In this essay, I argue that the pragma-dialectical approach to the analysis of argumentative discourse is limited, or could better serve critics, if it provided a more defined method for the evaluation of arguments based upon goals, purposes, and consequences. Specifically, I argue current conceptions and applications of pragma-dialectical methodology potentially run the risk of amorality in that arguments are deemed ‗good‘ as long as they meet the goals of the speaker, regardless of what those goals or purposes might be. In the following segments of this essay, I will more clearly and specifically identify and investigate the aforementioned ethical deficiencies of the pragma-dialectical method, and out-line a corrective based on the theories of American pragmatists such as John Dewey, William James, and Richard Rorty, that I believe functions to elevate the pragma in this particular approach.

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Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 License



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