A Socio-Historical Analysis of the Dynamics of Genocide in Bosnia 1992-1995: Forces Contributing to the Continuation of Genocide

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A Socio-Historical Analysis of the Dynamics of Genocide in Bosnia 1992-1995:

Forces Contributing to the Continuation of Genocide

by

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A Socio-Historical Analysis of the Dynamics of Genocide in Bosnia 1992-1995: Forces Contributing to the Continuation of Genocide

Lejla Alvarez

This thesis has been examined and approved by the following members of the student’s committee.

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Advisor

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Committee Member

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Committee Member
Dedication

I dedicate this work to my beloved mother, Paša, who died in the Bosnian War.
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ABSTRACT

Despite preventive and diagnostic instruments and mechanisms put in place by the international community, genocide - systematic destruction of social groups - persists as a major regional and global problem. Genocidal processes are multifaceted and involve multiple factors at all levels of analysis interacting to produce genocide. This study examines the most significant socio-historical factors in producing the genocidal war in Bosnia that started in the spring of 1992, carried out generally uninterrupted until late 1995, with some forms of violence continuing years after the official end of the war. The main goals of the research were to contextualize the genocide and explain why it occurred and continued for so long despite the United Nations' involvement in the conflict. To collect relevant evidence necessary to answer the research questions, I systematically generated, analyzed, and synthesized knowledge from scholarly publications as a source of data. I found that a protracted economic crisis, state-building processes following a regime change, and restructuring have created an opportunity to consolidate power and territory at the hand of extreme nationalist elites in Serbia and Croatia and those within Bosnia who shared their nationalist aspirations. Espousal of ethnic nationalism as legitimating ideology and the political agenda of atrocity as means of achieving the goal by the elites and public realized through military consolidation, and mobilization and arming of the masses. The handling of the conflict by the global bystander elite, spearheaded by the United Nations, was crucial for the realization of the Serbian major nationalist project. The UN's failure primarily lies in its unwillingness to distinguish between the perpetrators and their targets and in the organization's inability to effectively enact appropriate policies in the face of extreme human suffering and rampant violations of international laws.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Genocide is a “historically specific and an extreme form of organised violence involving armed and ideologically committed social organizations engaged in social destruction of unarmed populations, resulting in mass-scale human casualties and the devastation of social relations and corresponding cultural infrastructure” (Malesevic 2017:219). The recurrence of genocide since the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereafter Genocide Convention and UNGC) in 1948 accounts for millions of lives destroyed, including those of the victims of genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia and BiH, always refers to the whole country) 1992-1995. The mass atrocities in Bosnia have continued for over four years despite the efforts of the Bosnian government and targeted civilian groups, mainly Bosnian Muslims, to resist their destruction, and despite the efforts of the United Nations (UN) to stop the conflict. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has played an active role throughout most of the crisis in Yugoslavia and was central to the conflict in Bosnia that happened in the aftermath of its separation from Yugoslavia. However, despite numerous UNSC resolutions demanding an end to human rights abuses and hostilities, the genocidal war that started in the spring of 1992 and took place throughout the territories of BiH continued generally uninterrupted (Becirevic 2014).

This study is a socio-historical analysis of the dynamics of the genocide in Bosnia and the factors that contributed to its emergence and continuation. To better understand the phenomena of genocide, it is important to examine how and why the genocide in Bosnia occurred and why it persisted despite the UN efforts to intervene in the conflict, which the researchers have overlooked. The existing literature on the Bosnian genocidal war is of varied focus. A large body of research was dedicated to the examination of causes and process of disintegration of
Yugoslavia (see Ramet 2005; Dragovic-Soso 2009), and within that scope, to the causes of armed conflicts that stemmed out of it. Some of the scholarly work on the Bosnian genocide discusses the applicability of the term genocide in the case of Bosnia. At the same time, a good body of the literature focuses only on specific instances of mass violence that occurred during the conflict, such as the 1995 case of the Srebrenica massacre, which was legitimized as a case of genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (see Hoare 2014:516-7). In addition, some studies focused on the specific characteristics of the conflict, such as ethnicity and nationalism, or socio-psychological factors behind the mass atrocities. By building on prior literature in this study, I aimed to acquire a more sophisticated understanding of the phenomenon of genocide in 20th century Bosnia.

This research aimed to analyze the factors that have shaped the genocide in BiH. To collect relevant evidence necessary for such an analysis, I systematically generated, analyzed, and synthesized knowledge from scholarly publications as sources of data. To collect and analyze data and present my findings on the Bosnian genocide, I used Verdeja’s theoretical framework on the structural preconditions, ideological, and other contributive forces behind genocide as laid out in the article “On genocide: five contributing factors” (2002), and supplemented by author’s more recent work (2012). In addition, I used Shaw's explanation of the role of the international and regional systems in the production of genocide to situate the Bosnian genocide within the broader international context. Finally, to understand the effect of third parties on the continuation of the genocide, I situate global elite bystanders, such as the UN, as normal participants in genocide by employing Shaw’s (2012) theorization on the complexity and dynamics of genocidal relations between genocidists, targeted groups, and third parties.
I approached this topic, having actively and subjectively observed the genocidal war in Bosnia as a civilian living in Sarajevo throughout the conflict and the years after it ended. Thus, my motivation for this study rested partially on my personal experiences and my desire to overcome previously limited scientific understanding of the genocide in Bosnia and the troubling conditions of the society that remained in its aftermath. Furthermore, as a student of sociology and genocide, I sought to understand better social processes and conditions that generate genocide, ultimately contributing to the body of knowledge of the phenomenon of genocide.

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Conceptual Definitions

To describe and outlaw atrocities and the destruction committed by the Nazis during WWII, Raphael Lemkin, in 1944, defined the term 'genocide' in terms of the sustained, intentional, and premeditated killings of civilians and non-murderous techniques of genocide. After numerous edits and drafts by policymakers, the term was then codified into law in Article II of the *United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* in 1948 as

any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
The UN definition of genocide has not changed since it was first adopted, and it remains the legal definition of genocide today. Despite its numerous limitations, discussed below, many scholars construct their definitions of genocide by drawing on the UNGC definition.

Because genocide is both a legal and sociological concept, it is important to note the limitations of research that focuses on legal aspects of the phenomenon. For example, Hansen (2015:193) argues that "ambiguity, vagueness, legal and linguistic indeterminacy, interpretive leeway, and loopholes [are] the common features of international law." The UNGC is not an exception. While certain provisions of the Convention are sharply specific (e.g., fixed victim categories), other provisions are vague and unclear (e.g., scale or magnitude of genocide).

One of the difficult problems in academia with using the UN definition for understanding genocide is the concept of intent. As Smeulers (2008:971, 973) argues, a “paradox of international criminal law” lays in that “it aims to hold individuals responsible on the basis of the concept of individual criminal responsibility for crimes which are clear and explicit manifestations of collective violence.” Furthermore, by asking who is responsible for the genocide, it seeks to reveal individual culpability while neglecting the structural context. Verdeja (2002:38) claims that "intention is a fundamental aspect of genocide" as it allows us to distinguish it from "accidental deaths resulting from faulty social policies or benign neglect." However, Shaw (2015) finds the concept of intent to be problematic. First, genocidal actions have a "subjective meaning for the perpetrators" of genocide, or genocidists (Shaw 2015:111). Second, Shaw argues that genocidists are collective actors “engaged in political and military struggles” with “aims and policies [that] are necessarily complex and evolve according to the exigencies of the conflicts in which they are engaged” (Shaw 2015:111). Furthermore, among genocidists, there is usually a complex division of labor into general categories of organizers,
direct perpetrators, and supportive populations (Shaw 2015:147). Thus, Shaw argues, “we cannot assume singular intentions, let alone consistent motives for actions, or racist coherence of actors’ values and ideologies” (Shaw 2015:111).

The UNGC restricts targeted groups to the four categories of victims, which it terms protected groups, and leaves out political, sexual, class, and other groups. Some genocide scholars have modified the UNGC definition or formulated new definitions to include other social groups. Verdeja (2002:38) argues that it is the perpetrators who decide what social groups to target. However, regardless of the perpetrators' definitions of the victim groups, the civilian identity of the targeted groups is what “makes their targeting genocidal” (Shaw 2015:113). Furthermore, genocidists rarely focus on one kind of social target. Educated elites, including political enemies and social classes, are often targets of genocidists at the same time as ethnic or national groups (Shaw 2004:40).

Some scholars find the UNGC specification of the methods of genocide in terms of physical and biological destruction to be too broad and redefine genocide only as direct and intentional ‘mass murder’ (see Chalk and Jonahsson 1990). Such limitation leads to the development of new concepts such as “ethnic cleansing,” “politicide,” “gendercide,” “eliticide,” “culturicide,” etc., to describe the type of social destruction under their investigation. However, genocide is multifaceted destruction that involves social, cultural, physical, and biological destruction, encompassing all such concepts (Shaw 2015). Moreover, targeted groups experience suffering through other forms of violence beyond being killed. What links "torture, rape, separation, and dispossession" and other methods usually co-occurring in any given genocidal episode is "more important than their distinguishing features” (Shaw 2013:5).
The UNGC deliberately omits forced removal of targeted populations as one of the genocidal policies. However, genocidal destruction has a territorial dimension. Expulsion, territorial displacement, or forced removal continue to be "the most common means of group destruction throughout the modern period" (Shaw 2015:81). Shaw rejects the classification of 'ethnic cleansing' as something other than genocide, arguing that “because groups of people exist in physical space, [and] hold attachments to their land...destroying a social group always means destroying (partially if not totally) its presence and its economic, social and cultural power within a given territory” (Shaw 2015:81).

Even though the UN is more likely to use the concept of ‘ethnic cleansing’ than genocide, there is no precise UN definition of 'ethnic cleansing' or the qualification of violent acts that fall under the framework of the concept. A United Nations Commission of Experts, mandated to look into violations of international humanitarian law committed in the former Yugoslavia, defined ethnic cleansing in its interim report S/25274 as “rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area” (UN Security Council 1993). In its final report S/1994/674, the same Commission described ethnic cleansing as “a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas” (UN Security Council 1994).

Blum, Stanton, Sagi, and Richter argue that “bystanders’ use of the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ signals the lack of will to stop genocide, resulting in huge increases in deaths, and undermines international legal obligations to acknowledge genocide” (2008:204). The lack of will to act is evident in that “in all instances of genocide since 1948, there has been shameful delay in response by the UN, regional alliances, and major powers to first reports of genocidal
acts, despite immediate media attention” (Blum et al. 2008:208). The “use of the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ conceals the failure to investigate, collect and report the evidence of genocide, and worse, to prevent it” (Blum et al. 2008:207). However, even in the face of overwhelming evidence of ongoing atrocities, most cases of genocide are not recognized and represented as such due to difficult and highly contested processes with "powerful implications for international politics" (Shaw 2011:651). These processes shape the international community's policies toward an emerging conflict and may influence the actors involved in genocidal relations. In political and legal contexts, insisting on proof of genocide, especially while the atrocities are happening, can delay or prohibit the activity, enable the perpetrators to continue, etc.

In conclusion, in this section, I defined the concepts of genocide and closely related concepts, while other concepts emerge through literature review and presentation of the research results throughout the document. Even though the focus of my research is not on the clarification of the definition of genocide, it was relevant to engage in a discussion of the shortcomings of the UN definition. While it fails to capture the complexity of the phenomenon of genocide, it is the UNGC is of significance to the actors involved in the genocidal processes at all phases of conflict, including perpetrators, victims, and various third-party actors.

Theoretical Background

Scholars have identified and explored multiple structural and situational factors and processes that contribute to the emergence of genocidal episodes (for an overview, see Straus 2012). However, genocide does not have singular causes. Instead, it is a historical product that occurs within specific political, institutional, and ideological contexts. Theories on causes of genocide seek to explain how and why genocide occurs (Verdeja 2016).

I. Five contributing factors to genocide
The basic assumption of Verdeja’s framework is that the intersection of the five factors precipitates genocide and that the emergence of some of the factors without the presence of others will not result in genocide (2002:42). The five theoretical factors are grouped into three categories: structural elements (the existence of strong social cleavages and the lack of social stability), agentic elements (exclusionary ideology), and scalar and durational elements (resource mobilization and international context). Verdeja’s framework is ‘hybrid structuralist’ and holds that political oppression compounded with “a radically exclusivist political ideology" escalates into genocidal violence when two structural preconditions are met (Verdeja 2002:37-8).

Furthermore, the duration and scale of genocide are dependent on two factors "resource mobilization by the perpetrator regime and international support or interference" (Verdeja 2002:37, 41-43).

The first structural factor of genocide is the presence of profound political cleavages. Crucial preconditions for mass violence can emerge in a segmented society with strong social divisions (Verdeja 2002:38). Such divisions emerge out of identities already present among a population. Identities develop through political struggles across different historical contexts. Certain identities may persist over time, simultaneously shaping and being shaped in return by the broader public discourses. Furthermore, "regional and local histories, economic arrangements, accepted social practices, and other similarly contextual variables" determine the durability of those identities (Verdeja 2002:38). Under certain conditions, any existing identity in a population can become politically salient with potentially violent consequences. Extreme political violence may occur in societies with a history of intergroup violence and distrust among one another (Verdeja 2002). History of prior genocide and mass atrocities, especially when the perpetrator group was not punished or removed from power, makes the recurrence of such acts
somewhat more likely (Verdeja 2002:38-9). Political elites can instrumentalize such histories to achieve extremist in-group/out-group identifications by employing exclusivist methods, including scapegoating or devaluing the target groups (see factor four).

The second structural factor of genocide involves profound socio-political changes. Long-term structural issues such as poverty and long-term discrimination that is routinized and naturalized, of exclusion and marginalization may result in profound political and social insecurity that accompanies severe economic and social dislocation can facilitate devaluation and scapegoat of specific collectivities (Verdeja 2002:39). During a profound structural change, chaos and uncertainty may open an opportunity for political elites to make some collective identities salient again. The creation of a state through violent processes can be a major source of instability. Situations involving violence such as civil war, the threat of war, a coup led by a radical elite, and other types of social transformation also correlated with the onset of genocide and mass atrocity (Verdeja 2002:39).

The third factor of genocide is exclusivist political ideology employed by extremist political elites. The purpose of such exclusionary discourse is to construct "a powerful normative hierarchy between different segments of the population" or reinforce already existing divisions to legitimize the use of violence in the eyes of its in-group members (Verdeja 2002:37, 40). Verdeja (2002:40) defines exclusivist ideology as "a totalizing system of meaning based on pronounced in-group and out-group identifications, permitting no shared forms of identification between groups and premised on a hostile rejection of the out-group." The state elites encourage large-scale killings by publicly devaluing the victims and identifying them as enemies of the nation (Verdeja 2002:41). Therefore, the ideology must be adopted and reaffirmed by the elites and the public. However, it may be sufficient if the ideology is adopted by certain portions of the
population or state agency with the capacity to carry out exterminationist violence, such as the military (Verdeja 2002:40).

The fourth factor of genocide is resource mobilization, or the state’s capacity to carry out genocide. This capacity concerns the quantity and quality of the perpetrator’s lethal resources (such as weaponry) and its organizational ability to mobilize those resources (Verdeja 2013). Verdeja argues that, rather than being a precondition, resources available and committed to extermination by the perpetrating regime affect the scale and duration of genocide. The greater the resources devoted to extermination, the greater the scope and longer the duration of genocidal violence (Verdeja 2002:41-42). After successfully constructing divisions among different groups, the elites must devote resources to mobilizing large segments of the population against the target group. These actions may include encouraging "large-scale killings by publicly devaluing the victims and identifying them as enemies of the nation," "giving official sanction to their murder," and sustaining "massacres through the provision of logistical support, transportation and arms aid for the perpetrators" (Verdeja 2002:41). In more extreme cases, "states mobilize their military and security apparatuses, as well as numerous other coordinating bureaucracies, for the task of extermination" (Verdeja 2002:41). In some cases, states prioritize using their resources for the destruction of the targeted group despite needing those resources for more pressing issues such as fighting a war, which "illustrates the formidable focus [the regime] has on the genocidal project" (Verdeja 2002:42).

The fifth or final factor is the international context to genocide. Verdeja holds that the duration and scale of genocide are dependent not only on "resource mobilization by the perpetrator regime" but also on international interference (Verdeja 2002:37). International elements in the form of international support, indifference, or hostility play a crucial role in
enabling or limiting "the genocidal actions of political elites" and affecting the event's overall scope and duration (Verdeja 2002:37,41-42). Limited or lack of objections from the international community to genocidal policies allows for more time for extermination and a greater magnitude of violence. In some cases, genocidal states receive economic aid, or "general logistical and military support" from abroad necessary to carry out "systematic massacres without fear of economic collapse" (Verdeja 2002:42). The genocidists are "limited only by their own resourcefulness and their victims' ability to fight back" (Verdeja 2002:42).

In some cases, international actors are not always supportive of the perpetrator regime. Diplomatic protests, economic embargoes, and military invasions are some forms the external interference can take. Even though military intervention is often the most effective way to end atrocities, and the targeted groups often rely on external forces' military intervention, they rarely happen (Verdeja 2002:42). The historical record shows that the international community lacks the will to employ military intervention, and when it does, it is inefficient. Military intervention depends on "unpredictable political variables" and is "rarely, if ever, grounded solely in humanitarian concerns" (p.42). Thus, foreign interference often comes in the form "of spotty media coverage and occasional threats from an otherwise disinterested world community" (Verdeja 2002:42).

II. Genocide in international context: World-historical perspective

Genocide has occurred across different socio-historical contexts and is “one of history’s defining features, overlapping a range of central historical processes: war, imperialism, state-building, and class struggle” (Jones 2006: xxi). Shaw reveals the link between genocide and the modern international system by looking at significant late-modern historical changes of genocide. He finds that genocide is almost invariably conditioned by ever-changing international
politics and international relations (Shaw 2013:52; 193). This relationship is evident in the "synchronizations of major changes in the history of genocide with major changes in the international system," that is, historical shifts in global power arrangements (2013:193).

Shaw, drawing on the work of scholars such as Midlarsky (2015) and Levene (2005), argues that the international ‘context’ is the key to understanding genocide because “actors in genocidal conflicts operate simultaneously in interstate and state-society relations” (2013:46-50, 193). Events happening at the regional or international level shape local social relations by “either promoting or abetting genocide or preventing it altogether” (Midlarsky 2005:18). Levene argues (2005:156) that "the system is itself a root of modern genocide," realized through "the power competition in interstate relations and the normative frameworks of international institutions which regulates these relations – and how they interact in the production of genocide."

The systemic characteristics of international relations are historically variable, which can be observed in the variations in forms and patterns of genocide (Shaw 2013:63). Colonial, imperial, and international contexts generate genocidal relations in which "a range of international actors including third parties operate and relate to each other" (Shaw 2013:61). The “inter-imperial system systematically produced genocidal relations in local and regional conflicts with indigenous polities, while culminating in world wars which generalized genocidal tendencies” (Shaw 2013:199). Furthermore, literature shows that “colonialism contributes to the formation of in and out groups within societies” (Shaw 2013). The pattern of genocide in WWII was “driven by war between great powers, other states and armed movements (Shaw 2013:197).

Along with geopolitical modifications and expansion of democratization in the aftermath of WWII came significant changes in the preconditions, forms, and incidence of genocide (Shaw
The most significant change in the post-WWII international structure was establishing the United Nations system of world institutions as a response to the atrocities committed by Nazi and Japanese and to ensure lasting international peace and prevent and punish genocide in war and peace. These changes “represented a common authority framework for the entire world” and “a new common world interest in human rights and the prevention of mass slaughter” (Shaw 2000:120-1). With such treaties and mechanisms in place, the IC was now formally obligated to assist in conflict management, prevent or halt genocide, and punish the perpetrators. However, the “global-era international relations, while institutionalizing genocide prevention...have been implicated in producing as well as containing genocide...through [military interventions, conflict management, and democracy promotion]” (Shaw 2013:199). The UNGC, intended to deter and punish genocidists, was drafted and signed “in the context of ongoing genocide in which several of its principal members were involved, and which in one case it played a part in enabling it” (Shaw 2013:96). As Shaw explains, “expectations of a post-war world were undermined by genocide perpetrated by its member-states and others, in some of which the UN itself and Western powers were complicit” (Shaw 2013:124). Furthermore, the IC never took their duties seriously to prevent and punish, as targeting of civilian populations remains a recurring feature of many conflicts (2013:196).

During the Cold War, Europe was at the center of "strategic and diplomatic calculations," and it remained “stable and relatively peaceful” as opposed to “many states and regions around the world where the post-1945 period was decidedly hot” (Lawson 2010:1). Genocidal violence was a part of many political and armed conflicts during the Cold War and decolonization (Shaw 2013). The majority of the crises and nearly all of the casualties of the Cold War, which included over twenty million people, happened in the Third World (Lawson 2010). The Cold War bloc
system allowed for "[militarization of] social, political and ethnonational relations in many regions, while linked processes of decolonization and contested post-colonial power led to genocidal insurgency and counter-insurgency" (Shaw 2013:199). Under such conditions, the UN's efforts to prevent genocide and other forms of human rights violations were mostly absent. In terms of intervention, peacekeeping, and peacemaking, since its inception and until the end of the Cold War, the role of the UN in the preservation of world peace was minimal. With the end of the Cold War rather than a decisive shift toward suppressing genocide, “[the] transition of the late 1980s, like that of the late 1940s, involved a change in the pattern of genocide and its relation to the international system” (Shaw 2013:124).

While Shaw sees variations in genocide across these periods of change, he does not reject the apparent continuities that are evident in “general social processes including othering, dehumanization, and enemy formation, and specific methods of genocide such as expulsion, rape, and murder” utilized across historical periods of modernity (Shaw 2013:201). Furthermore, the recurrence of genocide in some regions across different historical periods demonstrates that “historical change does not create blank slates for new conflict” because “structural forces that shape the international system in one period continue to mark it, albeit in different contexts, in subsequent eras” (Shaw 2013:4).

III. Genocidal relations

Genocide is not a one-sided phenomenon. Instead, genocidal relations are characterized by "complex discriminations along lines of class, gender, party and locality" that develop through "combined, sequential and sometimes mutual targeting of different groups" (Shaw 2013:34-7). Shaw argues that "even the most asymmetrical conflict is often embedded in a system of conflicts, in which actors from victim-groups are allied to other actors who are
perpetrating violence" (Shaw 2015:35). For example, in recent research on the Rohingya genocide, Anwary (2019) finds that the interviewed refugees are divided in their views on the perpetrators. While all the interviewees saw the Myanmar Military as the perpetrator, some also saw the Buddhists as the perpetrators while others did not.

Genocidal relations rarely involve only genocidists and their targets. The complexity of genocidal relations is amplified by the presence of third parties, the actors who are external to the conflict but intervening in “the core relations between genocidists and their targets” (Shaw 2015:148-9). Third parties can participate in genocidal conflict through actions directly aimed at the conflict “by intervening politically, militarily or socially to prevent or halt genocide, or to aid the victims” (Shaw 2015:149). Furthermore, the actions of third parties in the conflict can indirectly affect the course of genocide. Usually, these modes of participation are combined (Shaw 2015:149).

Smeulers and Grünfeld (2011:355) argue that the role of any third party should "be defined according to its actions in relation to the other actors in the particular event." In the literature on atrocities and military conflicts, third parties are usually framed as passive bystanders, onlookers, passers-by, and observers (Shaw 2013; Smeulers and Grünfeld 2011). The bystander status is usually reserved for "states and international organizations in national and international politics" (Smeulers and Grünfeld 2011:331); "institutional actors with recognized legal duties and obligations in relation to ongoing international crimes" (Cameron 2012:71). For Shaw, bystanders are "actors who have the power capabilities to prevent or halt genocide" (2013:37).

A bystander can act as a collaborator by assisting the perpetrator or as a rescuer, assisting the victim (Smeulers and Grünfeld 2011:331). They argue that the bystander can, in principle,
behave 'neutrally' by assisting neither the perpetrator nor the victim. However, by doing nothing – "the bystander seems to give [their] tacit approval and enables the perpetrator to continue, thus effectively becoming a collaborator by facilitating the continuation and performance of the perpetrator's acts (Smeulers and Grünfeld 2011:333). The inaction of external elite bystanders is crucial to those who carry out mass atrocities. Any bystander can take a number of 'collaborator' and 'rescuer' roles and at any particular time during an episode of atrocities or a conflict period (Smeulers and Grünfeld 2011:355). Shaw argues that 'bystanding' is often seen as a response to genocide in the form of "observing without acting to halt genocide" (Shaw 2013:37). However, such a response cannot be seen as 'non-action' as the observers may be in fact acting "according to their own perceptions of their interests, values, and capabilities, even if in ways which fail to prevent or which even facilitate genocide (Shaw 2013:37). They are normal actors in genocide (2015:149).

In conclusion, the main purpose of this section was to move away from the conventional understanding of third parties as passive bystanders as often encountered in the literature. Instead, bystanders are active participants in the relations of genocide even when they do not act to stop genocide (Shaw 2013; Smeulers and Grünfeld 2011). All actors in genocidal relations, genocidists, their targets, and third parties have complex and changing roles.

CHAPTER 3. BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE BOSNIAN GENOCIDE

While some external and internal nationalist factions deny its existence, "Bosnia is the historical name of the South Slavonic country and present the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has existed in various state and constitutional forms for over a thousand years" (Lovrenovic 1994:416). For thousands of years, the peoples of Southeastern Europe (also known
under a geopolitical term, the Balkans) and among them those of Bosnian people have "intermittently suffered and flourished under various rulers" (Morus 2010:66). Their lives have been affected by the socio-political processes occurring in the regional and international contexts. Competing interests between foreign powers and transitions between occupation regimes have produced new social arrangements and relations between the peoples living in Bosnia, resulting in genocidal violence. For Hajdarpasic (2015:5), Bosnia represents a fascinating site of transnational and trans-imperial competition and mutual influence.

The overwhelming majority of people living today in Southeastern Europe, especially in Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia, are of South Slavic background (Judah 1997, Mazower 2002; Morus 2010). As Mazower explains, "human migrations have shaped the ethnography of the Balkans" for centuries. Thus, the "linguistic, racial and religious diversity of the people dates back to the Slavic invasions [mid-6th century], if not earlier" (Mazower 2002:40). Over the five centuries of Ottoman rule, from 1463–1878, despite the local populations’ conversion to Islam, the region remained religiously and culturally diverse. The Ottoman Empire was not an “ethnically based polity” and was able to “accommodate a variety of languages and religions” (Mazower 2002:40; 147). Furthermore, changes in the population were driven by larger socio-historical changes such as the fall of empires and through purposeful policies (by the Ottomans and later by the Yugoslav communists).

After the fall of the Ottomans, Bosnia was annexed to Austria-Hungary in 1908 and eventually became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in 1918 (Mazower 2002). In 1914 Bosnia became the assassination site that triggered the First World War (Hajdarpasic 2015:5). During World War II, while under the occupation of the Axis, Yugoslavia was the scene of genocidal and other mass atrocities (Hoare 2010). The occupying, fascist Axis powers
carried out crimes of genocide and mass violence against local populations, and by deliberately exploiting “the tensions simmering between ethnic groups” (Mazower 2002:123), facilitated home-grown genocidal projects of the Croat Ustasa and Serb Chetniks (Hoare 2010:1221). In addition to other repressive policies, the Croat regime has established concentration camps where it imprisoned and killed hundreds of thousands of Serbs and Jews (Mazower 2002:123).

Meanwhile, Serb Chetniks ‘killed tens of thousands of non-Serbs’ with intention ‘to cleanse Bosnia of everything that is not Serb’” (Banac 1994 cited in Mazower 2002:123). The Partisans, an army of communists led by Josip Broz Tito, played a decisive role in defeating the occupying Axis forces and their allies, the Nazi-puppet state of Croatia, and a Serb army defending the Serb-dominated Kingdom of Yugoslavia (Hoare 2010:1193).

After the war, in an attempt to heal national grievances, Tito organized the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (from now on SFRY or Yugoslavia) into six federal socialist republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. The central Yugoslavian government was in Belgrade, Serbia, and was dominated by Serbs. Tito himself and the Communist Party were the two unifying forces of this highly complex system of republics and national groups (Mazower 2002; Shaw 2003; Mulaj 2008). In 1974 the newly adopted federal Constitution recognized Bosnian Muslims for the first time as a ‘constitutive nation’ joining the other five nationalities that already held that privilege. To prevent the emergence of nationalism, "tensions between the republics were settled at the federal level of the state and Party apparatus" (Mazower 2002:140). Over time, it was “the Bosnian party, which had the most hardline leadership of any republic, became increasingly important in supporting the federal leadership” against “the nationalist currents [emerging] among Party cadres” (Mazower 2002:140).
After the death of Tito, with the so-called ethnic revival and increasingly competitive nationalist agendas, the system began to break down (Mazower 2002:140; Shaw 2013:133). By 1987, Serb nationalist ambitions were openly propagated by political leaders like Slobodan Milosevic (Mazower 2002:141). Mid-1989 was further marked by Milosevic's political maneuvers that strengthened the dominance of Serbia within the Yugoslav Federation (Karcic 2015). Meanwhile, in Croatia, Tudjman's nationalist doctrine dominated Croatian elections in 1990 (Pilch and Derdzinski 2004:94). In Bosnia, the first multiparty elections led to the power acquisition of nationalist parties representing the three largest ethnic groups. However, Banac (2009:461) argues, "there was no 'revival,' nor a specifically virulent form of Balkan or Yugoslav nationalism" as "nationalist trends in the Balkans always reflected and lagged behind the situation at the European center" including "the extraordinary horrors that overtook the northern areas of East Central Europe" in the 1940s. Instead, nationalist leaders manipulated ethnicity by spreading propaganda of fear, insecurity, and hatred, which advanced their political agenda and eventually led to an open conflict (Banac 2009; Mazower 2002; Oberschall 2000).

The end of the Cold War 1989 saw the collapse of 'communism' as an international geopolitical force affecting the global political-economic order and political-military affairs (Biserko 2007). In 1948, Yugoslavia was out of the Soviet bloc and into the Western sphere of influence. Officially, Yugoslavia remained “unaligned” with the two superpowers. The move, which compounded with its geo-strategic position, allowed it easier access to financial aid from the West during the Cold War. However, its significance faded with the end of the Cold War (Biserko 2007) further contributing to increasing socio-economic and political instability. The breakdown of the bi-polar order had many effects on Europe and the world as a whole, but above others, for the people in socialist states around the world (Lawson 2010:1). Although not
ubiquitous, the outcome of these effects was sometimes violent and included mass atrocities (Shaw 2013). The breakup of Yugoslavia is often wrongfully “seen as completely distinct from the developments which simultaneously took place elsewhere throughout the European continent” (Glaudric 2011:3). Shaw (2013:201) suggests that it should be understood “as an extreme case of the general conditions of the end of the Cold War, collapse of Communism and onset of democratization, which elsewhere did not always or generally produce genocide.” Other factors such as the unification of Germany and the larger project of European integration and enlargement, in which the European Community (EC) transformed itself into the European Union (EU) also shaped the international relations and overall external approach to Yugoslav crisis (Glaudric 2011).

The genocidal war in Bosnia and Herzegovina officially began on April 6, 1992, and ended on December 14, 1995. The end of the armed fighting was achieved through the acceptance of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) by the leaders of the three countries involved in the conflict: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Croatia in Dayton, Ohio, USA, on November 21, 1995. Unfortunately, while celebrated as a success of international diplomacy, DPA reinforced the conflict gains of the perpetrators of genocide. Furthermore, the international community's endorsement and implementation of DPA "institutionalized ethnic divisions and infused an ethno-national element to everything in Bosnia" (Freedom House 2018). Since then, Bosnia has remained under international supervision through the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in charge of implementing and enforcing the peace agreement.

CHAPTER 4: METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

To understand the factors behind the genocide in Bosnia 1992-1995, I have conducted a qualitative content analysis of secondary data sources in the form of the existing literature
relevant to the topic. Qualitative content analysis is "a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns" (Hsieh and Shannon 2005:1278). I employed a method of directed content analysis with a goal to "validate or extend conceptually a theoretical framework or theory" (p.1281). This approach relies on "existing theory or prior research to develop the initial coding scheme prior to beginning to analyze the data" (Hsieh and Shannon 2005:1286).

Additional sub-codes are developed as the analysis proceeds, and "the initial coding scheme [is] revised and refined" (Hsieh and Shannon 2005:1286).

Limitations of the Method

The weaknesses of the research using secondary published literature are related to the availability and access to the sources. Not all databases index items comprehensively - not all information about a publication is included in records; not all journal content is indexed. Publication authors may not have described articles accurately with key terms used. Some sources may not be included in traditional databases. Bias can stem from the actions of the original authors of a publication and the actions of the reviewer. The risk of bias can come at different stages of the research design, including selection, collection, synthesis, interpretation, and reporting. For example, selection bias may be caused by the absence of publications that should have been included in the synthesis but were not due to the limitations of the search tools (not identified) and availability of the identified but inaccessible publications; or studies that conflict with the author's beliefs can be overlooked or excluded. Adhering to a well-developed analytic protocol or a coding scheme increases the trustworthiness or validity of the study.
Data Collection

The review focused on discovering what contributive factors behind the genocide in Bosnia are suggested by the authors of publications drawn from the multidisciplinary, predominately social sciences, journal literature, and other forms of scholarly literature. In addition to these primary objects of analysis, I also used gray literature such as reports commissioned or produced by other organizations where necessary.

By utilizing the MavScholar database, I have conducted comprehensive searches and identified scholarly literature about the explanations of the genocide in Bosnia published since 1993 using the following search criteria:

1. Bosnia OR Bosnia-Herzegovina OR Yugoslavia OR Balkan*

   AND

2. genocide OR "ethnic cleansing" OR atrocities OR war

3. explanation OR context OR background OR cause OR factor

4. international OR global

5. response OR intervention OR involvement

To ensure that relevant data sources are not overlooked in the review, I ran a parallel search on Google Scholar using the same search terms, where I was able to identify additional publications not found by the original search. In some cases, I accessed the new results by entering the title and author's name in the MavScholar search tool. Additional relevant scholarly and gray literature was identified by "examining references in the literature already obtained" (Torraco 2016:416) and retrieved through MavScholar when available. I have attempted to locate and retrieve any search results that qualified but were not available in full text by using a basic Google search engine. In some cases, the authors made publications available through websites
such as ResearchGate and Academia.edu. For some literature that qualified I did not have access beyond the abstract or summary (e.g., Bassiouni 2017).

Initially, I have conducted a staged review of the literature by reviewing titles and abstracts of scholarly articles, executive summary, or a book preface and content where applicable to determine the degree of relevance to the research questions and adherence to the eligibility criteria. The search results were narrowed down and systematically categorized per the initial coding scheme discussed below. Additional inclusion criteria were that the source must consider at least two coding categories (factors of genocide). An exclusion criterion was that the source focused solely on or overemphasized the 'ancient hatreds' factor as an explanation for the genocide. Ultimately, twenty individual scholarly works satisfied the criteria. Finally, I conducted an in-depth review and coding of each item.

Coding and Analysis

I completed the coding of the contributing factors to emerging genocide in two stages. The first stage involved identifying initial conceptual coding categories based on existing theories of genocide and includes five broad coding categories: (1) profound socio-political divisions, (2) social instability and profound structural changes, (3) exclusivist political ideology, (4) resource mobilization, and (5) international context. Each of these coding categories contains sets of codes, of which the majority was predetermined through the initial literature review. The predetermined codes based on proposed structural and ideological preconditions to genocide were revealed consistently across examined scholarly works on genocide in Bosnia.

Additional codes were developed to describe the new data that emerged through content analysis of the published literature. Under (1) profound socio-political divisions category, I identified the following as codes: a. ethnic diversity with salient ethno-nationalist identities; b.
history of intergroup violence. Under (2) social instability and profound structural changes code category, I identified the following as codes: a. economic crisis and crisis of state legitimacy; b. democratization and decentralization of the federal government; c. political repression and violence; d. dissolution of the federal state and proclamation of independence; e. expanding conflict and shifting allegiances. Under (3) exclusivist political ideology, I identified the following as codes: a. extremist elite/leadership; b. construction of collective identities; c. dehumanization and devaluation of targeted groups; d. ethnic definition of territory. Under (4) resource mobilization, I identified the following as codes: a. state capacity to carry out genocide; b. targeted group's capacity to resist genocide. Under (5) international context, I identified the following as codes: a. global elite bystanders interfering in conflict; b. willingness to intervene; c. representation and classification of the conflict; d. measures taken to stop violence; e. conflict mediation and peacemaking; f. effectiveness of intervention.

I performed most of the analysis digitally using the Preview tool on my personal computer and manually annotating documents. For the works in printed format, I coded manually on paper. I engaged in paragraph-by-paragraph coding of the scholarly publications to gain in-depth knowledge of the data. Identification and coding of the factors were followed by grouping for analysis. Emergent themes/codes were grouped with initial codes based on factors. Prior and emergent themes and other observations were then recorded in a Microsoft Excel document. Furthermore, through the procedure described above, I have accumulated data into a database organized in two data structures or indexes: (1) Sources data-structure that contains objects of analysis - all source material organized in table formatted, so each row represents one unique entry - an individual data source item; the first two columns for each entry includes the author; title/subtitle of the publication; year of production or publishing, abstract. Each
subsequent column holds a datum/code based on the initial coding scheme; additional columns were added for new codes that did not fit the predetermined codes. (2) Metadata or data structure with codes and sub-codes accessed through secondary sources are organized following the initial coding scheme. Coding categories, codes, and subcodes occupy rows, with columns holding relevant excerpts (typical and atypical exemplars) from the source material.

Qualitative Synthesis and Narrative Construction

Identification and coding of the factors were followed by grouping for analysis. Emergent themes/codes were grouped with initial themes/coding with similar factors. I used this data to address the following research questions: how and why the genocide in Bosnia occurred and why it persisted despite the UN efforts to intervene in the conflict. I present my answers in the Chapter 5. Findings and Chapter 6. Discussion.

CHAPTER 5. FINDINGS

This section presents the socio-historical factors of the genocide I identified in existing scholarly literature. The following code sets about genocide preconditions were consistent across the literature that satisfied the criteria: (1) profound socio-political divisions, (2) social instability and profound structural changes, (3) exclusivist political ideology, (4) resource mobilization, and (5) international context. In addition, examples of the emergent subcodes include the targeted group's capacity to resist genocide (under resource mobilization code), representation and classification of the conflict, and measures to stop violence taken (both under international context code).

Profound Socio-political Divisions

Ethnic diversity with salient ethno-nationalist identities. The key causes of divisions within the SFRY were Serb nationalistic pretensions of Serb hegemony (Becirevic 2014:71). In
the period leading to the onset of the conflict, the ethno-national identities of the most numerous groups in Bosnia became increasingly the salient dimension of political contention resulting in the division into three warring ethno-religious groups. According to Morus, the exaggeration of inter-group difference among the diverse population was largely rooted in religious differences and narratives based on real and invented episodes of intergroup violence throughout the country and the region (Morus 2010:67). With the onset of the war, growing nationalist and religious divisions were compounded by ideological separations emerging from political and moral tensions.

As opposed to other SFRY republics with clear ethnic majorities, "BiH represented Yugoslavia's multi-ethnic essence" where, according to a 1991 population census, nearly 44 percent of the population were identified as "Bosnian-Muslim," slightly over 30 percent as Serbs, around 17 percent as Croats, and the rest as 'other" (Morus 2010:67). Further, these largest groups included other subgroups with "various goals, strategies, and beliefs" (Morus 2010:67). With about one-third of urban marriages being 'mixed' or "between partners of different ethnic/religious backgrounds" (Morus 2010:67), Bosnia had the highest rate of group intermarrying of all Yugoslav republics. This large degree of diversity has ensured that the complexity of the conflict and magnitude of violence and persecution of civilians would be the largest in all the wars of Yugoslav succession. Over the course of war, ethnoreligious identities became even more salient. Now including the targeted groups who increasingly became accepting of their new identities. In urban areas, especially in Sarajevo, people have resisted the process, striving to preserve “secular, ethnically pluralist character of the city”, but “even them found it acting in accordance with the new emphasis on religion and nationality-or, ironically, reacting against nationalism in a way that reinforced those divisions” (Macek 2009:123).
History of intergroup violence. Bosnia and the wider region have a history of intergroup violence. Scholars (Mazower 2002; Mulaj 2008; Hoare 2010; Shaw 2013) identified several major episodes of ethnic cleansing in twentieth-century Balkans, including violence that occurred during the Balkan Wars (1912-13), the First World War, the Second World War, and post-WWII. As it did in the rest of Europe, the rise of the nation-state in the Balkans has included "the process of national homogenization and mass violence against members of the ethno-religious 'other'" (Hoare 2010:1121). Mulaj (2008:528) argues that "the rate of occurrence of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans suggests that mass expulsion in the region may have been conceived by national elites as a consistent 'solution' to undesired ethnic minorities."

Furthermore, according to Shaw the Balkans can be seen as one of the world's "region[s] of genocide" in which "nationalist conflicts...repeatedly produce anti-population violence" (2013:197). Malesevic points out that the West’s idea of the Balkans is ethnocentric and false because “for much of its history this region was less violent and certainly less nationalist than its Western European counterparts” (2012:301).

Social Instability and Profound Structural Changes

Economic crisis and crisis of state legitimacy. The late sixties and early seventies were the period of relative economic prosperity in Yugoslavia (Lukic and Lynch 1996:110). However, after Tito's death, increased income inequality, diminished income-earning opportunities, falling living standards, and increased uncertainty caused by the economic crisis represented a "challenge to the legitimacy of the political system itself" (Mazower 2002:138). According to Harland, "real income per capita fell by almost half in the decade following Tito's death" (2017:4).
A protracted economic crisis, a decade of external debt crisis, and austerity measures enacted in response have eroded “the economic and social bases for stable and inclusive government” (Klugman 1999:14). This “reduced capacity of the state to deliver services and income security” effectively undermined the legitimacy of the federal government and “increased the potential for conflict” (Klugman 1999:14). Furthermore, freezing wages and other austerity measures, alienated workers and contributed to the rise of discontent toward the government (Klugman 1999; Mazower 2002). This weakening of the strength of the federal government "opened the way for nationalist struggles at the regional and republic level over economic resources and political power" (Mazower 2002:138). Serbian and Slovene political elites, in particular, resisted the austerity measures (Mazower 2002:138).

In 1980s International Monetary Fund (IMF) came to the government's aid but only temporarily. As Klugman (1999:13-4) elaborates,

it is argued that the IMF failed to recognize and accommodate the consequences of its conditionality in terms of social polarization and political disintegration. The austerities required by policies of demand repression led to conditions that could not easily foster a political culture of tolerance and compromise. The macroeconomic programmes neglected effective safety nets while they failed to take into account the political capacity needed to manage the conflicts associated with the stabilization programme. Hence, while the IMF programme did not directly cause the outbreak of the conflict, the policies associated with stabilization and adjustment added a further source of discontent with the federal government.
Looking in the context of international changes, Yugoslavia’s unaligned status between two power blocs during the Cold War allowed it easier access to financial aid from the West, with the end of Cold War that was no longer the case (Harland 2017).

Democratization and decentralization of the federal government. Already existing social instability in the Yugoslav republics was further exacerbated by constitutional changes, "[abandonment] of socialism for a market economy," and the processes of democratic transition (Oberschall 2000:987). Hoare (2019:119) explains,

the Bosnian Muslims were officially recognized as a nation in 1968 and, thanks to their higher birth rate and higher Serb emigration, they overtook the Serbs to become the largest Bosnian nationality by the start of the 1970s. The Bosnian Croats, too, were rehabilitated from the late 1960s onward, assuming their share of power in the republic. This loss of hegemony laid the basis for a progressive Bosnian Serb disenchantment with the Bosnian republic, leading eventually to secessionist rebellion.

For some of the states and provinces, the early "substitute" for democratization can be found in the adoption of the 1974 Constitution. The Serbian political elite aggrieved about the recognition of Muslims as a 'constitutive nation', also felt that the constitution "placed Serbia at an unfair disadvantage by allowing for two autonomous provinces within Serbia: Kosovo (with an Albanian majority) and Vojvodina (with a Hungarian majority)" (Morus 2007:162). The change considerably increased the national republics' constitutional authority, effectively decentralizing the federal Government in Belgrade (Serbia), but also strengthening nationalist tendencies within republics (Lukic and Lynch 1996:108-111).

The first democratic elections in SFRY republics played a critical role in the dissolution of Yugoslavia, since now "the principle of electoral legitimacy was established, and ethnic-
nationalist parties knew that they had to maintain electoral majorities in their new statelets" (Shaw 2013). In Bosnia, being the most diverse of the republics, Bosnian-Muslim (also termed Bosniak, a somewhat contested term), Serbian and Croatian nationalist parties struggled for control against each other (Shaw 2003) as well against non-ethnic parties (Mazower 2002). Maksic (2015:334) explains, the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina (SDS BiH) “in the 16 months that followed the elections, it initiated a series of activities that eroded the power of BiH institutions to which it had been elected. SDS BiH declared its own organs superior to those of BiH and established exclusive control in Serb-majority areas.”

Political repression and violence. Before the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the onset of the armed conflicts, political repression and violence against civilians was already happening across Yugoslav republics contributing to the further instability of the SFRY. Mulaj (2008:78) points out that since 1989 a "milder form of ethnic cleansing has been going on in Kosovo," where 90 percent of the population was Albanian and predominately Muslim. By ending the province's autonomy, Milosevic has instituted a repressive apartheid-like regime (Shaw 2003; Jones 2006; Mulaj 2008). Tens of thousands of ethnic Albanians were removed from jobs and deprived of health services. In addition, Milosevic turned Kosovo into a large militia camp (Jones 2006:214) and forced Albanians out of all public institutions including schools: forcing them to set up parallel unofficial bodies, creating an uneasy situation of dual power in Kosova" (Shaw 2003:190). Jones claims, "in retrospect, this was the key event that unraveled Yugoslavia" because after seeing what happened in Kosovo, "no ethnic group could feel entirely safe in a Serb-dominated federation" (Jones 2006:214).

Dissolution of the federal state and proclamation of independence. While some scholars blame state failure in Yugoslavia for the breakup and violence that ensued, Mulaj (2008)
distinguishes state collapse and state failure. State institutions can persist in fulfilling their key attributes, even when the state fails. Although the federation of Yugoslavia collapsed in 1991, the state at the republic level did not. In Serbia and Croatia, in particular, the state was functional in fulfilling its duty to its respective populace in its entirety. However, it did not offer protection to all its citizens. Some state institutions were in existence in Bosnia as well, although the government in Sarajevo was much weaker than its counterparts in Belgrade and Zagreb. Even during the most severe armed conflicts during the Yugoslav wars, "state institutions were in place and operating" (Mulaj 2008:12).

Lukic and Lynch argue that "Great Serbian nationalism had in effect destroyed Yugoslavia and any prospect for a peaceful renegotiation of political relations among the nations of Yugoslavia, before the Slovene and Croatian movements towards independence" (1996:113; original emphasis). Dissolution of Yugoslavia thus officially started when the authorities of Slovenia and Croatia, the two wealthiest and most 'Westernized' republics, eventually moved towards independence, striving toward the unification with the EU (Slovenia in 2004 and Croatia in 2013 have been into the Union). Their proclamations prompted an attack by the JNA (Shaw 2003). However, the war against Slovenia was brief, and a formality, involved few deaths, and led to a quick JNA withdrawal (Hoare 2019). In contrast, the war in Croatia was brutal, involving direct persecution, ethnic cleansing, a variety of mass atrocities, hence genocide. Moreover, since Croatia had upwards of 600,000 Serbs living in Croatia, Milosevic was determined to prevent Croatia from leaving, or at least not with its intact borders, and even "local Serb leaders were poised to create the Krajina statelet linked to Serbia" (Shaw 2003:190), as “they did not want to become minorities in someone else's new nationalist state” (Harland 20017:8).
For BiH, the transition was exceptionally difficult as it fought to support the preservation of the Bosnian federation (Mulaj 2008). The Bosnian Muslim and Croat parties, faced with growing Serbian nationalism, decided on an independent Bosnia. The BiH independence referendum was held on February 29 and March 1, during which nearly 64% of registered Bosnians voted affirmatively despite a boycott by most ethnic Serbs and disruptions in SDS-governed municipalities" (Maksic 2015:341). Although it faced a hostile Serbian opposition, the Muslim-Croat majority voted for independence hoping for a peaceful dissolution. However, speaking to the BiH Parliament, SDS BIH leader Radovan Karadzic (1991 cited in Sim 1998) threatened:

Please understand this seriously. This is not good what you Muslims are doing. You want to take Bosnia-Herzegovina down the freeway to hell that Slovenia and Croatia are traveling. Do not think you will not lead Bosnia into hell. And do not think that you can avoid making the Muslim people disappear because the Muslim people cannot defend themselves if there is a war.

Under significant social and political divisions described above, Bosnia and Herzegovina, following Slovenia and Croatia, declared its independence from the SFRY in March 1992 and was recognized in April 1992 by the UN and the international community as an independent and sovereign state. In response to Bosnia's declaration of independence from Yugoslavia, Bosnian Serbs immediately declared independence from Bosnia and Herzegovina (Jones 2006:215). They established a parallel state, while the JNA launched a campaign to 'cleanse' Bosnia of its Muslim population. Ethnic cleansing "was purported to serve the policy of nation-state building and ancillary efforts of national elites to achieve security for the dominant nation" (Mulaj 2008:11).
Bosnian independence proclamation and its overwhelming recognition by the international community signified the official beginning of the war in Bosnia. However, the recognition itself was a trigger and not the cause of the Serbian aggression on Bosnia. Serbia made its plans earlier, and the process of carving up the republic was already underway (Mulaj 2008:97). With the beginning of the war, "Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats fought to unite with Serbia and Croatia respectively by breaking up the non-Serbian and non-Croatian populations in the areas they controlled or aimed to control" (Shaw 2003:191). Shaw claims that "the Serbian political rationale for expelling much of the [Bosnian Muslims] and Croatian population was already determined before the violence began" (2013:134). In 1991, before the onset of the conflict, Tudjman and Milosevic, despite being enemies to each other, had been discussing dividing up Bosnia in pursuit of their nationalistic goals (Shaw 2003:135; Lukic and Lynch 1996:209-212). Therefore, genocide, in this case, is not the consequence of the war. Instead, the war was genocidal in its planning and execution.

*Expanding conflict and shifting allegiances.* Bosnian Croat forces, HVO (Croatian Defence Council) and HOS (Croatian Defence Forces; the main military force of Bosnian Croats), were initially allies of the Bosnian Army (Lukic and Lynch 1996; Shaw 2003). However, by summer 1992, HVO purged its rank of Muslim soldiers. Under orders from Croatia, HVO assassinated the commander of the HOS to destroy the Croat-Muslim military alliance that fought together "for the territorial integrity of BiH and consolidate power over the forces." In preparation for the partition of Bosnia, Herzeg-Bosna, a para-state with Mostar as its capital, was established in the territories adjacent to Croatia. During the Croat-Muslim war 1993-1994, Croats committed ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims as well. For example, when thousands of Muslim refugees fleeing Serbian genocidal attacks in eastern BiH were pouring into Croat-
controlled Mostar and started to change the "national balance of the city," Croats continued the genocide started by the Serbs (Lukic and Lynch 1996:213). This expansion of the conflict had further impacted Bosnian Muslims' ability to defend themselves as they were now targeted by two enemies. In 1995 with a renowned alliance that ended the 1993-94 Bosnian-Croat war, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were able to turn the tables against Serbian forces (Shaw 2003:191).

**Exclusivist Political Ideology**

*Extremist elite/leadership.* Mulaj (2008:12) demonstrates that 'ethnic cleansing' was carried out by "nationalist military agents in accordance with a devised state policy." The political manipulation of identities as legitimating ideology of nationalist projects has involved the formulation of ideological goals, construction of collective identities, and ethnic definition of territory. May (2013:612) argues that "the war had been brought about by Milosevic's greater Serbia project" and that "the very same issue underpinned the continuation of the conflict." Lukic and Lynch (1996:113) state that "in almost every important respect, the chain of events leading to the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia...is directly related to the implementation of the political programme of Slobodan Milosevic after he became the unquestioned leader of Serbia."

However, as Biserko (1999) argues, "while Milosevic bears primary responsibility for disasters caused by the regime, in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and... Kosovo, he has only followed and expressed the collective consciousness of much of the Serbian elite - especially within the security forces." In the late 1980s, Milosevic took the opportunity and "transformed himself...form a staunch communist into a born-again Serbian ultranationalist" by adopting "the political program of the most ultranationalist Serbs - a fringe faction that was never permitted to promote their neofascist ideology under Tito" (Campbell 2001:56).
Construction of collective identities. The Serb nationalist project was formulated in the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU Memorandum) in 1986, which outlined all the Serbian grievances and determined the direction of the Serbian nationalist policy (Cekic 2005; Glaurdic 2009; Morus 2007). Cekic claims that the memorandum was produced for "the realization of the Serbian nationalist program" (2005:200). The SANU Memorandum had a profound influence on the official policy of Serbia in the Yugoslav crisis. The Memorandum "launched a new virulent vocabulary into the public discourse" including "phrases such as 'genocide against the Serbs,' 'the Serbian Holocaust,' 'the Serbian exodus,' etc., rhetoric that infused politics, and particularly the media, which played a crucial role in the radicalization of the Serbs (Cekic 2005; Morus 2007). The ideology in the SANU memorandum overtook the military and the "federal diplomacy, federal and other institutions" (Cekic 2005). According to Glaurdic, the SANU Memorandum of 1986 was an "intense revisionist radicalization of Serbia's intellectual elite that publicly portrayed the modern Yugoslav state as a spiritual, economic, and political loss for the Serbs and which called for a new and more assertive platform for change based on true Serbian national interests" (2009:89). These dominant narratives of the SANU memorandum were useful in constituting an exclusive Serb national identity.

According to Sells (2020:101), “religious rituals and symbols played a central role” in both Serbian and Croatian nationalist campaigns. Sells (2020:101) further explains,

Even prior to the breakup of Yugoslav, Croatian Catholic and Serbian Orthodox prelates had organized massive pilgrimages to sites of World War II atrocities and to holy sites associated with aspirations for a Greater Catholic Croatia and Greater Serbian Orthodox
Serbia, and militia campaigns (like the medieval Crusades) were in some cases carried out as forms of pilgrimage.

The purpose of enactment of these rituals and construction and reconstruction of nationalistic myths was to frame the increasingly hostile relations between Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims as an outcome of centuries of hatred. The purpose of enacting these rituals and constructing and reconstructing nationalistic myths was to frame the increasingly hostile relations between Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims as an outcome of centuries of hatred. However, these performances did not reflect the actual situation where "heavily armed armies and militias supported by Croatia and Serbia" engaged in "[elimination of] Bosnian Muslim inhabitants" and carving up of Bosnia with the purpose of the annexation of the newly created "ethnically 'pure'... "[Catholic Croat] and [Serb Orthodox] regions to Croatia and Serbia, respectively" (Sells 2020:101).

Devaluation and dehumanization of targeted groups. The construction of an exclusive Serb national identity involved framing Serbs as victims and simultaneous devaluation and dehumanization of the targeted groups. In the years following the SANU memorandum, Serbian nationalist rallies organized by Milosevic focused on Muslims as a target. Jones (2006:213) argues that in April 1987, "Milosevic sowed the seeds for genocide" in his speech to the crowd of Serb protestors in Kosovo by using the term 'genocide' to "describe [their] supposed destiny there at the hands of the Albanian majority." Cigar argues that "the Muslims, duly designated as one of the principal threats, increasingly became an object of political activity by the Serbs. These rallies included slogans such as: 'Oh Muslims, you black crows, Tito is no longer around to protect you!'; 'We love you, Slobodan, because you hate the Muslims!' and 'I'll be first, who'll be second, to drink some Turkish blood?' Most threatening were the cries of 'we want arms'...voiced at such staged rallies" (Cigar 1995:35).
After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Bosnian Muslims inherited the grievances Serbian political elites held against the Ottomans or Turks and derogatory labeling that came with it. As Hoare (2010: 1199) suggests that it was rather "a class conflict [that] underlay the division between Muslims and Orthodox that would become a national division between Muslims and Serbs." He adds, "the class interests of the Serb peasantry were the progenitors of the [Bosnian Chetnik] movement that engaged in the mass extermination of Muslims during World War II" (Hoare 2010:1199-200). Nevertheless, this ethno-religious animosity was periodically made salient by the political elites and realized through episodes of mass atrocities (Judah 1997) such as the one in the 1990s. Based on historical elements embedded in Serbian nationalist doctrine/mythology, statements such as "[W]e will do our utmost to crush their race and descendants so completely that history will not even remember them" (cited in Cigar 1995:35) came in abundance in the period leading to the onset of the genocide. Thus, the strategy of stirring up real or imagined historical memories of Serbia's oppression by the Ottoman Turks and the Muslims' alleged support of the Nazi-installed regime justified the acceptance by the Serbian populace in support of their military agenda (Cigar 1995).

Suljagic (2021) describes how the construction or conceptualization of Bosnian Muslims as the Serbs' mortal enemies played out at a republican level in Bosnia. On October 13, 1991, just days after the Bosnian Serb Assembly, dominated by the SDS BiH, was founded and proclaimed the supreme legislative organ of the Serbs in Bosnia, Radovan Karadzic, the SDS BiH leader and Bosnian Serb wartime president, warns, "In just a couple of days, Sarajevo will be gone and there will be 500,000 dead in one month, and the Muslims will be annihilated in Bosnia and Herzegovina" (in BIRN 2011: n.a). The Assembly—both its individual members, and as an institution—played a central role not only in determining policies that ultimately led to
genocide but also in the process of reconceptualization of [Bosnian Muslims] as cultural aliens whose very existence presented a mortal threat to the existence of the Serb people" (2021:1). The rhetoric was produced by the political and military leadership. Karadzic was "the key figure involved in dehumanizing Bosnian Muslims, redefining them as the enemy and making genocidal violence a political policy” (2021:1). Another one was Biljana Plavsic, a biologist specializing in genetics, a well-respected professor at Sarajevo University, and later the president of the Republic Srpska. In her contribution to the SANU memorandum, she "targeted Muslims as the agents behind Serbian subjugation throughout history" (Morus 2009:156-7). Drawing on her scientific background, Plavsic demonized Muslims through references to the fundamentalist threat inherent in the Muslim race. She further dehumanized Muslims, "proclaiming them to be descendants of 'biologically degenerate' Serbs” (Maksic 2015:342).

On a local level, “the process of redefinition of their erstwhile Muslim neighbors and friends", this rhetoric was further "employed by mid-ranking and low-lever perpetrators’ (Suljagic 2021:6). For example, in the town of Bratunac, graffiti written on public and private property alike in the months leading up to violence read: "Muslims, Balijas, Turks move out, you're going to be slaughtered" (Suljagic 2021:6). The perpetrators used the term "slaughter" in its literal sense of killing cattle or other animals by throat-cutting or head-chopping. The SDS' power to manipulate their constituency is evident in their propaganda that [over the two-year-long process] "turned a dispersed majority of ethnic Serbs into a well-bounded group prepared to support a war of ethnic separation waged in the name of ‘national interests’” (Maksic 2015:342). Furthermore, Karadzic “skillfully used concurrent events in Croatia to mobilize Bosnian Serbs" (Maksic and Toal 2014).
Ethnic definition of territory. Ethnic purification of territory was important for achieving the Serbian plan that relied on physical control of Serb-held territory in Bosnia. Hoare (2021:45) argues that the "genocidal goal of the Serb perpetrators was to destroy the Bosniaks and non-Serbs generally as a group or group on Serb-held territory." Mulaj (2008:107) explains that "ethnic cleansing was premised on ethnic definition of territory and was purported to serve control of the state, its territory and its resources by the dominant nation and the granting of rights and protections exclusively to its members." Hence, the acquisition of Bosnian territories was crucial to the Serbian political leadership and military. Even before the onset of the war Federal Defense Secretary Veljko Kadijevic stated: “[Bosnia] by its geographical position and size [is] one of the keystones for the formation of a common state for all Serb people” (cited in Mulaj 2008:112). Since Bosnia was strategically vital for realizing the nationalist plan, the Serbian state had to implore extreme genocidal measures to secure victory for the Serbian people. On May 12, 1992, in a key session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, six strategic goals were adopted, including the physical separation of the Serbs from the Bosnian Muslims and the Croats (Becirevic 2014). Vulliamy (1998:77) provides an explanation of "the simple origins of the war" using the words of Vladimir Srebov of the SDS BiH party, from an interview in Vreme magazine, Belgrade, October 30, 1995):

The plan was for a division of Bosnia into two spheres of influence, leading to a Greater Serbia and a Greater Croatia. The Muslims were to be subjected to a final solution-more than half were to be killed, a smaller segment converted to Orthodoxy while a smaller segment still, those with riches, could buy their lives and leave. The goal to was cleanse Bosnia-Herzegovina completely of the Muslim people.
Silber and Little argue that the technique [of ethnic cleansing] was designed to render the territory ethnically pure, and to make certain, by instilling hatred and fear that would endure, that Muslims and Serbs could never again live together" (1996 cited in Jones 2006:216). The goal of the policy was to "ensure not only military victory and the expulsion of target populations but also a permanent post-genocide arrangement" (Jones 2006:216). According to Bringa, "by the summer of 1992, Serbian forces had taken control over and 'ethnically cleansed' 70 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina" (1995:199).

Meanwhile, Croatia's nationalist pretensions on Bosnia were propagated by Tudjman, who held that [BiH] was an "artificial polity, one whose very existence has historically prevented the integration of its Croatian community into Croatia itself...despite the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina has existed (more or less continuously), as a distinct political and administrative entity since the Middle Ages, and was administered by both the Ottoman and Austrian empires, as well as Tito's Yugoslavia, as a coherent unit" (Lukic and Lynch 1996:209). Through his negotiation with Milosevic, the president of Croatia sought to divide Bosnia and create Greater Croatia.

Resource Mobilization

State capacity to carry out genocide. Serbian nationalists needed an "extreme force to break apart a society that was otherwise capable of ignoring the mundane fractures of class and ethnicity" (Mazower 2002:148). The main sources of power for Serbia, who fought the war outside of its own borders, was in the JNA, mobilization of local Serbian populations, and continuous supply of resources and logistics from FRY. The JNA, reputed to be the fourth most powerful force in Europe (Glenny 1992[1996]), with bases in all the republics, constituted the basis from which three Serb armies of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia were formed: the Army of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (in Croatia), and the Army of Republika Srpska (also Bosnian Serb Army). The Serbian campaign in Bosnia combined the Bosnian Serb Army, the local militia, and the notorious Arkan and Seselj murder gangs from Serbia (Shaw 2003:191) and foreign mercenaries (Arielli 2020).

Serbian resource mobilization involved the consolidation of military power through ideological penetration of the high ranks, and ethnic homogenization of the JNA included efforts at all levels of the institution. While the SANU Memorandum "[became] the basic political reading at the Federal Secretariat for Defence," the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and the SDS BiH exerted the strongest political influence on the JNA (Cekic 2005:184). In the early 1990s, the ethnic composition of JNA active military personnel and conscripts changed dramatically. In already Serb-dominated JNA, Serbian officers suddenly rose in ranks, while other ethnicities holding high positions abandoned or were dismissed from the JNA. Furthermore, some officers left because of the JNA's transformation into the Serbian Army in Bosnia and Croatia. In March 1992, only 28 out of 150 (in 1991) officers with the rank of general (almost exclusively Serbs and Montenegrins) remained in the JNA. By April 1992, around 90 percent of all JNA officers were Serb or Montenegrin. From spring 1991 to early 1992, the share of Serbian conscripts in the JNA rose from somewhat above 35 percent to around 90 percent. This was partly to do with the refusal of Bosniaks and Croats to take part in the war in Croatia (Biserko 2018).

However, the Serbian takeover of the JNA was not a sudden occurrence but a process that can be traced back to the early 1980s. Becirevic (2014:70) explains how the JNA was restructured under the Serbian power grab and resource mobilization strategies in preparation for the war. The SFRY Armed Forces, made of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and republic-based Territorial Defense (TO) units, were designed to operate as a uniform system of trained
civilian troops prepared for participation in armed combat. The operational strategy of the SFRY defense system was for the JNA to respond first to aggression and provide time to mobilize TO (guerilla) forces, ultimately organizing "a comprehensive and united defense" (Becirevic 2014:70-1). Originally the system was intended to be used against external aggressors only. However, after the death of Tito in 1980, the constitutional authority of the armed forces was officially extended to allow its use under 'extraordinary circumstances' on the Yugoslav territory. In 1987, the "Strategy of General National Defense and Social Self-Defense of the SFRY" document reiterated that the forces could be deployed "in case of internal emergency or unrest," defined broadly leaving space for "legislative manipulation and misuse of the armed forces" (Becirevic 2014:71). These changes were made in response to 1980s unrests in Kosovo. Milosevic's control of Kosovo helped Serbia gain control of the federal presidency and the federal Yugoslav army" (Shaw 2003:190).

During the aggression against Bosnia, the JNA employed the tactics meant to address an external enemy to those that would achieve the internal goal of genocide against Bosniaks (in Becirevic 2014:70). Such an operation required the mobilization of a majority of the Serb population in Bosnia and Herzegovina and necessitated having specific plans in place should the aggression be launched. "There was an assumption that the whole of the population in some way would be mobilized either as part of the Territorial Defense or as what was called civil defense" (Becirevic 2014:70). On May 12, 1992, the JNA Command issued an order for the mobilization of the corpus' war units in Bosnia to "[ensure] that all men of military age of Serb ethnicity are mobilized, as well as members of other ethnicities who wish to fight for the just cause" of their newly formed para-state (Becirevic 2014:70). Weitz (2003:235) holds that "as an eminently twentieth-century dictatorship, Serbia made ethnic cleansing and genocide a cause not only of
the state but also of the population as well." Kolaric (2019) finds in 1995 the Serbian Ministry of the Interior arrested and forcibly mobilized Serbian refugees that fled the conflict in Croatia and Bosnia, "and then handed them over to the army and police authorities of the [Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina], as well as to paramilitary groups from Serbia, which were affiliated with the State Security Service" (Kolaric 2019:7). They were then sent back into the conflict.

In the spring of 1991, the SDS began arming the Bosnian Serb population in cooperation with the JNA. In addition to receiving weapons from the JNA in BiH, the SDS also received weapons from JNA units withdrawn from Slovenia and Croatia. Also, the JNA played a major role in equipping and training Bosnian Serb paramilitaries (Biserko 2018). After the 'withdrawal' of the JNA from BiH on May 19, 1992, the JNA transformed into the Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, continued to support its offshoot armies in BiH and in Croatia. Between autumn 1991 and spring 1992, the SDS BiH set up municipal crisis staff (crisis headquarters, K.C.) as parallel political and military institutions, which played a crucial role in realizing the plan of action and distributing the resources. The support was not limited to the provision of personnel through the K.C.s. It also included significant military and logistical assistance, which was provided through the Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia General Staff (Biserko 2018). According to Malesevic (2018:751), two offshoots of the JNA, the Army of Republika Srpska and the Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, "were largely financed and supplied by the Belgrade-based central command of Yugoslav Military."

Targeted group's capacity to resist genocide. The power differential between the perpetrators and the targeted groups affected their resourcefulness and ability to organize and defend themselves. Disadvantages in power and capacity for defense, limited military, logistics,
and others. Destruction of leadership/elite and infrastructure by genocidists. Lack of kin-state/home-state to which the group could rely on the continuous military, financial, and political support. At the onset of the aggression on Bosnia, Serbian forces faced "the largely unarmed Bosnian government and non-Serb civilian population" (Shaw 2003:192). The Army of BiH (ARBiH) was one of three armies to emerge from the TO of the Socialist Republic of BiH. The others were the Army of the Serb Republic (VRS) and the Croatian Defense Council (HVO) (Hoare 2004). Croatian and Bosnian government forces were improvised from 1991, and they lacked the heavy firepower of the Serbs. Due to the military structure of the Yugoslav Army, designed for quick mobilization and guerilla war, all republics had a militia structure, and most men had undergone military training (Shaw 2003:192). While all the republics had some weapons, most of the military weapons were in the hands of Serbia.

Following the earlier example of the E.C., the U.N. has imposed an arms embargo on all former Yugoslavia since September 1991. Despite being recognized by the U.N. as an independent sovereign state, the sanctions were enforced until the end of the war. Although the embargo was imposed on Serbia and its forces in Bosnia, the Serbs were unaffected because they had in their possession the entire arsenal of the JNA (Mulaj 2008:99). With some support from the USA and a few other states, Bosnia and Croatia developed armies that prevented all-out Serbian victory in 1992 (Shaw 2003:191).

Throughout 1993, the ARBiH strengthened "through their year of combat experience, …weapons captured in ambushes and…through clandestine foreign assistance" (Morus 2010:77). Uninvited volunteers (the ICTY estimates between 300 to 1,500), whose presence "created strategic control problems" for the Bosnian government, were sent along with limited weapons and supplies by Muslim states. Arielli (2020:55,58) argues that "foreign volunteers,"
often referred to as mercenaries, joined the forces of each of the warring sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Hoare (2004:120), "right-wing extremists, mercenaries and adventurers joined the struggle on opposing sides" with fighters from Russia and Greece, two predominantly Orthodox countries, fought on the Serb side, volunteers from Catholic countries supported Croats, while "volunteers from the Islamic world - and even a few principled idealists from Christian Europe and elsewhere - joining the Bosnians" (see also Halimovic 2014 and Kovacevic 2021). The foreign fighters constituted a very small minority within the overall number of combatants on each side, with the number of foreigners roughly similar. However, "the fighters that came from the Middle East and North Africa received" disproportionate attention from western media, as well as being "mentioned multiple times in a report sent by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the U.N. Secretary-General, to the U.N. Security Council in May 1994" (Arielli 2020:58). In addition, Serbian and Croatian propaganda highlighted the presence of the pro-Bosnian 'mujahideen' and tried to tie them to atrocities against civilians" (Arielli 2020:58). Reports of 'mujahedeen jihad' by Serb media "fanned the flames of an already thriving bonfire of fear" building on already high anti-Muslim hostility and Islamophobia (Morus 2010:77).

In his research on Bosnian eliticide, specifically in the cases of Zvornik, Foca, and Prijedor, Gratz finds that the "systematic elimination of leading and prominent figures" was conducted in the early stages of the systematic attack on the targeted populations, which was "one of the main reasons for the devastating effects of military operations against the civilian population of Eastern and Western Bosnia" (Gratz 2011:409-10). Gratz argues that "it is probable that all high-profile mass murders in recent history comprised certain forms of organized leadership extermination, which, in most cases as a preparatory phase, proved to be essential to the process of physical or biological destruction of a population as a whole."
International Context

Global elite bystanders interfering in conflict. The international character of the conflict was defined not only by the aggression on Bosnia by Serbia and Croatia but also by the interference of the global elite bystanders, such as the United Nations, the European Community (later European Union), NATO, state governments (such as US, Germany, etc.), and other organizations, were involved in the process of Yugoslavia's collapse. The complexity of the international community’s involvement in Yugoslavia was rooted in the fact that it was “constituted” of multiple actors with many different interests and goals as well as multitude of methods used to achieve them. As Nation (2003: ix) explains, “from the outset…the Balkan war was shaped by great power intervention—whether in support of local allies, in the name of conflict resolution, or with an eye to the long-term benefits to be derived from geopolitical realignment in what was still regarded as a strategically relevant world region.”

These actors did not always work together which often resulted in “sporadic and haphazard efforts” to establish peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and eventually build its state institutions and internal framework from the ground up (Toal and Dahlman 2005: 573-4). In addition to the above mentioned powerful international actors, multiple bodies and organizations, such as the Red Cross, UNHCR, and many other IGOs and NGOs, working within framework of the UN Charter, have participated in different capacities in the events prior to, during, and after the genocidal war.

Willingness to intervene. By the nature and purpose of the U.N. Charter, the Organization was involved since the onset of the Yugoslav disintegration (Barnett 1996). However, the way the U.N. (and the U.S.) initially responded to the crisis in Yugoslavia was to transfer of responsibility to the E.C. European powers insisted that the Yugoslav wars represented a
“European problem” to be handled by Europe, while the United States, first under George H. W. Bush and then under Bill Clinton, initially happily obliged. Glaurdic (2011:2) argues that the Yugoslav crisis was actually seen by many in the E.C. “as a welcome test of whether the E.C.—soon to be transformed into the European Union (E.U.)—could grow into a unified force for positive and proactive foreign policy,” however, “their failures in Yugoslavia were indeed so devastating and so profound that the transformation of the E.C./E.U. into a unified actor capable of any common foreign policy was for years rightly considered to be impossible” (Glaudric 2011:3). The E.C.’s failure to prevent or end the war forced the U.N. to eventually intervene. Yet, the Organization has also proven incapable of effectively responding to regional conflicts (Daalder 1994) and putting an end to mass atrocities. During the ongoing conflict, Sharp (1994:43) argued that the war in Bosnia was essentially "between genocidal aggressors and their victims," and "under such dynamics, the West should have demonstrated its intolerance toward genocide by taking appropriate actions," which it failed to do.

Over the four years of the conflict, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the principal apparatus of the U.N., voted on and adopted numerous resolutions addressing the situation in Yugoslavia, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the developments in other former states of SFRY. The U.N.’s mandates in Bosnia included "enforcing no-fly zones, protecting the seven regions that became known as ‘safe havens,’ delivering humanitarian assistance, making Sarajevo free from heavy weapons, and other demands in over one hundred Security Council resolutions" (Barnett 1996:151). However, the United Nations and the Security Council avoided any involvement that would mean using force to deliver humanitarian assistance or protect civilians (Barnett 1996:150-1). The United Nations had the authority to enforce these resolutions and protect civilians: it could use "all necessary means." Yet these mandates were
intermittently implemented at best, and, at worst, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and other atrocities were carried out by Serbs in full view of the United Nations without much response (Barnett 1996:150-1).

**Representation and classification of the situation.** During the escalation of the Yugoslav wars, there were attempts by media, politicians, diplomats, as well as academics, to explain the conflict in Bosnia as a consequence of 'ancient hatred' various nationalities held toward one another (Abazi and Doja 2017; Malesevic 2012; Mazower 2002; Morus 2010). Western observers saw the region as having a "peculiar propensity to violence among the people of the region" (Mazower 2002:148). Abazi and Doja find that for an external observer, "ethno-religious hatred, wars, violence and atrocities in Southeast Europe were endemic and primordial" as it was represented as such "by the journalism of the North American and West European diplomatic and political establishment" (2017:1019). These views were not exclusive to the 1990s and had a long history in how the West relates to the Balkans. Malesevic (2012:300) finds that "since the beginning of the 19th century the Balkans has been a synonym for aggressive nationalism and unbridled violence; the two phenomena traditionally understood to be the key obstacles for its social development." With the onset of Yugoslav crisis "the violence of the 1912–1913 Balkan wars re-emerged as a compelling factor in arguments in many books and reports" based on narratives of Balkan wars that were produced "not by academic scholars in the strictest sense of the term, but by a freelance, extra-academic or pseudo-academic cottage industry" (Abazi and Doja 2017:1018-9). Furthermore, according to these narratives, the Southeast European peoples "live in another time and a barbaric land, "making them "geographically very close to mainstream Europe and yet culturally very distant," which meant that it was “necessary to contain them and fence them off from the rest of Western Europe" (Abazi and Doja 2017:1019).
Representations of cultural backwardness, propensity for violence, complex and longstanding ethno-religious grievances created a sense "that the present [cannot] be different from the past," effectively framing the ongoing conflict as a "complicated and irresolvable political situation" (Abazi and Doja 2017:1019). On the other hand, "many Bosnians were deeply and continually shocked that westerners with whom they identified strongly did not respond to the conflict" (Macek 2009:123).

Abazi and Doja hold that these "particular types of knowledge about the Balkan wars…had a decisive and independent influence on the outcomes of the wars as well as on the international representations of" the conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia (2017:1012). Such views and misrepresentations of the conflict allowed avoiding classifying the conflict in the way that reflected the real situation on the ground. In effect these misclassifications further allowed the UN to maintain a neutral status and avoid taking part in the conflict which is a position appropriate in the case of a civil war.

First, the international community strategically mislabeled the situation in Bosnia 'civil war' because there is no requirement for direct intervention in a civil war, while "classifying the conflict as international aggression mandates intervention under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter" (Mulaj 2008:99-100). As reflected by the U.N.’s charter, international society has been organized throughout the XX century on the principle of sovereign states whose 'territorial integrity and political independence were guaranteed by international law (Chapter I, Purposes and Principles). However, even though the UNSC on May 30, 1992, imposed economic sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro due to their actions against Bosnia, it failed to "[authorize] the use of force to turn back the aggression" as it was in the case of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (Lukic and Lynch 1996:291). The U.N.’s own report on the Srebrenica massacre states, "no
failure did more to damage the standing and credibility of United Nations peacekeeping in the 1990s than its failure to distinguish between victim and aggressor' (U.N. General Assembly 2000).

Second, the international community avoided using the term genocide to characterize the Serbs' actions against civilians in Bosnia. Since the establishment of the U.N. Convention, "political and legal authorities were often reluctant to acknowledge the genocide, preferring to use euphemisms such as ethnic cleansing and humanitarian crisis and to apply charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes" (Shaw 2013:125). An admission that genocide is being committed obligates signatory states to take action, halt and punish the genocidists (Lukic and Lynch 1996:326). Article VIII of the UNGC stipulates that "any State Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter as those organs may consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide and related acts" (Komar et al. 2020:2). This formal declaration becomes the "trigger mechanism," and requires either the United Nations Security Council or the International Criminal Court to act (Komar et al. 2020:2). Komar et al. (2020:2) write," the trigger mechanism for the Bosnian genocide was a letter [UN/S/24401], dated August 10, 1992, from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations, which outlined the Balkan conflict and the atrocities being committed." The UNSC responded to this official call by the Bosnian government by forming. On September 14, 1992, authorizing the Commission of Experts to investigate allegations of genocide and crimes against humanity in the Former Yugoslavia. Among other findings, the report of the Expert Commission stated that 'it is unquestionable that the events in [the Prijedor Municipality] since April 30, 1992, qualify as crimes against humanity. Furthermore, it is likely to be confirmed in court under due process of law that these
events constitute genocide" (U.N. Security Council 1994). However, the destruction of social groups in Bosnia was called 'ethnic cleansing', which is, as opposed to genocide, not recognized as cleansing as an independent crime in international law (Shaw 2013).

Measures taken to stop violence. The aggressor states claimed that the conflict between Bosnian ethno-religious groups was caused by ethnic hatred rooted in historical violence (Mulaj 2008:101). As Morus argues, history served as “a legitimizing rationale for nationalist agendas” as well as for the international community’s response, “deciding which perspective to pay closest attention” (2010:66). Taking such an approach meant aligning with the political reasoning of the Serbian and Croatian leadership that favored the dismemberment of Bosnia. The international community treated the "warring factions as equal, primitive, and irrationally violent" (Morus 2010:79) and attributed equal responsibility to all sides. Such a view justified imposing sanctions on the victims as well. For three years the Bosnian Serbs enjoyed superiority not only on account of their overwhelming firepower but also thanks to the attitude of the international community (Biserko 2007:19). The arms embargo marks the start of the U.N.'s involvement in the crisis and is one of the most controversial and long-lasting UNSC actions towards the conflict in Bosnia. Imposing an arms embargo on all parties enhanced the military superiority of the aggressors and amplified unequal power relations between the parties to the conflict (Lukic and Lynch 1996; Mulaj 2008; Becirevic 2014). And thus, it heavily affected the dynamics of the actors in the conflict and prevented targeted groups from defending themselves. The European Community (E.C.) first imposed military sanctions against the Bosnian government and Bosnian Serbs on July 5, 1991, by attributing equal responsibility to all sides. The purpose of the embargo was to reduce the quantity of weapons entering the war zone and prevent further escalation of the fighting (Lukic and Lynch 1996: 295; Mulaj 2008:98). In September 1991, the UNSC followed
with the 'arms embargo' on all republics of the former Yugoslavia for the same reason. The UNSC has upheld this resolution throughout the entire conflict despite the available information on the impact the policy had on the ability of the BIH to defend its people. It rejected the request to remove the illegal embargo from the newly independent Bosnian government, "effectively undermining its right to self-defense" (Mulaj 2008:98). The embargo stayed in place even when Yugoslavia, the main subject to the sanction, ceased to exist. Many efforts of policy critics, including some parties in the U.S., to lift it did not work either. However, according to the interview with U.S. president Clinton in 1993, "U.S. allies in Europe blocked proposals to adjust or remove the embargo. They justified their opposition on plausible humanitarian grounds, arguing that more arms would only fuel the bloodshed, but privately, key allies objected that an independent Bosnia would be "unnatural" as the only Muslim nation in Europe. [They] favored the embargo precisely because it locked in Bosnia's disadvantage" (Branch 2009:31).

Another huge failure of the international community was designating 'safe areas' for civilians while the necessary troops, mandate, and resources for their protection were not provided (Mulaj 2008). Nevertheless, the idea of safe heavens was heavily favored by European policy actors and governments. For example, the British government favored "maintaining 'refugees' as near to their place of origin as possible, which essentially meant keeping refugees out of Britain" (May 2013:600). Jones (2006:220) writes, "the besieging of Srebrenica and other Muslim-majority cities in Bosnia in spring 1993 forced a US-led response to establish six 'safe areas' under U.N. protection, but these were never effectively defended". The 'safe areas' were established without the consent of the conflict parties and without "any credible military deterrent" and real commitment to defend the 'safe areas' (Mulaj 2008:99). As such, they were strategically incoherent. The U.N. member states provided only 7000 lightly armed troops with a
peacekeeping mandate, even though there was no peace to keep (Mulaj 2008:99). In reality, a strategically sound operation with about thirty-five combat-capable peace-enforcers was needed (Mulaj 2008:99). When in 1995 Srebrenica fell to the Serbs, it was 'protected' by fewer than 400 Dutch peacekeepers, mostly lightly armed. To remain impartial to the situation, the troops were ordered to use their weapons only in self-defense" (Jones 2006:220). The Muslim men surrendered any weapons they had to the United Nations in return for its protection. Around 8000 men and boys were "taken" from the "safe area" and in just a few days, "were shot, butchered, buried alive or crammed into factories or farm buildings and blown up" (Vulliamy 1998:75). DutchBat soldiers maintained calm, kept Bosniaks separated, and loaded the buses (Morus 2010:78). The U.N. has handed over the civilians they were supposed to protect to genocidal killers (Shaw 2003:218). As Jones (2006:220) suggests, "genocidal massacres were the predictable result" while “suspicion has swirled that, mass atrocities aside, the U.S. and E.U. were not unhappy to see the 'safe areas' fall to the Serbs." The "safe areas" were safe only for UNPROFOR troops (Mulaj 2008:99). The massacre in Srebrenica was a turning point. The West finally engaged in a military action and finally allowed the term "genocide" into discourse but only in the case of Srebrenica (Becirevic 2014:xi). Instead of preventing or mitigating genocidal atrocities, "the decisions and (in)actions of the U.N. exacerbated the crisis in many instances" (Morus 2010:79).

Finally, "by arguing that it had to adhere to the principles of consent of the parties and impartiality, the United Nations could avoid further involvement and (hopefully) provide some cover from future criticism" (Barnett 1996:153-4). The U.N.'s insistence on consent and impartiality seems to go beyond organizational culture and stated principles (Barnett 1996). The trend of favoring self-interests over those suffering is further evident in framing the situation in
Bosnia as a humanitarian crisis instead of a "legal or political-military problem," focusing on the consequences rather than on the causes" of the conflict (Lukic and Lynch 1996:292). Barnett claims that "by emphasizing the delivery of humanitarian relief rather than the protection of civilians, U.N. officials could shift responsibility from themselves to the participants of the conflict" (1996:153-4). Mulaj argues, "the West's policy in Bosnia demonstrates that impartiality can be an illusion when aggressors and civilians are treated equally, and an arms embargo is applied in the same matter to the weak and the strong" (2008:101).

**Conflict mediation and peacemaking.** The mediating third parties had an impact on the conflict dynamics. In the aftermath of the signing of the peace agreement that ended the JNA's aggression against Croatia, the U.N. envoy Cyrus Vance held that since the war in Croatia was ending the conflict would not spill to Bosnia. The position of U.N. actors was that "there was no need for U.N. blue helmets to undertake conflict prevention, and Bosnia instead hosted a mission of E.U. observers" (Becirevic 2014:50). Vance himself has assured the Bosnian president Izetbegovic and the media in Sarajevo, that the agreement is good for Bosnia. However, "implementation of the U.N. plan, which was supervised by the international community, included redeploying most JNA artillery from Croatia to the territory of Bosnia. Carrying out the Croatian peace agreement meant that "under the auspices of the international community the JNA practically occupied Bosnia" (Becirevic 2014:50). Soon after, Bosnia became the site of some of the most extreme genocidal violence.

The international way of dealing with the conflict, initiated by the E.C., based on the view that all sides are equally guilty, involved "[reaching] a compromise between community leaders," effectively adopting Serbia's propaganda (Mulaj 2008:101). Despite the warnings of the intelligence experts about the seriousness of the situation in Yugoslavia and an impending
bloody conflict (Campbell 2001), the West (esp. the E.C.), initially tried to preserve Yugoslavia due to the country's $16 billion debt toward the international community (Mulaj 2008). However, their position changed soon after the political crisis escalated into armed conflicts. Since then, the peace process consistently sanctioned the dismemberment of Bosnia along ethnic lines. The process, which involved the U.N., and other third parties, searched for a political settlement "without redressing the military imbalance favoring the aggressor" (Lukic and Lynch 1996:286). The negotiation of the terms of peace was with war criminals - the "nationalist leaders who planned and enacted the expulsion of minorities (Mulaj 2008:101).

Mulaj (2008:55), reveals that some criticize the Dayton accord for "de facto partitioning Bosnia and legitimizing ethnic cleansing, given that it provided for two distinct entities (Muslim-Croat federation holding 51 percent of the territory and Republika Srpska holding the remaining 49) percent and for tree separate armies, Muslim, Croatian and Serbian, while the provisions of the agreement for the return of thee refugees have been slow to materialize." The third entity, Brcko, is not a part of the federal structure. Harland (2017) argues that when the DPA finally ended the war in Bosnia in 1995, it was not a breakthrough in diplomacy and peacemaking. On the contrary, the plan "had been in preparation since before the fighting began and it “evolved slowly over the three-and-a-half years" only to take on "many of the worst features of the earlier plans and [discard] some of the best" (Harland 2017:3).

Furthermore, Harland (2017) argues that peace treaties such as the Vance-Owen plan in 1993, which proposed dividing Bosnia into ethnic 'cantons', may have sped the ethnic cleansing of some regions to make Serb and Croat claims stronger (Harland 2017). Mulaj (2008:101) finds that the general problem with the partition plans was that proposals for the division of territory created 'new ethnic minorities' while stimulating ethnic cleansing as a strategy of removal. In
effect, such plans legitimized and encouraged the expulsion of ethnic minorities. For example, the fact that the Vance-Owen plan "rewarded the Croats not only with what they had previously wanted but also with some areas additionally with the Muslim majority, is said to have given Croatian troops an incitement to cleanse Muslims in the latter areas, which they did in the course of the Croat-Muslim war of 1993-1994" (Mulaj 2008:101). Neither did Serbs cease their ethnic cleansing of the Muslims. Ultimately, the West, by negotiating the Dayton Agreement, which ended the armed conflict, provided for the internal partition of Bosnia into statelets organized on the basis of ethnicity (Mulaj 2008:102).

Ultimately, the genocidists were rewarded for their actions through the recognition of their para-state, Republika Srpska, which was created through mass murder, rape, and expulsion. They were allocated half of the prewar Bosnian territory (Becirevic 2014:x). The new constitutional order of Bosnia, as produced by Dayton, preserved "the ethnic division created by the war" and "was later…condemned by the European Court of Human Rights…for denying Roma, Jews and others from the possibility of assuming the highest political office" (Blitz 2015).

*Effectiveness of intervention.* The “management structures within the institution proved to have serious limitations, along with the inherent problems and contradictions of peacekeeping itself in areas of continuing conflict” (Pilch and Derdzinski 2004:94). The U.N.’s already limited resources were stretched very thin between 1992-95, as in addition to those in the former Yugoslavia several complex peacekeeping operations were undertaken in Cambodia, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda (Pilch and Derdzinski 2004:94). As the number and complexity of UN missions increased with alarming speed and the U.N. struggled to respond to emerging threats and crises in a timely fashion, revealing that the U.N. and larger international community were not well-equipped to confront and contain crises.
Harland argues that “international organizations, such as the UN and NATO, were given conflicting mandates and undermined one another” in Bosnia (2017:30). The UNPROFOR and “the tools at [its] disposal were poorly coordinated”, while “military intervention, when it happened, was disconnected from efforts to find a political settlement” (Harland 2017:30). Costalli (2013:357) researched the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions by looking at the local variation in UN troop deployment and violence in the Bosnian war shows that although peacekeeping works, but “have little effect on subsequent violence” because “it is deployed where the most severe violence takes place.” The actions of the UN peacekeeping forces were often late as they occurred in settings where any prevention of atrocities was no longer an option.

Morus (2010:79) finds that humanitarian efforts were plagued by error and incompetence. Although aid convoys offered some relief, lack of regional knowledge resulted in unfortunate consequences. Local militias “taxed” aid transports, taking as much as 50 percent. UNPROFOR was lightly armed and the VRS easily hijacked aid convoys, confiscating UN weapons and vehicles. Further, when air drops were attempted, the pallets often dropped miles away from their targets, forcing civilians to risk reaching the dropped pallets through rough terrain, land-mines, and snipers. It was one only one of many of “failures and blunders” that resulted in the Srebrenica massacre was “when the Dutch officer in charge of protecting the Bosnian enclave of Srebrenica requested an airstrike in July 1995, he was refused as he had used the wrong form” (Porter 1999).

CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION

This study's objective was to examine the socio-historical context of the genocide in Bosnia by employing Verdeja's framework that identifies five factors of genocide and Shaw's work on the role of international contexts in genocide. In addition, the dynamics of the conflict
are understood under Shaw's theorizing on genocidal relations and the position of the international community, spearheaded by the United Nations, toward participants in genocide by Smeulers and Grüenfeld.

Through a literature review of scholarly publications, I found that salient political identities were increasingly driven by the narratives of the history of intergroup violence narratives with a major focus on religious differences. Furthermore, the lack of social stability and security, rooted in long-term structural factors such as the protracted economic crisis since the 1970s, has undermined state legitimacy. Economic dislocation and austerity measures have worsened the situation and the discontent of the elite and general population. Serbia's power grab, political repression, and violence against minorities in Kosovo have further undermined trust in the federal government dominated by Serbs. Severe political crises were compounded by changes in the political context, including constitutional or regime changes. Countries transition from a socialist society toward a democratic society effectively decentralized the federal government and installed ethno-nationalist elites in power. Elections and referendum on secession led to the dissolution of the federal state. The proclamation and recognition of independence triggered a partial Bosnian state collapse and fighting in Bosnia.

However, the continuation of genocide throughout four years or more depended on additional factors. The first significant set of factors includes the perpetrator's military superiority, highly successful strategic resource mobilization that occurred in preparation for the genocidal war and the commitment to the cause by the Serbian leadership in Bosnia and Serbia. Resource mobilization of that magnitude was made possible by employing extreme ideologies aimed at the ethno-nationalization of Serbs and dehumanizing non-Serb populations across at
least three republics. Smaller in scale but similar in nature, processes of ethno-nationalization of Croats occurred in Croatia and BiH.

The genocidal policy by Serbia was meant to ensure not only military victory and the expulsion of target populations but also a permanent post-genocide arrangement" (Jones 2006:216). Ideological factors are behind the mobilization of resources necessary to carry out the plan, contributing toward the continuation of genocide. Once a mobilizing exclusionary ideology before the war, in the conflict was a fully embraced national ideology translated into a policy of ethnic cleansing continued to be a driving force throughout the conflict. The difference was that ongoing violence against the targeted populations and their resistance and even retaliatory violence further fanning the flames and escalating hostile conditions. The instability of alliances between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats and emergent in-group and out-group hostilities further complicated the conflict. The conflict dynamics between Serbia and Croatia and mediating third parties had an impact on the situation in Bosnia.

The existing literature suggests that the international community contributed to the onset and continuation of genocidal violence. Furthermore, the literature reveals that the global elite bystanders' interference in Bosnia was inconsistent with the international norms, principles, and policies enacted to address the situation. In addition, ethnocentric views of the people in the region, especially Bosnian Muslims, have negatively shaped the situation. Mulaj argues that at the international level, the emergence of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia can be understood as a failure of prevention on the international community's side (Mulaj 2008), while the continuation of the atrocities is in the failure of response. Perhaps the prevention failure may be traced back to the IMF's refusal of financial aid, insistence on austerity programs that further destabilized Yugoslavia. However, the evidence shows that its tolerance of human rights abuses in the
Kosovo province, which persisted throughout the 1990s, and its failure to act forcefully during Serbia's attacks on Slovenia and Croatia signaled the perpetrators that the international community would not stand in the way to achieving their political goals and war aims. This passivity may have been a factor in original Serbian planning for war" (Mulaj 2008:98). Thus, it is safe to assume that every passing failure to act on Serbia's atrocities encouraged them to continue their nationalist project.

However, one of the main reasons for failing to address the genocide in Bosnia appropriately and effectively was the unwillingness to properly classify the conflict and distinguish between the perpetrators and their targets. The U.N. has classified the ongoing atrocities against civilians as a humanitarian crisis, aggression as a civil war, and all parties to the conflict as equal participants. Such an approach to the situation in Bosnia allowed third parties to avoid actions as prescribed by international treaties. This self-serving strategy created a space for its inaction and for the perpetrators to carry out their plan unabated until late 1995 when it was almost complete. According to Smeulers and Grünfeld (2011), taking a neutral position in its relations to other parties in genocide, namely perpetrators and victims, means that, in effect, the Organization was taking the side of the perpetrators by not protecting those who needed it. By misrepresenting and mislabeling the situation, the U.N. maintained impartiality and stayed out of the direct conflict, thus effectively siding with the genocidists.

Furthermore, the literature generally agrees that the U.N. rewarded and enabled violence by appeasing aggression and allowing uninterrupted attacks on civilians. Moreover, it favored interventions that benefited the Organization's self-interest, the interests of the third parties and perpetrators rather than the targeted groups and those defending them. Worse of all, imposing the
arms embargo has heavily disadvantaged the targeted group and prevented it to defends itself. In effect, the I.C., namely the U.N., amplified conditions generative of mass atrocities.

Notes on Method and Theory

This study was a directed content analysis method to "validate or extend a theoretical framework or theory" (Hsieh and Shannon 2005:1281) conceptually. I find that the existing scholarly literature supports Verdeja's theoretical framework. However, the problem with the approach outlined by Verdeja (2002) is that it heavily focuses on the perpetrators' actions and actions of third parties toward them, while the actions of targeted groups are left to be inferred through the perpetrator's actions at all levels of analysis. For example, Verdeja's fourth factor, or resource mobilization, is concerned with the genocidal regime's capacity to commit to the execution of the genocidal plan. It does not say much about the resistance to destruction on the side of the victims and their allies. First, it shows is also important to examine the capacity of the targeted group to defend itself, its actions, and its relations to other actors in the conflict (Shaw 2003). Second, Verdeja argues that it is important to situate genocide in an "international context and not merely relegate it to the domestic level" as "global political context can facilitate or impede genocide" (Verdeja 2002:41). However, the author focuses on examining the role of third parties and their position toward the genocidists. If we are looking solely at what actions are taken toward the perpetrators of genocide, we may not see the larger picture. This obscures the international community's position toward the targeted groups, including attitudes such as orientalism and Islamophobia.

Furthermore, and more importantly, as Shaw demonstrates, we should consider the "global political context" which is how global politics shapes genocidal processes. Additional emergent codes and sub-codes that reveal such data can provide a more nuanced view of how the
genocide started and continued despite factors intervening in the conflict. In conclusion, Verdeja's five factors framework is broad, meaning that each of the five factors of the code categories is flexible enough to accommodate variations in the primary coding scheme and the emerging codes previously not considered. As such, this framework can be useful in explaining the origins and the parameters of a broad range of political violence aimed at social groups.

Statement of limitations. First, one of the major limitations of this study is the absence of literature published in languages other than English. While I did not limit the selection on geographical location, the search was limited to the English language literature, which is exclusionary as it omits possibly valuable literature not available in English. This is especially important considering that there is a body of literature written only in the languages spoken in Bosnia and the region. Second, ideally, to avoid coder bias in any content analysis, there should be multiple independent analysts; due to the nature and purpose of this study, I was the only reviewer or coder. However, the systematic character of my research protocol and adherence to it provides a high degree of transparency and reliability. Furthermore, for the purpose and scope of this project, this protocol is sufficient to produce the knowledge necessary to answer the research question and move the academic inquiry further toward the less examined aspects of the topic under investigation.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the 1990s genocidal war in Bosnia represents one of the worst tragedies in the history of the Bosnian people, especially Bosnian Muslims. Even though the war ended decades ago, the post-war struggle defines society. Today, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains a country stuck in a struggle with the consequences of the genocidal war. The way the conflict ended has significant overall effects on stability in Bosnia. Socio-political processes that shaped
the events in the 1990s are still ongoing and are increasingly hostile. Structural and ideological conditions that led to the 1990s genocide in Bosnia never ceased to exist. Fragmentation into three ethnic groups that characterized the war and genocidal relations in the 1990s continues today. Genocide denial and threats of secession the perpetrators persist and are the source of a constant struggle between political elites.

Furthermore, the outcomes of the 1990s genocide fostered the creation of factors as ethnic discrimination and segregation, both not existing previously in their current forms or scale. As a result, the risk of renewed violence and political instability not only persists but is yet again amplified by the current international political and ongoing economic instability. As precipitating elements persist in Bosnia, there is no obvious amelioration to them at the horizon; it remains to see how the international community will respond to the ongoing crisis.
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### Appendix A. Abbreviations and Acronyms

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARBiH</td>
<td>Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bosnia</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Dayton Peace Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC/EU</td>
<td>European Community/European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRY</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; Serbia and Montenegro</td>
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<td>HLC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Law Center</td>
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<td>HOS</td>
<td>Croatian Defence Forces</td>
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<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<td>HVO</td>
<td>Croatian Defense Council</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court (1998)</td>
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<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force</td>
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<td>IGO</td>
<td>Intergovernmental organization</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>JNA</td>
<td>Yugoslav People's Army</td>
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<td>KC</td>
<td>Crisis staff/headquarters (in Republika Srpska)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>OHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Representative</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<td>RS</td>
<td>Republika Srpska</td>
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<tr>
<td>SANU</td>
<td>Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDS BiH</td>
<td>Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFRY</td>
<td>Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; Tito’s Yugoslavia; Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPS</td>
<td>Socialist Party of Serbia</td>
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<tr>
<td>SR BiH</td>
<td>Socialist Republic of BiH (within SFRY)</td>
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<td>SVK</td>
<td>Serbian Army of Krajina</td>
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<td>TO</td>
<td>Territorial Defense</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNGC</td>
<td>The UN Genocide Convention</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>VJ</td>
<td>Yugoslav Army (Serbia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>VRS</td>
<td>Army of the Serb Republic; Bosnian Serb Army</td>
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