the dialogue" (p. 6). She insists that "practical wisdom to guide reasonable, ethical action has little to do with winning and losing and more to do with adjusting and adapting to a world bound together" in a web of relationships (p. 10).

In short, a cooperative approach to argumentation might obviate many of the reservations that feminists^{2&3} might otherwise have regarding argumen-

tation. Further elaboration of the concept is warranted. I believe much transitional insight may be gleaned from the dialectical perspective on argument, and it is to this topic that I now turn.

Argumentation and Dialectic

"All arguments can be regarded as rhetorical, dialectical, and logical phenomenon" (Wenzel, 1990, p. 9). Wenzel (1990) notes that the interests that motivate rhetoric, dialectic and logic are: "the interest in adapting speeches to audiences and situations; the interest in cooperative methods for decision making; and the interest in developing standards for rational judgment" (p. 9). These distinctions can also be used as perspectives from which to evaluate argument products. Hample (1990), for example, explains:

From the rhetorical perspective, a scholar wishes to know how effective an argument is and why. Logical criticism is concerned about the validity or strength of an argument. From the dialectical point of view, you might wonder whether an argument reflects all that is known about a topic, and whether an argument has proceeded in a way free enough to permit all reasonable contributions to be properly evaluated. (p. 298)

In brief, the rhetorical perspective is interested in advocative effectiveness, in the successful influence of the audience. The logical perspective is focused on the soundness of argument, its validity or strength, and the acceptability, relevance, and sufficiency of evidence. Finally, the dialectical perspective is committed to interaction that facilitates the best possible decision by encouraging well-informed evaluation resulting from candid, critical and comprehensive discussion. These distinctions deserve further elaboration.

The rhetorical view promotes successful influence over the audience by an advocate. It is interested in the speaker's discovering the available means of exercising *power over* the audience. The rhetorical perspective asks arguers to adapt advocacy for impact (Hample, 1990; Warnick & Inch, 1989; Wenzel, 1990). "Whatever works" summarizes the highly instrumental rhetorical perspective. In short, the rhetorical perspective would embrace unilateral monologue as "good" argumentation. Not surprisingly, I predict that those embracing feminism^{2&3} would reject the rhetorical perspective on argumentation as proceeding from masculinist premises and promoting power-over.

Nor would feminists² likely subscribe to the logical perspective of argument evaluation. A critic operating from a logical position is interested in rationality, soundness, validity, and evidence (Hample, 1990; Warnick & Inch, 1989; Wenzel, 1990). Several feminists have questioned the appropriateness of strictly "logical" standards of argument evaluation (Blinn, 1992). Strict rationality is inconsistent with feminine valuation of emotion and intuition. Exclusively logical criteria of evaluation ask the evaluator to divorce herself from the wholeness of her humanity (Makau, 1990).

The dialectical approach is interested in communication that promotes the best possible decision-making (Warnick & Inch, 1989; Hample, 1990; Wenzel, 1990). Wenzel (1990) summarizes criteria for dialectical communication:

Good argument-as-procedure should measure up to the "four Cs." Good dialectical argumentation depends on the arguers being *cooperative* in following appropriate rules and committing themselves to the common purpose of good decision-making. Good argumentation is *comprehensive* in dealing with the subject matter as thoroughly as possible. Good argumentation is *candid* in making ideas clear and getting them out in the open for examination. Finally sound argumentation is *critical* in its commitment to basing decisions on the most rigorous testing of positions the circumstances allow. (p. 24)

Dialectical thought is characterized by the interrelationship of participants. While advocates may have formed tentative and conditional opinions, they remain radically open to the possibility of altering their original position in response to feedback (Warren 1984). Dialectical participants are therefore *empowered with one another*.

The distinctions among rhetorical, logical, and dialectical perspectives can be further unpacked. Both the rhetorical and logical perspectives privilege unilateral communication. The argument "source" transmits a message to a "target" which "receives" it. The source need not seek nor value audience response. This contrasts with the bilateral dialectical perspective. While the dialectical perspective is dialogical, both rhetorical and logical perspectives are monological in assuming that one "truth" preexists and should prevail. From the rhetorical perspective, the preexisting "truth" (from the rhetor's state of mind) is the only thing that matters. From the logical perspective, truth is assumed to be "objective" and demonstrable. Contrasted with the subjective truth of rhetoric and the objective truth of logic, the dialectical perspective seeks an intersubjective decision. Finally, the rhetorical perspective adapts to the psychological state of the audience to secure adherence; the logical perspective demands audience compliance with omnilogical truth; and the dialectical perspective seeks audience participation in dialogical decisions.

The dialectical approach, then, epitomizes the stance of bilateral dialogue. It also proceeds from traditionally feminine values. As such, we might predict overwhelming support from feminists² and strong support from feminist³ for a dialectical approach to advocative communication. Conversely, we can expect that feminist^{2&3} would strongly oppose the rhetorical perspective on argument as unilateral monologue.

Conclusions and Beginnings

Feminist theorists share many interests with argumentation scholars working to develop dialectical or cooperative argument, and both argumentation scholars and feminist theorists proceed from many of the same premises as communication ethicists who advocate bilateral dialogue. With one foot planted firmly in feminist theory and the other in argumentation studies, we can move forward to examine the implications of a new feminist dialectical partnership in communication studies.

What implications would such a partnership entail? Initially, our approach to teaching the argumentation/debate course would need immediate rethinking. Makau (1992) argues that the cooperative argumentation and debate course would teach students to approach debate from the standpoint of the judge rather than the advocate: "Training students to be judicious means

teaching them to be open, to seek understanding, and to reason with care and responsibility; this is in sharp contrast to the patriarchal goals of teaching students to become effective advocates" (p. 83). In the cooperative argumentation course, students are evaluated not on "how badly they beat their opponent" but on how well their arguments contribute to the quality of the audience's decision-making. A goal in competitive debate is to separate arguers into winners and losers, but as Blinn (1992) explains:

Standards for cooperative argumentation are intended to lead to a better-informed audience, one who has a deeper understanding of multi-faceted issues from several perspectives, one who can make critical judgments and act on those judgments in short, an audience who is a "winner." (p. 4)

Beyond the argumentation course, a feminist dialectical partnership would also have implications for forensics pedagogy⁵. It saddens many of us long associated with academic debate to realize, as Johannesen (1983) does, that debate is frequently seen as a "typical example" of monologue disguised as dialogue (p. 52) and that the "attitudes of rhetorical rape often manifest themselves in . . . competitive intercollegiate debate" (p. 59). It's time to ask what role directors, coaches, and judges have in perpetuating these outlooks and what they might do to transform such a promising activity. Forensics educators might reinterpret "the better job of debating" in more bilateral-dialectical-feminist terms, like those proposed for the cooperative argumentation course. Debaters might be rewarded for facilitating good decision making, rather than for "crushing" their opponents.

Forensics educators might also question what dialectical purpose is achieved in the practice of assigning unilateral rights or responsibilities to the affirmative or negative in academic debates. A unilateral affirmative burden of proof, unilateral negative presumption, unilateral affirmative right to define, and unilateral negative responsibility to clash are typical components of contemporary paradigms of academic debate. Why unilateral? Why, for example, must the negative refute a specific "case" unilaterally imposed on them by the affirmative while the affirmative is free to affirm any part of the resolution? Must debate be so estranged from "the principle of egalitarian responsibility" and the idea of "symmetrical rights?" These questions need rethinking and a handful of debaters have begun to do so. If judges and coaches could be nudged out of traditional and "comfortable" ways of doing things, a more dialectical form of academic debate might be realized.

We should also consider extending the value of bilateral dialogue beyond the debate context. Monological, unilateral, control-based models have dom-

⁵ Given the more general thrust of the bulk of my manuscript one reader of an earlier version of this essay wondered why, in my conclusion, I "turn on academic debate which is a game not a real argument." I choose to extend my critique to debate because I agree with Herbeck (1990) that "the divergency of debate from argumentation is problematic" (p. 9). Trapp (1993) is correct, I believe, in observing that "debate is in trouble because its practitioners have lost their focus on argumentation" (p. 23). Debate is real argument. In fact, Goodnight (1981) argues that academic debate "is a paradigm case of argumentation" and he calls for the re-union of argumentation and debate theory (p. 416). If debate is a game it is an argumentative game, and so, "we ought to take an argumentative perspective on academic debate" (Trapp, 1993, p. 24).

inated communication studies. Klumpp and Holihan (1989) argue that our field has been preoccupied with a managerial approach that sought to "differentiate dialectic and rhetoric" (p. 88). Deetz (1994) contends that the field has promoted "control-centered conceptions and research methods" such as managerial rhetoric and compliance gaining (p. 6). Shepherd (1992) agrees that our field has been dominated by a view of communication as "persuasion, influence, and control" (p. 204). These control-based conceptions obviously fail the test of feminism^{2&3} since they value the rhetor's power over the audience.

Feminist dialectical criteria might also contribute to more "critical" modes of rhetorical criticism. Scholars could apply these new critical tools to an expanded pool of artifacts by understanding that "political" rhetoric need not be limited to "public" address. Robin Lakoff (1990) explains that there are at least two kinds of "power-oriented discourse." Macropolitical discourse refers to relations between established groups nations, religions, races, and institutions, for instance. Micropolitical discourse "involves the development and use of strategies that create and enhance power differences among individuals" (p. 21). Dialectical-Bilateral-Feminist criteria could guide criticism of the rhetoric of both macropolitical public address and micropolitical interpersonal communication.

Finally, in extending such analyses to interpersonal relations, we might want to consider beginning with our own communication practices. While feminists have reminded us that "the personal is political" we must also understand that the political is personal. We construct, in our own lives, a slice of the social world. When we confront others monologically, we re-produce a dominant ideology. When we engage equals dialogically, we embody "other" ways of being. Behaving bilaterally challenges "an oppressive system simply because it models an alternative to the system" (Foss & Griffin, 1995, p. 17).

Those working at the intersections of argumentation studies, communication ethics, and feminist theory have a unique opportunity to influence the direction of communication studies and the evolution of human values. Communication scholars must not underestimate our potential to influence cultural formations (Meadows, 1990; Shepherd, 1992). As feminist forester Gloria Steinem (1983) concludes:

A feminist assault on the politics of talking and listening, is a radical act. It's a way of transforming the cultural vessel in which both instant communication and long-term anthropological change are carried. (p. 190)

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