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The Making of a Virtual Monster: Ideological Criticism on the ISIS Hate and Extremism

By

Md Shah Jahan

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of

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The Making of a Virtual Monster: Ideological Criticism on the ISIS Hate and Extremism

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This thesis has been examined and approved by the following members of the student's committee.

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ABSTRACT

The 9/11 incident and its subsequent terrorism specifically the rise of radical Islamist groups like ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), and al-Qaeda astounds the world. ISIS's propaganda technique using digital media helps the terrorist group motivate and recruit a large group of people from around the world. Terrorist incidents like the Dhaka café in 2016 and France soccer game attack in 2015 provide a glimpse of ISIS ferocity and barbarism with its subsequent series of attacks. This research examines the kind of rhetorical language that ISIS leaders and followers use to support their ideologies. And, how the internet became the main medium for ISIS in promoting hate ideology, violence, and terror? In this study, I follow the method of ideological criticism to examine ISIS's rhetorical artifacts.

I analyze the speeches of al-Baghdadi, the ISIS top leader, and Bangladesh and France terrorists. Specifically, I collect data from the video speeches, with the purpose of revealing how al-Baghdadi and other terrorist's speeches were crafted with ideological elements to attract and motivate people. I, then, analyze the functions of the text, cultural influence, and practice on subsequent global socio-political reality.

I identify three main ideologies from the artifacts—a) martyrdom or victory, b) global Muslims' freedom, and c) Establishment of Caliphate for Global Muslims. ISIS ideologies work as camouflage to mislead people. The linguistic construction of ISIS messages are not exception to other such groups to motivate and recruit people. The findings of the analysis led to some intriguing results of how an extremist group begins and culminates its propaganda mechanisms through clever rhetorical strategies. ISIS incorporates concurrent problems in Muslims countries, blames the West and its allies for all those problems. The terrorist group also includes various divine and worldly benefits of terrorism in its rhetorical strategy.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....3

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....4

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION7

Purpose of the Study.....10

Objective of the Study.....11

Precis of Chapters.....12

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW14

Technology and Hate.....14

Idea of Hate and Cyber Hate.....15

 Unrestrained (!) opportunity for online hate.....16

 Early perpetrators of online hate.....17

 Religious extremists in driving seat.....19

 ISIS: Online hate.....20

Understanding Extremism.....22

 Types of extremism.....25

 History of extremism/violent extremism.....26

 ISIS: A face of massive radicalization.....30

 Al-Qaeda: Early perpetrators of international Islamic terrorism.....32

 ISIS: A progeny of Al-Qaeda with extreme savagery.....33

Ideology.....37

Ideology of Hate.....42

Ideology of Extremism.....44

Digital rhetoric: A Framework to Study Technology and Virtual Artifacts.....	47
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY	49
Description of Text.....	51
Process of Analysis.....	52
Procedures.....	54
CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS	56
The Rhetorical Situation.....	57
Ideologies Embed in the ISIS Artifacts.....	60
Martyrdom or Victory.....	61
Implementation of God’s order.....	63
Global Muslims’ Freedom.....	65
Establishment of Caliphate for Global Muslims.....	68
Creation of fear is important.....	72
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION.....	75
Implications of the Study.....	76
Advantage of individuals own interpretation of Islam—jihad and others.....	77
Cultural lag—between the binary of two extremist ideologies	79
Using symbols to justify their opposition to West.....	81
Contribution to Rhetorical Communication.....	82
Limitations of the Study.....	83
Future Research.....	84
References	85

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

July 1, 2016 is the black-letter day for Bangladesh. It was the day that the people of Dhaka city, capital of Bangladesh, experienced the first massive hit of global terrorism. In a café in Dhaka twenty-two people, mostly foreign diplomats, were killed, but, it represents a big threat to the secular national demeanor of Bangladesh. People were stunned not only for the incident, and its brutality, but for the perpetrators who carried out the killing in a highly secured and sophisticated part of Dhaka city. Everyone looked for answers to the question: why would five youths perpetrate such brutality? The most surprising thing was the secular background of the attackers. One of them was son of a leader of ruling Awami League party, and three others were from general education system and practically from secular families (Ap & Pokharel, 2016; Hammadi & Gowen, 2016; Manik & Anand, 2016). Meer Hayet Kabir, the father of an attacker, upon apologizing to global community, said “I still don't want to believe my son has done it with his own, conscious mind” (Kalra & Quadir, 2016, p. 1). Meer Saameh Mubasher, son of Mr Kabir, was killed during counter operation in the café by law enforcing agencies, and was known as “mommy boy” to his friends due to his innocent and introvert behavior (Kalra, 2016). Mubasher wanted to be a sociologist and a theologian. Mr. Kabir was astonished in thinking about how his son was diverted and radicalized in only two months as he along with other attackers were missing couple of months before the café attack. Mr. Kabir, the top official of an international telecom company, stated that “if they can steal my son, they can steal anybody's kid” (Kalra, p. 3). Almost similar characterizations emerged from friends and family members of four other assassins who took part in the attack.

Questions centering on the incident and its aftermath remained unanswered. Astounded people looked for answers to how these educated youths with good backgrounds become so

ferocious and destructive? How did the “mommy boy” become a terrorist? Or, how was it possible to radicalize the talented youths in a short time? What were the deficiencies in their life? Family and friends of the attackers confirmed that social media could be the only way of influencing of the youths. Undoubtedly, extremist groups like ISIS or al-Qaeda use social media as sophisticated and effective communication tools to disseminate their fanatical messages to people (Liang, 2015). Youths, the prime users of social media, are confronting and being motivated by these messages. Ibrahim, another 19-year old alleged extremist member, was killed during another anti-terrorist drive by law enforcers in Gazipur, the outskirts of Dhaka, was blamed to be influenced by social media. Azim Uddin, father of Ibrahim, lamented that “only mobile phone destroyed my son” (Zayeeef, 2016, p. 1).

Most of Bangladeshi youths, linked to extremism, were missing from their family for two to four months. Analysts claim that extremists could be trained during this time for big operations like Dhaka Café attack (Hammadi & Gowen, 2016). However, the reason for their primary involvement in extremism remained unanswered. People were also surprised to learn that these extremists came from educated middle and upper class rather than impoverished families, though the established notion is that members of poor and lower class primarily join with militants (Griffiths, 2016). According to George Washington University and Brookings Institution, around 73% of ISIS recruits are from middle class or wealthier families (Long, 2015).

Although Mr. Kabir doubted that his son could be radicalized at school or mosque, he was unsure of what actually happened. The video speech of Mubasher, which ISIS published months after the Café attack, contradicts his family’s statements about him (Indian Times, 2016; Deccan Chronicles, 2016). In the video, Mubasher spoke with a clear voice in Bengali and

Arabic mixed languages, condemning both the West and the secular Bangladeshi politicians. The speech was full of hate and extremism, and it seemed to be a replica of ISIS's Salafi ideological rhetoric¹. This hate rhetoric was nothing new in Western and non-Western countries from the binary of West and East, or Oriental and Occidental etc. (Funk & Said, 2004; Lipka, 2016). Both sides are "other" to one another and try to confirm their own greatness, virtue, and self-sufficiency through their rhetoric (Funk & Said). Thus, practice of hate establishes a foundation in both societies. As Yanay (2002) extends that this collective hatred is nothing but "a failure to mediate between similarity and difference, closeness and separation, isolation and connectedness, at the same time that national and religious groups aspire to be included and be recognized as part of humanity" (p. 53).

Therefore, the practice of hate in Middle-Eastern countries by Salafi ideologists later became extremist, when they got involved in conflicts with respective state power. The extremism later transformed to terrorism by al-Qaeda and ISIS. Though the Salafi movement is pretty old; got prominence during 18th and 19th centuries (Olidort, 2015), al-Qaeda is its new addition. Finally, ISIS provides the movement with an enormous expansion through violence and terrorism.

¹ The rise of Salafi jihadi doctrine was a result of conflict between Sunni (a sect of Islam) reformers and clerical establishment over reaction to rapid social transforms including industrialization, and globalization (Moghadam, 2008). Salafi ideological rhetoric talks about purification of Islam from corrupted Muslim especially the rulers in the Middle-Eastern countries (Henzel, 2005) and strives to eradicate West's influences on them. The Salafi jihadists "emphasize on the military exploits of the early generations of Muslims to give their violence an even more immediate divine imperative" (Dar & Hamid, 2016, p. 4). Their narratives indicated the West as key opponent while the native politicians, allies of West would be defeated because they were serving infidel's (kafir) interest (Gerges, 2014).

Purpose of the Study

But, how do youths around the world get attracted to ISIS discourse? This much-discussed question impacts the study of extremism. As a citizen of Bangladesh, terrorist incidents like the Dhaka café attack, influenced me to explore the causes behind the impact of ISIS ideology. This is because traditional Bangladeshi socio-cultural practices do not conform to such hate and extremism as ISIS does. Certainly, hate groups craft their messages with elements predominantly for educating, encouraging participation within the group and among the public, invoking divine privilege, and indicting external groups and organizations (McNamee, Peterson & Peña, 2010). According to McNamee, et al., “All of these messages position the hate group as an educator to both members and the public at large” (p. 267). So, this authority of language compels its members to voluntarily enslave themselves to a certain ideology. Hate groups also formulate messages keeping three features in mind—fear appeal; emphasizing on member benefit; and inoculation techniques (2010).

Likewise, plenty of studies have been conducted on hate group’s message construction and member recruitment strategies (Dunbar et al., 2014; Graham, 2015; Hemmer, 1995; Weinberg, 2011), but research about specifically how the violent extremism or terrorism language and rhetoric might motivate people to act are a few. Moreover, research on ISIS’s hate ideology, following al-Qaeda, is almost non-existent in communication scholarship. Undoubtedly, the internet becomes the prime carrier for hate groups’ rhetoric—to create, spread and nurture their ideology. Furthermore, researchers also widely studied on whether hate groups promote violence or not (Blee, 2007; Douglas, McGarty, Bliuc, & Lala, 2005; Glaser, Dixit, & Green, 2002). The question remains unanswered: how does the internet become the main medium for promoting hate ideology, violence, and terror? In this research, I will follow an

ideological criticism approach to examine ISIS's rhetorical artifacts that help the extremist group gain supporters across the world. Finally, I will argue about the practice of collective hatred as it has influence on present global terrorism. I will talk specifically about how the digital media and internet is an important medium for promoting hate and extremism.

Objective of the Study

Plenty of reasons could be existent behind the global youths joining to ISIS. It is undoubtedly that the channels of ISIS's message like website contents including books, leaflets, news articles, and public speeches contain some elements that convinced their followers to celebrate them. Therefore, the ideological artifacts of ISIS should get more systematic scrutiny to unearth its reality.

The goal of this study is to uncover the ISIS ideology embedded in the speeches of its top leader (caliph) Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Bangladesh and France terrorists. In this study, I will use the rhetorical method of ideological criticism to analyze the speeches. The method usually "looks to beliefs, values, attitudes, and visions of a particular aspect of the world approach" (Dunham, Higgins, & Uy, 2011). Ideological criticism is mainly concerned with the idea of power, and it looks into how one dominant worldview justify privileges over other groups (Brummett, 1994; Dunham, Higgins, & Uy, 2011; Foss, 2009). Al-Furqan Media Foundation, ISIS's media wing released Al-Baghdadi's speech on July 5, 2014. Soon after al-Baghdadi declared the Caliphate (Islamic State) and entitled himself as the "caliph" of all Muslims around the world (Site Intelligence, 2014). Al-Baghdadi delivered his sermon at a Mosque in the militant-held northern Iraqi city of Mosul (Strange, 2014). The message, titled "A Message to the Mujahideen and the Muslim Ummah in the Month of Ramadan" was distributed as an audio link through al-Furqan Foundation's Twitter account (Cunningham, Everton, Schroeder, 2015;

Gambhir, 2016). English, Russian, French, German, and Albanian translations of the transcript were subsequently issued by another ISIS-affiliated media organization, al-Hayat Media Center. In the 19-minute and 47-second-long Arabic speech, al-Baghdadi called upon Muslims to act against global oppression and to emigrate to the newly-declared Caliphate (Site Intelligence, 2014).

On the other hand, I collect Bangladesh terrorist video from *heavy.com*, a New York based online news portal. The around 15-minute video titled “And the Disbelievers Planned, but Allah Planned, and Allah is the Best of Planners” featured 5 terrorists who undertook Dhaka café attack on July 1, 2016. The video was a compilation of five terrorist’s messages with a brief description of the concurrent scenario of Bangladesh’s “anti-Islamic” activities and various government initiatives. The environment and audio visuals show that ISIS recorded the speech in a locked room of any remote residential area. They recorded the video for global audience especially targeting Bangladesh people. France ISIS speech was recorded separately in forest or desert areas. *The New York Times* published the video narrated by its reporter Rukmini Callimachi which originally published by Site Intelligence (Al-Hlou, 2016). Specifically, I collect data from the videos, with the purpose of revealing how speeches of al-Baghdadi and other terrorists were crafted with ideological elements to attract and motivate people. I, then, analyze the functions of the text, cultural influence and practice on subsequent global socio-political reality.

Precis of Chapters

In chapter 2, I discuss about the concept of hate and extremism. I examine the existing literature of ISIS’s hate practice and its connections with past century’s ideologues and its influence on present large world population. I also extend a discussion on ideology focusing on

hate and extremism which provides a theoretical overview of this research. In chapter 3, I discuss the method of ideological criticism, looking at the function of the text, its cultural influence and practice. In chapter 4, I analyze the artifacts. I talked about the functions and ISIS ideologies embedded in the terrorist's rhetoric. Finally, in chapter 5, I discuss ISIS's rhetorical strategy to motivate people to terrorism, and the contribution of the study to the rhetorical communication.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, I will, first, provide a discussion on hate practice in society and try to show how different groups use technology especially social media as an aide to enhance their propaganda and recruitment. Second, I will provide a discussion on extremism, its definitions, origins; and how it transformed into a violent extremist group. I, then, will discuss ISIS, its roots and provide a brief conversation on the group. Finally, I will include a theoretical framework on ideology, emphasizing on how ideology has relation with hate and extremism. This literature review provides the foundation for an ideological criticism approach to my research.

Technology and Hate

“How high does a wall need to be to keep out the internet?” Hillary Clinton, the Democrat Party candidate for the 2016 U.S. election, countered Republican candidate, now President, Donald Trump’s proposal of building a wall on the Mexican border and banning Muslims in America (Ahmed & George, 2016; Billings, 2016). The reality, in fact, is not an exaggeration. Innovative technological tools and high-speed internet make things difficult for policymakers from state, regional, and global levels to legally enforce any hard and fast code of behavior in the technological environment. Different countries, though have their unique policies for regulating the internet. For instance, Federal Communications Commission regulates the U.S. internet. In spite of having free speech principles, the country has the most sophisticated regulations for internet (Ang, 1997).

Similarly, identifying a certain behavior as hate crime also differs from society to society. Petrosino (1999), for example, stated though hate crime as a behavior existed in the U.S. society more than 300 years, only recently it has “recognized as a violation of law” (p. 23). Before formulating some legal frameworks, hate crimes were rationalized as established ideology and

regarded as “manifest destiny” (Petrosino, p. 26) for black people. As Petrosino mentioned, “manifest destiny was the belief that America was to be governed by White Anglo-Saxon Protestants, as ordained by “God Almighty”” (p. 26).

Idea of Hate and Cyber Hate

The definition of hate crime is complicated and complex as an action is regarded as crime in one jurisdiction, which is certainly not the same case in others. Similarly, hate crimes are illegal for some societies and are not legally forbidden for others. For example, slavery was legal in the U.S. until 13th amendment of constitution. Similarly, in countries where same sex marriage is illegal, LGBTQ people face various hate crimes and many of them are not legally protected. Petrosino extended the idea: “Some statutes will list race, color, religion, or national origin as specific categories protected by hate crime legislation. Other statutes may also include gender, sexual orientation, and the physically disabled in their laws” (p. 24).

Furthermore, Almagor (2011) defines hate speech as bias-motivated, hostile, malicious speech to a person or a group because of their perceived innate characteristics. Almagor states, “Express[ing] discriminatory, intimidating, disapproving, antagonistic and/or prejudicial attitudes toward those characteristics which include sex, race, religion, ethnicity, color, national origin, disability, or sexual orientation” (p. 3). Titley (2014) extends on the meaning of hate speech by stating that it should be “understood as covering all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance” (p. 14). Critical race theorists Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado, and Crenshaw (1993) use the term assaultive speech interchangeably with hate speech to define “words that are used as weapons to ambush, terrorize, wound, humiliate, and degrade” (as cited in Calvert, 1997, p. 5). Therefore, hate crime is the victimization of an individual or a group due to their racial,

ethnic, religious identities, nationality, gender, sexual orientation, and physical ability. Similarly, expressing online hate or hi-tech hate enable extremists to camouflage, and hit-hard against certain individuals or groups.

Keen (2014) defines online hate as any written material, any image or any other representation of ideas to promote hate or violence against any individual or group based on race, color or ethnicity. Anti-Defamation League (2016) describes cyber hate as using of any electronic technology to spread information relating to bigotry, discrimination, terrorism and extremism through various medium like websites, blogs, chat rooms, social media and gaming. In short, cyber hate is a comprehensive propaganda against humanity targeting hatred and intimidation using internet.

Unrestrained (!) opportunity for online hate

The question of whether the internet is a privilege is important for present time since it has become “an integral part of global connectivity” (Ahmed & George, 2016, p. 11). The internet is no longer a privilege rather a right in the current reality when people cannot think of living without connectivity (Ahmed & George). But, the communication highway remains unsafe or posing a great threat for people as extremists or hate mongers misuse it to spread their propaganda. Shaw (2012) compares the internet with a machine gun for extremist. Extremists have transformed the privilege of freedom of speech to freedom of hate (Titley, 2014).

Hate groups take advantage of technological progress as the internet empowers everyone to be a publisher, making “online propaganda almost impossible to track, control, and combat” (Foxman & Wolf, 2013, p. 10). Wider communication options—social media sites and other

virtual networks—of web 3.0² lead rapid flood of hate and bigotry on the internet which will increase with ever-evolving technological advancement. In a world where moral bases of people are deteriorating, hate mongers' repeated propaganda makes it normal and acceptable (Foxman & Wolf). Hate, ultimately, becomes part of strong worldwide movement rather than an isolated practice; provides its perpetrators almost free and unrestrained advertisement to create an illusion among millions of people (Brown, 2009; Stern, 1999).

Targets of hate groups are almost stable, but their propaganda mechanism saw an uplift because of technological advancement (Schafer, 2002). A treasure trove of hate documents are still available in the form of books, newspapers, newsletters, fliers, and radio programs (Stern, 1999). Extremist groups, now, rely more on internet as it is as a superior communication tool for spreading hate.

Early perpetrators of online hate

Millions of American households received the availability of internet in 1995, which was also the year of first hate website established (Almagor, 2014; Schafer, 2002). A Florida-based computer consultant Donald Black launched first extremist hate site—Stormfront (www.stormfront.org) in January, 1995 (Schafer, 2002; Stern, 1999). Stormfront has over 250,000 active members who read its plenty of resources, and maintain connections in various ways (Foxman & Wolf 2013). During the pre-internet era, extremists groups used to use bulletin

² Web 3.0 refers to the third generation of Internet-based services which also termed as the intelligent Web. 3.0 is famous for being the semantic web, microformats, natural language search, data-mining, machine learning, recommendation agents, and artificial intelligence technologies (Kershaw, 2013). The web emphasizes machine-facilitated understanding of information in order to provide a more productive and intuitive user experience. Web 3.0 will be more connected, open, and intelligent, with semantic web technologies, distributed databases, machine reasoning, and autonomous agents (Strickland, 2008).

board system³ to communicate among members, recruit new members, and spread hate (Coates, 1995; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997).

Since then, extremist groups' online presence has gradually been increasing with new and innovative forms. Within a short time period, almost all known and established hate organizations open their shop in the online arena and many new and young haters also entered the scene (Stern, 1999). Soon after Stormfront, Hammerskin Nation, the most violent and organized neo-Nazi skinhead group; the National Socialist Movement (NSM), the largest neo-Nazi group in the U.S.; the New Black Panther Party for Self Defense (NBPP), the largest organized anti-Semitic and racist black militant group in America—launched their online journey (Foxman & Wolf, 2013). Some of the hate groups included propaganda against black people, anti-immigrant, and anti-Muslim with their usual forms of extremist activities (Almagor, 2011). Shepherd, Harvey, Jordan, Srauy, & Miltner (2015) extends,

By the 2000s, diverse inflammatory groups began to emerge according with the Internet's spread as a mass medium, from sites like SomethingAwful to groups with campaigns like the Gay Niggers Association of America (which included some members who became famous for being trolls, such as Weev). (p. 2)

The other hate groups in general, who espouse various ideologies of hatred, are—anti-conspirators, anti-religious sites, anti-abortion, anti-liberal, anti-communist, and anti-feminist sites, anti-LGBT groups, holocaust denial groups, racist music labels, radical traditionalist

³ Bulletin board system (BBS) is a text-based online communities which facilitates users to log in over the Internet using dedicated software. The BBS predates the World Wide Web and was a popular application for Telnet users. The system was an early example of the Internet's ability to foster large online communities (Driscoll, 2016).

Catholic groups (Almagor, 2014; SPLC, 2016). However, among others, religious hate or extremist groups (or perpetrators take religion as guide) were active from very beginning.

Religious extremists in driving seat

Religious hate groups seldom directly use the name of religion in their propaganda mechanism; however, they take religion as a guide to justify their actions. Hate groups try to validate their activities by saying that their actions are in the name of their God. Almagor (2014) asserted, “People cannot base anything outside their ultimate commitment to their faith. After all, it is far better to trust the consistent and enlightened almighty who knows all than to trust reason of fallible humans” (p. 11). Moreover, hate groups pursue new members with messages consisting of—fear appeals, an emphasis on member benefits, and inoculation strategies (McNamee, Peterson & Peña, 2010). The strategies of most extremist groups are somehow mostly embedded in religious ideology. For example, through fear appeals, hate groups bring about religious obligations to invoke fear to people. McNamee et al., (2010) stated, “In tandem, these messages emphasize the fact that the group is venerated by God” (p. 276).

Based on Southern Poverty Law Center data, Hamilton (2014) describes that among the 939 hate groups, currently operating in the U.S., many of them are religiously driven. The extremist groups like ISIS, and al-Qaeda are based on religion (Islam). Goodenough (2016) quoting Pope Francis says, “There is always a small group of extremists in practically every religion. We have them too” (p. 1). Religious hate groups until 2001, were mostly anti-Semitic who geared up propaganda against Jew people. However, 9/11 and subsequent incidents brought massive conflict on the internet between Muslim, Christian and Jew people. According to SPLC (2017), “Anti-Muslim hate groups are a relatively new phenomenon in the United States, most of

them appearing in the aftermath of the World Trade Center terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001” (p. 1).

Internet informed the world about the emergence of al-Qaeda as terrorist organization, and Osama bin-Laden, the group’s supreme leader which was grooming since 1998 (Kimmage, 2010). Thomas (2003) says, “Evidence strongly suggests that terrorists used the internet to plan their operations for 9/11” (p. 112). Al-Qaeda, then ISIS, used the internet as a marketing tool in its propaganda activities, and recruitment strategies (Haves, 2015). Social media materials injected by Islamist groups are growing threats as those are enhancing self-radicalization (ADL, 2016).

Al-Qaeda, the pioneer of radicalization, followed three elements in its media strategy: content—came in the form of radical revolutionary ideology and spectacular terrorist attacks; conduit—was transformed media landscape e.g., satellite television news, internet; and context—the virulent resentment among Arab and West, and the U.S. response to that provocation (Kimmage, 2010). The As-Sahab Institute for Media Production was al-Qaeda’s virtual media production which was run solely on the internet maintaining forums, blogs, file-hosting blogs and distributed its message world-wide (Kimmage). Only in 2009, As-Sahab released about 70 original productions (Kimmage).

ISIS: Online hate

The blessings of web 3.0 enriched ISIS to threaten global humanity by its destructive missions. Being a lineage of al-Qaeda, ISIS adopted every strategy from its forerunner coupled with new and innovative ways of media use. ISIS became famous for its heinous atrocities those it circulated in the internet with video and graphical presentation. The organization has almost all types of internet tools and options like TOR (anonymity network), VPNs (virtual private

networks), and encryption, to recruit supporters while staying anonymous (Frenkel, 2016; Gross, 2016). The extremist group also uses spam email and other hacking options to collect information from their targeted people around the world (ADL, 2016; Fidler, 2015; Frenkel, 2016; Koerner, 2016).

Why does ISIS target young people? Global young population are not only targeted by ISIS alone but all other extremist groups prey on the young generation. Scholars say “acts of lone-wolf terrorism” (Weimann, 2012, p. 76) is the innovative and effective version of recruitment policy for extremist groups. Fanatics target the lone and isolated individual from society. Liang (2015) summarizes the experiences of Farah Pandith, a former U.S. Department of State representative, who traveled around 80 Muslim majority countries. Liang says, the 9/11 attacks and subsequent incidents, and media portrayals of Islam seriously affected young generation in those countries. They are uncertain of the status of their religion. In a state of cultural vacuum, many Muslim majority regions, under long colonial rule, and subsequent autocratic administrations in many countries led youths to question—what is modern Islam? What are the differences “between culture and religion? (Liang, p. 3). Moreover, the Arab spring of 2011 in some Middle-Eastern countries evoked the Muslim millennials against autocratic ruler and left them in a state of lack of proper guidance (Spencer, 2016; Wooden, 2013). Unemployment could be the other main reason for young Muslims committing to ISIS. But, why are millennials from Western countries migrating to Iraq and Syria? Analysts say the lone wolf theory is again applicable here. Extremist groups target the lone young millennials who spend most of their time in social media being lonely and depressed (Callimachi, 2015).

So, the literature suggests that extremist groups are utilizing technology to motivate, recruit, and attack their targets. With the increase of terrorism in last couple of decades, religious

extremist groups spread their messages online and the reflections are visible offline, too. In the recruitment endeavor, terrorist groups target the disillusioned, and lonely young people. However, the most important point is that terrorist groups have already acquired developed technological mechanisms to enhance their activities.

Understanding Extremism

The dynamics of present global socio-economic-political realities become “central to understanding the roots of religious extremism” (Zaoui, 2005, p. 1) due to the pervasiveness of its destructive activities, hate crime, terrorism, and panic among people. The historically old term, extremism, becomes synonymous to Islamic terrorist groups since the 9/11 attack by Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda. Subsequently, rightwing extremist ideology becomes the most dangerous domestic terrorism threat in the United States and most parts of the world (Atkins, 2004; Hale, 2012). The proliferation of violent extremism almost submerged the existence of other types of extremism, e.g. racial, religious, or political (Neumann, 2010).

Extremism is a complex phenomenon to define as it is far removed from ordinary activities that lead to severe forms of conflict (Coleman, & Bartoli, 2014). Extremism is a political term which determines those activities that are not morally, ideologically or politically in accordance with written (legal and constitutional) and non-written norms of a state. Moreover, these activities are fully intolerant toward others and reject democracy as a means of governance with rejecting existing social order (Pratt, 2010; Sotlar, 2004). Extremist activities include those such as--terrorism, racism, xenophobia, interethnic and interreligious hatred, left- or right-wing political radicalism and religious fundamentalism.

Coleman and Bartoli (2014) describe extremism as “...activities (beliefs, attitudes, feelings, actions, strategies) of a character far removed from the ordinary” (p. 2). Extremism is

usually a negative term even to its' perpetrators because any extremist movement or act will be regarded as "just and moral (pro-social freedom fighting)" while others will view the same tasks as "unjust and immoral (antisocial "terrorism") "depending on the observer's values, politics, moral scope, and the nature of their relationship with the actor" (Coleman, & Bartoli, P. 2). Sotlar (2004) describes extremism by focusing on three lexical points of view of "extreme:" (1) extreme as adjective denotes "beliefs and political parties which most people consider unreasonable and unacceptable", (2) extremism as noun stands for "political extremism (in term of extreme political opinions)", (3) extremist as noun can denote a "group of extremists (in term of people with extreme opinions)" while the adjective extremist can represent a group of people with "extremist tendencies." Extremism is an emotional outlet of sever feelings, which occasionally regarded as rational strategy in a game over power.

In line with above definition, extremism could be any political ideology opposing "a society's core values and principles" (Borum, 2011, p. 10). For instance, if we consider extremism in a liberal democratic context, it will advocate racial or religious supremacy and/or opposes the core principles of democracy and universal human rights (Borum). Further, when extremism becomes violent and creates panic from those with opposing interests and opinions, it may lead to terrorist actions (Hale, 2012). In other words, extremism is the precursor of terrorism; extremists who become violent and perpetrate atrocities toward nations, religions and people to fulfill their intention, always develop a noble argument to justify their acts (Martin, 2011). So, extremism is the revelation of a kind of behavior, verbally and physically, which crosses the general set of norms, rules, and roles in society, and which also creates panic and danger for that particular community as a whole.

Emergence of extremist ideology in a society is the consequence of several factors. Some extremists come from societies where people face adverse conditions such as poverty, inadequate access to healthcare, nutrition, education, and employment, a denial of basic human needs (for security, dignity, group identity, and political participation), unending experiences of humiliation, and an ever widening gap between what people believe they deserve and what they can attain (Coleman, & Bartoli, 2014). Three such extremist movements lasting several decades in the last century—Basque terrorist movement in Spain in 1950s, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in the United Kingdom in 1970s, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka in 1980s (Lynch III, 2015). Sometimes it is constructed by (1) political authorities, who take advantages of the adverse situations, and, (2) dominant groups that maintain power and resist demands for change over marginalized groups (Coleman, & Bartoli, 2014). So, here, extremism shows two faces—one is the extension of deprivations, and the other is domineering technique by the powerful authorities which groups in a society fuel to the extremism strengthening their domination. Going beyond the present religion-based extremism, the three examples, above, were durable and pernicious non-religious extremist groups of the past half-century who fought after being marginalized by their respective government (Lynch III, 2015). For example, the LTTE extremism claimed around 80,000 lives in 35 years before ending within 2006 by massive action from the government (Layton, 2015). Extremism sometimes emerges from apocalyptic, eschatological ideologies (Coleman, & Bartoli, 2014) which are prevalent in the contemporary world. The present much-talked about term “jihad” is the perfect example of apocalyptic extremism/terrorism (Ruff, Sandole, & Vasili, 2004).

Types of extremism

Extremism could be distinguished by various forms—some extremist groups emerge for religious purposes like ISIS and al-Qaeda. Some groups support racial separatism like the Ku Klux Klan. Other extremist groups are far-right sympathizers to Nazi ideologies and are heavily racist, Islamophobic, or Anti-Semitic, preaching intolerant views in the society, repatriation to non-white and Muslim migrants believing that they should be sent back to their homeland. Striegher (2015) divides the discussion of ideological extremism into three categories—race, religion, and issue-oriented ideology.

Roger Darlington's World (2013), a UK based online group, lists around 13 categories of extremist groups⁴ those are active in online and offline environment for spreading hate and terror in society. Extremist groups could be categorized based on their overarching motives too. For instance, separatist group who wants to detach from existing political, geographical, or religious boundary (Terrorism Research, 2017). Sri Lanka's LTTE was one of such groups. Extremist (terrorist) groups could be motivated from ethnocentric (KKK), nationalistic (PIRA) and revolutionary (Colombian Marxist-Leninist group FARC) point of views. It could also be from political (Philippines based Islamic group Abu Sayyaf), religious (ISIS, al-Qaeda), social (U.K. based Environmental Liberation Front-ELF), domestic (Argentinean death squads) and international/transnational perspectives (ISIS) (Terrorism Research, 2017).

⁴ Roger Darlington's World (2013), a UK based online group, listed around 13 categories of extremist groups, who are active both online and offline settings: (1) political extremism; (2) white supremacy; (3) holocaust denial; (4) religious cults; (5) Islamist militancy; (6) anti-homosexuality; (7) anti-abortionist(sm); (8) pro-anorexia/bulimia; (9) animal liberation; (10) sports hooliganism; (11) weapon-making information; (12) suicide assistance; (13) schlock sites (RDW, 2013).

Atkins (2004) provides details of around 290 notorious extremists and extremists' organizations around the world who are famous for their violent histories, hate crimes, and terrorism. Atkins focuses on the notoriety of extremists based on ideology, religion, region, and race; where religion based extremism is the second largest groups, followed by economic and social extremism practiced by Earth First! Similarly, Atkins lists around 275 homegrown

Race Ideology	Religious Ideology	Issue-oriented Ideology
Black Separatists	Christian Identity	Anti-government
New Black Panther Party	Aryan Nations	Anti-abortion
Ku Klux Klan	The Creativity Movement	Environmentalists
Neo-Confederates	Muslim Identity	
Neo-Nazis	Jewish Defense League	
White Power Skinheads	Aum Shinrikyo	
White Nationalists		

extremists and extremists' group in the U.S. from political (Philippines based Islamic group Abu Sayyaf), religious (ISIS, al-Qaeda), social (U.K. based Environmental Liberation Front-ELF), domestic (Argentinean death squads) and international/transnational perspectives (ISIS) (Terrorism Research, 2017).

History of extremism/violent extremism

Among all, religion and race-based extremist groups are widely active, and brutal in the present society. Radical Islamic extremist groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda engage brutal and destructive activities based on religious extremism. For example, KKK is one of such groups. The white supremacist group, infamous for horrific violence and atrocities, was formed in 1865 in Pulaski, Tennessee (Smith, Christopher, & Warner, 2011) which is "responsible for literally hundreds of lynching and killings" (Smith, Christopher, & Warner, p. 652). The extremist group

is still active with various splinter groups. Analysts fear that the KKK has been rising again especially centering the last presidential election, and dreaming as opportunity of involving political trend (Addley, 2016; AP, 2016; Musumeci, 2016). It gets clearer when KKK organized victory parade, and procession after Donald Trump's electing as the President of the U.S (Lavender, 2016; Levy, 2016).

Neo-Nazi is another right-wing extremist group which emerged during post-World War II social and political perspectives. The group shares a hatred for Jews and a love for Adolf Hitler and his ideology (SPLC, 2017). Moreover, the group and other subgroups who belong the same ideology also hate other minority people in the society like gays and lesbians, even Christians and Jews. Islamic extremist groups came to light during the last two decades while white supremacist groups are active from long ago.

However, extremism crosses its own boundary when violence becomes a predominant feature of activities (Mahan & Griset, 2013; Southers, 2013; Striegher, 2015). According to Striegher (2015), violent extremism (VE) is "an ideology that accepts the use of violence for the pursuit of goals that are generally social, racial, religious and/or political in nature" (p. 79). The history of VE based on race, religion and power has a long history (Cronin, 2003). The first reported incident of VE/terrorism happened in the first century BCE by a Jewish terrorist group named the Zealots-Sicarii which was active against Roman rule in Judea, the modern name of the mountainous southern part of Palestine (Chaliand & Blin, 2007; Cronin, 2003; Nassar, 2010). The group murdered their targets with daggers in broad daylight in Jerusalem (Cronin). Chaliand & Blin (2007) mentions that the Zealots had two types of objectives—first, as a religious organization, it tried to impose, often by force, religious practices even on the other Jews groups. Second, being a political organization, the perpetrators were active to gain their country's

independence from Rome. Chaliand & Blin says, “The party’s religious aims were inseparable from its political objectives” (p. 57). Cronin (2003) mentions the “Hindu Thugs” and the Muslim Assassins were also involved in early terrorism. The rise of Muslim assassins occurred in the second century BCE who were rooted in Iran and Syria.

However, the origin of modern VE/terrorism is connected to the French Revolution (Chaliand & Blin, 2007; Cronin, 2003; Nassar, 2010; Ruff, Sandole, & Vasili, 2004). Cronin stated the French republic government used the term “terror” in 1795 against revolutionaries to protect its power. Cronin further added that the modern terrorism is also a dynamic concept which maintains a political and historical context. Chaliand & Blin asserted that terrorism has a direct link to current social, economic, and political structure of a society, and terrorist groups, in most cases, express their ideological strength by spreading violence and terror. The huge rise of Islamic terrorism occurred, as Chaliand & Blin describe, “In Iran, in 1979, [when] radical Islamism burst onto the scene in its Shi’ite incarnation. That same year, the war in Afghanistan—with the help of the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan—abetted the rise of radical Sunni Islamism” (p.10).

Many say that the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 in the US was a response to Western domination over rest of the world, a capitalist economic system, and western imperialism. Chaliand & Blin state it is a fallacious idea that eradicating the discrimination will solve terrorist crises—rather it is connected to its “European roots in the ideological context of modern political doctrines— anarchism, Marxism, nihilism, fascism—that all challenge the “bourgeois” order embodied today in capitalism and globalization” (p. 78). According to Lindsey, Greenberg, & Daalder (2003), the 9/11 attack was a signal to the end of the age of geopolitics and the advent of global politics which challenged U.S. policymakers who shun the

thinking of unrivaled world power. Nabudere (2004) said, the 9/11 event tested the global power relations severely and it becomes clear that the world has “irrevocably changed with those events” (p. 1).

In line with French Revolution, terrorist activities have been going on in the name of colonization, decolonization, globalization, and anti-globalization by different perpetrators of different names. Cronin (2003) said whatever political or ideological goals nurtured by the global terrorist organizations, all fight against— (1) empires, (2), colonial powers, and (3), the U.S. led international system marked by globalization. In the continuous process of global terrorism against colonialism, the World War I was the big event of life and asset destructions which necessitated the World War II. The subsequent Cold War between the U.S. and Soviet Union also is worth mentioning here as it has connection with present ripe of international terrorism.

After 9/11 attack, the U.S. became involved in a war on terror against al-Qaeda and sent troops to Afghanistan and a number of other countries which “ushered in a new era for world politics” (Nassar, 2010, p. 17). Scholars defined this change differently—some say it as “American Century”, while others named it as “Clash of Civilizations,” (Nassar, p. 17). The history of al-Qaeda and then, ISIS has a significant connection with defeating communism, and former Soviet Union. During that time, the U.S. was the ally of al-Qaeda. So, focusing on the historical context of some terrorist groups will provide a good idea about present phenomenon of global terrorism.

With the historical perspective of extremism or violent extremism, in the present world see the hybridization of various groups who are emerged as a threat to mankind. People, now, on the one hand are panicked, wary of Islamic terrorism; on the other hand, hundreds of other extremist groups are emerging around the world. For example, in the current climate, we see the

revival of KKK, Neo-Nazi and widely anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim, and xenophobic groups. Middle-Eastern refugees in Germany faced 222 attacks from different extremist groups in 2015 (Koehler, 2016). Similarly, the SPLC reported an increase hate and extremist cases 10 days after the November 8th U.S. election of President Donald Trump (Yan, Sgueglia, and Walker, 2016). Similarly, the rise or revival of extremism could be a response to the world-wide Islamic terrorism or they inspired by destructive activities of ISIS.

The ISIS and al-Qaeda, though, are brutal in their destructive activities, many compare the groups with KKK and Hitler's Nazi Germany. In terms of religious and ethnocentric belief, both ISIS and KKK "sanctimoniously cite a religious basis for their barbaric acts" (Freudberg, 2014, p. 2). Wilstein (2015) mentioned citing former National Basketball Association (NBA) star Kareem Abdul-Jabbar that ISIS is same as KKK—they claim as Christian Knight; however, they don't practice Christianity. According to Naipaulin (2015), ISIS is "comparable to Adolf Hitler's regime in its fanaticism and barbarity" (p. 1). However, some oppose the idea as the major victims of ISIS atrocities is its own religious people. It is true that ISIS is comprised of Muslims, but, the main victim of the terrorist group is its counterparts (Obeidallah, 2015). Besides, the Nazi was a sovereign entity and ISIS is not. Whatever the similarities and dissimilarities are, ISIS is distinct as it materializes the blessings of technological advancements in its worldwide recruitments, arms and ammunitions. But, how does such extremist group emerge? I will now focus on ISIS birth and emergence in Middle-East.

ISIS: A face of massive radicalization

After the fall of Soviet Union (USSR) in 1989, the ideological extremism, more specifically Islamic extremism, gained momentum replacing nationalist or leftist revolutionary movements. Radical Islamic groups were organizing separately and strengthening their

foundations, mainly in the Middle-Eastern countries in the last couple of centuries. The September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center and some other U.S. institutions was the biggest revelation of a new form of violent extremism in the jihad era (Cronin, 2003), which killed around 3,000 civilians (CNN, 2016; DiGrande, Neria, Brackbill, Pulliam, & Galea, 2010; Lichtenstein, 2011; Miles, 2008; Moyers, 2007; Ridley, 2012; Walters, 2016). Analysts say that the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan (Cronin, p. 38) enticed extremist groups to become more aggressive and brutal.

The two incidents—the Iranian Revolution and Soviet defeat—bolstered the extremists’ dream to establish their so-called sovereign Islamic country. Al-Qaeda played the role as a protagonist in the process of terrorist hybridization in the last several decades, and now, the Islamic State (IS) or ISIS proves itself as a formidable force. According to McCants (2015), al-Qaeda leaders dreamed “to build popular Muslim support before declaring the caliphate” (p. 7), or an Islamic state. However, the ISIS “wanted to impose a caliphate regardless of what the masses thought” (p. 7).

The dimensions of al-Qaeda and ISIS’s brutality demand to look back the roots and origins of the organizations because the terrorist groups are not an overnight creation of any authority rather they have a long bloody roots and routes. Among the two main sects—Sunni and Shi’ite—of Muslim, the terrorists are the part of Sunni ideology who are known as Salafi Muslim. However, all Sunni followers are not Salafi and all Salafies are not extremist. The fight between “Sunni reformers and the traditional Sunni clerical establishment” over purification of Islam from corrupted Muslim especially the rulers in the Middle-Eastern countries led to the rise of extremist group like al-Qaeda (Henzel, 2005, p. 70). The terrorist groups—ISIS and al-Qaeda—are the lineage of that more revolutionary Salafi ideologists. After the first wave of

jihadism in 1990s, large number of terrorists, as Gerges (2014) contend, “traveled to Afghanistan to fight the Soviet occupation, a cause that launched the second jihadist wave” (p. 341), and Osama bin Laden emerged as the supreme leader.

Al-Qaeda: Early perpetrators of international Islamic terrorism

The huge public exposure of al-Qaeda, occurred during the time of Soviet Union’s invasion to Afghanistan. The Soviet Union’s, or then the USSR, invasion of Afghanistan raised tensions among other Muslim countries. The Saudi Arabians, mainly, were thinking that the Soviet Union could be a big threat for the Muslim world. Osama bin Laden, who was a wealthy Saudi national, became so angry at the Soviet Union that he started a movement to defeat them (Thuraisingham, 2010). Since 1979, bin Laden had been working to form al-Qaeda, which was formally established in 1988 (Thuraisingham). Bin Laden, then, participated in Afghan-Soviet war. Bin Laden returned back to Saudi Arabia after the defeat of USSR in 1989 (Kassimyar, 2009).

However, in August 1990, Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait created international pandemonium (Davis, 2007) which increased pressure on Saudi monarch and its allies fearing that if the Iraqi dictator survives in his move, he would get encouraged to attack other countries too. At this point, both the U.S. and bin Laden offered Saudi Arabia help defeat Saddam Hussein. But, the Saudi government responded to the U.S. offer by rejecting bin Laden which infuriated and instigated him to attack both the U.S. and Saudi troops. As a result, bin Laden lost his Saudi citizenship in 1994 (Thuraisingham, 2010). Consequently, bin Laden moved to Sudan and lived there until 1996 before the Sudanese government rejecting him from their country as the al-Qaeda attacked on the U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia.

Bin Laden, then, joined with Taliban, another regional terrorist group in a lawless Afghanistan and masterminded several plots including the September 11, 2001 attack. According to Mapping Militant Organizations project by Stanford University (2015), the CIA and Saudi Arabia funneled financial assistance to militant (mujahideen) groups through Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) throughout the Soviet occupation, even though both al-Qaeda and CIA officials denied that. Katzman (2016) citing the State Department extends, "A total of about \$3 billion in economic and covert military assistance was provided by the United States to the Afghan mujahedin from 1980 until the end of the Soviet occupation in 1989" (p. 3).

On October 7, 2001, within a month of 9/11 incident, the U.S. forces started attack on Taliban-controlled Afghanistan with an intense bombing campaign by allied forces (Katzman, 2016). Katzman says, "After the September 11 attacks, Bush Administration decided to militarily overthrow the Taliban when it refused a U.S. demand to extradite bin Laden" (p. 7). In the face of joint attacks, the Taliban conceded defeat by November 22, 2001 (Daalder, 2015). Al-Qaeda, then moved to Iraq after the U.S. led forces defeated Saddam Hussein in 2003. However, bin Laden went hiding after fall of Afghanistan and Iraq who was defeated by U.S. Special Forces in Abbottabad, Pakistan on May 2, 2011 (CNN, 2016; Katzman, 2016; NBC, 2011).

ISIS: A progeny of Al-Qaeda with extreme savagery

The terrorist group ISIS, which "has seized a chunk of land stretching from northern Syria to central Iraq, has struck fear into the hearts of leaders around the world" (Thompson, Greene & Torre, 2014, p. 1). The group, also known as the Islamic State in Iraq, and the Levant (ISIL) and Islamic State (IS), which aims to create an Islamic state called a caliphate across Iraq, Syria and beyond (Sanchez, 2015).

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the founder of ISIS joined the fight against the U.S. forces in Afghanistan in 2001. However, after the fall of Taliban in Afghanistan, al-Zarqawi with one of his fellows fled from the battleground and decided to hide in Iraq as the U.S. forces were preparing to invade the country. Al-Zarqawi, “a hotheaded Jordanian street-tough-turned-jihadist” was nurturing his long cherished goal of establishing an Islamic state and drew a picture of the post-Saddam Hussein war-torn Iraq as his dream land (McCants, 2015, p. 9). Just weeks later of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, as Warrick (2015) said,

The newly famous and well-funded terrorist gained a battle-ground and a cause and soon thousands of followers. Over three tumultuous years, he intentionally pushed Iraq to the brink of sectarian war by unleashing wave after wave of savage attacks on Shi’ite civilians. (p. 7)

Al-Zarqawi’s “intimate terrorism”⁵ panicked millions of people around the world due to the proliferation of internet where he sent the horrific and brutal activities through audio visual media (2015, p. 7).

The nomenclature of the terrorist organization saw various transformations since its creation in 2004. The organization, at the beginning, was a splinter of al-Qaeda (Wood, 2015). However, after al-Zarqawi’s death by a U.S. attack in June 2006, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, Zarqawi’s successor, announced the creation of the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) (Fisher, 2015; McCants, 2015; Sanchez, 2015). In the subsequent years, ISI was strengthened and included Syria in its territory after seizing a vast land of battle-torn Syria, and changed the name as

⁵ Intimate Terrorism: “The beheading of individual hostages, captured on video and sent around the world, using the internet’s new power to broadcast directly into people’s homes.” (Warrick, 2015).

Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2013 (Wofford, 2014). But, the U.S. and the United Nations officials, and some news organizations refer to the jihadist group by the acronym ISIL, which stands for Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Sanchez, 2015). The 'L' stands for Levant which is an English translation of "al-Sham" that denotes the geographical area larger than Syria. The other lesser known name of the organization is DAIISH: "The straight Arabic shorthand for the group known as: al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi Iraq wa al-Sham, commonly used in the Arab world and among many Arab media outlets and politicians" (Sanchez, 2015, p. 3).

Though ISIS was created from al-Qaeda, it shunned its predecessor in early 2014 and became more brutal and rampant in its territory and other parts of the world (Thompson, Greene & Torre, 2014). McCants (2015) said, "The new caliphate was expansive and flush with weapons and cash, reportedly in the billions" (p. 1). After al-Zarqawi's death, "self-styled caliph" al-Baghdadi becomes the head and supreme leader of ISIS who is advised by the Councils and governors body. The geographical area of ISIS "stretched from Mosul to the outskirts of Aleppo in Syria, the distance from Washington, DC to Cleveland, Ohio" (McCants, 2015, p. 1).

Thompson, Greene & Torre (2014) reported that ISIS controls "more than half of Syria's oil assets—along with a number of oil fields in Iraq, which earns up \$3 million each day" (p. 2). In terms of fighting force, ISIS has around 30,000 fighters (Gerges, 2014), a majority of them have traveled from larger Muslim majority countries. However, people from non-Muslim majority countries like Finland, Ireland and Australia also joined the ISIS.

Sanchez et al. (2016) state that ISIS inspired, since declaring of the caliphate in mid-2014, at least 90 terrorist attacks in 21 countries other than Iraq and Syria. They further asserted that those attacks killed at least 1,390 people and injured more than 2,000 others who were

mostly innocent individuals. Beyond natural conflict with Shi'ite community, ISIS mainly divided its target population into two—the far enemy and near enemy. Al-Qaeda's jihadist strategy was against the far enemy, the U.S. and its European allies; however, ISIS prioritized the fight against the Shi'ite and “the near enemy, the Iraqi and Syrian regimes, as well as all secular, pro-Western regimes in the Muslim world” (Gerges, 2014, p. 340). Gerges stated that al-Baghdadi has a genocidal worldview like Zarqawi, which is the Shi'ites “are infidels—a fifth column in the heart of Islam that must either convert or be exterminated,” (p. 340). ISIS bears the same beliefs about the secular Muslim worlds. However, ISIS's recent attacks in 2015 in France and in 2016 in Bangladesh, which killed around 150 people, proves that it has targeted both near and far enemies⁶.

The ISIS is very much known as terrorist group; however, it becomes synonymous with the spreading of fear, hate, extremism, and brutality. Gerges (2014) stated that the terrorist group's atrocities like viciousness, carrying out massacres, beheadings “might seem senseless, but for ISIS, it appears to be a rational choice, intended to terrorize its enemies and to impress potential recruits” (p. 340). The ISIS caliph al-Baghdadi, a doctorate in Islamic culture and history, seldom care about others' opinions in terms of terrorist activities which “alienated senior radical preachers who have publicly disowned it” (p. 342).

The extremist group's activities faced a massive setback in recent months in Iraq and Syria “as local forces, backed by a U.S. led coalition, ousted Islamic State fighters from much of the territory they controlled” (Laub, 2016, p. 1). The apparently decaying power of ISIS in its birthplace, in no doubt, invokes hope of eradication of the terrorist organization. However, the

⁶ Gerges (2014) divides the targets of ISIS as Far and Near Enemy. Gerges said, ISIS's central priority is the fight against the “far enemy”—America and its European allies. Near enemy—the Iraqi and Syrian regimes, as well as all secular, pro-Western regimes in the Muslim world.

global spread of their ideological motives, still remains as a threat. In recent attacks in Germany and Turkey, 12 and 39 people respectively were killed (Eddy, & Smale, 2016; Mccallister, 2017; McKirdy, Yan & Lee, 2017; Simon, Ellis & Pleitgen, 2016) corroborate the apprehension. The second, threat of ISIS is its recruitment propaganda among global Muslim youths. As Withnall & Romero (2015) said,

A quarter of the planet is Muslim. That's 1.6 billion people, 62 percent of that number is under the age of 30. So, that matters to us and we need to understand that the threat is not just ISIS but the demographic that is being affected, and the virtual armies that will be around long after ISIS is gone. (p. 7)

ISIS's recruiters target the youth and brainwash them to its hate and extremist ideology. The problem-torn world environment with mass unemployment, lack of proper cultural strategy and absence of adequate government scheme, directly or indirectly, facilitate the ISIS recruiters to prey the youths. I now, want to start a discussion on ideology emphasizing on hate and extremism. This part of research is a theoretical analysis of ideology as well.

Ideology

What does ideology mean? A direct and simple answer to the question is difficult with its multiple and shifting meanings over time (Freeden, 2006; Martin, 2015). Some scholars describe ideology as dogmatic, while others defined it from the view of political sophistication. Some even define it as dominant modes of thought, while others describe it from the view of those alienated by status quo (Gerring, 1997). Ideology is a value-laden and completely political term (Freeden, 2006). It has differences and disagreement center on language use, context, and historical events. Whatever the definition, understanding the functions of ideology is still central to the social science discourse and research (Gerring, 1997).

In many cases, theorists try to follow two to seven criteria in highlighting the functions of ideology. Hamilton (1987) extends,

It may be that theorists are unable to agree upon the best terminology with which to describe a reality, the fundamental characteristics and categories of which are not in dispute. Or, it may be that the disagreement is about how reality itself is to be categorized. (p. 18)

The term was coined by Destutt de Tracy, a French philosopher, during the French Revolution. Tracy described the meaning of ideology from etymological point of view (idea and logos) and studied of how ideas are formed (Skirbekk, 2005). But, the meaning of the term evolved over time with changing socio-political realities. According to Mullins (1972) ideology is,

A logically coherent system of symbols which, within a more or less sophisticated conception of history, links the cognitive and evaluative perception of one's social condition-especially its prospects for the future-to a program of collective action for the maintenance, alteration or transformation of society. (p. 510)

So, ideology here, is a logical system which offers programs for social maintenance or transformation or both. Similarly, Hamilton (1987) defines,

An ideology is a system of collectively held normative and reputedly factual ideas and beliefs and attitudes advocating a particular pattern of social relationships and arrangements, and/or aimed at justifying a particular pattern of conduct, which its proponents seek to promote, realize, pursue or maintain. (p. 38)

According to Hamilton, ideology is nothing but collective normative ideas, beliefs and attitudes that advocates a certain type of social order which try to justify, establish and maintain it.

However, I will now expand on the discussion of ideology mainly from theoretical point of view. In the theoretical study of ideology, some refer to belief systems of any individual or group, while others are concerned with linguistic, cultural production and social practices (Balkin, 1998). Among all, Marx and Engels' approach of ideology got the most scholarly attention and was interpreted from diverge perspectives (Parekh, 1982). Marx first used the term in his "German Ideology" denoting as a false consciousness of proletarians (working class) which impedes to gain their legitimate material reality and get exploited by bourgeois (owner of the means of production; simply say industrialist) (Czolacz, 2017; McCarney, 2005). Some discussed the Marxist view from classical approach—which means, experience and practical activities are key to production of knowledge (Martin, 2015). It distorts or denies the real conditions by ideology (Sholle, 1988). Some, however, analyze it from classical functionalist perspective (Balkin, 1998). Marx and Engels conceptualize ideology a specific form of thought which serves the interest of various classes (Balkin; Parekh, 1982). Moreover, Martin (2015) extends that Marx and Engels use the term to describe "the most abstract conceptions that populate an imaginary world of ideas independent of material life" (p. 10). Some scholars see ideology as totalitarian seduction and a collective model of ideas denoting that single truth concealing the reality, and drive for justification of it (Freedon, 2006). After Marx, Lenin extend the ideological discussion. Lenin, however, uses it from neutral connotation saying that "ideology must be understood as the political consciousness of a given group of people, most especially that of an economic and social class" (p. 3).

The Frankfurt School scholars developed the second stage of Marxist ideological discussion (Stoddart, 2007). Theorists like Walter Benjamin, Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse, directed the concept from material approach to cultural explanation

(Sholle, 1988; Stoddart, 2007). The concept and character of dominant class changed a little bit in this period. However, the less privileged class was still subordinated, and the Marx's prediction of revolution did not see light (Stoddart, 2007). By reexamining ideological superstructure, these theorists discovered a new-styled power practice which ensured domination less or without any risk from dominated class. Technological development, and new cultural productions like movies, music, radio broadcasts and books, infiltrated tremendously among greater population (Stoddart). Horkheimer and Adorno (1944) defined, in their media theory, the domination process shifting from proletariat and bourgeois to mass culture and masses (Fischer, 2009; Garlitz, 2005). Thus, Adorno and Horkheimer contend that the uniformity of mass cultural productions—television, film, radio—diffuses a unique type of cultural ideology which people have no alternative but to accept (Czolacz, 2017; Fischer, 2009; Garlitz, 2005). According to media theory, ideology of mass culture is not the choice of consumer rather than the media owner. Masses have no control and no alternative without consuming the cultural production. In this process, media owners adopt the mass culture and transform it how they want.

Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci put another fundamental explanation of ideology through the notion of *hegemony*, which is a distinction between coercion and consent (Stoddart). Gramsci explains—firstly, power of ideology stems from consent rather than use of force by ruling class in a new cultural and social reality (Brooker, 2003). Moreover, the hegemonic power convinces people to “subscribe to the social values and norms of an inherently exploitative system (Stoddart, 2007, p. 201). Gramsci's second idea is common sense, which fundamentally, changed the Marxist ideological definition, as working class takes the domination as normal and does not see any confrontation with ruling class.

Whereas, structural Marxism emphasized on empirical base and active human agents of ideology who implement it (Sholle, 1988). Structural theorists disagree with cultural approach (experience and agency) of ideology, and suggest that domination rather derives from textuality as a practice which produces experience. Louis Althusser extends that “texts are not made by subjects (agents); instead subjects are made by texts” (Sholle, p. 22). Althusser argues that people’s cultural experiences derive from ruling class’s textuality of domination. He articulates the concept by two types mechanisms or apparatuses—a) repressive state apparatuses (RSAs) and b) ideological state apparatuses (ISAs)—for maintaining dominance (Brooker, 2003). According to Althusser, RSAs are the domination forces of ruling class those have explicit agendas to exert control, for example, the army or police. Besides, ISAs are semi-independent agents of a state, like the media, educational institutions, the family who do not directly exert control, but, work as a representative to disseminate ideology among masses.

Cultural thinker Stuart Hall includes both concepts into his theory from the idea that “ideology stems from the notion that all signs are polysemic and that nothing has an intrinsic or inherent meaning” (Mudambi, 2012, p. 25). Hall argues social discourses are the archetypal tools which depend on ideological implications for their meanings (Hall, 1988). Thus, ideological discussion now turned into post-structural stage: “a mode of thinking that succeeded structuralism” (Littlejohn & Foss, 2009, p. 2) which is complex and entails many-sided discussions. As Freedman (2006) argues, post-structuralists, many of whom have come to the subject of ideology from the breeding grounds of discourse as power on the one hand, and the weaving of reality-screening social imaginaries on the other, are intriguingly suspended between interpretative and normative critique. On the other hand, Michel Foucault (1978) rejects the notion of ideology due to complexity and vagueness in its definition rather takes discourse as the

key theme of his discussion. A Nietzschean thinker, Foucault defines discourse as the central to power practice in society. Foucault argues power is everywhere and discourse is the main source of power. Power mainly functions, as Foucault extends, within and through discourse to structure of knowledge and establish a regime of truth (Mudambi, 2012).

However, contemporary critics, though, on the one hand, abandon the concept of ideology replacing discourse or power/knowledge in favor of Foucault; on the other hand, they prone to go back to Lenin's or Gramsci's more complicated notion of the term (Littlejohn & Foss, 2009). Slavoj Zizek, for example, recently defended the usefulness of ideology for scholarship by providing a Leninist interpretation. Zizek argues that an ideology can be known only when it contrasts with another competing belief systems. Ideology to Zizek, "not merely a set of beliefs, but instead a set of institutionalized practices founded on beliefs which the subject may or may not actually hold" (Czolacz, 2017, p. 4).

So, the concept of ideology, according to present-day thinkers, necessitates a conflict between two competing practices of beliefs, values, and attitudes; and the proponents of it may or may not truly embrace that notions. Similarly, as ideological practices are somehow confrontational, incorporates competing elements in its system, it obviates some sorts of debate too. One group or individuals tend to compete with others to establish the superiority of his or her ideology and this competition obligates the practice of hate.

Ideology of Hate

How does ideology incite hate? How is hate integral to ideological underpinnings? One can easily get the classification of ideological groups based on their violent and non-violent characteristics; but, there is no division based on hate and non-hate philosophy (Mumford et al, 2008). Mumford et al. blame mainly the leadership characteristics of an organization to

determine its violent or non-violent ideology, while “narcissism, a sense of superiority, and feelings of pride have been linked to the propensity of leaders to induce violence” (p. 1525).

So, does it mean that hate is integral to ideology? Mullins’s (1972) critique of ideology above, signals the necessity of hate, but not universally, to achieve its goals. Similarly, Hamilton (1987) and others’ ideas support that ideology has somehow inherent connection to practices of hate. Moreover, hate ideology inspired by race, ethnicity, gender, age, and sexual orientation has been central parts of our socio-cultural and political identity (George & Wilcox, 1996; Schafer, 2002).

Similarly, ideological groups maintain specific goals and strive to achieve certain objectives. Ideological leaders design their beliefs, values, and practices based on their thinking and their philosophy is inherently right and acceptable to its members (Blau, 1964; Thompson & Bunderson, 2003). Moreover, ideological groups are usually rigid about their beliefs and values to ensure their unique status in society. They become frustrated when they fail to meet their goals and lead to more severity (Murray & Cowden, 1999). From classical to post-structuralism, scholars discuss how dominant groups in society indirectly nurture hate to secure power over marginalized groups. However, the revelation of hate does not come to surface unless competing ideological groups acquire some sorts of power and try to establish superiority over one another, or those perceived threat to them.

Though hate ideology is an old notion, the term has become clichéd in the last couple of decades (Petrosino, 1999). The present-day saturation of global hate makes the term connected to people’s everyday activities. Niza Yanay (2009), author of the book “*The Ideology of Hatred: The Psychic Power of Discourse*” describes how hate ideology is pervasive and revived as a powerful practice in contemporary times. In an interview with Neve Gordon, Yanay (2012)

states that in the post 9/11 society, people use the word *hate* in the context of terrorism, specifically to refer Islamic groups who idealize West as an enemy. As Yanay recalls, President Bush used rhetoric that separated the world between Muslims who hate, and the Westerns who are targets of their hatred. The clear divisions between hatred as an experience and hatred as ideology obviate new enquiries on the relationship between politics and hatred. Because President Bush generalized all Muslims and divided into two polarizations of power practice to attest his political ideology. This new situation requires attention to power relations between other groups as well, like colonizer and colonized, ruler and subject (Yanay). This competing power relations transform to terrorism when a group tend to compete with others to establish the superiority. Yanay, an Israeli thinker, extends that when people from her society were asked about Palestinians or Arabs in general, they spoke with hatred, though, they might have not meet any person of those countries. Yanay identifies this attitude as a national ideology of hatred. To describe ideology as work, Yanay talks about suicide bombing which people identify as hate crime; however, very few people see airstrikes on populated areas as crime.

Ideology of Extremism

Hate ideology transforms to extremism when a group of people strives to establish superiority over others and spread its hate ideology to public by attacking others or carrying out any criminal activity. Extremism generally is going beyond the fundamental norms and values of a society like democracy, rule of law, individual liberty, and tolerance to different faiths and beliefs. Likewise, extremism could be a political ideology opposing core values and principles of a particular society (Borum, 2011). For example, if we consider extremism in a liberal democratic context in general, it advocates racial or religious supremacy and/or opposes the core principles of democracy and universal human rights (Borum). Further, when extremism becomes

violent and creates panic to opposing interests, it may lead to terrorist actions (Hale, 2012). In other words, extremism is the precursor of terrorism. Extremists who become violent and perpetrate atrocities toward people to fulfill their intention, always develop a noble argument to justify their acts (Martin, 2011). Therefore, extremism is the revelation of a kind of behavior, verbally and physically, which crosses the general set of principles of a society.

But, how does the ideology of extremism work? First, extremist ideology might expose or authorize, legitimize or necessitate violent actions. Sometimes, it highlights compelling but fictitious narratives of politics and history. Second, extremist groups directly and persuasively articulate their ideology to influence followers. Furthermore, identity crisis of individuals or ambiguity about belonging leads to extremism (Haynes, 2015; Raffie, 2015). This uncertainty ranges from personal issues to experiences of racism, discrimination, deprivation and being the victim of perpetrators. A broad range of perceived grievances, whether is real, fake, or imagined, could lead to extremist ideology as well (South Tyneside Council, 2015). Extremist groups are the outcome of any of those situations. Ideological campaigns can change its character depending on situations (Schafer, 2002; SPLC, 2017; Zenko, 2015). All groups follow and take lessons from their predecessors irrespective of their ideological stance.

Likewise, Chertoff (2008) accuses twentieth-century's Western totalitarianism on the rise of present-day extremist ideology. Chertoff points to four indicators connecting today's extremists and their intellectual cousins of 20th century who advanced totalitarian ideologies such as communism and fascism. The first indicator is the language used by extremist leaders significantly mimics the radical rhetoric of the last century. For instance, Western leaders used terms like vanguard, revolution, imperialist, capitalist, colonialist, reactionary, and establishment to describe others. Extremist ideologues now use the same words to address the West as Chertoff

mentions in describing bin Laden's speech. The second indicator is that extremists follow the legacy of revolutionary Marxism and fascism ideologies of the last century to carry out indiscriminate violence. The third indicator is celebration of death. Chertoff says it was a particularly striking feature of Western totalitarian movements in the last couple of centuries from the French Revolution to Marxism, Fascism, and Hitler's Holocaust movement. For example, Chertoff quoted bin Laden who compared his own ideology with the U.S. after 9/11, "We love death. The U.S. loves life. That is the difference between us two" (p. 13). The last and fourth indicator is that the present-day radical extremism borrowed from "revolutionary Western ideology is the complete elevation of rule of the "ideologically correct" man above rule of law" (p. 14). Chertoff extends that this idea succeeds all rules even the democracy and/or traditional religious beliefs.

In conclusion, the discussion suggests that ideology from its early explanations was a vague concept serving the ideas of the dominant group. The concept changed over time but the characteristics of domination and power relations remain almost same. Moreover, no approach offers any hope for marginalized group but concedes to the subjugation of the dominant except in Foucault's discourse of resistance. However, the present rise of extremism supports Zizek's argument that an ideology can be known only when it contrasts with another competing ideology. Zizek extends that ideology is not simply a set of beliefs, but a set of established practices. Thus, the competitive and confrontational ideological practices between groups obligate the practice of hate, which lead to extremism in its final stage. The notion is well-matched with my study if we connect the present ISIS's violent extremism to its 18th century founder fathers hate ideology. Salafists introduced hate campaign against West which spread over times and gained power before coming out light with violent extremism. ISIS perceives

Western ideology as their competitor and wants to win over it through extremism (Dettke, 2017; Huey, 2015).

Digital Rhetoric: A Framework to Study Technology and Virtual Artifacts

Scholars apply digital rhetoric in a variety of contexts to study technologically-driven artifacts—this includes the rhetoric of technology, social media use, rhetorical appeals in online forums, website design, multimodal composition, and the study of new media. For instance, if we describe digital rhetoric as a productive art, it can incorporate all digital texts and productions as objects of study (Eyman, 2015). Similarly, definitional and theoretical discussions of digital rhetoric also support that it is an extension of the field of rhetoric. A researcher can apply any rhetorical theory or concept to digital artifacts considering its context, nature and expectations. For instance, Kenneth Burke (1969) comments on the scope of rhetorical practice as:

Wherever there is persuasion, there is rhetoric. And wherever there is “meaning,” there is “persuasion.” Food, eaten and digested, is not rhetorical. But in the meaning of food there is much rhetoric, the meaning being persuasive enough for the idea of food to be used, like the ideas of religion, as a rhetorical device for statesmen. (as cited in Eyman, 2015, p. 12)

So, digital rhetoric is an artifact not as a product but of its underneath meaning. According to Eyman (2015), “The term “digital rhetoric” is perhaps most simply defined as the application of rhetorical theory (as analytic method or heuristic for production) to digital texts and performance (p. 13). If we go with Burke, digital rhetoric can incorporate almost all theories and methods of classical to contemporary rhetorical traditions (Eyman). For

instance, we can talk about Plato's five canons of rhetoric in the context of digital productions, and we can identify sophists and their role in using rhetoric as well.

Moreover, we can look at the contemporary ideas like the rhetorical situation, identity, networks, digital ecologies, economies, and circulation to study of digital rhetoric (Eyman). "Born digital" could be another concept to study, as digital natives are those who are born after 1980 and have access and skills on networked digital technologies (Palfrey & Gasser, 2008). Additionally, digital rhetoric as a field could engage multiple theories and methods due to the rapid pace of technological development and relative youth of digital rhetoric as a field (Eyman, 2015). Transnational terrorism and terrorist groups like ISIS, and al-Qaeda, are such some topics in ever-evolving technological environment.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

In this research, I use ideological criticism approach to examine ISIS's hate and extremist philosophies in the artifacts of al-Baghdadi and his fellow terrorists. The study shows how ISIS's ideology functions within the texts. Ideological criticism allows a researcher to find out how a particular ideology functions within the artifacts (Gentile, 2011). Gentile extends that ideological criticism "shows how the artifact functions and reinforces the ideology, or it allows one to argue and makes a statement claiming the lack of reinforcement on the ideology by the artifact" (p. 13). Gentile suggests four steps for an ideological criticism— first, identifying a person or artifacts or observing the artifacts from surface, second, providing an in-depth look into the elements or identifying the supported components related to the artifacts, third, identifying the ideological elements of the artifacts, and finally, recognizing the functions of the ideology.

Michael McGee (1980), first used the term "ideograph" in ideological criticism and converged rhetoric and ideology in the form of verbal constructs. McGee defines ideograph as summary-terms that transcends the usual idea of a term. For instance, the U.S. ideographs are equality, liberty, and freedom of speech (McGee). Connelly (2010) elaborates that slogan-like terms, as McGee suggests, usually act as technical political expressions, and merge with people's routine discourse as articulations of personal motives. Connelly extends that "ideographs become as one-sum orientations, a heuristic symbolizing the entire line of ideological argumentation" (p. 5). McGee delineates four features of ideographs—a) they are ordinary expressions of political discourse, b) they are top-notch notions collective commitment, 3) they license power use, guiding inappropriate behavior into acceptable channels, and 4) they are culture-bound. Connelly, further, elaborates that McGee distinguishes negative ideographs like slavery, racism, and terrorism which characterize inappropriate behavior in a society from positive ideographs,

like liberty, freedom, democracy which denotes anything good and ideal (2010). Connelly extends that,

Ideographs have more persuasiveness than other tropes because of the socialization process that trains the mind to accept and invoke culturally imbedded ideologies.

Ideographs are central to the structure of the culture they constitute, and, thus, can sometimes change the perception of a rhetorical situation when invoked. (p. 6)

So, ideographs play key functions in a culture to persuade people and change their way of thinking in different socio-cultural settings. Though some scholars are prone to agree that ideographs exercise power within cultures, other scholars contend that it depends on who defines its meaning (Cloud, 1999).

McKerrow (2009) also asserts that an ideological critique discusses the nature of power practice in a society. A critique can show “how power can be used in fashioning relationships that have the potential to demarginalize a group or to otherwise enable its members to gain control of their own lives...” (2009, p. 2). McKerrow includes that whatever the discourse is—visual or textual artifacts— it “reflects, establishes, or challenges existing power relations between and among people” (2009, p. 2).

Foss (2009) suggests to follow a four-step guideline or procedure for ideological criticism—1) selecting an artifact; 2) analyzing the artifact; 3) formulating a research question; and 4) writing the essay. A researcher has freedom to select an artifact for ideological criticism; it could be political, cultural. However, for analyzing an artifact, Foss again proposes four steps—“1) identifying the presented elements of the artifact, 2) identifying the suggested elements linked to the presented elements, 3) formulating an ideology, and 4) identifying the functions served by the ideology” (p. 214). I link McGee and Foss mainly in two stages of this

method section. I follow McGee's definition and characterization of ideograph to select artifacts for this research. McGee's four features as well as divisions of ideographs guided me to find out the artifacts. Whereas, Foss's four-step procedure of ideological criticism guides me to maintain the structure and steps of the research. I will now provide a picture of my texts for the research.

Description of Text

Foss argues that a researcher can select any artifact for ideological criticism as "ideologies exist everywhere" (p. 214). However, researchers usually attempt to select a political artifact for ideological analysis since other types of element produce comparatively less obvious understandings (2009). For example, Forster & Mawdsley (2004) analyze the speeches of Hitler and Stalin on the eve of World War II, which justified their move to war. Similarly, many other scholars studied speeches of controversial leaders like Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini to examine their ideologies and propaganda mechanisms (Casmir, 1963; Nelson, 2009; Postoutenko, 2016; Spielvogel & Redles, 1997; Titlestad, 2009; White, 1949; & Wilkie, 1966).

Specifically, I pick al-Baghdadi's first public speech and the speeches of Bangladesh and France ISIS terrorists as the text for this research. Al-Baghdadi is the top leader of ISIS, who also claims himself as the Caliph of Muslims around the world (Dawson, 2014; McCants, 2016). The speech is significant for various reasons. First, it was the first formal declaration of so-called Islamic State though ISIS established it in between 2006 to 2013 (Bunzel, 2015). Second, al-Baghdadi named himself as the Caliph of the State which was significant as well. Although al-Zarqawi established ISIS, he did not see himself as Caliph. Finally, al-Baghdadi's speech holds a type of authority over his followers with clear messages. ISIS's media wing- Al-Hayat Media Center released the speech on July 5, 2014 (Rubin, 2014; Withnall, 2014). The speech, al-Baghdadi delivered on July 4, 2014 was the first formal declaration of the Islamic State

(Caliphate) through which he proclaims himself as the Caliph⁷ (Georges, 2015; Strange, 2014). The speech clearly made a boundary between the followers of ISIS and the non-believers (kufir) outside of it. More specifically, Al-Baghdadi demarcates his supporters as in-group and others as out-group. Georges, (2015) extends,

Pronouns like “them” and “they” are applied to draw a clear line between “the camp of the Jews, the crusaders, their allies, and with them the rest of the nations and religions of kufir” and that of “the camp of Muslims and the mujahidin” represented by the “we” pronoun. (p. 5)

Al-Baghdadi’s this demarcation from the binary of *we* and *them* reveals his ideology of hate. Thus, the subsequent messages broadly encourage his followers to terrorism. On the other hand, Bangladesh and France terrorist speeches carry significance as it was the rhetoric of field level executioner of ISIS propaganda.

Process of Analysis

I follow Foss’s (2009) four steps of analysis of ideological artifacts. Foss extends the first stage of analysis to identify the rhetorical aspects of artifact which also provides a clear direction to find out ideologies. A researcher’s task is to find out the individual signs that point to ideological principles in the artifact and closely try to find out the “implicit ideology through the rhetorical content and form of the artifact” (Foss, 2009). Foss suggests an easy way to code the artifact for presented and suggested elements which encompasses identifying the key noticeable

⁷ Caliph derives from Arabic word khalifah which generally denotes successor of the prophet Muhammad. Besides, caliphate, origins from Arabic khilafah, means “the office of the political leader of the Muslim community (ummah) or state, particularly during the period from 632 AD to 1258” (Sowerwine, 2009, p.1). Caliphs do not hold any spiritual authority of Muhammad rather they govern an Islamic State under Islamic law (Sharia). The Caliph possesses supreme authority of a state as the commander of chief. Abu Bakr was the first Caliph in Islam after Muhammad’s demise (2009).

characteristics of the artifact. For instance, “it could include major arguments, types of evidence, images, particular terms, or metaphors” (2009, p. 214). Foss further guides that all those observable aspects provide the hints of its ideology.

Foss’s second stage of analysis suggests that researchers now articulate “ideas, references, themes, allusions, or concepts that are suggested by the presented elements” (216). In this stage, critics categorize the meaning of the elements which will provide the foundation for ideological principles. Foss suggests that critics take the list of presented elements and to generate at least one idea or concept. This list works as tools to discover the ideology in the artifact. A critic then groups the suggested elements into categories and unites them into a coherent framework. Foss extends that critics then strive to find out major identical clusters, themes, or ideas characterize all or most of his/her suggested elements to discover the ideology. A researcher now focuses on ideas suggested by presented elements not the elements alone. Foss particularly suggests to look into the points—membership of the group, activities, goals, core belief, defining event, sacred text, ultimate authority, values/norms, position and group-relations, and social resources the group has or needs.

The final stage of analysis is identifying the functions served the ideology. Foss suggests that the researcher show how the ideology functions for the audience who encounters it and the consequences it has in the world. The critic must ask: “does it encourage the audience to accept a particular position on a social issue? Does it present a view of a condition that is naïve, misguided, or inappropriate for some reason? Does the ideology present something as natural and normal in the artifact so that audiences do not question a particular perspective? Does it represent a marginalized perspective that it invites the audience to consider?” So, the study will

follow the same stages of analysis of the artifacts of al-Baghdadi and other terrorists' speeches to closely look into ISIS hate and extremist ideology.

Procedures

Through google search engine, I searched for al-Baghdadi's speech. I found several links containing different speeches from the ISIS leader. However, very few of those speeches were complete, and many of them unable to prove authentic. So, for making sure of the authenticity of the speech, I looked into all mainstream media websites and compared the news related to the speech. I mainly focused on the length of the speech, the delivery date, and the date of publication. Finally, I collected the English translation of the original Arabic speech from Al-Arabiya Network English website (AAE, 2014). The network is a 24-hour news channel in Arab world head office in Dubai, UAE. I saved the transcript of the speech in a pdf file to keep it intact. To further justify the authenticity of the texts, I checked several video postings of the speech on YouTube and other channels as well. Finally, I decided to analyze the speech as artifact of my study.

On the other hand, I collected Bangladesh terrorist video from *heavy.com*, a New York based online news portal (Heavy.com, 2016). The around 15-minute video featured 5 terrorists who undertook Dhaka café attack on July 1, 2016. The video was a compilation of five terrorist's messages with a brief description of the concurrent scenario of Bangladesh's "anti-Islamic" activities and various government initiatives. I only focused on the terrorist's speeches for this research. Similarly, I took France ISIS speech from the New Your Times website (New York Times, 2016). The New York Times video narrated by its reporter Rukmini Callimachi which originally published by Site Intelligence (Al-Hlou, 2016). I examine the speech for repeated themes after collecting the data. I then named, organized, and categorized the themes. Next, I

reexamine the data to further understand and revise the themes, also seeking for connections between themes that were established by the data. I then revise the themes and sort the data by theme and then determine the overarching ideologies, which provided the categories for the themes.

CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS

In this chapter, I analyze the speeches of al-Baghdadi, and the Bangladesh and France ISIS terrorists. I follow Foss's (2009) four-step guideline for analyzing the artifacts. First, I identify the presented elements of the artifacts. Second, I categorize the suggested elements of the artifacts. Then, I formulate three main ideologies from the artifacts. The ideologies are—a) martyrdom or victory, b) freedom, and c) caliphate. Finally, I identify the functions served by the ideologies.

The three video speeches present plenty of effective elements to show the rhetorical functions within the speeches. Al-Baghdadi and his followers used powerful rhetoric quoting verses from Quran, and Hadith, and tried to show their impact in present global socio-political situations. They included every persuasive element to justify their rhetorical appeals. The ISIS rhetoric primarily presented the dire situation of global Muslims blaming the West and their allies responsible for it. So, this situation obligates *jihad* which is the only option for them to emancipate Muslims. Al-Baghdadi and his supporters justified terrorism, killing innocent people, and labeling it as Allah's order. The speeches presented the prospects for success of terrorism coupled with the pride of established Caliphate⁸.

⁸ Caliphate, origins from Arabic khilafah, means “the office of the political leader of the Muslim community (ummah) or state, particularly during the period from 632 to 1258 AD” (Sowerwine, 2009, p.1). Besides, caliph derives from Arabic word khalifah which generally denotes successor of the prophet Muhammad. Caliphs do not hold any spiritual authority of Prophet Muhammad rather they govern an Islamic State under Islamic law (Sharia). The Caliph possesses supreme authority of a state as the commander of chief. Abu Bakr was the first Caliph in Islam after Prophet Muhammad's demise (2009).

The Rhetorical Situation

Al-Baghdadi's speech itself is an important rhetorical element that shows how rhetoric deceitfully attracts and motivates people. Time and place are two important components of the speech within its rhetorical constructions. Al-Baghdadi delivered his sermon at a Mosque in Mosul, the holy place of Muslims, which was an apparent continuation of the paths of Prophet Muhammad and early Caliphs. According to ISIS, al-Qaeda and other political Islamists, all decisions and declarations of an Islamic government should come from Mosque which they treat as Parliament (Armstrong, 2014; Jasser & Raza, 2015). During the speech, al-Baghdadi wore traditional black robes and a turban and "he could also be seen sporting a bulky, silver wrist watch" (Corcoran, 2014, para. 4). The black robe of al-Baghdadi resembled the ISIS flag. Terrorists from Bangladesh and France also wore the same color. ISIS black color also has a historical tradition. As Gander (2015) said, "Monochrome flags are an ancient tradition in ancient Eastern, Arabic, and Islamic tradition, and some people believe one of the Prophet Muhammad's original banners was black..... Modern jihadists therefore adopted this style to legitimize their causes" (para. 7).

On the other hand, the time of al-Baghdadi's speech was important as well from two perspectives—first, it was during the month of Ramadan (the month of fasting) which Muslims believe is the most rewarded period. Second, al-Baghdadi picked Friday for his speech, the holiest day for Muslims as they congregate on this day in Mosque for prayer. After the sermon, al-Baghdadi led the prayers as imam (one who leads prayers). So, al-Baghdadi picked such an important time for his sermon when people were in a devotional mood. In terms of rhetorical appeal, al-Baghdadi used verses from Quran and Hadith as reference for his speech. He mainly used languages from the Prophet Muhammad and early Caliphs. Al-Baghdadi mentioned the

word Allah, God, and Lord many times in the speech. His selection of pronouns was mainly to distinguish his supporters and enemies.

In terms of Bangladesh case, the speech was a compilation of five terrorist's messages with a brief description of the concurrent scenario of the country's "anti-Islamic" activities and various government initiatives. The environment and audio visuals show that ISIS recorded the speech in a locked room of a remote residential area. I would say remote residential area because there were some sounds of cows, coupled with those of other person's conversation and of a crying child. They recorded the video for global audience especially targeting Bangladesh people. They followed al-Baghdadi in their language choices with full of Quranic verses and hate and extremist words. They also wore black dresses (Panjabi, traditional Bengali dress for men) and red scarves. They spoke standing in front of ISIS black flag with firearms hanging from their neck and they held a sharp knife in their hand. On the other hand, the French ISIS speech was recorded separately in forest or desert areas. The New York Times published the video narrated by its reporter Rukmini Callimachi which originally published by Site Intelligence (Al-Hlou, 2016). Their rhetorical language repeatedly mentioned al-Baghdadi as their Caliph and desired to implement his order. However, their attire was different than usual ISIS terrorists. They wore military-styled uniforms while carrying knife and arms.

Speakers repeatedly mentioned jihad as a unique religious icon which is the major obligation for Muslims. Jihad, according to ISIS rhetoric, is murdering of people irrespective of gender, race, and religion who disagree with their ideology. They mentioned the "sword" as the main weapon in jihad which also resembles a religious symbol since the Prophet Muhammad and early Muslims used it. Allah, the Prophet, and his early followers are the other religious icons. They incorporated these icons to authenticate their claims and motivate their followers.

Moreover, the terrorists used the holy month, holy day, prayer, paradise, hellfire, Caliphate, believers, apostle, and the apocalypse as religious icons.

Further, ISIS rhetoric suggests almost common elements despite having distinct speaking situations. The distinction between al-Baghdadi and other ISIS terrorists was their role as speaker. Al-Baghdadi's speech signals his role as the top leader of the terrorist group. His speech was more inclusive and instructive for his followers. The speech exemplifies al-Baghdadi's language use as he used pronouns like "you" and "your" almost twice as many times as he used "we", "us" and "our". Moreover, his mimicking of the Prophet Muhammad and early Muslim leaders, his quoting of verses from Quran and Hadith, and instructions for jihad and migration—all attest his role as supreme leader and justify his political project. For instance, al-Baghdadi copied speech from first Caliph of Islam Abu Bakr,

I have been tasked with this great burden, and this great responsibility. It is a great responsibility, and I was chosen to lead you, while I am not the best among you, and no better than you. If you see me doing the right-hood, help me, and if you see me on falsehood, advise me and lead me to the right path. Obey me as long as I obey Allah, and If I disobey Him, you should not obey me. (para. 43-44)

Caliph Abu Bakr used the same quote in his inaugural speech as the first Caliph of Islam (Ibrahim, 2012). Even, the first Caliph delivered his speech to a crowd at a Mosque in Medina. The argument and semantic formation of the speech helped al-Baghdadi effectively "control [the] most influential discourse" concerning Islam and therefore has "more chances to control the minds and actions" of numerous vulnerable Muslims (van Dijk, 2001, p. 355).

On the other hand, speeches of Bangladesh and France terrorists suggest speaker's role as executioner of al-Baghdadi's order and present themselves as model followers of ISIS. For

example, France terrorist Sami Aminur and others repeatedly mentioned al-Baghdadi as their instructor and guide. They invited European people to join with them and “kill infidels” as al-Baghdadi suggested them. Similarly, Bangladesh terrorists refer to the Caliphate and its activities as their role model, and they would execute al-Baghdadi’s order.

Ideologies Embedded in the ISIS Artifacts

Al-Baghdadi and his followers present a complete extremist image of ISIS in the speeches. His rhetoric is a blueprint of representing a dark future. Elements of the artifacts guide me to formulate three extremist ideologies of ISIS. Speeches show that jihad is nothing but a matter of pride to the terrorist group. According to ISIS, eliminating the “infidels” and their allies has innumerable successes hereafter. ISIS cleverly uses the established Islamic myth that if someone sacrifices their life during fight with disbelievers, he/she certainly will earn paradise in the hereafter which is martyrdom. Whereas, if someone win, he/she will be glorified in earth or enjoy the result of victory. Al-Baghdadi incorporated all problem-torn Muslim countries in his speech and identified that people are not free in those regions. ISIS does not see any other way to secure so-called freedom of Muslims except through the spreading anarchy. So, al-Baghdadi tried to convince his followers to take arms and fight for the freedom of their Muslim brothers and sisters. ISIS has established a rhetoric that the West and their allies are responsible for socio-political disorders, unemployment and all other problems. Besides, ISIS thinks *jihad* or fighting against infidels and allies does not get an institutional shape unless it has an independent state. Though ISIS is like al-Qaeda and other Islamic terrorist groups, it is unique in its idea of establishment of Caliphate or a sovereign Shariah based state. According to ISIS, the Iraq and Syria based Caliphate is the beginning of establishment of a singular global Muslim state or *Ummah*. ISIS basically sanctions all types of barbarism to win over against the West and allied

forces as a technique to form their so-called *Ummah*. Besides, ISIS treats all other groups who do not conform to its *Ummah* mission irrespective to race, religion, and color as their enemy. So, the following will now elaborate the three important ideologies of ISIS.

Martyrdom or Victory

The ISIS rhetoric shows that the group does not see any crime in harming innocent people since the definition of innocence is different for its followers. Speeches support the claim that the destructive force has no grief for harming innocent people rather it perceives the task as a matter of pride. ISIS published the Bangladesh terrorist's speech after the Café incident though they recorded the video before the operation. The speech was one kind of celebration of the mass murder in the Café. Terrorists proudly pointed their daggers and firearms and said they are prepared to harm infidels. As Mubasher, a terrorist, said, "Oh disbelievers, we have sharpened our weapon to kill you. All of your weapons, all technologies, and armies are lame in front of us. We will win by the help of Allah" (para. 10-13). Another terrorist Nibras Islam said, "We fight for Allah. When Allah is happy on us, we don't care what people say about us" (para. 3). So, the ISIS terrorist has no grief of murdering people in the name of Allah. Similarly, France terrorists said that they were ready to spread atrocities everywhere. As one of the terrorists said, "We have received an order from the leader of the believers [al-Baghdadi] to kill you wherever you are" (para. 1). The voices of Bangladesh and France terrorists basically were the re-articulation of al-Baghdadi's speech:

Allah Almighty has ordered us to fight his enemies, and to carry out jihad for his sake to spread the religion. O people: The religion of Allah, the Exalted, will not be implemented, and this goal cannot be achieved, for which Allah created us, except by the

implementation of the *Shairah* of Allah, and appealing to him, and the application of Islamic law. This can only be achieved by force and power. (para. 36-38)

Al-Baghdadi sees no option to win over and establish Islamic law without using force and power. Accordingly, his followers around the world carry out atrocities, harming innocent people to achieve enormous successes. Al-Baghdadi exalts his fighter (Mujahedeen) for carrying jihad (fight) saying,

Go forth, O mujahidin in the path of Allah. Terrify the enemies of Allah and seek death in the places where you expect to find it, for the *dunyā* (worldly life) will come to an end, and the hereafter will last forever. (para. 14)

ISIS chief, here, encourages his followers not only to create anarchy, but also to expect death also for everlasting success in the afterlife. This type of motivation is an additional spirit to ISIS killing mission. ISIS, until February 2017, carries out around 140 terrorist attacks in 29 countries outside Iraq and Syria which “killed at least 2,043 people and injured thousands more” (Sanchez, Lister, Bixler, O'Key, Hogenmiller & Tawfeeq, 2017, para. 1).

The black-clad jihadist network celebrates every incident through social media or by releasing new videos upon taking responsibility of the attack. The speeches of Bangladesh and France terrorists also support the martyrdom as one kind of post operation celebration justifying (!) suffering. It, sometimes, released more than one videos after celebrating these incidents. For instance, an ISIS video on Café incident shows the Islamic State fighters who traveled to Iraq from Dhaka celebrate and acclaim the heroic (!) role of Bangladeshi terrorists for carrying out the attack. As one of the terrorists said, “I am really proud of our Bangladeshi mujahedeen brothers for a nice operation. The task you did never happened in Bangladesh. You (brothers) made history. I wish Allah will accept your martyrdom, Amen” (para. 1-3). Another terrorist

said, "...and what you witnessed in Bangladesh yesterday is just a glimpse. This will repeat, repeat and repeat until you lose and we will win and the Shariah is established throughout the world" (para. 12-14). Similarly, after 2015 Paris attack, ISIS released video threatening more attacks in France, and even in Washington D.C. in the US (Schuppe, 2015). In both cases, law enforcers murder the terrorists who initiated the incidents (BBC, 2016; DW, 2016; The Indian Express, 2016). But, none of their fellow regrets of their death as they think the deceased terrorists achieved martyrdom (NDTV, 2016; Prince, 2016).

The terrorist rhetoric encourages suffering and harm by showing two beneficial sides of *jihad* either one participates in terrorist activities or sacrifice one's life, suggesting innumerable successes in here and hereafter. As I mentioned earlier, ISIS uses established Islamic myth of achieving paradise if someone sacrifice themselves, and win over the fight, he/she will be glorified forever. Al-Baghdadi said,

If you knew what lies in *Jihad* of reward, dignity, honor, and pride in world and the hereafter, neither of you would have abandoned *Jihad*. It is the trade shown by Allah to spare you shame, and to grant you dignity in life and the hereafter. (para. 53-54)

The ISIS styled capitalism of jihad does not provide enough guidelines for right or wrong but entices people to commit harm to others. We see the implementation of al-Baghdadi's sermon across the world as ISIS terrorists commit harmful acts on people to gain enormous everlasting success.

Implementation of God's Order

Along with quotes from Quran, and Hadith, al-Baghdadi and his followers repeatedly imitate Prophet Muhammad and the early Caliph's speeches to prove their credibility. For example, al-Baghdadi started his sermon by praising Allah and Prophet Muhammad. He invites

people for prayers and fasting as it was month of Ramadan (devoted Muslims fast during the month). Al-Baghdadi indicates that the Prophet Muhammad marched with his army in this month. The ISIS leader believes that this was a suitable time to attack disbelievers, as he stated,

It is a month for Jihad, where the Prophet, Allah's peace and prayers be upon him, used to form brigades, and mobilize the armies to fight the enemies of Allah, and to fight the infidels. Therefore, you should seize this holy month, Believers, to achieve Allah's obedience. (para. 31)

Al-Baghdadi, then, encourages Muslims to join the fight by saying that Allah doubles reward in this month for all good deeds. He again quotes a verse from Quran and said that Allah created us to fight for his cause. Bangladeshi terrorists use almost the same language choices in their speeches saying that they should not be fearful because Allah is with them. Similarly, the France terrorists describe the harming of innocent people as the victory of Allah since their leader al-Baghdadi ordered them. As one of the terrorist said, "We have received an order from the leader of the believers [Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi] to kill you wherever you are" (para. 2).

The two-way benefits of *jihad* influenced ISIS terrorists in killing people as they think murdering infidels and their allies give them everlasting life. Martyrdom is the most precious to the terrorists as ISIS rhetoric made it clear that life after death is forever with full of abundance. However, if someone wins in the fight, they will also enjoy the glory of freedom. Leaders of the terrorists like al-Baghdadi and al-Qaeda leader bin Laden informed their followers that life is most important to the West. Jihad or mass murder is the only option to make afraid and shake them. As bin Laden said after 9/11 that "We love death. The U.S. loves life. That is the difference between us two" (Chertoff, 2008, p. 13). So, ISIS terrorists take suffering and harm as a matter of pride to achieve martyrdom or victory.

Global Muslims' Freedom

ISIS's ambitious project of worldwide Caliphate seldom cares about the binary of legality or illegality. Terrorist rhetoric makes the group's embedded ideology of barbarity visible, which is one of the major components of ISIS jihadist mission. According to the terrorist organization, taking arms is the only solution to eradicate global Muslim's grief and to form a unified *Ummah* (a singular global Muslim society). Al-Baghdadi and terrorists from Bangladesh and France repeatedly mention that the ongoing fight against crusader and their allies to establish real freedom for global Muslim population. As al-Baghdadi encourages his supporters, "So take up arms, take up arms, O soldiers of the Islamic State! And fight, fight (para. 23)! The ISIS leader repeatedly emphasizes taking up arms to ensure Muslims' freedom. The terrorist group again shows, here, that taking arms and weapons is central to their mission, providing solutions to oppressions on Muslims. Al-Baghdadi referred to his supporters as "soldiers of the Islamic State," an ultimate calling to ISIS terrorists giving them absolute authorization of violence. As ISIS supporters believe that they are the saviors of Islam and Muslims, al-Baghdadi's announcement solidifies that they are the soldiers of Allah and restoring Islam is in their hand. This goal is achievable only by implementing the order of their Caliph al-Baghdadi and building the Islamic State.

Al-Baghdadi's inspiration of savagery acts like *opium* among ISIS supporters around the world. The unrestrained terrorists received legal release of atrocity which annihilates the lives of thousands of innocent people. The series of terrorist attacks in different parts of the world testify the claim. Terrorists reiterate the announcement with pride that al-Baghdadi ordered them to "kill infidels," and their allies. As Bangladeshi terrorist Rohan, narrating a verse from Quran said, "Kill infidels near to you. You have Quranic rules to kill insects; but, you don't find the rules of

killing infidels. Fear Allah” (para. 7). The terrorist, here, didn’t provide any boundaries for these acts which means that the judgement of right or wrong, innocent or guilty is not important to them. So, ISIS freedom project creates doubt when they mercilessly murder people. The Dhaka Café attack authenticates the claim as terrorists killed 22 innocent people without knowing their race, religion, and ethnicity (Hanna, Ellis, Ahmed & Grinberg, 2016; Summers & Pleasance, 2016). Some of the victims were Muslims who fasted whole day and got killed just after breaking the fast (devoted Muslims fast during the month of Ramadan in the Islamic calendar). Among other victims, three were students of different U.S. universities, just met to hang out. There was a pregnant woman among the victims which proves that terrorists did not consider anything except the order of al-Baghdadi. French terrorists attacked in a soccer match which killed around 130 people (Bolton, 2015; Cleary, 2015). The ISIS video, released after the attack, resembled the same voice as those were in Europe which was to kill infidels. So, in all cases, they don’t care about anything except harming people who desire to eradicate global Muslims’ grief.

Finally, *jihad* or fighting against “infidels” is the key element of the ISIS project of *ummah*. The ISIS version of *jihad* is about the murder of people outside of their camp. According to ISIS rhetoric, *jihad* is full of reward from Allah; it is source of everlasting dignity, honor and pride. Al-Baghdadi’s provocative advertisement of *jihad* basically influences his supporters to carry out his cause world-wide. The boundless reward of *jihad*, as al-Baghdadi explains it, influences terrorists to kill more people to gain ultimate return. The ISIS leader brings shame to the dignity of his supporters who refuse to join in *jihad*. ISIS global-network abides by al-Baghdadi’s order. As Bangladeshi terrorist Mubasher said, “We are that man who are glorified

by *jihad*” (para. 5). Similarly, France terrorists also treat themselves glorified jihadist of Islamic State.

The ISIS chief repeatedly urged Muslim to take up arms adding terms like “inflicted,” “moaning,” and “plight” as common discursive psychological warfare technique to make his language strong (Georges, 2015). As al-Baghdadi said,

..... Muslims’ rights are forcibly seized in China, India, Palestine, Somalia, the Arabian Peninsula, the Caucasus, Shām (the Levant), Egypt, Iraq, Indonesia, Afghanistan, the Philippines, Ahvaz, Iran [by the rāfidah (shia)], Pakistan, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria and Morocco, in the East and in the West. So, raise your ambitions, O soldiers of the Islamic State! For your brothers, all over the world are waiting for your rescue, and are anticipating your brigades. It is enough for you to just look at the scenes that have reached you from Central Africa, and from Burma before that. What is hidden from us is far worse. (para. 25-26)

Al-Baghdadi falsely identifies the sufferings of people in various countries of Africa, Asia and Europe as oppressions on Muslims. The countries have basically been long-suffering from socio-political, and communal crisis. For example, terrorism, and civil war cripple Afghanistan Iraq, and Libya. Al-Baghdadi, here, generalizes all regional problems as oppressions on Muslims rather considering how its problem are different than the others. So, in general, all problems are not the Islamic or oppressions on Muslim. The ISIS leader uses rhetoric to highlight the crisis—to recruit more people in his party and to gain sympathy from Muslim world. He crafts his speech incorporating messages of hope and anger which would obviously touch the victims and those who see the incidents from surface. Al-Baghdadi mentions miserable conditions of Muslims in different countries as technique to increase anger and narration of ISIS success

stories(!) to increase hope among his supporters. However, in many cases, the problems are not religious rather than regional or political crisis. Besides, solutions to the problems could also be multifaceted.

Al-Baghdadi also urges his followers to form military to eradicate global Muslim's grief. Bangladeshi terrorists also stated that all their activities are a response to Western domination, the murder of Muslims in different parts of the world, and a way to ensure subjugated Muslim's freedom. French terrorists echoes the same tone to justify their attack. Sami Amimur, one of the French terrorists, spoke of targeting the young Muslims of Europe, "Take action. Wake up before it's too late and they begin slaughtering you" (para. 2).

Al-Baghdadi sees that Muslims in different countries are inflicted by worst kind of torture. The terrorists blame the West and their allies for this condition without suggesting any good way out. They see that Westerners and their allies seized Muslims rights and thrown them into a dire state of poverty. According to ISIS rhetoric, imitation of western legislation and judiciary systems is responsible for present condition. Al-Baghdadi and Bangladesh terrorists find that Muslims welcomed their present situation by forgetting Caliphate and their glorified past.

Establishment of Caliphate for Global Muslims

A major element of the speeches was the declaration of Caliphate or a sovereign state of ISIS. Al-Baghdadi and the other terrorists describes the state as their sources of strength and pride. Al-Baghdadi, upon declaring the Caliphate, announces himself as Caliph or the supreme leader of global Muslims. He said,

Therefore, rush O Muslims to your state. Yes, it is your state. Rush, because Syria is not for the Syrians, and Iraq is not for the Iraqis. The earth is Allah's. {Indeed, the earth

belongs to Allah. He causes to inherit it whom He wills of His servants. And the [best] outcome is for the righteous} [Al-A'rāf: 128]. The State is a state for all Muslims. The land is for the Muslims, all the Muslims. (para. 43)

Al-Baghdadi, here, invited Muslims to accept the Caliphate as their state and called on them to “rush” to their territory (Georges, 2015). He basically tried to justify ISIS activities as right and good by citing Allah’s promise. Bangladesh terrorists repeatedly mentioned Caliphate terming it as “dignity.” As Khairuzzaman, a Bangladesh ISIS terrorist, spoke, “We were oppressed and dishonored. Allah has honored us with Caliphate. So, come together under the Caliphate and fight against infidels collectively” (para. 2). Similarly, France terrorist Sami Amimur identified himself as not a normal foot soldier rather the part of fighters in Iraq and Syria. France terrorists mentioned al-Baghdadi’s name several times which is their allegiance to the Caliph and Caliphate.

Besides, ISIS rhetoric clears the boundary of friend and enemy. The in-group and out-group divisions testimony that the binary of race, religion and geographical boundary is not so important to SIS. Al-Baghdadi identifies his friends in two ways—first, those loyal to his Caliphate, traveled to Islamic State from different parts of the world. Second, his supporters those undertake missions to perpetrate harm in various countries. Al-Baghdadi emboldens his supporters by incorporating regional crisis as oppressions on Muslims. The ISIS chief said,

Indeed, the Ummah of Islam is watching your jihad with eyes of hope, and indeed you have brothers in many parts of the world being inflicted with the worst kinds of torture. Their honor is being violated. Their blood is being spilled. Prisoners are moaning and crying for help. Orphans and widows are complaining of their plight. Women who have

lost their children are weeping. Masājīd (plural of masjid) are desecrated and sanctities are violated... (para. 25)

The speeches of al-Baghdadi and his followers clearly divide the global population into two camps. Al-Baghdadi and his fellow terrorists make this rhetorical division much narrower. They divide people simply by those who fight against Westerners and those who do not. According to ISIS rhetoric, jihad against the “camp of Kufir” (disbelievers) makes the “camp of Islam” glorified. Al-Baghdadi blamed “the camp of kufir”—infidels, crusaders, Jews and allies are accountable for global Muslims’ sufferings. Al-Baghdadi’s usage of the terms like “camp of Kufir”, “orphans and widows”, “prisoners crying for help”, “honor being violated”, and “blood is being spilled” is a unique rhetorical strategy in support of his ideologies. He highlighted the pseudo oppressions on Muslims to secure support to his utopian caliphate. Al-Baghdadi wanted to give a message that if you come under the caliphate, he or Islamic State will strive to eradicate all those problems and *Ummah* or single global Muslim community will fight back in response to oppressions. So, he only sees the devotion to the utopia of Islamic State is the overnight panacea of Muslim’s problems. Al-Baghdadi demarcates the “others” saying that:

O ummah of Islam, indeed the world today has been divided into two camps and two trenches, with no third camp present: The camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of kufir (disbelief) and hypocrisy – the camp of the Muslims and the mujahidin everywhere, and the camp of the Jews, the crusaders, their allies, and with them the rest of the nations and religions of kufir, all being led by America and Russia, and being mobilized by the Jews. (para. 33)

Al-Baghdadi clears his position here by dividing the world into two camps, puts all responsibilities to the camp of kufir. The ISIS chief mentions “hypocrisy”; he mainly indicates all

Muslims outside of his so-called “the camp of Islam”. Al-Baghdadi tries to unmask them saying treacherous and agents of crusaders, atheists and Jews:

So listen, O ummah of Islam. Listen and comprehend. Stand up and rise. For the time has come for you to free yourself from the shackles of weakness, and stand in the face of tyranny, against the treacherous rulers – the agents of the crusaders and the atheists, and the guards of the Jews. (para 32)

The self-styled caliph’s this statement excludes all as outsiders except he and his supporters. This hefty generalization primarily support success to ISIS to gain money and muscle from global supporters. The same tone resonates in the rhetoric of Bangladesh and French terrorists. As Bangladeshi terrorist Mubasher said,

O disbelievers, o taghut (transgressors from Islam), we have good news for you which will hurt you. We are here, we have sharpened our daggers to send you hell. We will win, by mercy of Allah, in face of your developed weapons, technologies and armies. (para. 9-10)

Mubasher again reiterates al-Baghdadi’s divisions of global people from the binary of in-group and out-group putting all except ISIS supporters in the in-group. He describes their win over allied forces even though they have arms and ammunition. The ISIS terrorists threat Bangladeshi secular politicians for sheltering people from West and allied countries. Moreover, they followed the strategy of killing infidels (as they say) “near to you.” In both cases, terrorists refer to al-Baghdadi’s sermon as their guide. France terrorist Sami Amimur echoes the same voice that “we are not weak rather than stronger than you” (para. 6).

Creation of fear is important

The artifacts made it visible that al-Baghdadi and his followers believe that creation of fear is necessary for the world to take notice and keep their Caliphate safe. They perceive that a state of fear and anarchy could be a path to control world leadership and a possible solution to emancipate Muslim's grief. As al-Baghdadi talks about his followers, "They have a statement that will cause the world to hear and understand the meaning of terrorism, and boots that will trample the idol of nationalism, destroy the idol of democracy and uncover its deviant nature" (para. 31). The rhetorical structure of the ISIS mastermind here works as a threat to the established global socio-political institutions. The message is that the ISIS terrorists are well-equipped and well-trained to destroy all those structures. Al-Baghdadi repeatedly mentioned jihad (fighting) to create fear among his opposition, but to energize his followers. He further said,

O people: The religion of Allah, the Exalted, will not be implemented, and this goal cannot be achieved, for which Allah created us, except by the implementation of the shariah of Allah, and appealing to him, and the application of Islamic law. This can only be achieved by force and power. (para. 41)

So, the ISIS mastermind thinks force and power is the only way to implement his so-called Islamic rule and attract more people to his cause. He again used terror words here in support of his rhetoric and to infuse fear among the West and their allies. The rhetoric of fear repeatedly came in the speeches of Bangladesh and France terrorists too. As one of France terrorists stated: "We are in Syria, we are in Iraq and now, we are here and we are not just normal foot soldiers. We are here to create atrocities" (para. 5). Similarly, Nibras Islam, a Bangladeshi terrorist,

spoke, “O Crusaders: you will flee from Bangla. We will make you sleepless. Your heart will shake in fear of us” (para 3).

Al-Baghdadi’s rhetoric is absolutely a dark script of the global human, but its shrewd language structure misleads some people to get attracted to ISIS. However, Al-Baghdadi and other ISIS members see the light centering the Caliphate which they see as their source of pride and inspiration. ISIS chief’s speech signals one kind of formal inauguration Islamic State with instructions of savagery around the world. Bangladesh terrorists mentioned that the establishment of Caliphate, and declare their undefeatable mission. France terrorists praised al-Baghdadi for his taking responsibility of global Muslims! They declared their glorification for being with ISIS and being part of the killing mission which they indicate as the highest achievement in here and hereafter. This rhetoric states the joining of thousands of people with them as effectiveness of their endeavor. Thousands of other people have already traveled to ISIS land and took part in fighting against allied forces. Moreover, ISIS people imagine their successes and acquiring of global power whenever they win over Crusaders and Jews.

In conclusion, ISIS ideologies show that the organization establishes its utopic Caliphate through creating anarchy, harming innocent people and dividing society based on the binary of us versus them rhetoric. Hate and extremist ideology of ISIS shortly provides great success in recruiting large number of followers (Wood, 2015). The ISIS mastermind might have programed the project by anticipating to recruit a large group of die-heart supporters from the problem-torn regions of the world especially Islamic countries, which apparently received huge success. However, the hate and extremist ideology would not sustain itself in the long run. The majority people in Muslim countries did not welcome its destructive activities like savagery, murdering people and irrational rigid-opposition to West and allies in the name of Islam (Jensen, 2015;

Poushter, 2015; Rapoport, 2008). Anti-ISIS propaganda, mass awareness and various reform programs help reduce recruitment coupling with massive program by U.S.- led coalition forces to oust the terrorist group from its territory (Laub, 2016). Yet, the global clutch of the terrorist group remains as a threat.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

The analysis led to interesting conclusions on ISIS hate and extremist ideologies—martyrdom or victory, freedom, and caliphate. The first ideology has a religious and historical basis as many verses of Quran and Hadith mentioned *jihad* is a good work. But, it has different perspectives and various explanations to determine which one is good or bad. For instance, death in a war of liberation is considered martyrdom, but if someone wins any such war is considered as the veteran and enjoys the glory of victory. ISIS uses this notion here to motivate people to its other two ideologies. Al-Baghdadi misleadingly informed people that they will ensure so-called freedom of global Muslims and will establish the caliphate. ISIS ideologies, at first sight, would work as camouflage, as the flipside of them is dark and very much hate and extremist. The linguistic construction of ISIS messages is not an exception to other hate and extremist groups that desire to motivate and recruit more people. Moreover, the analysis provides important contributions to rhetorical communication since it shows how ISIS used digital media and virtual environment for its propaganda circulation.

In this analysis, I showed the linguistic choices and rhetorical structures of the mastermind and executioner, Al-Baghdadi. Al-Baghdadi and his followers crafted their messages with elements for motivating participation within the group, and among the public, invoking divine privilege, and pointing to external groups and organizations (McNamee, Peterson & Peña, 2010). Specifically, al-Baghdadi's rhetorical construction attests to his influence of language use in persuading his followers to terrorism. On the other hand, Bangladesh and France ISIS terrorists' speeches are the implementation of al-Baghdadi's order as he termed the terrorists as the "soldier of Islamic State". Terrorists messages also have motivational elements that mostly justified their act of extremism. However, this research examines how the violent

extremism/terrorism language and rhetoric might motivate people to act. Analysis of the artifacts provides plenty of directions to the questions. For instance, al-Baghdadi, as a rhetorical strategy, brings the stories of oppressions and tortures of Muslims in his speech creating space to defend terrorism.

Additionally, the rhetorical situation, target audience, and audio-visual construction of the artifacts support that ISIS did not target people of a certain locality or country, rather it mainly tried to reach the global Muslim audience. Though, Al-Baghdadi spoke in a Mosque, he did not specifically address the gathering, rather invited global Muslims to respond to his cause. He knew very well that he has the digital mechanism to reach global Muslim community. The people got the speech through twitter, which ISIS media wing uploaded a couple hours after the speech. Bangladesh and France terrorists made their video for the global Muslim community as there was no audience during their speeches. These speeches came out through internet months after the incidents.

Implications of the Study

This research effectively unearths the hate and extremist ideologies of ISIS embedded in the speeches of al-Baghdadi, and the French and Bangladeshi terrorists. The rhetorical method of ideological criticism guided this analysis to uncover their beliefs, values, attitudes, and visions of ISIS to establish their so-called global caliphate through terrorism (Dunham, Higgins, & Uy, 2011). ISIS's ideologies form its beliefs and attitudes of eradicating all global problems—discriminations, poverty—by attacking people who oppose their message. Moreover, the present series of attacks on innocent people testify ISIS destructive visions. Further, ISIS rhetoric sets up the power struggle with West visible and are determined to establish their superiority over all other superpowers around the world. Since the ideological criticism is concerned with the idea of

power and justifies the processes of domination over the others (Dunham, Higgins, & Uy, 2011; Foss, 2009). I used ideological criticism two ways—first, ISIS considers the West as the dominant group and Muslims are the subordinate group. Western domination continues for long time by the help of local ruling class, and hypocrites. Second, ISIS wants to halt the West and establish its own domination. The terrorist group justifies its domination by narrating all problems in the Muslim regions and plans to eradicate them. ISIS terrorists repeatedly express their determination to hold the reign of global power. For example, Bangladeshi terrorist Mubasher said, “O disbelievers, o hypocrites, we are providing such good news to you that will give you pain. We are coming by Allah’s will. We have sharpened our weapon to send you hell. We will win over you whatever weapons, technology, and armies you have!”

The findings of the analysis also led to some intriguing results on how an extremist group develops its propaganda mechanisms. Analyses found that the ISIS speeches provide a complete idea of how terrorism works from top to bottom—the top leaders’ motivation and its execution in the field level. As I mentioned earlier, ISIS ideologies basically mislead people. The apparently overarching ideologies—martyrdom or victory, freedom, and caliphate—are a shrewd and cleverly conceived rhetorical strategies to attract and motivate people. ISIS basically takes the advantage of social and religious situations over their rhetoric which apparently mislead people. In the following, I will now explain how the ISIS does design rhetorical strategies to promote its objectives (Foss, 2009). I will provide the reasons and causes why ISIS rhetoric did able to motivate people.

Advantage of individuals own interpretation of Islam—jihad and others

ISIS’s first and most successful rhetorical strategy is the utilization of individual’s own explanations of Islam. The nature of individual’s own explanation of Islam is basically

discarding the established explanations of Quran and Hadith. Traditionally, Islamic followers are guided by four imams (scholars in Islam) in terms of complicated and confronting issues of people's everyday life. Majority of global Muslims follow the four imams-- Imam Abu Hanifa, Imam Al Shafi, Imam Malik, and Imam Ahmad Abn Hambal—who have separate, but not confrontational schools of thoughts and methods of Islamic jurisprudence (Kadous, 2015; Zahra, 2017). However, Salafi ideologists do not follow any of those imams rather depend on their own explanation of Quran and Hadith. The danger is here that a verse of Quran might have links to different events and incidents raised during the period of Prophet Muhammad; those might not be universally applicable. It is true that Quran has lots of violent, and extremist verses like other Abrahamic religious⁹ books—Tanakh, Talmud, and Bible. A recent study by Tom Anderson, a U.S. researcher, found that “... Bible scored higher for anger and much lower for joy and trust than the Quran” (Bowden, 2016, para. 6). Anderson said, “Killing and destruction are referenced slightly more often in the New Testament (2.8%) than in the Quran (2.1%), but the Old Testament clearly leads—more than twice that of the Quran—in mentions of destruction and killing (5.3%)” (Osborne, 2016, para. 8). For example, Quran mentions the word *jihad*, often translated as "holy war," though from pure linguistic sense it means “struggling or striving” (BBC, 2009; Kabbani, 2017).

⁹ The Abrahamic religions, or faiths are a group of Semitic-originated belief systems; most of them claim themselves as the descent of ancient Israelites and worship Abraham's God (Goldman, 2013). Followers of those religions consider Abraham as the founder their faith system. The belief system is monotheistic which originated in the middle east and identifies Jerusalem as their holy city. The main Abrahamic religions are Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. Christianity belongs to largest religious practitioners encompassing Roman Catholic and different Protestant practices based on Bible. Islam followers consider Quran as their religious book. Whereas, Judaism believers follow Hebrew Bible, also called Hebrew Scriptures, Old Testament, or Tanakh.

Islamic scholars assert that jihad is striving of self-purification or fighting with self to keep oneself on the path of right, not merely war or murder (Bonner, 2006; Elias, 2015; Reinebach, 2013). However, ISIS supporters interpret jihad as the synonym of murdering disbelievers. Similarly, they also misinterpret the way of Shariah or Islamic law implementation. Many Islamic scholars state that Shariah or Islamic law implementation is only possible when the opinion wins in a popular vote, and it is illegal to forcefully impose Shariah on a community (Quraishi-Landes, 2016). But, terrorist groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda are prone to enforce Shariah through violence and terrorism. So, the ISIS took the advantage of its own interpretations of Islam which has increased the risks and dangers in the global environment. Al-Baghdadi and other terrorists used it as a rhetorical strategy to motivate people.

Cultural lag—between the binary of two extremist ideologies

Cultural conflict—between native and foreign especially West—has become a worst phenomenon in most Middle-Eastern and Muslim majority countries. Many liberal and progressive people support the very blessings globalization. They are very keen to unrestraint cultural practices and comfortable to Western type of lifestyle. However, because of the overall population's levels of education, understanding and ways of cultural practices did not develop compared to rapid changes in material conditions like new entertainment devices and easy access to global culture. Immaterial conditions like norms, beliefs and customs did not change that level which usually take longer time to change than the material one. Ogburn's (1922) "cultural lag"¹⁰

¹⁰ The concept of 'cultural lag' was introduced by W.F. Ogburn in his book Social Change (1922). He distinguished between 'material' and 'non-material' culture and stressed that material culture changes rapidly than non-material culture. In this process changes in our non-material culture always lag behind the changes in material culture. Moreover, the different parts of the culture do not change at the same rate and speed. The changes in technology and material culture come more rapidly than changes in non-material culture. The time interval between the

theory is well-applicable here as the technological development increases the gap between material and non-material cultural practices and productions. As non-material aspects of culture take long time to adjust and persist longer than material facets. For example, it is true that the rapid technological development and new inventions have ushered in comforts and benefits of people's life. This opens the world to everyone via a smartphone or other digital devices. However, the non-material aspects are unable to conform this rapid material change which necessitate cultural lag.

So, the conflict between liberal or progressive and traditional (read native or local) groups in that regions obligates the rise other cultural extremists who are very rigid to orthodox Islamic practices. The conflict becomes visible when the progressive groups both from politics and social arenas imitate and advocate the Western-type culture to resist the orthodox Islamic practices rather trying get a solution from local or native. People lean to Islamic orthodoxy because of this cultural extremism. I would say, this advantages extremist groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda to justify their appeal and recruit more people. Extremists mislead people saying that the liberal group imitates the disbelievers and brings un-Islamic cultural practices in our country. Whereas the progressive front is very sophisticated to foreign imitation in the name of development. As Asif Nazrul said, "We witnessed the rise of two extremist groups in our city areas in last couple of years—One is religious and the other is anti-religious class. I think both groups practice extreme and toxic rhetoric to attack their opponents" (Nazrul, 2017, para. 5).

appearance of a new trait (material culture) and the completion of the adaptation it forces (non-material culture) is known as 'cultural lag' (Mondal, 2016).

Using symbols to justify their opposition to West

ISIS staged a successful drama in terms of highlighting the teachings of Prophet Muhammad, Caliphs and early Muslims which worked to camouflage and motivate people. For example, ISIS followers believe that sword is their main weapon as Prophet Muhammad won in many wars fighting with the weapon. Even though terrorists use other developed weapons, they believe that the final win will come by sword. The rhetorical significance of sword is important to motivate people to the war against the infidels though they use all types of developed weapons. Similarly, ISIS tries to prove as devoted to Islam by mimicking every tasks and practices from early Islam.

The conflict between East and West is centuries years old. Colonialism and Western domination on some Asia and African countries influence the conflict. However, the conflict between Islam and non-Islamic religions is a comparatively new phenomenon. Islamic extremist groups strive to convert the conflict of East versus West to Islam versus non-Islamic. ISIS, previously al-Qaeda, thinks it the confronting power with the U.S. and allies. This concept is very much match with the contemporary definition of ideology as scholars think it requires a conflict between two competing belief systems.

The poor socio-political environment of many Muslim majority countries coupling with cultural divisions put youths in a state of no guidance. Around 200 years of colonial rules, and its aftermath dictatorships put the region in a condition of cultural vacuum. As people's participation in the power was almost absent, general growth of socio-cultural practices was put to a halt (Fraihat, 2016). Pandith, a former U.S. Department of State representative, observed that the 9/11 and subsequent incidents, media portrayals of Islam placed young generation in a dilemma about their religion and culture (Liang, 2015). Moreover, the Arab spring of 2011

fueled the ongoing conflicts and disorganizations in the Middle-Eastern countries (Spencer, 2016; Wooden, 2013). Different versions of education systems—general (government), madrasah-completely religion based (semi-government and private), English medium (private for rich people) make the social division much worst. Unemployment and depression could be the other main reason for young Muslims committing to extremism. Extremist groups target the lone young millennials who spend most of their time in social media being lonely and depressed (Callimachi, 2015). ISIS took the advantage of this disorganized conditions of that region. Al-Baghdadi and the other terrorists misleadingly blame the West for all the problems which was another rhetorical strategy of the terrorist group. For instance, al-Baghdadi said,

Indeed, the Muslims were defeated after the fall of their khilāfah (caliphate). Then their state ceased to exist, so the disbelievers were able to weaken and humiliate the Muslims, dominate them in every region, plunder their wealth and resources, and rob them of their rights. They accomplished this by attacking and occupying their lands, placing their treacherous agents in power to rule the Muslims with an iron fist, and spreading dazzling and deceptive slogans such as: civilization, peace, co-existence, freedom, democracy, secularism, baathism, nationalism, and patriotism, among other false slogans. (para. 34)

Contribution to Rhetorical Communication

It would not be any exaggeration if I say internet and digital media made a major chunk of ISIS's work done. The easy and rapid publication technique made terrorists' tasks really simple. ISIS sent their audio and video productions to leading media to publish it. Later, the terrorist group uploaded its messages through different internet sites, twitter accounts and blog posts. Developed versions of web 3.0 enriched ISIS to threaten global humanity. Internet helped ISIS to make and circulate the heinous videos and graphical presentation of atrocities those

worked as threat to global peace-loving community, but used as a tool to motivate more extremists. ISIS utilizes technology to encourage, and recruit people, and attack its targets. The artifacts of this research also the productions of digital technology. Although Al-Baghdadi spoke to a tiny gathering in a Mosque, he targeted the larger global audience. Similarly, ISIS made the video speeches of Bangladesh and France terrorists absolutely for virtual audience.

In this research, ISIS rhetoric, in the age of digital media saturation, first relates to the existing ideas on hate and extremist groups rhetorical strategies forming their messages. As McNamee, Peterson and Peña (2010) state, hate and extremist groups create their messages for educating, encouraging participation within the group and among the public, invoking divine privilege, and indicting external participation to groups and organizations. For instance, al-Baghdadi provides various educating, motivational and privilege related messages in his speech. Second, this research adds to the field of rhetoric in explaining how the violent extremism/terrorism language and rhetoric might motivate people to act. ISIS rhetoric and ideologies provide a picture of how terrorism language/rhetoric persuade people to act. Furthermore, this study is a breakthrough in terms of studying new and more violent extremist groups like ISIS. For instance, ISIS spread its propaganda through online sources and motivate people to join the group.

Limitations of the Study

This research has three easily identifiable limitations. First, I experienced difficulty in getting authentic and updated information of the extremist group like ISIS since its activities are almost unreachable without publication. So, it is difficult to crosscheck the information and activities of ISIS to ensure actual and more accurate material for this research. Second, availability of internet materials as social media and other internet management bodies

frequently delete the controversial materials from the web. Besides, the authenticity of internet materials is difficult to verify. ISIS publications are unavailable after a certain period as social media and internet companies frequently delete them to halt terrorist propaganda. Moreover, fake and distorted information emerged on the internet due to its anonymity. Therefore, it was a difficult task to get more and authentic information for this research.

Future Research

In the line of ISIS's transnational terrorism, future research on extremism and how such organizations use social media to spread their ideologies would be complicated. Because of the ever-evolving technological mediums, research on the spread of hate and extremist ideology is important as anonymity options minimize the risk and face-threat. Besides, more and more research on hate should help easily identify the activities and forthcoming threats from the extremist groups. Terrorist groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda use the multi-modal communication options of social media to spread its ideological messages, motivate and train their followers. For future research must examine the techniques of media use of various extremist groups. For instance, the difference between the media strategy of al-Qaeda and ISIS. One can conduct research from social media management perspectives, too, studying netiquette and language of extremism. What would be the criteria of freedom of speech and extremist propaganda in social media environment? Besides, one can conduct a comparative research with ISIS and other religion-based extremist groups. Options also open to conduct research to find out the reasons why terrorist groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda did emerge. Research should also continue to show how ISIS ideology does not conform with overall Muslims lifestyles and practices of religion.

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