Event Title

Considering Democracy "An 'Unrealistic' Alternative": The Results of The 1954 American Intervention In Guatemala

Presenter Information

Mark Viskocil, Minnesota State University, Mankato

Location

CSU 253/254

Start Date

22-4-2008 8:30 AM

End Date

22-4-2008 10:30 AM

Student's Major

Psychology

Student's College

Social and Behavioral Sciences

Mentor's Name

Matthew Loayza

Mentor's Department

History

Mentor's College

Social and Behavioral Sciences

Description

Guatemalan political elites have traditionally resorted to violence and repression in order to suppress social reform movements. In 1944, a group of middle-class reformers, including army captain Jacobo Arbenz, spearheaded a revolution that replaced dictator Jorge Ubico and began instituting genuine democratic reforms. The new civilian president, Juan Arevalo, sponsored new economic and political reforms intended to benefit the rural poor that constituted two-thirds of the Guatemalan population. Six years later, the revolution continued with the election of Arbenz, who promised to continue the efforts of his predecessor. However, U.S. officials, viewing developments in Guatemala through a Cold War prism, came to see Arbenz as a communist subjugating Guatemala and turning it into a Soviet proxy state. In 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his advisors responded by approving and implementing a Central Intelligence Agency plan to overthrow Arbenz and replace him with a counter-revolutionary leader, Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas. This paper examines the results of the 1954 American intervention, why it ultimately failed and why historians have come to view it as a mistake. It is based on relevant secondary literature and original U.S. government sources, including Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency telegrams, correspondence and National Intelligence Estimates.